Colombia (2026-05-01)

During the reporting period, multiple non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) were ongoing in Colombia. At least four NIACs took place to which Colombia was a party:

Colombia v. the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)
Colombia v. the Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC) (formerly Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC))
Colombia v. the Estado Mayor Central (EMC)
Colombia v. the Comandos de la Frontera (CDF)

Additionally, at least six other NIACs between armed groups were ongoing:

ELN v. the EGC
ELN v. the Frente 33 of the Estado Mayor de los Bloques y el Frente (EMBF)
EMC v. the Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez
EMC v. the EGC
EMC v. the ELN
EMC v. the Segunda Marquetalia (SM)

Colombia is a State Party to Additional Protocol II of 1977. All four of the NIACs to which Colombia is a party continue to meet the additional requirements of Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II, meaning that this treaty is applicable in addition to the rules of customary international humanitarian law (IHL).

Additional Protocol II does not apply to the NIACs between organized armed groups who are not fighting the territorial state (Colombia in this case) as Article 1(1) of the Protocol is limited to situations where the territorial State is confronting a non-State armed group.¹ The law of NIAC, in particular Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other rules of customary IHL, applies to these situations.

During the 1960s, Marxist campesino and student guerrilla groups emerged in Colombia in response to conditions of an unequal land distribution and land ownership policy that benefitted large landowning interests, multinational agribusiness, and mining companies.² Between 1948 and 1958, Colombia experienced a decade of political violence known as La Violencia. It is in this period that the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo(FARC-EP) and the ELN were established.³ Subsequently, landowners organized to protect themselves against guerrilla groups and, in turn, spurred the emergence of right-wing paramilitary groups in the 1980s. The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) was the largest of these paramilitary groups.⁴

The FARC-EP and the ELN have a history of relying on violence, abduction and extortion to raise revenue and gain leverage over their adversaries. Allegedly, Colombian guerrilla groups kidnapped more than 25,000 people between 1970 and 2010.⁵

Historically, the illicit trade in drugs has been a driver of the conflict in Colombia.⁶ At the start of the twenty-first century, Colombia was responsible for up to 90% of global cocaine production. Simultaneously, multiple non-State armed groups profited from the cocaine trade and competition over territory among these groups provoked further armed violence.⁷

In 2002, Álvaro Uribe won the presidential elections and took a strong stance against the guerrilla groups. Uribe managed to reduce significantly the number of murders and kidnappings, although human rights groups accused the government of human rights abuses. In 2004, the AUC disarmed during the Uribe presidency. However, red flags were raised concerning possible ties between Uribe and the paramilitary groups.⁸

In 2010, Juan Manuel Santos, the Minister of Defence under President Uribe, was himself elected president of Colombia. In 2012, formal peace talks with the FARC-EP were initiated by his government. By the middle of 2016, the Colombian government under Santos and the FARC-EP led by Rodrigo Londoño had agreed to a ceasefire, which the leadership signed in Cartagena in September 2016.⁹

As a result of the peace agreement, more than 13,000 FARC-EP members have laid down their weapons. The FARC-EP formed a political party under the name ‘Comunes’ and was awarded five guaranteed seats in the Senate and the House of Representatives for the period of two subsequent legislative sessions.¹⁰

Post-peace agreement arrangements include the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, which is tasked with supporting the peace agreement.¹¹ The agreement included the creation of a transitional justice system called the Comprehensive System for Peace, which is comprised of the Truth Commission, the Unit for the Search of Missing Persons (UBPD), and the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP).¹²

However, some members of the former FARC-EP did not participate in the peace agreement and set up dissident groups. In 2021, these groups engaged in violent attacks in different parts of Colombia despite the initial reduction in conflict-related violence resulting from the 2016 peace agreement.¹³ Further, 2021 marked the rise of historically large nationwide protests as a consequence of the stalled implementation of the peace agreement and tax reforms.

