Central African Republic (2026-07-07)

As of May 2026, four non-international armed conflicts were ongoing in the Central African Republic (CAR).

CAR (supported by the Wagner Group/Africa Corps) v Return, Reclamation, and Rehabilitation (3R)
CAR (supported by the Wagner Group/Africa Corps) v Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC – Coalition des patriotes pour le changement)
CAR (supported by the Wagner Group/Africa Corps) v CPC-Fondamentale (CPC-F)
CAR (supported by the Wagner Group/Africa Corps) v Azande Ani Kpi Gbe (AAKG) (supported by Wagner Ti Azande (WTA))

In contrast, two armed conflicts ongoing in 2025 and early 2026 had ended.

CAR (supported by the Wagner Group/Africa Corps) v Unity for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) (conflict ended June 2025)
UPC v AAKG (ended August 2024)

CAR is a State Party to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and customary international humanitarian law (IHL) applies to all the NIACs in CAR.

CAR is also a State Party to Additional Protocol II of 1977, but none of the NIACs to which it is a party meet the requirements of its Article 1(1), which requires a non-State armed group to have territorial control enabling them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations. The NIAC between the AAKG and the UPC cannot be regulated by the Protocol as it requires one of the parties to be the territorial State. The Protocol applies to armed conflicts ‘which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups’.¹

Since gaining independence from French colonial rule in 1960, CAR has experienced prolonged periods of violence and instability, including five coups d’état – in 1966, 1979, 1981, 2003, and 2013, along with an attempted coup in late 2022.² The most recent successful unconstitutional change of power, which took place in 2013, has been the basis for the ongoing hostilities.³ In March 2013, Séléka forces – a coalition of armed, predominantly Muslim groups – led an insurgency that culminated in the seizure of the capital, Bangui, and the ousting of the government of François Bozizé.⁴ Subsequently, the Séléka leader, Michel Djotodia, proclaimed himself president.⁵

In response to the brutality exercised by Séléka forces, ‘Anti-Balaka’ (‘invincible’ in Sango) coalitions of Christian fighters were established to initiate violent attacks on Séléka forces and Muslim civilians, reigniting violence with a strong religious aspect, killing many thousands and displacing hundreds of thousands of people.⁶ Following a joint initiative by France and Chad, President Djotodia was removed from office on 10 January 2014.⁷ The National Transitional Council elected the mayor of Bangui, Catherine Samba-Panza, as interim president on 20 January 2014 and established a transitional government of members of the Séléka and the Anti-Balaka groups as well as members of the deposed Bozizé government.⁸

The transitional government failed to achieve a peaceful resolution to the crisis.⁹ Séléka groups were known to roam the country and engage in marauding activities.¹⁰ The clashes rapidly escalated into conflict, leading to a witch hunt which targeted Muslims.¹¹ The Muslim population were suspected of supporting the Séléka and, as a result, they were brutally persecuted, with many murdered or expelled.¹²

Reflecting the depth of the crisis, in April 2014, the United Nations Security Council authorized the deployment of a peacekeeping force, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), comprising African Union (AU) and French forces that had been deployed in CAR previously.¹³ MINUSCA was created to protect civilians and disarm militia groups.¹⁴ As of June 2025, MINUSCA remained in CAR with troops from Rwanda, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, Zambia, Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Burundi, and Cameroon. More than 18,000 peacekeepers are currently engaged in operations in CAR.¹⁵ Since the start of the mission, numerous attacks have been perpetrated against UN peacekeepers and humanitarian workers from other humanitarian agencies, resulting in the death of 208 MINUSCA peacekeepers by February 2025.¹⁶

After elections in 2016, Faustin Archange Touadéra assumed office on 30 March, thereby bringing to a conclusion the transition period and leading to the departure of the French forces initially deployed alongside MINUSCA.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the installation of the new president did not signify a new beginning, as he previously had served as prime minister under Bozizé from 2008 to 2013.¹⁸

Despite the initial optimism that followed Touadéra’s election, the crisis continued to intensify throughout 2016 and 2017.¹⁹ A peace agreement that was signed in June 2017 between the government and thirteen of the fourteen primary armed factions had minimal impact.²⁰ Evidence is that ex-Séléka and anti-Balaka militias, along with hundreds of additional local groups, were able to engage in open operations and exercise control over a significant portion of CAR territory.²¹

Between 2018 and 2020 sporadic armed confrontations took place between the government and the increasingly fragmented armed groups.²² In February 2019, a renewed peace agreement (Bangui Peace Agreement) was signed by the government and fourteen armed groups.²³ However, the majority of its provisions have not been implemented.²⁴ Additionally, reports by human rights organizations and UN agencies indicate that violence perpetrated by both ex-Séléka forces and anti-Balaka groups may constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity.²⁵

In opposition to the December 2020 elections, six armed groups, including former Séléka and Anti-Balaka militia, united to establish the CPC, a unified coalition committed to challenging the government.²⁶ Touadéra declared himself the winner of the election, having received 53 per cent of the vote.²⁷ The opposition contested the result, and on 13 January 2021 the CPC launched an offensive on the capital but were defeated by government forces with the support of MINUSCA.²⁸

Since late 2020, there has been a discernible shift in the balance of power in the government’s favour, with the support of Rwandan soldiers and the Wagner Group, proving instrumental in this transition.²⁹ Through its use of considerable violence, the Wagner Group has facilitated the government’s re-acquisition of a significant portion of the west of the country, but it has also been accused of committing human rights and IHL violations.³⁰ In recent years, CAR has been the subject of fierce competition for influence in the region between Russia and Western nations, particularly France and the United States.³¹ Moscow exerts significant influence over national institutions and controls the extraction of natural resources, including at the Ndassima gold mine, while also exercising oversight over smuggling and trade networks.³²

In 2023, changes occurred in CAR; a new wave of attacks with improved weaponry was launched by CPC against the government, two armed groups, and three other militant factions were dissolved, and a referendum on removing presidential term limits was held.³³ Elections were scheduled to take place in December 2025.³⁴ Despite being weakened and experiencing with internal divisions, non-State armed groups use guerrilla tactics, often ambushing government forces, and precipitate violence in rural areas.³⁵ As in the past, the conflict fluctuates between low-level fighting and high-level escalation.³⁶

The humanitarian crisis in CAR is also persisting, with around seventy per cent of the population living in extreme poverty and 3.4 million individuals requiring assistance.³⁷ The armed conflict in neighbouring Sudan has also had a significant impact on the situation in CAR, with reports of air strikes and recruitment of fighters by Sudanese forces affecting the ongoing violence and provoking further instability (see below).³⁸ Additionally, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) reported 469,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) within CAR at the end of 2024.³⁹ According to MINUSCA, the number of IDPs had dropped to around 428,000 by January 2026.⁴⁰ The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has documented an almost steady number of 700,000 refugees outside CAR for years now.⁴¹ At the same time, as of January 2026, the CAR hosted approximately 62,000 refugees and asylum-seekers, of which 39,000 were Sudanese refugees.⁴² Humanitarian access continues to be limited due to the presence of armed groups, the lack of infrastructure such as roads, bridges and ferries, and the presence of unexploded ordnance in some western prefectures.⁴³

Transition from Wagner Group to Africa Corps

In January 2025, Russian representatives proposed an increase in troop numbers and the establishment of a Russian military base in the CAR. In return, they requested Touadéra’s agreement to replace the Wagner Group with Africa Corps and transfer the group’s economic resources to them. They also requested that the CAR pay up to $15 million per month – more than half its annual budget – for Africa Corps’ services.⁴⁴ In late 2025, reports emerged that the CAR’s government was increasingly supporting Russia’s endeavour to fully replace Wagner Group with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), potentially financing this transition in a bid to establish itself as a pivotal partner of the CAR (see below).⁴⁵ In early 2026, news sources alleged that President Touadéra had accepted Russia’s conditions concerning the replacement of Wagner Group with Africa Corps under pressure from the Kremlin. Touadéra reportedly agreed to implement the transition by late 2026.⁴⁶ It remains to be seen whether this transition will lead to Wagner’s full withdrawal or if the two forces will co-exist in the future.⁴⁷

The struggle for influence between Western countries and Russia as well as the diversification of economic and security partnerships

In 2025, there was a marked intensification of the rivalry between the foreign security allies.⁴⁸ The government’s plans to establish a 35,000-strong army by 2030 have been a contributing factor to the ongoing competition between Rwanda and Russia in the domain of military training.⁴⁹ In an endeavour to consolidate Moscow’s standing as the primary security partner of CAR, Russia delivered 400 bulletproof vests to FACA on 1 March 2025.⁵⁰ At the same time, the French Embassy in Bangui conducted a selection examination on 6 March 2025 for twenty army officers who were seeking scholarships in France.⁵¹ Paris’ renewed engagement has prompted a fresh surge in anti-French rhetoric emanating from Russia.⁵² In August 2025, the UAE scaled up its investments in the CAR, for example by funding the installation of a solar farm near Bangui with $90 million. Security analysts suggest that the UAE may be counting on Touadéra’s financial reliance on them to allow them to use CAR territory as a supply corridor for the UAE-backed RSF in Sudan.⁵³ In September 2025, Touadéra said in an interview with The Financial Times that he would appreciate the collaboration of any country in development efforts and the mineral sector.⁵⁴ Later that month, Touadéra met with Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajan on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).⁵⁵ On 25 November 2025, Touadéra formally requested Rwanda’s continued support in guaranteeing security during December 2025 elections.⁵⁶ Two days later, on 27 November 2025, the CAR’s Minister for Mining, Rufin Benam Beltoungou, signed an agreement with the Canadian company CVMR granting the company rights to explore and exploit strategic minerals such as uranium, coltan, copper, gold, and nickel.⁵⁷

In a further effort to diversity the CAR’s security partnerships, FACA’s Chief of Staff Major General Zépherin Mamadou travelled to Uganda between 3 and 8 February 2026 to explore the potential for military cooperation between both countries, especially in the fields of military training and operational capacity-building.⁵⁸ In a parallel development, on 3 February 2026, a group of US Africa Command (AFRICOM) officials held meetings with CAR authorities in Bangui to further security coordination between the United States and CAR.⁵⁹ In his first official visit since being re-elected (see above), President Touadéra travelled to Russia on 4 March 2026 to discuss the expansion of trade relations and bolstering collaboration in the energy sector with President Vladimir Putin.⁶⁰ In a parallel development, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot travelled to Bangui on 13 March 2026, seeking a ‘full restoration of relations’. This was the first visit of a French foreign minister in the CAR since 2018. During his visit, Barrot reached an agreement with the CAR Foreign Minister, Sylvie Notéfé, regarding the re-establishment of the French public agency Expertise France in the country.⁶¹ Tensions heightened a few days before Barrot’s arrival, when Wagner Group members detained a French and a Central African staff member of Médecins Sans Frontières, sparking a wave of anti-French narratives. The humanitarian workers were released by CAR authorities on 11 March 2026.⁶² In a further sign of diversification of security partnerships, on 4 April 2026, the CAR launched a joint security operation with Chad to counter violence along their shared border.⁶³ Between 26 and 29 May 2026, Touadéra attended the first International Security Forum initiated by President Putin and held in Moscow.⁶⁴

Mixed transitional justice record and ICC proceedings

A UN-backed Special Criminal Court (SCC) with hybrid jurisdiction was formed in 2015 under legislation enacted by the National Assembly of the CAR.⁶⁵ The court’s mandate is to prosecute the most severe crimes committed on CAR territory since 2003, with a particular focus on war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of human rights.⁶⁶

In its third-ever judgment, on 19 June 2025, the SCC convicted six former members of the FPRC in the ‘Ndélé II’ case for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Ndélé in March 2020. However, four of the six former FPRC members were convicted in absentia because they had not yet been arrested.⁶⁷ A month later, on 28 July 2025, the SCC handed down its fourth verdict. Six members of the Goula faction of the FPRC were convicted in absentia for multiple crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Ndélé in March and April 2020 in the so-called ‘Ndélé I’ case.⁶⁸ On 17 October 2025, Amnesty International voiced concern over the fact that the SCC faced a serious funding shortfall that could jeopardize its operations.⁶⁹ Nonetheless, on 30 October 2025 and with the support of MINUSCA, the SCC initiated the ‘Guen’ trial against six members of an Anti-Balaka group who are alleged to have committed crimes against humanity and war crimes in February and March 2014 in Guen, Gadzi and Djomo in Mambéré-Kadéï prefecture.

In late 2025, the European Union (EU), MINUSCA and UNDP agreed to partially cover the Court’s financial deficits. The SCC is thus still operational, albeit with a restricted operational capacity.⁷⁰ On 16 June 2026, the SCC announced the opening of its sixth trial dubbed ‘Bossembélé’.⁷¹

On the global stage, Alfred Yekatom, the former commander of the Anti-Balaka movement, and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, the former senior leader and National General Coordinator of the Anti-Balaka movement were sentenced by the ICC’s Trial Chamber V on 24 July 2025. They were convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder, torture, forced displacement, and attacks against civilians in Bangui and the western part of the CAR between late 2013 and early 2014.⁷² On 12 September 2025, the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber II declared the Beïna case (see above) inadmissible before the Court, on the grounds that the ‘CAR is willing and able to genuinely investigate and prosecute the case’. The SCC was seized of the case and initiated proceedings in October 2025. The ICC later confirmed its decision on 11 March 2026.⁷³

Renewals of MINUSCA’s mandate

MINUSCA has been deployed in CAR since 2014 with an approximate strength of 18,500 personnel.⁷⁴ The top five troop contributing nations are Rwanda, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, and Zambia.⁷⁵

On 14 November 2025, the Security Council renewed MINUSCA’s mandate for another year through Resolution 2800 (2025). This decision was the Council, with only the United States abstaining from the vote. While MINUSCA’s key tasks remain unchanged under the new mandate, the number of peacekeepers within the mission was reduced by two percent to 14,046 military personnel. President Touadéra thanked MINUSCA for its partnership and emphasized the roadmap for a gradual transfer of responsibility from MINUSCA to the Government.⁷⁶ Rumours of a permanent withdrawal of the mission started to spread in early 2026, when MINUSCA closed twenty-one of its bases across the country. During a press conference in late March 2026, however, the mission’s spokesperson formally denied any intention of leaving, instead referring to a reorganization of its deployment due to significant financial constraints. The closed bases were handed over to CAR authorities and FACA, but nevertheless resulted in security vacuums.⁷⁷

Developments related to December 2025 presidential elections

On 26 July 2025, President Touadéra was confirmed as the presidential candidate for the ruling United Hearts Movement (MCU).⁷⁸ Despite the doubts expressed by MINUSCA about the CAR’s operational capacity to organize presidential and legislative elections, the country’s government reaffirmed its plans to hold presidential elections in December 2025 and announced that municipal elections would be postponed from August 2025 to December 2025.⁷⁹ In August 2025, CAR authorities announced that presidential and legislative elections would take place on 28 December 2025.⁸⁰

The long-anticipated political dialogue between MCU and opposition parties was held in Bangui in early September 2025 but failed to resolve existing tensions.⁸¹ Between 2 and 11 October 2025, a total of ten candidates filed applications with the National Elections Authority for the 28 December presidential election.⁸² Following several efforts to undermine opposition candidates by CAR authorities,⁸³ seven candidates were officially confirmed by the Constitutional Court on 14 November 2025.⁸⁴

On 28 December 2025, presidential, legislative, regional and municipal elections took place largely peacefully. However, AAKG members blocked the holding of elections in Bambouti and other locations across the Haut-Mbomou prefecture and kidnapped an electoral body official.⁸⁵ These were the CAR’s first regional and municipal elections since 1988.⁸⁶ On 5 January 2026, Touadéra was announced as the winner of the election with 76.15 per cent of the votes. Opposition forces alleged electoral fraud.⁸⁷

On 26 April 2026, the second round of legislative and regional elections was held to fill the fifty-four remaining positions in parliament.⁸⁸ The ninety members of parliament who were elected in the first round of legislative elections in late December 2025 were sworn in during the first extraordinary session of the National Assembly in Bangui on 4 May 2026. Matthieu Simplice Sarandji, a close confidant of Touadéra, was elected speaker of the parliament on 7 May 2026, while Félix Moloua was re-appointed as Prime Minister on 15 May 2026. The new government was unveiled on 21 May 2026.⁸⁹ Even after the formation of the new government, authorities have persisted in putting pressure on political rivals.⁹⁰

Government truce with armed groups 3R and UPC and return of the Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique/Central African Patriotic Movement (MPC) to 2019 peace agreement

In an effort to improve the security situation in rural areas ahead of the presidential elections scheduled for December 2025, the government signed an agreement with two predominantly Fulani armed groups on 19 April 2025, namely the UPC and 3R.⁹¹ As part of the deal, the groups agreed to commit to reintegration into the peace process and immediately to cease hostilities.⁹² This agreement came about despite the fact that 3R is part of the CPC alliance, and the UPC belongs to the CPC-F alliance, neither of which is open to peace talks with the government.⁹³ As of June 2025, tensions remained high between the signatories since the agreement.⁹⁴

At the 10 July 2025 ceremony in Bangui to formally mark the truce agreed upon in April 2025, Ali Darassa (leader of the UPC) and Sembé Bobbo (commander of the 3R) declared their decision to cease hostilities and dissolve their respective factions. They further handed over their weapons.⁹⁵ While this marked a significant symbolic accomplishment, armed clashes and insecurity continued over the ensuing months as large numbers of UPC and 3R fighters rejected calls to disarm. Contrary to the government’s plans to facilitate the reintegration of demobilized fighters into civilian life, most of them demanded integration into FACA instead. By 6 August 2025, only 375 fighters had formally disarmed.⁹⁶ By 1 October 2025, a total of 647 ex-fighters were disarmed and demobilized in the areas of Bambari, Grimari, Maloum, Koui, Sanguéré-Lim, Bouar, and Yaloké.⁹⁷ On 29 October 2025, MINUSCA announced the demobilization of a further eighty-eight 3R fighters in Noufou town, Mambéré-Kadeï prefecture.⁹⁸ Reports emerged in November 2025 of ongoing insurgent activity carried out by UPC, notably in Ouaka prefecture.⁹⁹