In August 2022, Gustavo Petro was elected Colombia’s first left-wing president. His election revived efforts to restart the peace process that had stalled.¹⁴ President Petro’s government announced a ‘Paz Total’ (‘Total Peace’) policy, which aims to achieve a full implementation of the 2016 peace agreement and ensure structural and social reform. The government is negotiating with ten armed groups as part of this strategy. Despite reaching temporary bilateral ceasefires with certain groups, no substantive peace agreements had been formalized at the time of reporting.¹⁵Indeed, since the middle of 2024, the level of violence has escalated significantly.

Escalating tension between armed groups in Catatumbo

The Catatumbo region, which is rich in mineral resources and provides ideal climatic conditions for coca cultivation, has been a traditional stronghold of the ELN, whose control was recently threatened by the growing presence of the Frente 33 of the EMBF, leading to an increase in armed clashes.¹⁶ On 16 January 2025, the ELN initiated a coordinated offensive in Catatumbo during which the group undertook house-to-house searches for former FARC fighters and conducted attacks on Catatumbo-based encampments of the EMBF’s Frente 33. The offensive continued until the end of the month, and resulted in the killing of more than 80 people, the forcible confinement of 24,000, and the displacement of a further 48,000.¹⁷ In response to this heightened armed group activity, on 31 January 2025, the Colombian and Venezuelan governments announced a joint “anti-narcotics military operation” in Catatumbo.¹⁸

Operación Perseo (Operation Perseus)

On 12 October 2024, the Ejército Nacional de Colombia (Colombian National Army) launched ‘Operación Perseo’, aiming to retake the town of El Plateado in the municipality of Argelia, in southern Cauca, a region with a strong presence of the EMC and the ELN and a high concentration of drug production.¹⁹ This operation forms part of the so-called ‘Misión Cauca’, the government’s project for the profound transformation of territories ravaged by armed conflict.²⁰ El Plateado, a town with approximately 8,000 inhabitants, has been an EMC stronghold for several years. The EMC controls illegal economic activity in this town, especially the production and trafficking of cocaine in the Cañón del Micay area.²¹

Ceasefires and the ‘total peace’ process

During the reporting period, several ceasefire agreements were reached and hostilities suspended as a part of President Petro’s ‘total peace’ policy. On 30 June 2023, however, the six-month bilateral ceasefires between the government and the Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada(ACSN), as well as with the Segunda Marquetalia (SM) ended.²² Both groups, though, subsequently initiated peace talks with the government – the SM in June 2024 and the ACSN in February 2025.²³ The talks with the ACSN remained ongoing at the time of writing, while the SM disengaged from the total peace process after its splintering in November 2024.²⁴

The Colombian government agreed to a bilateral ceasefire with the ELN for 180 days on 3 August 2023.²⁵ On 29 January 2024, the parties agreed on a seven-day extension after the expiration of the ceasefire to allow for discussions. This extension was contingent upon establishing specified terms.²⁶ Following protracted negotiations, a six-month extension was agreed on 5 February 2024, coming into effect the following day.²⁷ This bilateral ceasefire expired on 3 August 2024 and was not extended by the parties.²⁸ After peace talks had resumed in November 2024, they were again suspended in January 2025 following attacks carried out by the ELN in the Catatumbo region.²⁹

In addition to the agreement with the ELN, the government implemented a bilateral ceasefire with the EMC on 16 October 2023 for a period of three months.³⁰ This ceasefire agreement expired on 15 January 2024.³¹ The Government and the EMC agreed to an extension which came into effect on 16 January to 15 July 2024.³² However, after disagreements among members of the EMC, the EMBF formed as a splinter group.³³ The original EMC faction engaged with the government in a dialogue until 16 March 2024 when the government initiated a partial suspension of the ceasefire in the Cauca, Nariño and Valle del Cauca departments along the Pacific Coast.³⁴ This faction under the leadership of Iván Mordisco disengaged from peace talks following the April 2024 splintering of the group.³⁵