At the same time, Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique/Central African Patriotic Movement (MPC) leader Mahamat Al-Khatim declared his willingness to renew his commitment to the 2019 Bangui Political Peace Agreement (APPR-RCA). On 19 November 2025, Al-Khatim entered into an agreement in N’Djamena to end MPC operations in the Kémo, Nana-Gribizi, and Ouham-Fafa prefectures, respect territorial integrity, and set up security procedures for demobilization and disarmament.¹⁰⁰ A few weeks earlier, on 7 October 2025, two other armed groups had officially announced their dissolution, namely the Anti-Balaka Ngaïssona faction and the Mouvement révolution et justice (RJ) led by Armel Sayo.¹⁰¹

Sudan civil war spill-over

On 13 June 2025, UN Secretary-General António Guterres reported the presence of Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the Am Dafok and Aouk areas of the Vakaga Prefecture.¹⁰² A few days later, on 20 June 2025, armed individuals attacked a UN peacekeeping patrol in Am-Sissia village in CAR, near the country’s border with Sudan, killing a Zambian peacekeeper.¹⁰³ Blaming this attack on ‘suspected Sudanese armed elements’, the UN warned that the conflict in Sudan was spilling across the border into CAR and further destabilising the region.¹⁰⁴

In the months predating this incident and during 2024, MINUSCA repeatedly reported incursions of RSF fighters into Vakaga prefecture, specifically around the areas of Am Dafok and Aouk.¹⁰⁵ Additionally, the RSF reportedly has ties with several Central African armed groups, such as the UPC, the MPC and the FPRC.¹⁰⁶ It typically recruits fighters and mercenaries from the ranks of these Central African groups in exchange for support, especially in the form of arms and ammunition.¹⁰⁷

In mid-2025, several incidents involving alleged members of Arab militias from Sudan were reported in Vakaga prefecture. On 2 July 2025, local youths pursued assailants who, earlier that day, had robbed a member of parliament in Birao town. The exact number of casualties on both sides remained unconfirmed. Additionally, between 8 and 10 July 2025, several villages on the outskirts of Birao came under attack. In these incidents, suspected members of an Arab militia burned down houses, fired shots, and caused significant property damage in the communities. Numerous villagers left their homes and escaped to Birao town.¹⁰⁸ Subsequently, efforts were made to de-escalate tensions, when a community dialogue mediated by MINUSCA was held in Am Dafok between 27 and 30 October 2025. A local peace agreement between Central African and Sudanese border communities was drawn up in which parties agreed to restrict the movement of weapons, hand over criminals to the competent judicial authorities and improve collaboration on transhumance.¹⁰⁹ However, a few months later, in April 2026, violence flared up again when members of the Wagner Group executed thirteen suspected Sudanese Fulani militiamen close to Am Dafok village. The alleged militiamen, in turn, assassinated four civilians who were allegedly working with the Wagner Group on 11 April 2026. The Sudanese RSF militia later reportedly arrested the suspected perpetrators of the killings of civilians in Am Dafok.¹¹⁰

Non-international armed conflict between Central African Republic (supported by the Wagner Group/Africa Corps) and Return, Reclamation, and Rehabilitation (3R)

Background

The pre-existing NIAC between FACA, supported by the Wagner Group and MINUSCA, against 3R continued as of May 2026. While the Wagner Group has fought alongside FACA and has been attacked by 3R,¹ MINUSCA has provided security assistance, including by deploying temporary operating bases to the areas in which FACA was fighting 3R, but does not possess a combat role.²

3R was established in 2015³ with the initial purpose of protecting herds which were constantly plundered by Anti-Balaka groups.⁴ The full name ‘Return, Reclamation and Rehabilitation’ captures this Fulani non-state actor’s overarching purpose, which is to return to CAR after being displaced throughout the region by Anti-Balaka militias.⁵

3R has been a part of the CPC since the coalition’s creation in December 2020.⁶ The armed groups that formed the coalition did so as a consequence of their joint denial of the Bangui Political Peace Agreement (APPR-RCA) signed between the CAR government and several armed groups in 2019.⁷ They further aimed to oust President Touadéra and drive out the Russian paramilitaries operating in CAR.⁸

However, the NIAC between CAR and 3R predates the formation of the CPC.⁹ 3R also launched several attacks¹⁰ outside the coalition it belongs to. The CPC also perpetrated separate attacks against FACA.¹¹

On 19 April 2025, the CAR government and 3R signed the ‘N’Djamena Agreement’, which obligates 3R fighters to cease fighting and rejoin the peace process.¹² Following its signature, the 3R leadership ordered the group’s fighters to lay down arms and adhere to the implementation of the agreement.¹³ A meeting between the CAR government and 3R was held on 19 June 2025 to ensure implementation of the agreement at local level.¹⁴ A ceremony was held in Bangui on 10 July 2025 to formally mark the truce agreed to in April 2025, during which the leader of the 3R symbolically handed over his weapons (see above).¹⁵ Despite this commitment to peace, tensions remained between the parties.¹⁶ Although 3R leader Sembé Bobbo formally declared the dissolution of the 3R on 10 July 2025, it is too early to conclude that every 3R structure has in reality ceased to exist.¹⁷ As a resumption of hostilities remains possible, and 3R has not ceased to exist, the N’Djamena Agreement is not in itself sufficient to declare that this pre-existing NIAC has ended.‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024. The 7 June 2025 announcement that 3R will fight alongside FACA serves as evidence that 3R continues to exist.¹⁸

Intensity

Indeed, 3R is considered one of the most active non-State armed groups in CAR,¹⁹ launching frequent attacks between January 2025 and May 2026.²⁰ Specific attacks between FACA (and support forces) and 3R, which resulted in casualties (often civilian victims) and destruction of infrastructure, included clashes during January,²¹ March,²² May,²³ and August 2025,²⁴ as well as February,²⁵ March,²⁶ and May 2026.²⁷

3R has increasingly been targeted by FACA and its support forces since 2021. As a result, it gave up several of its key logistical bases, including Koui, Borodoul, Kowone, and Nzakoundou in Ouham-Pendé prefecture, and Idéré in Nana-Mambéré prefecture. This has, however, led to 3R now controlling a network of smaller bases in remote areas of the same regions. One of these camps, over which 3R maintains control, is Ngoukala in Ouham-Pendé prefecture.²⁸

Despite 3R being able to acquire higher-calibre weaponry, such as 14.5mm and 12.7mm machine guns through their support networks, the shifting nature of its operations has led them to rely mostly on weapons that can easily be transported or carried in hand while walking through thick bush.²⁹ Weapons include Kalashnikov assault rifles and some handguns that are produced in CAR.³⁰ Apart from using rifles and grenade launchers,³¹ 3R frequently relies on remotely detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and landmines as their choice of weaponry.³²

Approximately one third of CAR’s population has been displaced as a result of the conflict and humanitarian crisis facing the State. By the end of 2025, the IDMC and UNHCR reported that 469,000 individuals were internally displaced.³³ Although not all displacement is a direct result of fighting between FACA and 3R, and attribution of cause is complicated in a battle space where multiple conflicts are ongoing, 3R’s tactics of burning down entire villages after an attack contributes significantly to the high number of IDPs.³⁴

In sum, the violence generated in the hostilities between FACA and 3R continued to meet the criterion of intensity demanded by IHL as of May 2026. Despite the ‘N’Djamena Agreement’ between CAR and 3R concluded on 19 April 2025, and 3R agreeing to fighting alongside FACA (see above), tensions remained high between the parties.³⁵

Organization

Information concerning the internal command structure of 3R is scarce, although it is known that it has both political and military divisions.³⁶ The UN Panel of Experts on CAR have also confirmed that 3R has a tiered (hierarchical) command structure which enables it to mobilize fighters. Cells differ in size and levels of organization, but each have their own commanders.³⁷ The hierarchical command structure³⁸ gives 3R the capacity to impose discipline and apply IHL.

Known leadership includes the overall commander of 3R, Ramadhane Abdelkader (also known as Sembé Bobbo) who also acts as the deputy to François Bozizé in the CPC alliance.³⁹ The Chief of Staff, based in north-western CAR, is Doborodjé Goska. Goska leads 3R operations while serving as the military Chief of Staff of the CPC coalition as a whole.⁴⁰ Other high-ranking officials in the 3R military wing include the military advisor, Abakar, and the Chief of Operations, Ardo Abba, as well as General Sangalisé and Colonel Koya.⁴¹ Colonel Hammadou Rawandou, who serves as the political coordinator of 3R, issues press statements on behalf of 3R.⁴²

3R is capable of launching both large-scale⁴³ and guerrilla-style attacks.⁴⁴ Guerrilla attacks include, for example, ambushing FACA soldiers on patrol or early in the morning.⁴⁵ The group’s military tactics include using intelligence gained from familiarity with the combat space and a network of local informants to launch surprise attacks against FACA.⁴⁶ Resources are replenished through illicit activities such as illegal mining and looting and ambushing FACA and foreign mineworkers.⁴⁷ Logistics, such as food and fuel supplies, are supported by small paths between Cameroon and Chad.⁴⁸ 3R also imposed a cattle and protection taxation system to fund weapons purchases.⁴⁹ The activities of the Wagner Group have, however, hindered weapon supply networks and routes. Nevertheless, as a means of mitigating logistical disruptions, 3R maintained stockpiles in underground weapon caches located at secret sites.⁵⁰

Despite the demobilization of several hundred 3R fighters by the end of May 2026,⁵¹ it is not yet certaint whether the various groups claiming to have demobilized have indeed ceased all military operations or ceased to exist.

It is, therefore, too early to declassify and until more information is obtained to prove otherwise it is presumed that 3R continues to satisfy the notion of organization as demanded by IHL.

The pre-existing NIAC between CAR and 3R continued as of May 2026.

1
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Markounda, une opération des Wagner sur des sites miniers locaux tourne au fiasco, plusieurs morts’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 15 August 2024; ‘Nouvelles frappes meurtrières de Wagner à la frontière tchado-centrafricaine’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 11 September 2024, ↩︎
2
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/383, 13 June 2025, including para 26; ‘Mandate’, MINUSCA. ↩︎
3
‘Return, Reclamation, Rehabilitation (3R) – Central African Republic (CAR)’, Tracking Terrorism; ‘Dozens of civilians killed in CAR violence: HRW’, Al Jazeera, 2 May 2017 ↩︎
4
‘La CPC condamne le massacre de Bozoum et appelle à l’unité’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 17 June 2025; M. E. Kindzeka, ‘CAR pleads with fleeing civilians to return after rebels attack villages’, Voice of America, 5 July 2024. ↩︎
5
‘3R rebel group in the Central African Republic loses territory and control over the illicit cattle economy, damaging legitimacy and offering entry points for state intervention’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, November 2023. ↩︎
6
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025. ↩︎
7
‘La CPC condamne le massacre de Bozoum et appelle à l’unité’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 17 June 2025. ↩︎
8
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025. ↩︎
9
A. Essa and News Agencies, ‘Newly formed 3R rebel group inflicts horrors in CAR: UN’, Al Jazeera, 23 December 2016. ↩︎
10
‘CrisisWatch, Tracking Conflict Worldwide: Global Overview June 2023’, International Crisis Group; ‘Nana-Mambéré: un Violent affrontement entre les hommes de Wagner et les rebelles de 3R à Nguia-Bouar, plusieurs morts’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 11 September 2023; ‘Centrafrique: nouvelle attaque des positions des soldats FACA à Besson, débandade générale’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 24 September 2023; ‘Centrafrique: une base des Faca visée par une attaque rebelle non-loin de Bocaranga’, Radio Ndekeluka, 12 October 2023; ‘Attaque meurtrière à Ndim et Létélé: Deux civils tués et un soldat FACA blessé’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 30 November 2023; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Centrafrique: une dizaine de civils enlevés par des hommes armés non loin de Yaloké’, Radio Ndekeluka, 6 March 2024; ‘Flash info: Embuscade à Bocaranga: Bilan tragique pour les mercenaires russes et les FACA’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 14 April 2024; ‘Centrafrique: la psychose règne encore à Gazi-Béa malgré la présence de l’armée’, Radio Ndekeluka, 7 May 2024 ↩︎
11
‘Violente attaque de la base de Wagner par les CPC à Baoro: un bilan catastrophique dévoilé’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 5 June 2023; ‘CrisisWatch, Tracking Conflict Worldwide: Global Overview June 2023’, International Crisis Group; ‘Dramatique confrontation près de Bossangoa: Les mercenaires de Wagner en difficulté’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 23 June 2023; ‘Centrafrique: Les rebelles de la CPC attaquent la base des mercenaires de Wagner à Awaka’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 11 June 2023; ‘Centrafrique: plus de 40 morts dans un affrontement entre deux groupes armés dans le sud-est du pays’, Xinhua, 22 June 2023; ‘Centrafrique: 3 rebelles de la CPC tués dans une attaque repoussée par les FACA à Nana Bakassa’, Radio Ndekeluka, 25 July 2023; ‘Centrafrique: Attaque meurtrière à Thiri, une dizaine des personnes tuées’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 1 August 2023; ‘Attaque de la CPC dans le Bamingui-Bangoran: Une journée tragique pour l’armée nationale’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 21 October 2023; ‘Bamingui-Bangoran: le poste avancé de l’armée nationale à Tiri attaqué par la CPC’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 10 January 2024; ‘Centrafrique: attaque d’hommes armés signalée au village Boungou non loin de Bria’, Radio Ndekeluka, 15 January 2024; ‘Centrafrique: la localité de Sikikédé attaquée par des hommes armés’, Radio Ndekeluka, 7 March 2024; ‘Attaque surprise des rebelles à Djayri: 2 soldats FACA tués et des armes récupérées’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 12 February 2024; ‘Centrafrique: près d’une vingtaine de civils tués par des hommes armés non loin du village Kella-Maoulé dans l’Ouham-Pendé’, Radio Ndekeluka, 3 April 2024; ‘14 killed, several wounded in latest raid on CAR villages: UN’, Big News Network, 18 April 2024; ‘Centrafrique: 2 militaires et un civil tués dans une attaque de la CPC repoussée par les Faca à Kadjama’, Radio Ndekeluka, 16 April 2024; JF. Koena, ‘Rebels kill at least 4 people during an attack on a Central African Republic mining town’, AP News, 12 May 2024; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Centrafrique: au moins 5 morts, don’t 4 burkinabés, dans une attaque sur un chantier minier’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 22 June 2024. ↩︎
12
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; J. G. Birru and L. Serwat, ‘Africa Overview: May 2025’, ACLED, 9 May 2025; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/383, 13 June 2025. ↩︎
13
‘Centrafrique: mise en œuvre de l’accord entre le gouvernement, l’UPC et les 3R’, RFI, 26 April 2025. ↩︎
14
‘Centrafrique: rebelles de l’UPC et paramilitaires de Wagner se sont rencontrés à Maloum’, RFI, 20 June 2025; F. Mazet, ‘Centrafrique: accord avec les 3R et l’UPC, deux mois après des «progrès» mais pas de désarmement’, RFI, 18 June 2025. ↩︎
15
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/638, 10 October 2025, paras 6-7; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, July 2025; ‘Centrafrique : deux chefs rebelles annoncent la dissolution de leurs mouvements armés pour rejoindre le processus de paix’, Xinhua, 11 July 2025; ‘Centrafrique : les deux principaux groupes armés déposent les armes’, Agence d’Information d’Afrique Centrale, 12 July 2025; ‘Rencontre de Paix à Bangui et Dissolution des Groupes Armés’, Africa Press, 11 July 2025. ↩︎
16
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; J. Njikam, ‘CENTRAFRIQUE : Le Chef de l’Etat fait le point sur le désarmement de rebelles signataires en avril d’un accord’, Frontières d’Afrique, 11 August 2025. ↩︎
17
‘Chairperson of the African Union Commission Welcomes the 19 April Peace Agreement in the Central African Republic and the Dissolution of the UPC and 3R Armed Groups’, African Union, 18 July 2025. ↩︎
18
‘La CPC condamne le massacre de Bozoum et appelle à l’unité’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 17 June 2025. ↩︎
19
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025 ↩︎
20
M. E. Kindzeka, ‘CAR pleads with fleeing civilians to return after rebels attack villages’, Voice of America, 5 July 2024. ↩︎
21
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Human Rights Division: Monthly Report: Human Rights Situation (January 2025)’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic ↩︎
22
‘Incendie et assassinat : nouveau drame au village Boforo près de Bozoum au nord de Centrafrique’, Radio Ndekeluka, 6 March 2025; ‘Centrafrique : deux personnes tuées et des maisons incendiées par des hommes armés dans le nord-ouest du pays’, Xinhua, 7 March 2025; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/383, 13 June 2025, para 25 ↩︎
23
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group ↩︎
24
‘deux soldats FACA neutralisés par la CPC sur l’axe Bouar – Abba Mogani’, Africa Press, 6 August 2025; ‘Update on the Situation in Central African Republic’, Amani Africa, 18 September 2025; ‘Au moins 2 civils blessés dans des tirs attribués aux éléments de 3R’, Radio Ndeke Luka, 22 August 2025; ‘Centrafrique : à Ndim, des dissidents armés des 3R agressent des autorités locales 15 août 2025’, N’Djamena Info, 17 August 2025 ↩︎
25
‘Centrafrique : l’armée affirme avoir repris le contrôle d’une zone frontalière en Haute-Kotto’, Radio Ndeke Luka, 6 February 2026; Réseau des journalistes pour les Droits de l’homme, Facebook, 4 February 2026; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, February 2026 ↩︎
26
‘Joint Security Operation Between Chad and the Central African Republic Leads to Seizure of Border Weapons Cache’, Brown Land News, 13 April 2026 ↩︎
27
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, May 2026. ↩︎
28
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 62. ↩︎
29
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 81. ↩︎
30
‘Joint Security Operation Between Chad and the Central African Republic Leads to Seizure of Border Weapons Cache’, Brown Land News, 13 April 2026. ↩︎
31
M. Kabatanya, ‘Central African Republic: ‘3R’ combatants in the northwest lay down their arms’, United Nations News, 17 October 2025; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 81 ↩︎
32
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 81. ↩︎
33
‘Central Africa Republic’, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 24 July 2026; ‘Central African Republic’, UNHCR. ↩︎
34
‘CAR: CCCM Cluster, IDPs Sites Map, Avril 2025’, ReliefWeb, 18 June 2025. ↩︎
35
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
36
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, Annex 7. ↩︎
37
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 61. ↩︎
38
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 61 ↩︎
39
‘La CPC condamne le massacre de Bozoum et appelle à l’unité’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 17 June 2025; ‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, Annex 7. ↩︎
40
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 60 and Annex 7. ↩︎
41
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 90 and Annex 7. ↩︎
42
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 68. ↩︎
43
‘Au moins 16 morts dans un affrontement entre des hommes armés et des soldats FACA dans le nord-ouest’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 21 December 2023; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group ↩︎
44
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025. ↩︎
45
‘Attaque meurtrière à Ndim et Létélé: Deux civils tués et un soldat FACA blessé’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 30 November 2023; ‘Flash info:Embuscade à Bocaranga: Bilan tragique pour les mercenaires russes et les FACA’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 14 April 2024. ↩︎
46
‘Une nouvelle offensive des mercenaires russes et des FACA sur le site minier de Roquette, près de Markounda’,Corbeau News Centrafrique, 2 September 2024. ↩︎
47
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025, para 27; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, paras 110–16. ↩︎
48
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 62. ↩︎
49
‘3R rebel group in the Central African Republic loses territory and control over the illicit cattle economy, damaging legitimacy and offering entry points for state intervention’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, November 2023. ↩︎
50
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 82. ↩︎
51
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/638, 10 October 2025, para 9 ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict between CAR (supported by the Wagner Group/Africa Corps) and the (CPC) Coalition of Patriots for Change

Background

In December, the CPC came together as a coalition of several of the most influential armed groups with the purpose of ousting President Touadéra and chasing the Russian paramilitaries out of CAR.¹ Another driver for the composition of the CPC was the denunciation by other groups of the Bangui Political Peace agreement signed in 2019.² At the time of its formation, the founding membership of the CPC consisted of the FPRC, 3R, the UPC, the MPC and two Anti-Balaka factions (Mokom and Ngaïssona).³ The CPC mounted sporadic attacks in different regions of the country in late December 2020.⁴ In January 2021, the CPC carried out its first coordinated attack in Bangui.⁵ In early 2023, the CPC rebels initiated a new wave of offensives.⁶

The CPC alliance has changed membership since its inception and has been impacted by internal disagreements.⁷ On 3 November 2023, the MPC announced it was leaving the CPC.⁸ A year later, on 8 November 2024, the MPC joined the newly formed CPC-F (see below).⁹

On 30 August 2024, internal tensions resulted in further fragmentation of the CPC, leading to the establishment of the CPC-F dissident faction (see below).¹⁰ After the August 2024 split, the CPC comprised three organized armed groups – 3R, the Anti-Balaka (Ndale’s faction), and the MPC-Renouveau (MPC-R).¹¹

On 19 April 2025, the N’Djamena Agreement was signed, and 3R committed to reintegrate into the peace process and to cease fighting.¹² As of end June 2025, 3R honoured this agreement and the integration process into FACA was undergoing.¹³ The decision of 3R to rejoin the political peace agreement was strongly opposed by the CPC.¹⁴

FACA is supported by the Africa Corps, and formerly Wagner Group, in their fight against the CPC.¹⁵ As shown above, 3R leader Bobbo formally declared the dissolution of the 3R on 10 July 2025.¹⁶ Therefore, the 3R cannot be regarded as an active member of the CPC as of May 2026. The CPC-F, in response to the demobilization of 3R rebels, killed at least two unarmed R3 fighters in Mboula village on 2 January 2026.¹⁷ In retaliation to these murders government aligned non-state armed groups exchanged fire with the CPC-F elements in Mboula village between 4 and 5 January 2026.¹⁸

FACA is supported by the Wagner Group, in their fight against the CPC.¹⁹

Intensity

As it is problematic to bilaterally attribute indicators of violence to any specific members of a coalition, it is possible to aggregate the violence generated between the enemies, if multiple organized armed groups who are sufficiently organized fight in a coalition against an enemy.²⁰ This section thus assesses whether the violence generated in this pre-existing NIAC between the CPC and CAR continued to equate to protracted armed violence.²¹

Frequent and intense fighting between the CPC and FACA continued as of May 2026. Clashes include those which occurred during January 2025.²² Attacks were not reported from January to June 2025, and it is unclear if the peace negotiations and April 2025 signing of the peace agreement between 3R and the Government of CAR impacted the CPC’s military readiness to fight FACA. It may have resulted in a temporary pause in violence as the CPC may have needed to regroup. The lull in fighting between the CPC and FACA since January 2025, does not, however, necessarily equate to the end of a NIAC.²³

Apart from attacks often resulting in a high number of casualties, including civilians,²⁴ the CPC frequently burns down huts, houses, and villages²⁵ forcing civilians to flee and hide in the bush.²⁶

The CPC coalition intensified its reliance on the use of IEDs on roads in CAR leading to the Chadian and Cameroonian borders since 2023.²⁷ The CPC coalition also relies on the use of conventional hand grenades and landmines against FACA.²⁸

As of end May 2026, the NIAC between FACA (supported by the Wagner Group) and the CPC continued to satisfy the intensity requirement demanded by IHL.

Organization

According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), for an alliance to become party to a NIAC, and to aggregate violence generated by such an alliance under IHL, all non-State actors that are members of the alliance must meet the organizational criteria under IHL.²⁹ Therefore, the threshold of organization of all members of the CPC alliance must individually be examined to meet the minimum requirements demanded by IHL. The below examination focuses on a key group belonging to this coalition, the Anti-Balaka (Ndale faction). There may be others, including the MPC-R who might be sufficiently organized but information on this is either scarce or not available in the public domain.

Anti-Balaka (Ndale faction)

General Marcel Ndalé, also known as Sylvain Gbokaho Minang Sylvain, leads this Anti-Balaka faction which also carries his family name: General Ndalé. He is considered a ‘historical’ anti-balaka, in other words, one of the founding fathers of the Balaka group.³⁰ Information suggests that the organizational structure of this non-State armed group is cellular as different ‘elements’ are commanded by different leaders.‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2648 (2022)’, UN Doc S/2023/360, 18 May 2023, para 31. Such leaders include Marcel Ndalé’s brothers Ibrahim and Sylvain Adamou Ndalé.³¹ The existence of this command structure infers the ability to impose discipline on fighters at cellular level.

The ability of the Anti-Balaka (Ndale faction) to implement IHL is confirmed by the successful negotiation of a ceasefire agreement without the need for international assistance as early as 3 October 2018. This ceasefire agreement facilitated the safe passage of IDPs.³² Around 2013, Anti-Balaka (Ndale faction) controlled territory around Nana-Mambéré and Ouham-Pendé.³³ Recent information suggests that this non-State actor no longer dominates sufficient territory in the CAR to trigger APII as the only reference in available information suggests a mere presence or ‘influence’ in the Bouar-Niem-Abba corridor³⁴ with ‘influence’ suggesting the involvement of the Anti-Balaka (Ndale faction) in the trafficking of minerals and other illicit activities through the Bouar-Niem-Abbas corridor.³⁵ Illicit activities in this corridor fuel the conflict effort of this non-State actor and attests to its logistical capacity.

The unity of voice requirement was confirmed on several occasions including the successful negotiation of ceasefires to which the Anti-Balaka (Ndale faction) is a party such as those signed in December 2017,³⁶ and October 2018³⁷ The lack of an official social media account or website for Anti-Balaka factions could be contributed to its decentralized command structure and that it tries to operate covertly to achieve its goals.³⁸

The Anti-Balaka (Nadele Faction) is sufficiently organized as demanded by IHL.

CPC Alliance

The ICRC also sets out factual considerations that are necessary for a collective of non-State armed groups who are sufficiently organized to qualify as an alliance.³⁹ These factors are used to determine, on a case-by-case basis, if there is a sufficient level of coordination in a coalition or alliance to become a party to a NIAC.⁴⁰

A shared ideology or common enemy does not automatically suggest that the necessary level of coordination for a coalition has been met. The ICRC suggests that the indicators should be considered on a case-by-case basis. These include the establishment of a coordination structure for the alliance as a whole, the sharing of operational tasks between organized armed groups who are members of the alliance, common rules of engagement, the coordination of simultaneous attacks against the opposing party, and the launching of joint military operations.⁴¹

The exiled former president of CAR, President Bozizé, is the general coordinator and initiator of the CPC alliance. He delivers instructions from Guinea-Bissau.⁴² In response to the establishment of the CPC-F faction, President Bozizé reorganized and appointed new key leaders in the CPC alliance on 9 September 2024.⁴³ Bozizé’s deputy, until 3R started its peace process with government in April 2025,⁴⁴ was 3R commander Sembé Bobbo.⁴⁵ As of May 2026, no reliable information is available regarding who took over Bobbo’s position.

New high-ranking appointments include Jean-Francis Bozizé, President Bozizé’s son, filling the post-split vacancy as the CPC’s military coordinator.⁴⁶ The vacancy of the deputy military coordinator was filled by Sylvain Béorofé Ngoyasse,⁴⁷ and the deputy Chief of Staff, who might now serve as acting Chief of Staff, is Teddy Gbenengaina.⁴⁸ Gbenengaina is advised by the special advisor to the Chief of Staff, Papi Bozizé,⁴⁹ and Bernard Bonda was appointed to serve as the CPC’s Secretary General⁵⁰ Léopold Bara acts as the head of external relations,⁵¹ and Ousmane Mohamadou is the liaison for relations with humanitarian organizations.⁵² It remains to be confirmed which of these leaders are still in their positions after July 2025 (see above).

The CPC retains a sophisticated common coalition structure as of end May 2026, despite the fracturing (see above). The assessment of intensity (see above) demonstrates that the CPC continued to coordinate simultaneous attacks against and launch joint military operations against FACA. The CPC continued to meet the coordination threshold expected to constitute a coalition.

The pre-existing NIAC between the CAR and CPC continued as of May 2026.

1
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 22 August 2025. ↩︎
2
‘La CPC condamne le massacre de Bozoum et appelle à l’unité’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 17 June 2025. ↩︎
3
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 22 August 2025. ↩︎
4
A. Surprenant, ‘In Pictures: Panic grips Bangui residents after rebel attack’, Al Jazeera, 14 January 2021; E. Murray and R. Sullivan, ‘Central African Republic’s Disputed Elections Exacerbate Rising Tensions’, United States Institute of Peace, 7 January 2021; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’, Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’, Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024. ↩︎
5
A. Surprenant, ‘In Pictures: Panic grips Bangui residents after rebel attack’, Al Jazeera, 14 January 2021; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’, Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024. ↩︎
6
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’, Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; E. Picco, ‘Ten Years After the Coup, Is the Central African Republic Facing Another Major Crisis?’, International Crisis Group, 22 March 2023. ↩︎
7
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 6. ↩︎
8
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, fn 5; ‘Centrafrique: le groupe armé MPC annonce quitter la coalition rebelle CPC‘, RFI, 3 November 2023. ↩︎
9
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025, para 9. ↩︎
10
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
11
‘Human Rights Division: Monthly Report: Human Rights Situation (October 2024)’, MINUSCA, fn 2; ‘October–December 2024: Human Rights Quarterly Brief on the Central African Republic’, MINUSCA, fn 8. ↩︎
12
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; L. Serwat and J. G. Birru, ‘Africa Overview: May 2025’, ACLED, 9 May 2025; F. Mazet, ‘Centrafrique: accord avec les 3R et l’UPC, deux mois après des «progrès» mais pas de désarmement’, RFI, 18 June 2025. ↩︎
13
L. Serwat and J. G. Birru, ‘Africa Overview: May 2025’, ACLED, 9 May 2025; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/383, 13 June 2025, para 29; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/638, 10 October 2025, para 9. ↩︎
14
‘La CPC condamne le massacre de Bozoum et appelle à l’unité’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 17 June 2025. ↩︎
15
‘La CPC revendique une attaque contre des paramilitaires russes dans la région de Bozoum’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 21 January 2025. ↩︎
16
‘Chairperson of the African Union Commission Welcomes the 19 April Peace Agreement in the Central African Republic and the Dissolution of the UPC and 3R Armed Groups’, African Union, 18 July 2025. ↩︎
17
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2026/71, 13 February 2026, para 19; ‘Tirs Intenses à Mboula Entre Forces de Ndalé et Mercenaires’, Africa Press, 6 January 2026; ‘Flash info : Tirs intenses en cours à Mboula entre forces du général Ndalé et les mercenaires russes’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 5 January 2026. ↩︎
18
‘Flash info : Tirs intenses en cours à Mboula entre forces du général Ndalé et les mercenaires russes’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 5 January 2026; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, January 2026; ‘Tirs Intenses à Mboula Entre Forces de Ndalé et Mercenaires’, Africa Press, 6 January 2026. ↩︎
19
‘La CPC revendique une attaque contre des paramilitaires russes dans la région de Bozoum’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 21 January 2025. ↩︎
20
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 17; J. Nikolic et al, ‘Aggregated intensity: classifying coalitions of non-State armed groups’, International Committee of the Red Cross: Humanitarian Law and Policy, 7 October 2020; S. D’Cunha, et al, ‘Defining armed conflict: some clarity in the fog of war’, International Committee of the Red Cross: Humanitarian Law and Policy, 2 May 2024. ↩︎
21
‘Flash info : Tirs intenses en cours à Mboula entre forces du général Ndalé et les mercenaires russes’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 5 January 2026. ↩︎
22
‘La CPC revendique une attaque contre des paramilitaires russes dans la région de Bozoum’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 21 January 2025. ↩︎
23
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee for the Red Cross, 2024, 19. ↩︎
24
‘Centrafrique: près d’une vingtaine de civils tués par des hommes armés non loin du village Kella-Maoulé dans l’Ouham-Pendé’, Radio Ndekeluka, 3 April 2024; ‘Centrafrique: la localité de Sikikédé reprise par les Faca et leurs alliés russes’, 8 March 2024 ↩︎
25
‘Centrafrique: la localité de Sikikédé reprise par les Faca et leurs alliés russes’, 8 March 2024 ↩︎
26
‘Centrafrique: 4 soldats FACA tués dans une embuscade à Gobolo’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 3 July 2023. ↩︎
27
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2648 (2022)’, UN Doc S/2023/360, 18 May 2023, Annex 26; ‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2648 (2022)’, UN Doc S/2023/87, 10 February 2023, para 35. ↩︎
28
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2648 (2022)’, UN Doc S/2023/360, 18 May 2023, Annex 26. ↩︎
29
‘International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts: Recommitting to Protection in Armed Conflict on the 70^th Anniversary of the Geneva Conventions’, International Committee of the Red Cross, October 2019, 40 – 41. ↩︎
30
O. Rogez, ‘Les Anti-Balaka’, RFI, May 2014. ↩︎
31
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2536 (2020)’, UN Doc S/2021/569, 25 June 2021, para 36; ‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2536 (2020)’, UN Doc S/2021/87, 27 January 2021, Annex 5.2. ↩︎
32
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2399 (2018)’, UN Doc S/2018/1119, 14 December 2018, para 111. ↩︎
33
‘FAUX: le chef anti-balaka, général Ndalé, n’est pas capturé par les Faca’, Radio Ndeke Luka, 18 August 2022. ↩︎
34
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 27; ‘deux soldats FACA neutralisés par la CPC sur l’axe Bouar – Abba Mogani’, Africa Press, 6 August 2025 ↩︎
35
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 27. ↩︎
36
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2399 (2018)’, UN Doc S/2018/1119, 14 December 2018, para 110 ↩︎
37
Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2399 (2018)’, UN Doc S/2018/1119, 14 December 2018, para 111. ↩︎
38
‘Anti-Balaka Militias’, Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition, 24 August 2025. ↩︎
39
J. Nikolic, et al, ‘Aggregated intensity: classifying coalitions of non-State armed groups’, International Committee of the Red Cross: Humanitarian Law and Policy, 7 October 2020. ↩︎
40
J. Nikolic et al, ‘Aggregated intensity: classifying coalitions of non-State armed groups’, ICRC Humanitarian Law and Policy, 7 October 2020. The examination below illustrates that the CPC alliance continues to meet a sufficient level of coordination. ↩︎
41
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 17; J. Nikolic et al, ‘Aggregated intensity: classifying coalitions of non-State armed groups’, ICRC Humanitarian Law and Policy, 7 October 2020. ↩︎
42
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 22 August 2025; ‘Central African Republic agrees peace deals with two rebel groups’, News24, 25 April 2025. ↩︎
43
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
44
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 11 ↩︎
45
‘Centrafrique: l’ex-président Bozizé réplique à la création d’une branche dissidente du groupe rebelle CPC’, RFI, 10 September 2025; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 60; ‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 8. ↩︎
46
‘Centrafrique: l’ex-président Bozizé réplique à la création d’une branche dissidente du groupe rebelle CPC’, RFI, 10 September 2025; ‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 9. ↩︎
47
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, Annex 5 ↩︎
48
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, Annex 5. ↩︎
49
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, Annex 5 ↩︎
50
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, Annex 5. ↩︎
51
‘Centrafrique: l’ex-président Bozizé réplique à la création d’une branche dissidente du groupe rebelle CPC’, RFI, 10 September 2025; ‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, Annex 5 ↩︎
52
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, Annex 5. ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict between CAR (supported by the Wagner Group/Africa Corps) and CPC-Fondamentale (CPC-F)

Background

The CPC-F is a splinter from the CPC that was established on 30 August 2024 (see above).¹ This split occurred in the aftermath of several months of internal tensions within the CPC coalition.² Ali Darassa, the leader of the UPC and former Chief of Staff of the CPC, made an announcement in early August 2024, declaring a ceasefire and the willingness of the CPC to reach an agreement with the CAR government.³ This announcement was met with resistance from the CPC’s general coordinator, former CAR President, François Bozizé, who dismissed Darassa from his post in the CPC for high treason.⁴

After the CPC-F, with Ali Darassa as its Chief of Staff, had split from the CPC, Darassa failed to comply with the government’s demands to participate in the DDRR process.⁵ This led to suspicions about the genuineness of Darassa’s commitment to the peace process.⁶

The CPC-F officially resumed hostilities against government forces following an announcement made on 25 October 2024, in which the coalition accused the government of continuously assaulting its positions.⁷ The CPC-F’s commitment to oust the CAR government was reiterated in an official communiqué by the coalition’s spokesperson on 28 November 2024.⁸

The Wagner Group has been supporting CAR by fighting alongside FACA against the CPC-F.⁹

Intensity

As it is problematic to bilaterally attribute indicators of violence to any specific members of a coalition, it is possible to aggregate the violence generated between the enemies if multiple organized armed groups that are sufficiently organized fight in a coalition against an enemy.¹⁰ This section thus assesses whether the violence generated by the fighting between the CPC-F and CAR equates to protracted armed violence.