A bilateral ceasefire with the EMBF, which remained at the negotiating table after the split from EMC, was extended until 15 October 2024 and then again until 15 April 2025.³⁶ On 17 April 2025, President Petro’s government formally declared that the ceasefire with the EMBF would not be renewed, while emphasizing that the decision not to extend the truce under its original terms did not imply the suspension of or end to the peace talks.³⁷ However, only a few hours after the announcement of the end of the ceasefire, the Colombian president ordered a suspension of the offensive and of the special military operations by the police against members of the EMBF until 18 May 2025 and conditionally extended the previous ceasefire de facto.³⁸ The president concluded the ‘Catatumbo’ agreement with the EMBF’s Frente 33 in May 2025 to create a ‘Temporary Location Zone’ in a rural area of Tibú.³⁹ This zone could operate in a manner analogous to the areas established for the surrender of weapons and a return to civilian life for former guerrillas of the FARC-EP.⁴⁰

On 19 December 2024, at the government’s dialogue table with Comuneros del Sur there was an agreement to introduce a 180-day ceasefire from January 2025 and for a process to be initiated to destroy the group’s weapons.⁴¹ At the end of a meeting with the Comuneros del Sur on 6 April 2025, during which the armed group agreed to progressively disarm, the President ordered the destruction of more than 500 explosive devices that were handed over as a part of the peace agreement. This is widely recognized as the first significant achievement of Gustavo Petro’s ‘total peace’ process.⁴² The remainder of the weapons were expected to be handed over and destroyed before the end of July 2025 and the process is subject to international verification.⁴³ The Comuneros del Sur further consented to replacing 5,000 hectares under coca cultivation (for cocaine) with an alternative crop.⁴⁴ The seventh round of talks between Gustavo Petro’s government and the Southern Comuneros was held in Nariño on 10 June 2025. During the talks, the group reached four agreements, one of which was the creation of a Temporary Location Zone in the municipality of Mallama, Nariño.⁴⁵

A peace process is underway between the Colombian government and a splinter group of SM, Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB). At the close of a third round of talks in Bogotá on 12 February 2025, Geovany Andrés Rojas, alias Araña, was arrested by agents of the Attorney General’s Office, acting on an Interpol Red Notice of Extradition. The arrest temporarily suspended negotiations, the CNEB agreed to renew talks in April.⁴⁶ The preliminary agreements, reached at the fourth round of talks on 10 April 2025, include support for the voluntary substitution of illicit crops, the CNEB respecting IHL, and the definition of a ‘roadmap’ towards a definitive peace agreement.⁴⁷ The government also formally acknowledged the formation of so-called Temporary Location Zones on 25 May 2025 for demobilization, disarmament and reintegration programmes for dissident fighters and further aspects of the peace talks.⁴⁸ In July 2025, Agreement No 12 was ratified, establishing the ‘Delivery, Verification and Progressive Destruction of War Material’ and approving the ‘Protocol on the Process of Destruction of War Material’.⁴⁹

The splintering of several armed groups on Colombian territory

During the review period, several armed groups in Colombia splintered, resulting in further fragmentation and an even greater number of factions. This part of the report highlights three of the most significant of these splintering processes.

First, the ELN fragmented. On 7 May 2024, the Comuneros del Sur faction declared its complete disassociation from the ELN Central Command.⁵⁰ It blamed its decision on the ELN’s refusal to engage in more aggressive actions and on the prevailing leadership model of political exile in ELN structures.⁵¹ Reports suggest, however, that the splintering of the group is primarily due to disagreements concerning the distribution of criminal finances – the ELN Central Command intended to assume complete control of the illegal funds and the resources generated by the Comuneros del Sur in Nariño.⁵² The Colombian government consented to enter into a peace negotiation with Comuneros del Sur as an autonomous entity, as a result of the splintering of the ELN. ⁵³