Several clashes between CAR, supported by the Wagner Group, and the CPC-F were reported during May 2025.¹¹ August 2025,¹² September 2025,¹³ and January 2026.¹⁴

Between 2 and 4 January 2026 the CPC-F targeted disarmed members of the CPC alliance and Wagner Group fighters in Mboula village.¹⁵ This led to an armed retaliation by the Wagner Group against the CPC-F. ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, January 2026. The exact number of fatalities is unclear.¹⁶ The CPC-F is also reported to have attacked government checkpoints during early 2026 triggering further internal displacement in this region.¹⁷

The Anti-Balaka Mokom faction, a CPC-F coalition member (see below), is lightly armed with artisanal weapons, assault rifles, and a few grenades and rocket launchers.¹⁸ This Anti-Balaka faction often relies on hunting rifles or guns seized from enemy forces.¹⁹ Other members of the coalition are, however, more heavily armed – for example the FPRC and the MPC, who receive weapons from the RSF.²⁰

The NIAC between FACA and the CPC-F continues to meet the intensity requirement demanded under IHL.

Organization

According to the ICRC, for an alliance to become party to a NIAC, and to aggregate violence generated by such an alliance under IHL, all non-State actors party to the alliance must meet the organizational criteria under IHL.²¹ Therefore, the threshold of organization of all members of the CPC-F alliance must individually be examined to meet the minimum requirements demanded by IHL. See an examination below of the nature of organization of all four members of the CPC-F alliance. There is some contention with regard to the membership of the CPC-F alliance. While MINUSCA and local news report that the CPC-F is made up of the UPC, the FPRC, the Anti-Balaka (Mokom faction), and the MPC,²² the UN Expert report lists the Front de défense pour les libertés publique (FDLP), instead of the MPC as a member of the coalition.²³

As shown above, UPC leader Ali Darrassa formally declared the dissolution of the UPC on 10 July 2025.²⁴ Therefore, the UPC cannot be regarded as an active member of the CPC-F as of May 2026.

Anti-Balaka (Mokom faction)

Historically very little is known about the leadership structure of Anti-Balaka factions in general.²⁵ These non-State actors arose from self-defence groups who have fought predominantly against Muslim groups, including of ethnic Fulani.²⁶

The leader of the Anti-Balaka (Mokom faction) is Maxime Mokom.²⁷ Mokom resumed leadership of his faction after charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity against him were dropped by the International Criminal Court (ICC) during October 2023.²⁸ This faction is composed mostly of ethnic Gbaya, Sara, and Mandja peoples²⁹ who are animists or Christian.³⁰ This non-State actor joined the CPC-F in August 2024.³¹ In October 2025, reports emerged that some fighters of the Anti-Balaka Mokom faction had disarmed in Bangui in the context of the government’s demobilization efforts.³²

The judgment of 24 July 2025 concerning the Situation in the Central African Republic ³³ provides insight into the organization of the Anti-Balaka and Mokom’s leadership style. Mokom was instrumental in liaising with self-defence groups in Cameroon, the DRC, and in CAR to coordinate activities.³⁴ These previously autonomous pre-existing self-defence group, now with a common enemy, organized themselves into military-like structures with shared command, and forming one movement called the ‘Anti-Balaka’.³⁵ The Anti-Balaka has zone commanders who report to the group’s operational coordinator.³⁶ Anti-Balaka leadership operates from different countries and different locations within countries. The group is, however, sufficiently organized because the overall leader is able to communicate with dispersed leaders to launch coordinated attacks from different locations.³⁷ The foregoing information attests to a tiered command structure that enables Anti-Balaka factions to enforce discipline and impose IHL.

Although not much information on logistics is revealed in this judgment, it is clear that Anti-Balaka seized military weapons from encounters against Séléka or other enemies. Anti-Balaka fighters also made makeshift bladed weapons, used hunting rifles and, where possible, service weapons retained from members of FACA.³⁸ Anti-Balaka factions rely on illegal activities to sustain their conflict efforts including looting civilian property, extorting civilians, illegal trade in natural resources in territories where they are active, and fundraising from opponents of the Séléka coalition.³⁹

The Anti-Balaka Mokom faction is sufficiently organized as demanded under IHL.

FPRC

The FPRC survived a heavy setback in 2019, after FACA successfully broke the alliance between the Roungas and the Goulas, the two primary ethnic groups represented in the FPRC. The FPRC subsequently split into two factions, with the splinter belonging to the Goulas community defecting from the FPRC and joining the Kara community militia to fight against the Roungas.⁴⁰

A further FPRC faction, called the ‘Révolution et justice Belanga’ faction, under the leadership of Abdoulaye Hissène splintered from the FPRC in 2022.⁴¹ This faction was, however, dissolved in 2023, after Hissène had been charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity, and placed under arrest following a warrant issued by the UN-backed Special Criminal Court (SCC) in Bangui.⁴²

The mainstream FPRC remains intact and is now lead by the overall leader, Noureddine Adam.⁴³ Haddo Adam Bachar acts as an emissary to Nourredine Adam.⁴⁴ Other senior leadership includes Ali Hamid and Kadher Kenengar.⁴⁵ The FPRC spokesperson is Aboubakar Sidiki,⁴⁶ ensuring there is unity of voice.In late 2025, reports emerged that some FPRC fighters had surrendered their weapons to CAR authorities.⁴⁷

Noureddine Adam uses his extensive network in Sudan for recruitment drives (mostly RSF fighters) and moves vehicles and military equipment from Sudan into CAR for the benefit of FPRC.⁴⁸ Adam also occasionally supplies FPRC fighters to RSF so that these fighters can be trained by and gain combat experience alongside the RSF before returning back to the FPRC after completing their rotation.⁴⁹

Access to training camps promotes discipline among fighters and creates the opportunity to train fighters in IHL. The RSF has also, on occasion, rotated its fighters to join the FPRC.⁵⁰

UN Experts report that the FPRC has an impressive weapons collection with arsenals based in Bria, Ndélé, and Ouanda-Djallé in north-eastern CAR which shows the logistical capacity of this non-State armed group. The group also has strategically placed bases close to supply routes through the borders with Sudan and South Sudan.⁵¹

The FPRC is sufficiently organized as demanded under IHL.

MPC

The MPC was founded in 2015.⁵² The group withdrew from the CPC coalition on 3 November 2023⁵³ and announced its decision to join the CPC-F instead on 8 November 2024.⁵⁴

The overall leader and military commander of the MPC is Mahamat Al-Khatim.⁵⁵ Al-Khatim unofficially serves as the spokesperson of this group‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/473, para 17; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, fn 5 and signs agreements on its behalf.⁵⁶

Idriss Al Bachar acts as Al-Khatim’s political advisor‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 49 while Ali Al-Habib Jeddo is in charge of coordinating arms transfers.⁵⁷ The residence of Mahamat Al-Khatim in N’Djamena seemingly serves as headquarters, as members of the leadership reside with Al-Khatim.⁵⁸ Beyond key leadership, little is known about the exact nature of the organizational structure of this non-State actor. The existence of these leadership positions, however, indicates a hierarchical command structure which, in turn, would allow for disciplinary action and the ability to impose compliance with IHL.

Military tactics are shared with other CPC-F members, in that the UPC, the MPC, the FPRC, and Anti-Balaka factions have repositioned themselves in a strategic zone between Batangafo, Kabo, Bossangoa, and Markounda, specifically in localities such as Bede, Bakassa and Hama, close to the border with Chad.⁵⁹ With the MPC being dominant in Ouham-Fafa and Nana-Grebizi,⁶⁰ MPC fighters were spotted in the border area with Chad, called Moyenne-Sido, in June 2025.⁶¹

MPC logistics include the movement of fighters from CAR to Sudan, specifically into El-Fasher.⁶² The contribution of this combat to the RSF⁶³ was a strategic logistical tactic to gain RSF support for arms and ammunition transfers from Sudan to CAR.⁶⁴ Weapon transfers from Sudan to MPC included approximately 170 AK-pattern assault rifles and ammunition, as well as thirty-seven foreign fighters recruited to reinforce the MPC.⁶⁵ The MPC raises funds through illicit activities such as extortion, kidnapping, exploitation, and opportunistic gains during transhumance periods.⁶⁶

In early November 2025, the MPC expressed a willingness to rejoin the 2019 peace agreement.⁶⁷ Later that month, it signed a new peace agreement with the CAR government under Chadian mediation.⁶⁸ As of May 2026, the MPC had not yet formally dissolved and early 2026 reporting still refers to Al-Khatim as the leader of the MPC, suggesting that the group is still active.⁶⁹

The MPC is sufficiently organized as demanded under IHL.

CPC-F alliance

The ICRC also sets out factual considerations that are necessary for a collective of non-State armed groups who are sufficiently organized to meet in order to qualify as an alliance.⁷⁰ These factors are used to determine, on a case-by-case basis, if there is a sufficient coordination in a coalition or alliance to become a party to a NIAC and to allow for the aggregation of intensity.⁷¹

A shared ideology or common enemy does not automatically suggest that the necessary level of coordination for a coalition has been met. The ICRC suggests that factual indicators should be considered on a case-by-case basis. These indicators include the establishment of a coordination structure for the alliance as a whole, the sharing of operational tasks between organized armed groups who are members of the alliance, common rules of engagement, the coordination of simultaneous attacks against the opposing party, and the launching joint military operations.⁷²

The CPC-F does have a coordination structure. Ali Darassa of the UPC served as the CPC-F’s overall Chief of Staff until the UPC’s formal dissolution in July 2025 (see above).⁷³ As of May 2026, no reliable information is available regarding who took over Darassa’s position. The general coordinator of the CPC-F is Haroun Gaye.⁷⁴ Other senior leaders in the CPC-F coordinator structure include Bernard Mokom (First Vice Coordinator), Aliou Amadou Bi (Second Vice Coordinator), Jean Blaise Kachala (Military Coordinator), Kouloum Kalam (Secretary-General), Marie Reine Hassen (Head of External Relations), Saidou Bello Mamadou (Head of Internal Relations) and Ali Aboubakar Sidick (Spokesperson).⁷⁵ It remains to be confirmed which of these leaders are still in their positions after July 2025 (see above). The CPC-F aims to establish an ad hoc committee to redefine its objectives and manage its current affairs.⁷⁶

As mentioned above, the CPC-F issued a communiqué threatening the resumption of hostilities against FACA on 25 October 2024⁷⁷ and released a communiqué reiterating its intent to overthrow the government of CAR on 28 November 2024.⁷⁸ The intensity analysis (see above) confirms that the CPC-F coordinates attacks and launches joint military operations. The synchronised attacks against two remote FACA bases on 6 November 2024 serve as evidence of such coordinated attacks.⁷⁹ Another example is the CPC-F’s statement following its December 2024 attack on May-Mbaya village (see 2023 version). The CPC-F not only claimed responsibility for this attack but also confirmed that the attack was part of a broader strategy orchestrated by its Chief of Staff.⁸⁰

The CPC-F has a sufficient level of coordination to constitute an alliance.

The FPRC, the Anti-Balaka (Mokom faction), and the MPC are sufficiently organized under IHL, and the CPC-F is sufficiently coordinated to constitute an alliance (see above).

Therefore, the pre-existing NIAC between CAR and the CPC-F continued as of May 2026.

1
‘Human Rights Division: Monthly Report: Human Rights Situation (October 2024)’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, fn 2; ‘October – December 2024: Human Rights Quarterly Brief on the Central African Republic’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, fn 8. ↩︎
2
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/730, 11 October 2024, para 5. ↩︎
3
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/730, 11 October 2024, para 5. ↩︎
4
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/730, 11 October 2024, para 5; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
5
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 15. ↩︎
6
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 14. ↩︎
7
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025, para 29. ↩︎
8
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025, para 9. ↩︎
9
‘La CPC-F revendique une attaque contre les FACA et Wagner près de May-mbaya’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 7 December 2024; ‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, Annex 7. ↩︎
10
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 17; S. D’Cunha et al, ‘Defining armed conflict: some clarity in the fog of war’, International Committee of the Red Cross: Humanitarian Law and Policy, 2 May 2024; J. Nikolic et al, ‘Aggregated intensity: classifying coalitions of non-State armed groups’, International Committee of the Red Cross Humanitarian Law and Policy, 7 October 2020. ↩︎
11
.‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘RCA: les FACA repoussent une importante attaque de rebelles à Ouadda’, Ndjoni Sango, 14 May 2025; ‘Bria: Trois rebelles de l’UPC et deux commerçants tués par des mercenaires russes’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 8 ↩︎
12
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, August 2025; ‘Update on the Situation in Central African Republic’, Amani Africa, 18 September 2025; ‘Human Rights Division: Monthly Report: Human Rights Situation’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, August 2025 ↩︎
13
‘Human Rights Division: Monthly Report: Human Rights Situation’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, September 2025 ↩︎
14
‘Flash info : Tirs intenses en cours à Mboula entre forces du général Ndalé et les mercenaires russes’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 5 January 2026. ↩︎
15
‘Tirs Intenses à Mboula Entre Forces de Ndalé et Mercenaires’, Africa Press, 6 January 2026. ↩︎
16
‘Flash info : Tirs intenses en cours à Mboula entre forces du général Ndalé et les mercenaires russes’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 5 January 2026. ↩︎
17
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2026/71, 13 February 2026, para 19. ↩︎
18
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2536 (2020)’, UN Doc S/2021/569, 25 June 2021, Annex 2.6. ↩︎
19
ICC, ‘In the Case of the Prosecutor v Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona’, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 24 July 2025, para 44. ↩︎
20
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 76; ‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 22 August 2025. ↩︎
21
‘International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts: Recommitting to Protection in Armed Conflict on the 70^th Anniversary of the Geneva Conventions’, International Committee of the Red Cross, October 2019, 40 – 41. ↩︎
22
‘Human Rights Division: Monthly Report: Human Rights Situation (December 2024)’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, fn 30; ‘Centrafrique: création d’une nouvelle coalition des groupes armés… la CMSPR’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 19 November 2024 ↩︎
23
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 7. This entry takes the former, majority view as a basis. ↩︎
24
‘Chairperson of the African Union Commission Welcomes the 19 April Peace Agreement in the Central African Republic and the Dissolution of the UPC and 3R Armed Groups’, African Union, 18 July 2025. ↩︎
25
‘Who are the anti-balaka of CAR?’, The New Humanitarian, 12 February 2014. ↩︎
26
L. Serwat et al, ‘Africa Overview: March 2025’, ACLED, 7 March 2025; ‘Central African Republic: Muslims Forced to Flee’, Human Rights Watch, 12 February 2014. ↩︎
27
‘Who are the anti-balaka of CAR?’, The New Humanitarian, 12 February 2014. ↩︎
28
‘Ex-CAR militia leader freed by ICC after all charges dropped’, France 24, 20 October 2023. ↩︎
29
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 22 August 2025 ↩︎
30
L. Serwat, et al, ‘Africa Overview: March 2025’, ACLED, 7 March 2025; ‘Central African Republic: Muslims Forced to Flee’, Human Rights Watch, 12 February 2014. ↩︎
31
‘October – December 2024: Human Rights Quarterly Brief on the Central African Republic’, MINUSCA, fn 8. ↩︎
32
‘Armed group combatants disarm in Bangui’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, 27 October 2025. ↩︎
33
ICC, ‘In the Case of the Prosecutor v Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona’, Judgment, Trial Chamber V, 24 July 2025 ↩︎
34
ICC, ‘In the Case of the Prosecutor v Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona’, Judgment, Trial Chamber V, 24 July 2025, para 37. ↩︎
35
ICC, ‘In the Case of the Prosecutor v Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona’, Judgment, Trial Chamber V, 24 July 2025, paras 42 – 43. ↩︎
36
ICC, ‘In the Case of the Prosecutor v Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona’, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 24 July 2025, para 62. ↩︎
37
ICC, ‘In the Case of the Prosecutor v Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona’, Judgment, Trial Chamber V, 24 July 2025, para 51. ↩︎
38
ICC, ‘In the Case of the Prosecutor v Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona’, Judgment, Trial Chamber V, 24 July 2025, para 44. ↩︎
39
I. Asef, ‘Anti-Balaka Militias’, Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition, 24 August 2025. ↩︎
40
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 22 August 2025. ↩︎
41
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, fn 3. ↩︎
42
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, fn 3; ‘Abdoulaye Hissène, un ancien chef rebelle, inculpé de crimes contre l’humanité en Centrafrique’, Le Temps, 8 September 2023; ‘Central African Republic ex-strongman charged with crimes against humanity’, Al Jazeera, 8 September 2023. ↩︎
43
F. Mazet, ‘Centrafrique: accord avec les 3R et l’UPC, deux mois après des «progrès» mais pas de désarmement’, RFI, 18 June 2025; ‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 22 August 2025; ‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, Annex 10. ↩︎
44
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, para 44. ↩︎
45
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 9. ↩︎
46
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, para 44 ↩︎
47
‘Armed groups lay down their weapons in Sam-Ouandja’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, 11 December 2025; K. Bensekkaim, ‘Central African Republic: 65 ex-FPRC fighters disarm voluntarily’, Al24 News, 28 October 2025. ↩︎
48
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 22 August 2025. ↩︎
49
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, para 21; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 75; ‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 36. ↩︎
50
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, para 42. ↩︎
51
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 65. ↩︎
52
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 22 August 2025; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
53
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/473, para 17; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025, para 9 ↩︎
54
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025, para 9. ↩︎
55
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025, para 9; ‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 22 August 2025. ↩︎
56
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, fn 5. ↩︎
57
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 76. ↩︎
58
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 77. ↩︎
59
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 63. ↩︎
60
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 22 August 2025 ↩︎
61
F. Mazet, ‘Centrafrique: accord avec les 3R et l’UPC, deux mois après des «progrès» mais pas de désarmement’, RFI, 18 June 2025; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
62
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 36. ↩︎
63
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 75 ↩︎
64
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, paras 49 and 78. ↩︎
65
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 76. ↩︎
66
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 63. ↩︎
67
‘Rebel groups in CAR lay down their arms as new peace deal begins’, RFI, 7 November 2025; ‘Central African Republic: Armed group MPC on the verge of signing peace agreement with Bangui’, Africa Intelligence, 18 November 2025. ↩︎
68
‘Le gouvernement centrafricain et le MPC signent un nouvel accord à Ndjamena’, Radio Ndeke Luka, 20 November 2025. ↩︎
69
‘Centrafrique: Malgré l’accord de paix, le chef rebelle Mahamat al-Khatim toujours exilé à N’Djamena’, Africa Intelligence, 10 April 2026. ↩︎
70
J. Nikolic et al, ‘Aggregated intensity: classifying coalitions of non-State armed groups’, ICRC Humanitarian Law and Policy, 7 October 2020. ↩︎
71
J. Nikolic et al, ‘Aggregated intensity: classifying coalitions of non-State armed groups’, ICRC Humanitarian Law and Policy, 7 October 2020. ↩︎
72
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, ICRC, 2024, 17; J. Nikolic, et al, ‘Aggregated intensity: classifying coalitions of non-State armed groups’, ICRC Humanitarian Law and Policy, 7 October 2020. ↩︎
73
‘Human Rights Division: Monthly Report: Human Rights Situation (October 2024)’, MINUSCA, fn 2. ↩︎
74
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 7. ↩︎
75
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, Annex 4. ↩︎
76
‘Human Rights Division: Monthly Report: Human Rights Situation (August 2024)’, MINUSCA, para 1. ↩︎
77
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025, para 29 ↩︎
78
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025, para 9. ↩︎
79
‘Nouvelle attaque meurtrière contre un poste des FACA à la frontière tchado-centrafricaine’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 12 November 2024. ↩︎
80
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 15. ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict between CAR (supported by the Wagner Group/Africa Corps) and Azande Ani Kpi Gbe non-formés (AAKG non-formés)

Background

AAKG fighters who opted not to be incorporated into FACA, continue to fight under the AAKG moniker.¹ The AAKG fighters not integrated into FACA are locally referred to by some as ‘AAKG non-formés’, translating to ‘the non-trained AAKG’. They were given this name because they did not undergo training by FACA or the Wagner Group, as opposed to the AAKG fighters integrated into FACA (see below), referred to as ‘Wagner Ti Azande’ (WTA).² Tensions between the AAKG and FACA reportedly arose following promises made by President Touadéra to integrate the AAKG to the military; members of the AAKG perceived this to be a false promise.³ Additionally, the AAKG were opposed to the government’s negotiations with its rival, the UPC. The negotiations concerned the distribution of grazing areas for the cattle of Fulani herders in areas in the Mbomou and Haut-Mbomou prefectures which the AAKG claimed for itself.⁴

There were calls for fighters of AAKG to disarm or reintegrate into FACA during May 2025 in response to violence between the AAKG and FACA.⁵ The continuation of clashes illustrates that this was not a successful drive. Reportedly, about 200 fighters who were initially integrated into FACA’s WTA unit have returned to the bush (referred to as ex-WTA in this entry) to rejoin the AAKG and fight against FACA and their Russian support force.⁶

In this NIAC, FACA has received military support from the Wagner Group and security assistance from MINUSCA.⁷ In particular, the AAKG mount attacks against both FACA and the Wagner Group.⁸ MINUSCA has been involved through establishing a Quick Reaction Force and deploying additional armoured personnel to the areas in which FACA and the Wagner Group are fighting the AAKG.⁹ Suspected AAKG members have, in return, attacked MINUSCA.¹⁰

Intensity

Clashes between the AAKG, supported by ex-WTA elements, and the FACA, benefiting from military support from Africa Corps and security assistance from MINUSCA, occurred during March,¹¹ April, P. Kum, ¹² May,¹³ and June 2025.¹⁴

The military operations between the AAKG and FACA in late April and early May 2025 around Zemio lasted for several days, resulting in multiple casualties. There were a series of attacks and counterattacks. MINUSCA was deployed to provide security assistance to FACA as the latter tried to repel the AAKG non-formés. Subsequently, additional support and security forces were deployed to the area to offer some security and humanitarian assistance to the civilians displaced due to the ferocity of fighting.¹⁵

Clashes between FACA and the AAKG which occurred on 5 August 2025 around Zémio, close to the Mbomou and Haut-Mbomou prefectures, led to the internal displacement of at least 100 civilians.¹⁶ On 5 September 2025, the AAKG took Captain Gilles Siméon Yassolo, a FACA soldier, hostage in the Zémio–Djemah axis region of the CAR. According to the last reports on this matter, Yassolo was held for at least twenty days.¹⁷ Clashes continued on 15 November 2025, when Wagner Group executed military operations against the AAKG in Zémio town (Haut-Mbomou prefecture) which resulted in further civilian displacement.¹⁸ On 15 December 2025, the AAKG ambushed a MUNISCA force convoy near the Zemio-Mboki axis in Haut-Mbomou prefecture. Two peacekeepers were injured.¹⁹

A series of planned military operations were executed by the AAKG against FACA from 28 December 2025 through January 2026. The first attack was directed at forces in Bambouti who were held for several days by the AAKG prior to FACA and the Wagner Group liberating Bambouti. One person died but neither their identity nor which party they belonged to (if any) is known.²⁰ Reports suggest that the AAKG attacked Bambouti with a view to disrupting the national elections.²¹ The AAKG military operations specifically prevented the regional State hospital from functioning.²²

FACA, Wagner Group, and the allied UPC responded to the initial attack by the AAKG on 1 January 2026 through joint military operations against the AAKG in Haut-Mbmou prefecture (Bambouti town) which borders with South Sudan. This military operation had both air and ground components. Russian Apache helicopters provided air cover through rocket strikes while ground forces were engaged in heavy fire (the AAKG were expecting a counter-offensive). Owing to the aerial component, the AAKG suffered losses although exact figures were not publicly reported. Beyond the death toll suffered by AAKG, casualties also include at least six Wagner Group fighters and at least eleven civilians. Civilian infrastructure was damaged due to the use of aerial rocket strikes in an area populated with civilians.²³ This series of attacks resulted in further humanitarian displacement and the nature of injuries following this series of attacks urged the ICRC to give a humanitarian update stressing that it is struggling to deliver humanitarian aid due to limited access.²⁴ MINUSCA peacekeepers were also deployed to Bambouti to assist the large numbers of IDPs resulting from January attacks.²⁵

The AAKG ambushed a FACA checkpoint in Demba village in the Mbomou prefecture on 3 February 2026. AAKG fighters captured four FACA soldiers working at the checkpoint during this operation.²⁶ On 8 March 2026, FACA and Wagner Group launched a joint military operation against the AAKG positions in Haut-Mbomou prefecture (Zémio town). This military operation successfully ousted the AAKG who fled into the bush. The ferocity of firefighting resulted in approximately 6,500 civilians fleeing Zémio town adding to internal displacement figures.²⁷ Wagner Group clashed with the AAKG in Mboki town on 2 April 2026 resulting in four suspected fighters being killed.²⁸

It is clear that the ferocity of fighting between CAR and the AAKG satisfied the notion of intensity as demanded under IHL.

Organization

AAKG

During 2024, approximately 500 AAKG fighters were integrated into FACA (see above).²⁹ Originally, the AAKG consisted of more than 1,000 fighters.³⁰ It is, therefore, evident that not all AAKG fighters were integrated into FACA. The others continue operating under the AAKG moniker and are now called AAKG non-formés by the local population (see above). As of late 2025, AKKG non-formés militia leaders claimed to have more than 5,000 fighters under their command.‘Central African Republic: Reining in the Zandé Militia’, International Crisis Group, 20 November 2025. Even though not all AAKG fighters were integrated into FACA, the main leadership was (see above).³¹ In late June 2025, Wawè Samuel Akumba-Zingi of the AAKG, in presenting a manifesto entitled ‘Our Land, Our Country Sessé Ti I, Kodro Ti I/Gani Sende, Gani Kporo’, announced that the AKKG would give way to the Our Land, Our Country Movement (MNTNP) movement.³² As of mid-2026, the AAKG still continues to militarily operate under the ‘AAKG’ banner. The creation of the MNTNP can thus be understood to represent the formation of a political wing.

There is limited information available on the internal leadership and disciplinary structure of the AAKG non-formés. What is known is that the AAKG had a tiered structure before its split (see above), and the AAKG continues to have a tiered hierarchy, as several senior leaders, ranked as commanders, exercise authority over fighters in the region under their command.³³ Additionally, two AAKG leaders were arrested by CAR authorities on 24 January 2025, following an attack on Fulani civilians. This indicates that the AAKG established a new leadership after the AAKG’s five core leaders had been integrated into FACA in May 2024, even though their identities remain unknown (see above).³⁴ In early 2026, reports emerged of a new ‘AAKG Coordination Group’ which issued public statements. A figure known as ‘Mackpayen the Central African’ claimed to be the new overall leader of AAKG.³⁵ It is also known that senior AAKG leaders who exercise command over battalions in Obo are Celestin Bakayogo Leman (aka ‘General Leman’) and Elie Gomengue (aka ‘Elie Pasteur’).³⁶ General Leman’s deputy is Marcelin Kangoyessi (aka ‘Maxon’).³⁷ Another senior leader is Cedric Parfait Agbia (aka ‘Baloko’ or ‘Boloko’).³⁸ Michel Koumboki is the official AAKG spokesperson.³⁹ The tiered command structure of the AAKG and the availability of training enables the AAKG to impose discipline and implement IHL. Additionally, the issuance of public statements by the AAKG Coordination Group enables it to speak with one voice.

The pre-split AAKG operated from the Haut-Mbomou prefecture, which is still the operational base of the AAKG non-formés.⁴⁰ Bambouti serves as a logistical entry point from South Sudan into CAR which is of strategic importance for the AAKG. The AAKG received direct logistical support from Yambio.⁴¹ AAKG may still receive support from South Sudan. Financial support was also received by the AAKG from members of the CAR parliament as a strategy to benefit from the AAKG’s opposition to the UPC.⁴² Prior to the incorporation of a part of the AAKG into FACA (see above), the military tactics of AAKG included forming an alliance with FACA and the Wagner Group to oppose the UPC and the CPC alliance.⁴³ As of early 2026, the repeated attacks on State symbols by the AAKG suggest that the group is developing from a community self-defense group into an armed actor that openly challenges the government. The AAKG is now competing with the State for legitimacy in Zandé areas. The group took over control of Bambouti on election day on 28 December 2025 (see above) and managed to hold it for several days, before Wagner Group members recaptured the town on 2 January 2026.⁴⁴ Furthermore, the AAKG’s continued violence (see above) proves the militia’s resilience and its ability to adapt its modus operandi.‘Central African Republic: Reining in the Zandé Militia’, International Crisis Group, 20 November 2025.

Plans to incorporate parts of the AAKG into FACA as WTA began in early 2024.⁴⁵ During mid-2024, some, but not all, members of the AAKG were incorporated into FACA structures.⁴⁶ On 6 May 2024, the first group of AAKG fighters were formally integrated into FACA by the CAR Ministry of Defense and the Restructuring of the Army as ‘soldat[s] de 2eme classe’ in a ‘Battalion Hors Rang’ for a period of three years through the ‘Decision regarding the incorporation of young recruits into the Central African Armed Forces’.⁴⁷ Former AAKG fighters incorporated into FACA structures, who earn salary as members of FACA, wear FACA uniforms and use FACA weaponry, are, according to the Ministry of Defence decision dated 6 May 2024, officially members of the CAR armed forces.⁴⁸ These so-called WTA, or AAKG formés, elements were trained by FACA or its Russian support elements⁴⁹ to continue combat against the UPC and other opposition forces. All five senior AAKG commanders who previously comprised its core AAKG leadership were integrated into FACA in mid-2024.⁵⁰ The AAKG was, therefore, not fully demobilized by the integration of a part of its fighters into FACA, leaving the AAKG non-formés fighting under the AAKG moniker.

After their integration into FACA, however, tensions arose between FACA and WTA, as numerous integrated fighters disobeyed their commanders’ instructions.⁵¹ This led to the cancellation of a third round of training for the integrated AAKG fighters in August 2024,⁵² thereby effectively halting the integration of AAKG fighters into FACA.⁵³ In the aftermath of the halted integration process, FACA succeeded in disarming about 100 AKKG formés fighters.⁵⁴ The rest, reportedly about 100 AAKG fighters who were initially integrated into FACA’s WTA unit, hung onto their weapons and returned to the bush (as ex-WTA) to join the AAKG’s fight against FACA and their Russian support elements, indicating that their integration did not last (see above).⁵⁵ As of late 2025, a mere ten AAKG formés fighters remained integrated into FACA.⁵⁶

The AAKG benefitted from being trained by the Wagner Group itself.⁵⁷ Professional training will enable this group to impose discipline amongst its ranks and lodge planned military operations. During late 2025 and early 2026, tactical military operations including the temporary capture of towns and strategic ambushes executed by the AAKG confirmed its ability to employ military tactics in order to achieve military objectives.⁵⁸ It is clear that the AAKG is sufficiently organized to engage in planned military operations that equate to protracted armed violence. The intensity of fighting between these enemies confirms that the AAKG is sufficiently organized under IHL.⁵⁹

The AAKG remains sufficiently organized to meet the organizational criteria demanded by IHL.

Therefore, a new NIAC between CAR and the AAKG ignited during the period under review.

1
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
2
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 120. ↩︎
3
L. Serwat, et al, ‘Africa Overview: June 2025’, ACLED, 6 June 2025; ‘Tensions dans le Haut-Mbomou: le CRSP accuse le gouvernement dans le conflit avec les combattants Azandé’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 14 May 2025. ↩︎
4
L. Serwat et al, ‘Africa Overview: June 2025’, ACLED, 6 June 2025; Tensions dans le Haut-Mbomou: le CRSP accuse le gouvernement dans le conflit avec les combattants Azandé’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 14 May 2025. ↩︎
5
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
6
‘Reprise des combats à Koumboli et la montée de tension à Obo’, Africa Press, 11 May 2025; ‘Le sud-est de la Centrafrique secoué par une nouvelle flambée de violences’, RFI, 8 May 2025. ↩︎
7
‘Zémio: après les affrontements, des milliers de déplacés vivent dans des conditions précaires’, Radio Ndekeluka, 6 May 2025; P. Kum, ‘République Centrafricaine: Zémio au bord du gouffre face à l’intensification des conflits’, Alwihda Info, 2 May 2025; ‘Le sud-est de la Centrafrique secoué par une nouvelle flambée de violences’, RFI, 8 May 2025; ‘Flash Info: Reprise des combats à Koumboli et la montée de tension à Obo’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 9 May 2025; ‘URGENT: Koumboli ravagé, les Mercenaires russes incendient la quasi-totalité des habitations, faisant un mort au passage’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 5 June 2025. ↩︎
8
‘URGENT: Koumboli ravagé, les Mercenaires russes incendient la quasi-totalité des habitations, faisant un mort au passage’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 5 June 2025; R. S. Domia-Ieu, ‘Centrafrique: le nord-ouest et le sud-est du pays en proie à une situation sécuritaire inquiétante’, RFI, 30 June 2025; ‘Flash Info: Reprise des combats à Koumboli et la montée de tension à Obo’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 9 May 2025. ↩︎
9
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/383, 13 June 2025, para 34. ↩︎
10
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/383, 13 June 2025, para 34; ‘Centrafrique: un Casque bleu kenyan tué dans une embuscade’, Ouragan, 29 March 2025; ‘Un casque-bleu de la Minusca tué dans une embuscade près de Zémio dans le sud-est de Centrafrique’, Radio Ndekeluka, 29 March 2025; C. Danimbe, ‘Centrafrique: Deux casques bleus blessés dans une attaque à Zémio, la MINUSCA appelle à la retenue’, Trace Infos, 17 June 2025. ↩︎
11
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/383, 13 June 2025, para 34 ↩︎
12
‘République Centrafricaine: Zémio au bord du gouffre face à l’intensification des conflits’, Alwihda Info, 2 May 2025 ↩︎
13
‘Zémio: après les affrontements, des milliers de déplacés vivent dans des conditions précaires’, Radio Ndekeluka, 6 May 2025; ‘Dernières minutes: Les miliciens Azandés progressent à Zémio, les soldats FACA et les mercenaires russes en déroute’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 2 May 2025; ‘Centrafrique: le calme revient à Zémio après les violents affrontements’, Radio Guira, 12 May 2025; P. Kum, ‘République Centrafricaine: Zémio au bord du gouffre face à l’intensification des conflits’, Alwihda Info, 2 May 2025 ↩︎
14
‘MINUSCA condemns an attack against its peacekeepers near Zémio in Haut-Mbomou’, MINUSCA, 17 June 2025; C. Danimbe, ‘Centrafrique: Deux casques bleus blessés dans une attaque à Zémio, la MINUSCA appelle à la retenue’, Trace Infos, 17 June 2025; ‘Dernières minutes: Les miliciens Azandés progressent à Zémio, les soldats FACA et les mercenaires russes en déroute’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 2 May 2025; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘URGENT: Koumboli ravagé, les Mercenaires russes incendient la quasi-totalité des habitations, faisant un mort au passage’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 5 June 2025; Philip Obaji Jr., X, 9 June 2025. ↩︎
15
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/383, 13 June 2025, para 35. ↩︎
16
‘Monthly Report: Human Rights Situation’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, August 2025, para 3. ↩︎
17
‘Centrafrique : les Zandé tiraillés entre armée, milice et troupes russes’, International Crisis Group, 20 November 2025; ‘Un capitaine de l’armée détaché auprès de l’Autorité nationale des élections pris en otage dans le Haut Mbomou’, Radio Ndeke Luka, 25 September 2025; ‘RCA : un capitaine de l’armée pris en otage dans le Haut-Mbomou’, Journal de Bangui, 26 September 2025. ↩︎
18
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, November 2025. ↩︎
19
‘Monthly Report: Human Rights Situation’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, December 2025, para 5; ‘2 UN peacekeepers injured in attack in Central African Republic: spokesperson’, Xinhua, 16 December 2025; ‘MINUSCA condemns attack against peacekeepers in Haut-Mbomou’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, 15 December 2025. ↩︎
20
‘En Centrafrique, l’armée et Wagner affrontent la milice AAKG dans le sud-est du pays’, Jeune Afrique, 8 January 2026. ↩︎
21
‘Centrafrique : un affrontement armé a empêché la tenue des élections à Bambouti’, Radio Ndeke Luka, 29 December 2025. ↩︎
22
‘Les craintes de rébellion sont en hausse dans le Sud-Est de la RCA’, African Defense Forum, 10 February 2026. ↩︎
23
‘Contre-offensive à Bambouti : les miliciens Azandés encerclent les mercenaires russes et font six morts’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 4 January 2026; ‘Wagner’s Blowback in the Central African Republic: Fresh Violence Tests Touadéra’s Third Mandate’, Robert Lansing Institute, 12 January 2026; ‘Tirs Intenses à Mboula Entre Forces de Ndalé et Mercenaires’, Africa Press, 6 January 2026; ‘CAR Sees Post-poll Clashes Between Army, Militia In Southeast’, Barrons, 7 January 2026. ↩︎
24
‘Contre-offensive à Bambouti : les miliciens Azandés encerclent les mercenaires russes et font six morts’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 4 January 2026. ↩︎
25
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2026/71, 13 February 2026, para 28. ↩︎
26
Réseau des journalistes pour les Droits de l’homme, Facebook, 3 February 2026; ‘Flash info : attaque surprise d’un checkpoint des FACA à Dembia, 2 militaires portés disparus’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 3 February 2026. ↩︎
27
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, March 2026. ↩︎
28
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, April 2026. ↩︎
29
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, paras 118 – 121. ↩︎
30
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025; ‘Central African Republic: Reining in the Zandé Militia’, International Crisis Group, 20 November 2025. ↩︎
31
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, Annex 25. ↩︎
32
‘Haut-Mbomou: AAKG Devient Mouvement Notre Terre’, Africa Press, 30 June 2025; ‘Haut-Mbomou : la milice AAKG se transforme en Mouvement Notre Terre, Notre Pays’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 29 June 2025. ↩︎
33
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, para 48; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, Annex 25. ↩︎
34
UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025, para 34. ↩︎
35
‘AAKG Dément Propagande de Wagner et Ministères’, Africa Press, 16 March 2026; ‘Centrafrique : les miliciens AAKG posent six conditions avant tout dialogue avec Bangui’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 9 February 2026. ↩︎
36
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 124 and Annex 25; ‘Crise imminente dans le Haut-Mbomou: Les AZANDE ANI KPI GBE menacent de déclencher de grandes hostilités’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 26 February 2024. ↩︎
37
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 124 and Annex 25. ↩︎
38
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, Annex 25; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, para 59. ↩︎
39
‘Centrafrique: A Zandé Ani Kpi Gbé dément avoir changé de nom et être fusionné avec le CRSP’, Radio Ndekeluka, 26 May 2025; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, para 56. ↩︎
40
‘Background Note – The situation in the Haut-Mbomou Prefecture’, United Nations Peacebuilding, March 2025, 1. ↩︎
41
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, para 39. ↩︎
42
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, Annex 25; ‘Central African Republic: Reining in the Zandé Militia’, International Crisis Group, 20 November 2025. ↩︎
43
L. Serwat, et al, ‘Africa Overview: October 2024’, ACLED, 8 November 2024; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
44
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, January 2026; ‘Wagner’s Blowback in the Central African Republic: Fresh Violence Tests Touadéra’s Third Mandate’, Robert Lansing Institute, 12 January 2026. ↩︎
45
‘Human Rights Division: Monthly Report: Human Rights Situation (April 2024)’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, para 6; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/730, 11 October 2024, para 30. ↩︎
46
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 118 – 121. ↩︎
47
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, Annex 25. ↩︎
48
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 122. ↩︎
49
Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 120–21 ↩︎
50
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, Annex 25. ↩︎
51
‘Central African Republic: Reining in the Zandé Militia’, International Crisis Group, 20 November 2025; ‘Central African Republic: Reining in the Zandé Militia’, International Crisis Group, 20 November 2025. ↩︎
52
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, Annex 25 ↩︎
53
‘Central African Republic: Reining in the Zandé Militia’, International Crisis Group, 20 November 2025. ↩︎
54
‘Central African Republic: Reining in the Zandé Militia’, International Crisis Group, 20 November 2025; ‘Monthly Report: Human Rights Situation’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, August 2025, para 3. ↩︎
55
‘Le sud-est de la Centrafrique secoué par une nouvelle flambée de violences’, RFI, 8 May 2025; ‘Reprise des combats à Koumboli et la montée de tension à Obo’, Africa Press, 11 May 2025; ‘Central African Republic: Reining in the Zandé Militia’, International Crisis Group, 20 November 2025. ↩︎
56
‘Central African Republic: Reining in the Zandé Militia’, International Crisis Group, 20 November 2025. ↩︎
57
‘Wagner’s Blowback in the Central African Republic: Fresh Violence Tests Touadéra’s Third Mandate’, Robert Lansing Institute, 12 January 2026. ↩︎
58
‘Contre-offensive à Bambouti : les miliciens Azandés encerclent les mercenaires russes et font six morts’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 4 January 2026; ‘Les craintes de rébellion sont en hausse dans le Sud-Est de la RCA’, African Defense Forum, 10 February 2026. ↩︎
59
ICC, ‘In the Case of the Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 14 March 2012, para 537; ICTY, ‘Prosecutor v Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovski’, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 10 July 2008, para 200. ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict between CAR (supported by the Wagner Group/Africa Corps) and Unity for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC)

Background

Transhumance (moving livestock seasonally for grazing purposes) is one of the dominant conflict drivers in CAR. The Muslim Fulani ethnic group is a nomadic or semi-nomadic herding community who has been subjected to violence by Anti-Balaka groups in CAR since 2013. During that time, the Anti-Balaka militias consisted of members of the local population who took up arms to fight against the Muslim Séléka rebel coalition and Muslim civilians.¹ As a consequence of these attacks, the group Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC), who are mostly of the Fulani ethnic group and an offshoot of the Séléka coalition, was formed to defend its herding community.²

The UPC organized itself into a militia during 2014 under the leadership of Ali Darassa. Since its formation, the UPC has dominated swathes of territory in Ouaka, Haute-Kotto, and Mbomou prefectures, which blocked access by government administrators to these territories, causing conflict with FACA. Fighting escalated between FACA and the UPC in 2021, when the UPC’s second-in-command defected to the CAR authorities, which prompted successful government offensives against it.³

FACA has received military support from the Wagner Group and its so-called ‘Black Russians’ – a militia constituted from former CAR non-State fighters – in their operations against the UPC. Conversely, UPC has mounted attacks against both FACA and Wagner Group fighters.⁴ FACA have also benefited from security assistance provided by MINUSCA, which has established temporary operating bases in areas where FACA was fighting the UPC.⁵

Prior to April 2025, the AAKG militia was also acting in support of FACA and the Wagner Group in their fight against the UPC.⁶ Unfulfilled promises regarding the integration of their fighters into the army, and disagreements over peace talks with the UPC, however, led to the AAKG turning against, and then actively fighting, FACA from April 2025.⁷

The UPC used to be a member of the CPC, which was established in December 2020 with the aim of overthrowing President Touadéra.⁸ However, since the split of the CPC-F from the CPC in April 2025 (see above), the UPC has been a member of the newly formed CPC-F.⁹

On 19 April 2025, the UPC and 3R (see above) signed a peace agreement with the CAR government aimed at disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation (DDRR).¹⁰ A ceremony was held in Bangui on 10 July 2025 to formally mark the truce agreed in April 2025, during which the leader of the UPC symbolically handed over his weapons (see above).¹¹ Despite this commitment to peace, tensions remained between the parties.¹² Although UPC leader Ali Darrassa formally declared the dissolution of the UPC on 10 July 2025, it is too early to conclude that all UPC structures no longer exist.¹³ Nevertheless, the absence of violence indicates that this NIAC has ended.

Intensity

Despite the UPC belonging first to the CPC, and later to the CPC-F alliance (see above), FACA and the UPC frequently engaged bilaterally outside clashes between FACA and the alliances to which the UPC belonged.

Clashes from August 2023 up to end May 2026 between the UPC and FACA include those which occurred in August,¹⁴ October,¹⁵ and November 2023,¹⁶ January,¹⁷ June,¹⁸ July,¹⁹ October,²⁰ and November 2024,²¹ May 2025, ²²and April 2026.²³

The UPC mostly concentrated its military operations against FACA military bases during the period under review. For example, the UPC stormed FACA positions on 20 October 2023 in the village of Mbo.According to information reported to Radio Ndekeluka, the village consequently came under the control of this armed group.²⁴ On 24 November 2023, UPC rebels launched a coordinated attack on FACA positions in Moyenne Sido and Mbo village.²⁵

FACA, supported by the Wagner Group, similarly launched successful military operations against UPC strongholds during the reporting period. Examples include the military operation launched on 26 August 2023. During this operation, FACA, with the support of the Wagner Group and ‘Black Russians’, attacked a position held by rebels from the UPC at the entrance to the town of Goya. FACA relied on air support for these operations, intensifying destruction on the ground.²⁶ Another example includes the military operations launched on 8 January 2024 by FACA, again supported by Africa Corps, against the UPC in Kabo town in the Ouham-Fafa prefecture.²⁷ The International Crisis Group reported a total of nineteen fatalities – fifteen rebels and four soldiers.²⁸ FACA regained control over UPC strongholds in the Haut-Mbomou prefecture on 5 June 2024. FACA also captured two key leaders and seized approximately 100 weapons while disarming eighty UPC soldiers.²⁹ In response to these operations, UPC rebels attacked FACA positions in Goya on 28 June 2024.³⁰ On 2 July 2024, FACA attacked the UPC stronghold in Ouadda town, killing seven fighters.³¹ The Wagner Group has intensified its offensive in support of FACA against the UPC, the CPC-F, and 3R in the hinterland since November 2024.³²

UPC’s arsenal includes PKM machine guns and RPG-7 rocket launchers.³³

Another indicator of regular and intense armed violence is that FACA continues to rely the Wagner Group to support CAR in its fight against UPC and other non-State actors on its territory.³⁴ Between 5 and 6 April 2026, the Wagner Group deployed near the Am Dafock village in CAR as part of its support operation against UPC. During this operation at least thirteen UPC fighters were killed. UPC retaliated on 11 April 2026 by executing at least four civilians it suspected of feeding intelligence to Wagner about UPC whereabouts and movements.³⁵

By the end of March 2026, 428,227 IDPs were reported in CAR. While it is impossible to attribute specific numbers of IDPs to the conflict between specific actors, the conflict is a prominent driver of these IDP figures.³⁶

The violence generated from fighting between FACA and the UPC did not continue to meet the notion of intensity as demanded by IHL as of June 2025.

Organization

Limited information is available concerning the organization of the UPC. Some information of the prominent leadership is, however, in the public domain. General Ali Darassa is both the founder³⁷ and leader of the UPC.³⁸ General Darassa also served as the military Chief of Staff of the CPC alliance,³⁹ and since this alliance splintered, (see above) as the Chief of Staff of the CPC-F alliance.⁴⁰ Other high-ranking UPC generals include Garga, Moussa, and Abdu.⁴¹ The command structure of the UPC is described as having an effective military command of thousands of fighters in different ranks.⁴² The existence of a hierarchical command structure enables the UPC to impose discipline and promote IHL.

The UPC sources weaponry and equipment from the Tamboura province in South Sudan, confirming its logistical capacity.⁴³

The UPC does have unity of voice. An example of this is a UPC delegation who travelled to Tullus and Nyala in South Darfur to broker mercenary support agreements with the RSF.⁴⁴ The UPC has a designated spokesperson, Ousmanou Mohamadou.⁴⁵

Despite the demobilization of several hundred UPC fighters by the end of May 2026,⁴⁶ it is not certain that all military operations have definitively ended.

Nevertheless, the drop in intensity means that the NIAC between FACA and the UPC ended by June 2025.

1
‘Violence and Herding in the Central African Republic: Time to Act’, International Crisis Group, 28 May 2025. ↩︎
2
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025; ‘Violence and Herding in the Central African Republic: Time to Act’, International Crisis Group, 28 May 2025. ↩︎
3
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025; ‘Violence and Herding in the Central African Republic: Time to Act’, International Crisis Group, 28 May 2025. ↩︎
4
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2648 (2022)’, UN Doc S/2023/360, 18 May 2023, para 109; A. C. Agenonga, ‘L’UPC, nouveau groupe armé étranger présent dans le Bas-Uélé’, Ebuteli, 12 September 2024; ‘Centrafrique: Violents affrontements meurtriers près de Bambari entre mercenaires Wagner et rebelles de la CPC-F, plusieurs morts’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 17 November 2024. ↩︎
5
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025, para 30. ↩︎
6
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025; ‘Grande offensive des Wagner ti Azandé et les russes contre l’UPC à Mboki, Zémio et Djema’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 25 May 2024; ‘Centrafrique: les Faca et leurs alliés lancent une importante opération militaire à Mboki’, Radio Ndekeluka, 27 May 2024. ↩︎
7
L. Serwat, et al, ‘Africa Overview: June 2025’, ACLED, 6 June 2025; ‘Tensions dans le Haut-Mbomou: le CRSP accuse le gouvernement dans le conflit avec les combattants Azandé’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 14 May 2025; ‘Le sud-est de la Centrafrique secoué par une nouvelle flambée de violences’, RFI, 8 May 2025. ↩︎
8
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025. ↩︎
9
‘October – December 2024: Human Rights Quarterly Brief on the Central African Republic’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, fn 8. ↩︎
10
T. Abhasakun, ‘Central African Republic Sees Major Progress on Disarmament and Reintegration of Former Fighters’, Peace News, 15 September 2025; ‘Agreement between the Transitional Government and the armed groups on the principles of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation and of integration into the uniformed State forces of the Central African Republic (DDRR Agreement)’, The University of Edinburgh: Peace Agreements. ↩︎
11
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/638, 10 October 2025, paras 6-7; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, July 2025; ‘Centrafrique : deux chefs rebelles annoncent la dissolution de leurs mouvements armés pour rejoindre le processus de paix’, Xinhua, 11 July 2025; ‘Centrafrique : les deux principaux groupes armés déposent les armes’, Agence d’Information d’Afrique Centrale, 12 July 2025; ‘Rencontre de Paix à Bangui et Dissolution des Groupes Armés’, Africa Press, 11 July 2025. ↩︎
12
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; J. Njikam, ‘CENTRAFRIQUE : Le Chef de l’Etat fait le point sur le désarmement de rebelles signataires en avril d’un accord’, Frontières d’Afrique, 11 August 2025. ↩︎
13
‘Chairperson of the African Union Commission Welcomes the 19 April Peace Agreement in the Central African Republic and the Dissolution of the UPC and 3R Armed Groups’, African Union, 18 July 2025. ↩︎
14
‘Un Violent affrontement opposant les forces gouvernementales et les rebelles dans la Ouaka: Tensions et destructions persistent’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 26 August 2023 ↩︎
15
‘Centrafrique: des positions de l’armée visées par une attaque rebelle dans le Nord’, Radio Ndekeluka, 20 October 2023 ↩︎
16
‘Conflit persistant à Sido: La CPC maintient le contrôle de la ville, les FACA en attente de renforts’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 25 November 2023 ↩︎
17
‘Centrafrique: des morts et des blessés dans l’attaque de la base des Faca à Kabo’, Radio Ndekeluka, 8 January 2024; ‘L’Aube Sanglante à Kabo: Un violent affrontement entre les rebelles et les soldats FACA en cours’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 8 January 2024; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group ↩︎
18
‘Offensive Rebelle en cours à Goya : Les FACA Pris au Piège’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 28 June 2024; ‘Centrafrique: l’armée repousse une attaque rebelle proche de Bambari’, Radio Ndekeluka, 29 June 2024; ‘Centrafrique: l’armée reconquiert les localités de Ouadda et Mouka’, Radio Ndekeluka, 5 June 2024 ↩︎
19
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/730, 11 October 2024, para 27, ↩︎
20
‘Centrafrique: des combats signalés proche de Bakouma entre l’armée et des rebelles’, Radio Ndekeluka, 9 October 2024; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025, para 29; ‘Centrafrique: des combats signalés proche de Bakouma entre l’armée et des rebelles’, Pravda RCA, 9 October 2024; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group ↩︎
21
Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Centrafrique: Violents affrontements meurtriers près de Bambari entre mercenaires Wagner et rebelles de la CPC-F, plusieurs morts’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 17 November 2024; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025, para 30 ↩︎
22
‘Bria: Trois rebelles de l’UPC et deux commerçants tués par des mercenaires russes’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 8 May 2025; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
23
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, April 2026; ‘Vakaga : le FSR attaque une localité d’Amdafock en représailles aux incursions de l’Afrikacorp au Soudan’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 13 April 2026; ‘Centrafrique : la préfecture de la Vakaga en état d’alerte après l’assassinat de quatre personnes’, Radio Ndeke Luka, 13 April 2026. ↩︎
24
‘Centrafrique: des positions de l’armée visées par une attaque rebelle dans le Nord’, Radio Ndekeluka, 20 October 2023. ↩︎
25
‘Conflit persistant à Sido: La CPC maintient le contrôle de la ville, les FACA en attente de renforts’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 25 November 2023. ↩︎
26
‘Un Violent affrontement opposant les forces gouvernementales et les rebelles dans la Ouaka: Tensions et destructions persistent’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 26 August 2023. ↩︎
27
‘Centrafrique: des morts et des blessés dans l’attaque de la base des Faca à Kabo’, Radio Ndekeluka, 8 January 2024; ‘L’Aube Sanglante à Kabo: Un violent affrontement entre les rebelles et les soldats FACA en cours’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 8 January 2024. ↩︎
28
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
29
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Centrafrique: l’armée reconquiert les localités de Ouadda et Mouka’, Radio Ndekeluka, 5 June 2024. ↩︎
30
‘Offensive Rebelle en cours à Goya : Les FACA Pris au Piège’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 28 June 2024; ‘Centrafrique: l’armée repousse une attaque rebelle proche de Bambari’, Radio Ndekeluka, 29 June 2024; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
31
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
32
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
33
‘MINUSCA/CAR Ex-combatant Disarmament’, UNifeed, 5 August 2025. ↩︎
34
‘Mapping Conflict: Russia’s Growing Influence in Africa’, International Crisis Group, 2 October 2025; ‘Russia Pushes CAR to Choose Africa Corps Over Wagner Mercenaries’, African Defense Forum, 28 October 2025; J. F. Koena et al, ‘Wagner’s Successors Wage Campaign Of Terror In Central African Republic’, Radio Free Europe, 9 February 2025 (Updated 28 March 2025); Y. Adegoke, ‘Why Wagner is winning hearts in the Central African Republic’, BBC, 11 December 2023; D. Ehl, ‘How the Russian Wagner Group is entrenching itself in Africa’, Deutsche Welle, 27 October 2024; A. Soltes, ‘Wagner Group in CAR: Not Quite a Success Story’, Geopolitical Monitor, 2 January 2025. ↩︎
35
‘Vakaga : le FSR attaque une localité d’Amdafock en représailles aux incursions de l’Afrikacorp au Soudan’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 13 April 2026; ‘Centrafrique : la préfecture de la Vakaga en état d’alerte après l’assassinat de quatre personnes’, Radio Ndeke Luka, 13 April 2026; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, April 2026. ↩︎
36
‘UNHCR Central African Republic (CAR) Operational Update – Quarterly: January – March 2026’, OHCHR Operational Data Portal, 22 May 2026. ↩︎
37
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group ↩︎
38
‘Centrafrique: rebelles de l’UPC et paramilitaires de Wagner se sont rencontrés à Maloum’, RFI, 20 June 2025; ‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025. ↩︎
39
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 6 ↩︎
40
‘Human Rights Division: Monthly Report: Human Rights Situation (October 2024)’, MINUSCA, fn 2; ‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 15. ↩︎
41
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 35. ↩︎
42
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025. ↩︎
43
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025. ↩︎
44
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 35. ↩︎
45
‘Centrafrique: la paix, une nécessité’, Sidwaya, 19 August 2024; Cercle de Réflexion pour l’essor de la Centrafrique, ‘Conversation entre l’espion Figeira et Ousmanou Mohamadou’, Facebook, 25 July 2024. ↩︎
46
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/638, 10 October 2025, para 9 ↩︎

Non-International Armed Conflict between Unity for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) and Azande Ani Kpi Gbe (AAKG)

Background

The moniker ‘Azande Ani Kpi Gbe’ (AAKG) translates to ‘the Zandé community has suffered too much/has experienced too many deaths’.¹ The AAKG, which was formed in 2023,² claims its existence serves to protect the Azande people, who have endured atrocities committed by the UPC and the Lords’ Resistance Army for many years. Most Azande live in the Mbomou and Haut-Mbomou prefectures in CAR.³ This non-State actor is fighting to achieve two overall objectives – to free Haut-Mbomou from the territorial control of the UPC and to persuade FACA and the CAR internal security forces to take control of ‘liberated towns’.⁴

A recent shift in fighting has been detected – the AAKG became radicalized on religious grounds, targeting not only Fulani, but also Zandé people of Muslim faith.⁵ The UPC, conversely, responded to heightened AAKG attacks against Muslim Fulani communities in CAR.⁶

This NIAC initially ignited between the UPC and the AAKG. However, around 500 AAKG fighters were integrated into FACA during 2024.⁷ This group of fighters that split from the former AAKG has since been described as a special unit within FACA called ‘WTA’ or ‘AAKG formés’.⁸ These WTA forces were trained by then-Wagner Group fighters and wore uniforms with shoulder sleeve insignia similar to those worn by the Wagner Group, hence the name.⁹ The remaining AAKG fighters, not integrated into FACA, are called ‘AAKG non-formés’ by the local population.¹⁰ The AAKG is the remnant of the former AAKG and, therefore, the pre-existing NIAC between the UPC and the AAKG continued between the UPC and the AAKG (‘non-formés’) up until August 2024.

Intensity

The pre-existing NIAC between the AAKG and the UPC continued during the reporting period. (see below). Since the split of the AAKG into the AAKG formés and the AAKG non-formés, the NIAC continued between the UPC and the AAKG (non-formés) (see above). Both groups clashed frequently during 2023.¹¹ Specific clashes during the reporting period include those during August 2023,¹² and January,¹³ May,¹⁴ and June 2024.¹⁵

AAKG fighters are equipped with automatic rifles.¹⁶ The UPC arsenal includes PKM machine guns and RPG-7 rocket launchers.¹⁷

Fighting remained protracted in nature until the integration of a part of the AAKG fighters into FACA forces (see above).¹⁸ There has been a lull in fighting between the AAKG and the UPC since July 2024, but this does not necessarily equate to the end of a NIAC.

For a NIAC to end, it is required that one of two requirements is satisfied. First, one of the parties to the NIAC ceases to exist, for example, the non-State actor is completely defeated or demobilized.¹⁹ As noted above, despite the integration of about 500 fighters into FACA during 2024, the AAKG has not ceased to exist as a large percentage of fighters remained part of the AAKG ‘non-formés’ military wing.²⁰ The second situation in which a NIAC comes to an end is if there is a lasting cessation of fighting without any real risk of resumption.²¹ The lull in fighting between the AAKG and the UPC can partially be attributed to the integration of some AAKG members into FACA during 2024 (see above) ²² or possibly under reporting. Additionally, since April 2025, the AAKG has focused its efforts on fighting FACA and the Wagner Group, taking up most of its combat capacity.²³ Despite the lull in direct fighting between the AAKG and the UPC, the AAKG, supported by ex-WTA fighters has, nevertheless, continued to target Fulani civilians over their suspected association with the UPC as of May 2026, indicating a high risk of resumption of fighting between both armed groups.²⁴

Organization

UPC (see above)

AAKG (see above)

The NIAC between the UPC and the remnants of the former AAKG ended in August 2024.

1
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025. ↩︎
2
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025; L. Serwat, et al, ‘Africa Overview: October 2024’, ACLED, 8 November 2024; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, para 35 ↩︎
3
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025; L. Serwat et al, ‘Africa Overview: October 2024’, ACLED, 8 November 2024; L. Serwat et al, ‘Africa Overview: June 2025’, ACLED, 6 June 2025. ↩︎
4
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, Annex 23. ↩︎
5
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, paras 58 – 61. ↩︎
6
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2023/769, 16 October 2023, paras 25 and 40. ↩︎
7
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
8
‘Human Rights Division: Monthly Report: Human Rights Situation (April 2024)’, MINUSCA, para 6; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/730, 11 October 2024, para 30; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 120; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/730, 11 October 2024, para 30. ↩︎
9
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 120. ↩︎
10
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 120. ↩︎
11
‘Bambouti, violent affrontement entre la milice d’autodéfense AZANDE ANI KPI GBE et les rebelles de l’UPC’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 15 March 2023; ‘Centrafrique: situation humanitaire alarmante à Bambouti après des affrontements’, Radio Ndekeluka, 22 March 2023; ‘Bambouti, nouvel affrontement entre les groupes armés’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 2 April 2023; ‘Mboki: Un nouvel épisode sanglant oppose les miliciens Azandé Ani Kpi Gbe aux rebelles de l’UPC’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 20 June 2023;‘CrisisWatch, Tracking Conflict Worldwide: Global Overview June 2023’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
12
‘Attaque violente en cours à Mboki : Milice contre Rebelles, la Terreur s’installe’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 29 August 2023; ‘Centrafrique: Nouvelle Attaque Meurtrière de la Milice Azandé anikpigbé proche de Zémio’,Corbeau News Centrafrique, 31 August 2023 ↩︎
13
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group ↩︎
14
‘Centrafrique: les Faca et leurs alliés lancent une importante opération militaire à Mboki’, Radio Ndekeluka, 27 May 2024; ‘Grande offensive des Wagner ti Azandé et les russes contre l’UPC à Mboki, Zémio et Djema’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 25 May 2024 ↩︎
15
‘Centrafrique: Trois rebelles de l’UPC abattus par des miliciens Azandé à Zemio’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 16 June 2024. ↩︎
16
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025. ↩︎
17
‘MINUSCA/CAR Ex-combatant Disarmament’, UNifeed, 5 August 2025. ↩︎
18
‘Central African Republic’, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 15 July 2025. ↩︎
19
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, ICRC, 2024. ↩︎
20
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 120; ‘Central African Republic’, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 15 July 2025. ↩︎
21
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024. A lull in fighting does not equate to no real risk of resumption.‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 19. ↩︎
22
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group ↩︎
23
‘Zémio: après les affrontements, des milliers de déplacés vivent dans des conditions précaires’, Radio Ndekeluka, 6 May 2025; P. Kum, ‘République Centrafricaine: Zémio au bord du gouffre face à l’intensification des conflits’, Alwihda Info, 2 May 2025; ‘Central African Republic: Wagner sends 50 mercenaries to southeast to battle militiamen’, Africa Intelligence, 15 May 2025; ‘Flash Info: Reprise des combats à Koumboli et la montée de tension à Obo’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 9 May 2025; R. S. Domia-Ieu, ‘Centrafrique: le nord-ouest et le sud-est du pays en proie à une situation sécuritaire inquiétante’, RFI, 30 June 2025. ↩︎
24
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025, para 34. ↩︎

State Parties

Central African Republic (CAR)

Non-State Actors

Return, Reclamation, and Rehabilitation (3R)
Unity for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC)
Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC)
Coalition of Patriots for Change-Fondamentale (CPC-F)
Azande Ani Kpi Gbe (AAKG)

Foreign Involvement

Wagner Group/Africa Corps [in combat alongside FACA]
MINUSCA [mandate extended until 15 November 2026; no active combat role]
Russia [military support: fighter jets, weapons, training]
United States [training soldiers]
France [offering scholarships to army officers for training in France]
Rwanda [offering military training]
Chad [joint security operation along shared border]

Other Non-State Actors Involved

Bancroft Global Development [US PMSC, no active combat reported]
Rapid Support Forces (RSF) [repeated incursions into CAR, recruiting efforts]

1
‘Article 1 – Material field of application’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases. ↩︎
2
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; D. Clouatre, ‘Military Coup Brings Dictatorship to Central African Republic’, EBSCO, 2023; ‘Bokassa Is Reported Overthrown In Coup in Central African Empire’, The New York Times, 21 September 1979; V. Aboudi, ‘Coups D’état in the Central African Republic and Political Instability in Central Africa Sub-Region’, On Policy, 30 June 2021; E. Picco, ‘Ten Years After the Coup, Is the Central African Republic Facing Another Major Crisis?’, International Crisis Group, 22 March 2023; T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024. ↩︎
3
J. Lechner and V. Ingasso, ‘Wagner woes and a rebel crackdown: A briefing on the Central African Republic’s shifting conflict’, The New Humanitarian, 7 September 2023; ‘Central African Republic: A Conflict Mapping’, International Peace Information Service, August 2018; ‘Bringing Lasting Peace to the Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, 15 October 2024. ↩︎
4
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; ‘Political and Ethnic Violence in Central African Republic’, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, November 2024. ↩︎
5
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024. ↩︎
6
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; ‘Bringing Lasting Peace to the Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, 15 October 2024; ‘Central African Republic: Sectarian Atrocities Escalate’, Human Rights Watch, 18 December 2013; ‘Central African Republic: Mapping human rights violations 2003-2015’, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); ‘Réfugiés et demandeurs d’asile de la République centrafricaine’, Operational Data Portal, 30 September 2025; ‘Briefing: Who are the anti-balaka of CAR?’, Reliefweb, 12 February 2014. ↩︎
7
T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; J. S. F. van Hoogstraten, ‘Central African Republic: The 21^st century’, Britannica, 11 October 2025. ↩︎
8
T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; J. S. F. van Hoogstraten, ‘Central African Republic: The 21^st century’, Britannica, 11 October 2025. ↩︎
9
T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; ‘Political and Ethnic Violence in Central African Republic’, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, November 2024; J. S. F. van Hoogstraten, ‘Central African Republic: The 21^st century’, Britannica, 11 October 2025. ↩︎
10
T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; ‘Political and Ethnic Violence in Central African Republic’, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, November 2024. ↩︎
11
T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; ‘Political and Ethnic Violence in Central African Republic’, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, November 2024. ↩︎
12
T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024. ↩︎
13
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; ‘Bringing Lasting Peace to the Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, 15 October 2024; ‘About’, MINUSCA. ↩︎
14
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; ‘About’, MINUSCA; ‘Mandate’, MINUSCA; ‘MINUSCA Fact Sheet’, United Nations Peacekeeping, 2014. ↩︎
15
‘MINUSCA Fact Sheet’, United Nations Peacekeeping, 2014; ‘MINUSCA condemns an attack against its peacekeepers near Zémio in Haut-Mbomou’, MINUSCA, 17 June 2025. ↩︎
16
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; ‘MINUSCA Fact Sheet’, United Nations Peacekeeping, 2014. ↩︎
17
T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; ‘Bringing Lasting Peace to the Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, 15 October 2024; ‘Central African Republic: Touadera wins election’, Al Jazeera, 21 February 2016. ↩︎
18
T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; M. Benn, ‘Newly Elected Central African Republic Leader Faces Hard Realities’, The New York Times, 21 February 2016; ‘Ex-PM Touadera takes lead in CAR vote’, Deutsche Welle, 4 January 2016. ↩︎
19
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; ‘Central African Republic: Events of 2016’, Human Rights Watch; T. Skarstein, ‘Central African Republic spiralling into new crisis’, Norwegian Refugee Council, 17 July 2017. ↩︎
20
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; ‘New fighting in CAR leaves dozens dead’, Deutsche Welle, 21 June 2017; Z. Baddorf, ‘Pessimism About CAR Peace Deal Widespread’, Voice of America, 23 June 2017. ↩︎
21
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; N. Dukhan, ‘Splintered Warfare: Alliances, affiliations, and agendas of armed factions and politico-military groups in the Central African Republic’, Enough, 10 August 2017; ‘Challenges ahead for the AU roadmap on the CAR’, ReliefWeb, 12 October 2017. ↩︎
22
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024. ↩︎
23
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; E. Murray and R. Sullivan, ‘Central African Republic Struggles to Implement Peace Deal’, US Institute of Peace, 17 October 2019. ↩︎
24
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’, Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; E. Murray and R. Sullivan, ‘Central African Republic Struggles to Implement Peace Deal’, US Institute of Peace, 17 October 2019. ↩︎
25
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; K. Larson, ‘UN report shows hundreds of Central African Republic abuses’, AP News, 30 May 2017. ↩︎
26
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’, Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; ‘CAR says ex-president attempting ‘coup’ as rebels form coalition’, Al Jazeera, 19 December 2020. ↩︎
27
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; ‘Central African Republic President Touadera wins new term, says electoral commission’, France 24, 4 January 2021. ↩︎
28
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; K. Ahmed, ‘Central African Republic suffers food shortages as rebels cut off capital’, The Guardian, 25 January 2021; A. Suprenant, ‘In Pictures: Panic grips Bangui residents after rebel attack’, Al Jazeera, 14 January 2021. ↩︎
29
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; ‘Bringing Lasting Peace to the Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, 15 October 2024; I. R. Mugisha, ‘Rwanda deploys troops to CAR under bilateral arrangement’, The East African, 22 December 2020; L. Serwat, et al, ‘Wagner Group Operations in Africa: Civilian Targeting Trends in the Central African Republic and Mali’, ACLED, 30 August 2022; ‘Rwanda’s Growing Role in the Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, 7 July 2023. ↩︎
30
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; J. Lechner and V. Ingasso, ‘Wagner woes and a rebel crackdown: A briefing on the Central African Republic’s shifting conflict’, The New Humanitarian, 7 September 2023; P. Bax, ‘Russia’s Influence in the Central African Republic’, International Crisis Groups, 3 December 2021; ‘CAR: Russian Wagner Group harassing and intimidating civilians – UN experts’, OHCHR, 27 October 2021. ↩︎
31
‘Bringing Lasting Peace to the Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, 15 October 2024. ↩︎
32
‘Bringing Lasting Peace to the Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, 15 October 2024; P. Bax, ‘Russia’s Influence in the Central African Republic’, International Crisis Groups, 3 December 2021; J. Inwood and J. Tacchi, ‘Wagner in Africa: How the Russian mercenary group has rebranded’, BBC, 20 February 2024. ↩︎
33
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; E. Picco, ‘Ten Years After the Coup, Is the Central African Republic Facing Another Major Crisis?’, International Crisis Group, 22 March 2023; ‘Bringing Lasting Peace to the Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, 15 October 2024; ‘MINUSCA chief to Security Council: Decade-long cycle of conflict can be broken’, United Nations News, 20 June 2023; ‘Central African Republic plans referendum on scrapping presidential term limits’, Reuters, 30 May 2023; J. Siegle and H. Wahila, ‘Central African Republic: Elite Capture becoming State Capture’, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 13 January 2025. ↩︎
34
J. Siegle and H. Wahila, ‘Central African Republic: Elite Capture becoming State Capture’, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 13 January 2025; ‘Central African Republic: UN Expert calls for urgent institutional reform of electoral authority ahead of 2025 elections’, OHCHR, 26 June 2025; ‘Upcoming elections ‘crucial opportunity’ for Central African Republic, UN top official tells Security Council’, United Nations News, 26 June 2025. ↩︎
35
T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; ‘Bringing Lasting Peace to the Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, 15 October 2024. ↩︎
36
T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024. ↩︎
37
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; ‘Bringing Lasting Peace to the Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, 15 October 2024; ‘Critical humanitarian situation in Central African Republic’, United Nations News, 5 June 2023; R. S. Domia-leu, ‘Centrafrique: 70% des ménages vivent dans la pauvreté, selon une étude’, RFI, 19 February 2025. ↩︎
38
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; ‘Background: The Varied Causes of Conflict in CAR’, Human Rights Watch, September 2007; ‘Conflict in Sudan is spilling into Central African Republic: UN’, TRT World, 27 June 2025. ↩︎
39
T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; ‘Central Africa Republic’, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 27 August 2024. ↩︎
40
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2026/71, 13 February 2026, para 49. ↩︎
41
T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; ‘Réfugiés et demandeurs d’asile de la République centrafricaine’, OHCHR Operational Data Portal, 30 September 2025. ↩︎
42
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2026/71, 13 February 2026, para 49; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/638, 10 October 2025, para 49. ↩︎
43
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/638, 10 October 2025, para 48; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2026/71, 13 February 2026, para 48. ↩︎
44
L. Karr et al, ‘US Competes with Russia and Others as It Engages African Autocrats: Africa File Special Edition’, Critical Threats, 21 April 2026; B. Vitkine, ‘La Centrafrique, dernier Etat africain à s’accrocher à « ses » Wagner’, Le Monde, 2 January 2026; M. Olivier, ‘Comment la Russie veut imposer Africa Corps à Touadéra’, Jeune Afrique, 5 March 2025. ↩︎
45
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, November 2025. ↩︎
46
M. Olivier, ‘De Wagner à Africa Corps : comment Faustin-Archange Touadéra a fini par basculer’, Jeune Afrique, 7 April 2026; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, February 2026; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, April 2026. ↩︎
47
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, April 2026. ↩︎
48
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
49
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Central African Republic enrols new soldiers trained by RDF’, Rwanda: Ministry of Defence, 24 November 2023; K. K. Klomegah, ‘Russia Offers Central African Republic Security Guarantee and Broader Economic Partnership’, Modern Diplomacy, 20 January 2025; ‘Over 400 soldiers trained by RDF join Central African Armed Forces’, Igihe, 7 March 2025. ↩︎
50
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
51
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
52
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
53
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, August 2025; P. Dakhling, ‘Central African Republic launches 50MW solar project with GSU’, African Energy Council, 24 August 2025; L. Karr et al, ‘US Competes with Russia and Others as It Engages African Autocrats: Africa File Special Edition’, Critical Threats, 21 April 2026; ‘Central African Republic: 90 million USD from the United Arab Emirates in a 60 MW solar power plant’, Financial Afrik, 18 August 2025. ↩︎
54
L. Karr et al, ‘US Competes with Russia and Others as It Engages African Autocrats: Africa File Special Edition’, Critical Threats, 21 April 2026. ↩︎
55
‘The Central African Republic: a laboratory of peace and politics” in New York, at the Permanent Mission of Italy, a meeting promoted by Sant’Egidio’, Sant’Egidio, 24 September 2025; L. Karr et al, ‘US Competes with Russia and Others as It Engages African Autocrats: Africa File Special Edition’, Critical Threats, 21 April 2026. ↩︎
56
L. Karr et al, ‘US Competes with Russia and Others as It Engages African Autocrats: Africa File Special Edition’, Critical Threats, 21 April 2026; ‘Centrafrique : Touadéra trouve des garanties à Kigali pour pallier un éventuel retrait russe’, Jeune Afrique, 26 November 2025. ↩︎
57
‘The Central African Republic enters a new era of mineral resources development: Historic mining partnership signed with the CVMR Group, driven by the vision of President TOUADÉRA and the expertise of Minister BENAM’, CVMR, 27 November 2025; L. Karr et al, ‘US Competes with Russia and Others as It Engages African Autocrats: Africa File Special Edition’, Critical Threats, 21 April 2026. ↩︎
58
‘Central African Republic Military Chief Meets Gen Kainerugaba, Hails UPDF Partnership’, Ugandan Peoples’ Defence Forces, 5 February 2026; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, February 2026. ↩︎
59
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, February 2026; T. Hall, ‘AFRICOM Inspector General Engagement Strengthens Military Governance Partnership in Central African Republic’, U.S. Africa Command, 27 February 2026. ↩︎
60
‘CAR president pledges closer ties with Russia’, Africa News, 5 March 2026; ‘Central African Republic seeks Russian support on energy’, Reuters, 5 March 2026; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, March 2026. ↩︎
61
‘Joint Statement – Minister’s Barrot’s visit to the Central African Republic’, Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires Étrangers, 16 March 2026; ‘Central African Republic’, Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires Étrangers, 25 March 2026; ‘French FM begins Central African visit as relations with Bangui warm’, RFI, 13 March 2026; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, March 2026. ↩︎
62
‘Two MSF staff members detained in Central African Republic’, Médecins Sans Frontières, 10 March 2026; ‘Two MSF staff members released in Central African Republic’, ReliefWeb, 14 March 2026; ‘Doctors Without Borders announces arrest of two employees in the Central African Republic’, Le Monde, 10 March 2026; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, March 2026. ↩︎
63
‘Joint Chad–CAR security swoop leads to major arms seizure’, APA News, 14 April 2026; ‘Joint Security Operation Between Chad and the Central African Republic Leads to Seizure of Border Weapons Cache’, Brown Land News, 13 April 2026; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, April 2026. ↩︎
64
M. B. Sallama, ‘Between Rhetoric and Reality: Moscow’s Security Forum and the Hard Limits of Russia’s Presence in Africa’, Modern Ghana, 30 May 2026; ‘Central African Republic: Touadéra due in Moscow amid tensions over Wagner and Africa Corps’, Africa Intelligence, 15 May 2026. ↩︎
65
‘Background Note – Special Criminal Court’, United Nations Peacebuilding. ↩︎
66
‘Background Note – Special Criminal Court’, United Nations Peacebuilding. ↩︎
67
‘Central African Republic: Breakthrough as Ex-Combatants Convicted for War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity But Trial Tarnished by Absence of Four Defendants’, Amnesty International, 20 June 2025; Cour Penale Special, ‘Le Parquet special v Oumar Serge Abdoulaye Assan et consorts’, Résumé du Jugement n° 39-S1-2025 sur l’action publique, 19 June 2025. ↩︎
68
‘La Cour pénale spéciale rend son verdict dans l’affaire dite Ndélé 1 contumace’, Cour Penale Special, July 2025; ‘Human Rights Division: Monthly Report: Human Rights Situation’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic July 2025, para 10. ↩︎
69
‘CAR: Urgent financial support needed to prevent catastrophic closure of Special Criminal Court’, Amnesty International, 17 October 2025; D. Odero, ‘Amnesty International voices concern over possible closure of Special Criminal Court in Central African Republic’, Jurist News, 18 October 2025. ↩︎
70
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2026/71, 13 February 2026, para 43; ‘Human Rights Division: Monthly Report: Human Rights Situation’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic July 2025, para 10. ↩︎
71
‘Ouverture de l’audience publique du sixième procès de la Section d’assises de la CPS’, Cour Penale Speciale, April 2026. ↩︎
72
‘Human Rights Division: Monthly Report: Human Rights Situation’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic July 2025, para 11. ↩︎
73
ICC, ‘Situation in the Central African Republic II: Decision on the Central African Republic’s challenge to the admissibility of the case against Edmond Beina’, 12 September 2025; ‘ICC Appeals Chamber confirms decision on inadmissibility of the case against Edmond Beina’, International Criminal Court, 11 March 2026; ‘Human Rights Division: Monthly Report: Human Rights Situation’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, September 2025, para 9. ↩︎
74
‘MINUSCA Fact Sheet’, United Nations Peacekeeping, 2014; ‘Facts and Figures’, MINUSCA; ‘Security Council Extends United Nations Mission in Central African Republic, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2759 (2024)’, UN Press release, 14 November 2024. ↩︎
75
‘MINUSCA Fact Sheet’, UN Peacekeeping, 2014. ↩︎
76
‘Security Council Extends Mandate of Stabilization Mission in Central African Republic for One Year, Adopting Resolution 2800 (2025)’, United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 13 November 2025; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, November 2025. ↩︎
77
S. Ekanem, ‘UN forces withdraw from two Central African bases, passing infrastructure to state authorities’, Business Insider Africa, 23 March 2026; R. S. Domia-Leu, ‘Centrafrique: la Minusca rassure en déclarant qu’elle n’a pas l’intention de plier bagage’, RFI, 26 March 2026; Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2026/71, 13 February 2026, paras 1 and 54–57; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, April 2026. ↩︎
78
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, July 2025; ‘Touadéra Investi Candidat MCU Pour 2025 En RCA’, Africa Press, 30 July 2025; ‘Centrafrique Touadéra confirmé candidat à un troisième mandat sous la nouvelle Constitution’, Koaci, 27 July 2025. ↩︎
79
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, July 2025; ‘Forty years and counting: CAR once again postpones local elections’, Africa News, 13 July 2025. ↩︎
80
D. Wabwireh, ‘Central African Republic sets 28 December 2025 for pivotal general elections’, Africa News, 8 August 2025; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, August 2025. ↩︎
81
R. Esmenjaud, ‘Has external support given the CAR a false sense of security?’, Institute for Security Studies, 15 September 2025; ‘Central African Republic: Briefing and Consultations’, Security Council Report, 27 October 2025; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, September 2025. ↩︎
82
‘Centrafrique : dix candidatures à la présidentielle enregistrées par l’ANE’, Radio Ndeke Luka, 13 October 2025; ‘Centrafrique: Qui sont les 10 candidats enregistrés à la présidentielle 2025 en attente de validation finale par le Conseil Constitutionnel?’, Oub@ngui Médias, 17 October 2025; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, October 2025. ↩︎
83
‘Central African Republic: Concerns Over Crucial Election’, Human Rights Watch, 28 November 2025 ↩︎
84
J. F. Koena and M. Banchereau, ‘Central African Republic leader cleared for third term in key vote followed closely by Russia’, Associated Press, 14 November 2025; ‘Central African court lets two ex-PMs stand against Touadera in vote’, Reuters, 14 November 2025; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, November 2025. ↩︎
85
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, December 2025; C. Bouëssel, ‘Central African Republic: Consolidating Security Gains after the Elections’, International Crisis Group, 27 January 2026; ‘Wagner’s Blowback in the Central African Republic: Fresh Violence Tests Touadéra’s Third Mandate’, Robert Lansing Institute, 12 January 2026; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2026/71, 13 February 2026, paras 26-27. ↩︎
86
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2026/71, 13 February 2026, para 2. ↩︎
87
‘CAR’s President Touadéra wins third-term in office, provisional results show’, Africa News, 6 January 2026; JF. Koena and W. McMakin, ‘Election runner-up in Central African Republic alleges fraud in vote’, Associated Press, 7 January 2026; C. Bouëssel, ‘Central African Republic: Consolidating Security Gains after the Elections’, International Crisis Group, 27 January 2026; ‘Centrafrique : Faustin-Archange Touadéra réélu président avec 76 % des voix, l’opposition dénonce des irrégularités majeures’, Le Monde, 6 January 2026; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, December 2025. The Constitutional Court confirmed Touadéra’s election victory on 19 January 2026,‘Central African Republic’s top court declares incumbent president election winner’, Le Monde, 19 January 2026; ‘Central African Republic court validates Touadera’s re-election’, Reuters, 19 January 2026; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, January 2026 and he was sworn in on 30 March 2026.‘CAR strongman Touadéra sworn in for third term on promises of security, peace’, RFI, 31 March 2026; J. Tasamba, ‘Central African Republic’s Touadera sworn in for third term’, AA, 30 March 2026. ↩︎
88
‘Strike delays release of election results in Central African Republic’, Africa News, 6 May 2026; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, April 2026. ↩︎
89
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, May 2026; ‘Central African Republic forms new government’, Xinhua, 22 May 2026; ‘Central African Republic: How President Touadéra sidelined nephew Évariste Ngamana in National Assembly’, Africa Intelligence, 13 May 2026; ‘Monthly Forecast: Central African Republic – Post-Electoral Consolidation, MINUSCA Reconfiguration, DDR Progress, and Persistent Border Insecurity’, African Security Analysis, 4 June 2026; ‘Central African Republic Forms New Government Under Touadera’, New Kerala, 22 May 2026. ↩︎
90
JF. Koena, ‘Central African Republic opposition leader denounces seizure of his passport’, Associated Press, 6 May 2026; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, May 2026. ↩︎
91
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Centrafrique: les autorités détaillent comment les groupes rebelles UPC et 3R ont signé un cessez-le-feu’, RFI, 25 April 2024; ‘Central African Republic at ‘Delicate Juncture’ ahead of Election Cycle, Peacekeeping Chief Tells Security Council, Urging International Support to Strengthen Democracy’, United Nations Press release, 26 June 2025. ↩︎
92
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Centrafrique: les autorités détaillent comment les groupes rebelles UPC et 3R ont signé un cessez-le-feu’, RFI, 25 April 2024; ‘Central African Republic at ‘Delicate Juncture’ ahead of Election Cycle, Peacekeeping Chief Tells Security Council, Urging International Support to Strengthen Democracy’, UN Press release, 26 June 2025; ‘Centrafrique: mise en oeuvre de l’accord entre le gouvernement, l’UPC et les 3R’, RFI, 26 April 2025. ↩︎
93
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘October – December 2024: Human Rights Quarterly Brief on the Central African Republic’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic. ↩︎
94
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Central African Republic at ‘Delicate Juncture’ ahead of Election Cycle, Peacekeeping Chief Tells Security Council, Urging International Support to Strengthen Democracy’, UN Press release, 26 June 2025. ↩︎
95
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/638, 10 October 2025, paras 6-7; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, July 2025; ‘Centrafrique : deux chefs rebelles annoncent la dissolution de leurs mouvements armés pour rejoindre le processus de paix’, Xinhua, 11 July 2025; ‘Centrafrique : les deux principaux groupes armés déposent les armes’, Agence d’Information d’Afrique Centrale, 12 July 2025; ‘Rencontre de Paix à Bangui et Dissolution des Groupes Armés’, Africa Press, 11 July 2025. ↩︎
96
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, August 2025; J. Njikam, ‘CENTRAFRIQUE : Le Chef de l’Etat fait le point sur le désarmement de rebelles signataires en avril d’un accord’, Frontières d’Afrique, 11 August 2025; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, September 2025. ↩︎
97
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/638, 10 October 2025, para 9. ↩︎
98
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, October 2025. ↩︎
99
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, November 2025. ↩︎
100
‘Human Rights Division: Monthly Reports: Human Rights Situation’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, November 2025, para 3; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2026/71, 13 February 2026, para 13; ‘Central African Republic: Armed group MPC on the verge of signing peace agreement with Bangui’, Africa Intelligence, 18 November 2025; ‘Le gouvernement centrafricain et le MPC signent un nouvel accord à Ndjamena’, Radio Ndeke Luka, 20 November 2025. ↩︎
101
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2026/71, 13 February 2026, para 13; ‘Une cérémonie solennelle présidée par le Chef de l’État et les garants de l’APPR/RCA officialise le 7 octobre la dissolution intégrale de deux groupes armés’, Radio Guira, 8 October 2025. ↩︎
102
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/383, 13 June 2025. ↩︎
103
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Secretary-General Condemns Attack against Mission in Central African Republic’, United Nations Press release, 22 June 2025; ‘MINUSCA condemns deadly attack against peacekeepers in Vakaga’, UN Peacekeeping, 21 June 2025. ↩︎
104
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Security Council Press Statement on Attack against Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Central African Republic’, UN Press release, 24 June 2025; ‘Central African Republic: Briefing and Consultations’, Security Council Report, 25 June 2025. ↩︎
105
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/383, 13 June 2025; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025. ↩︎
106
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024; ‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025. ↩︎
107
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024; ‘Guerre au Soudan: les Forces de soutien rapide recrutent des combattants en Centrafrique’, RFI, 15 June 2024. ↩︎
108
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, July 2025; ‘Centrafrique: Exode massif vers Birao après des attaques violentes dans les villages voisins’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 12 July 2025; ‘Exode Massif Vers Birao Après Attaques Violentes’, Africa Press, 13 July 2025; ‘Vakaga : panique aux alentours de Birao, les éléments armés soudanais sèment la panique’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 8 July 2025; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/638, 10 October 2025, para 25. ↩︎
109
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2026/71, 13 February 2026, para 21; L. Serwat et al, ‘Africa Overview: August 2025’, 8 August 2025; ‘Border Tribes Hold Peace Conference Between Sudan and CAR’, Darfur 24, 27 October 2025; ‘Centrafrique–Soudan : la Minusca impliquée dans la prévention des conflits à Amdafock’, Radio Ndeke Luka, 30 October 2025. ↩︎
110
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, April 2026. ↩︎

Central African Republic

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (January 2025-May 2026)

Transition from Wagner Group to Africa Corps

The struggle for influence between Western countries and Russia as well as the diversification of economic and security partnerships

Mixed transitional justice record and ICC proceedings

Renewals of MINUSCA’s mandate

Developments related to December 2025 presidential elections

Government truce with armed groups 3R and UPC and return of the Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique/Central African Patriotic Movement (MPC) to 2019 peace agreement

Sudan civil war spill-over

Non International Armed Conflict

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Anti-Balaka (Ndale faction)

CPC Alliance

Background

Intensity

Organization

Anti-Balaka (Mokom faction)

FPRC

MPC

CPC-F alliance

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Parties to the Conflict

State Parties

Non-State Actors

Other main Actors

Foreign Involvement

Other Non-State Actors Involved