The EMC experienced two significant divisions during the review period. The EMC is itself a splinter group that split from the pre-2016 FARC-EP. The first fragmentation occurred when the ‘Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez’ broke away from the EMC’s ‘Adán Izquierdo Company’.⁵⁴ Their departure occurred after a video circulated via social media on 27 November 2023, in which an individual known as ‘Óscar Barreto’ declared the establishment of a new group.⁵⁵ The rift between the two entities seemingly stemmed from their ideological disparity and disputes over territorial control.⁵⁶ The second split from the EMC during this period occurred on 6 April 2024 when the EMBF declared its separation from the EMC. This division is a result of tensions over the group’s participation in peace negotiations with Gustavo Petro’s government after the regional termination of the EMC’s March 2024 ceasefire. Following separation from the EMC, the EMBF continued to participate in peace negotiations with the government.⁵⁷

The third significant splinter event relates to the SM, which was formerly a part of the now defunct FARC-EP. The SM divided into two factions in November 2024.⁵⁸ The smaller faction continues to be designated the SM, whereas the larger breakaway group identifies as the CNEB. At the time of reporting, CNEB was engaged in peace talks with the government whereas Segunda Marquetalia is not.⁵⁹ The other two major armed groups operating in Colombia, the EGC and the ACSN, also known as Los Pachenca, did not undergo significant splintering during the reporting period.

Unprecedented series of bombings by EMC in June 2025 following the attempted assassination of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe in Bogotá

On 10 June 2025, the FARC-EP dissident group EMC, led by a commander known as ‘Iván Mordisco’, launched an unparalleled series of synchronised bombings across the departments of Cauca and Valle de Cauca along the Pacific coast.⁶⁰ About twenty-six attacks, which included car bombs and drones, were directed at police stations and patrols, some of which took place in Colombia’s third-largest city, Cali.⁶¹

The towns of Buenos Aires, Caloto, Corinto, Jamundí, and Morales have been hit by further attacks, according to the Ministry of Defence.⁶² Carlos Fernando Triana, the national police chief, stated that the attackers had used a variety of weapons in their attack, including car bombs, motorcycle bombs, rifle fire, and a suspected drone.⁶³ At least two police officers and five civilians were killed in the attacks, and at least fifty people were wounded.⁶⁴ In response, operations were immediately launched by security forces against the EMC in the region. ‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group. The assaults occurred just days after an attempted assassination of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe on 7 June 2025 in Bogotá, which put the country on heightened alert and signalled an escalation in Colombia’s security crisis.⁶⁵

Increasing numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs)

It is reported that around 7.3 million people were internally displaced at the end of 2024 due to ongoing conflict and drug-related violence.⁶⁶ This figure represents a very large increase on the 5.1 million recorded in 2023.⁶⁷ However, some of the increase is attributable to the government’s adjustment of the number of individuals who continue to encounter vulnerabilities associated with their displacement.⁶⁸ Norte de Santander, the Catatumbo region that borders Venezuela, witnessed a substantial surge in violence and displacement, particularly towards the end of 2024, resulting in a significant influx of individuals into urban areas.⁶⁹ In Colombia, however, it is difficult to attribute IDPs exclusively to NIAC-related fighting or to the omnipresent gang violence associated with the drug trade.⁷⁰

State Parties

Colombia

Non-State parties

Comuneros del Sur
Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)
Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC) (formerly Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC))
Estado Mayor de los Bloques y el Frente (EMBF)
Comandos de la Frontera (CDF) of Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB)
Estado Mayor Central (EMC)
Segunda Marquetalia (SM)
Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez (Frente 57)

Non-State Actors

Comuneros del Sur
Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB)

1
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.44.
2
M. L. Perez, ‘Kolumbien’, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 31 March 2025.
3
C. Klobucista and D. Renwick, ‘Colombia’s Civil Conflict’, US Council of Foreign Relations, 11 January 2017.
4
C. Klobucista and D. Renwick, ‘Colombia’s Civil Conflict’, Council of Foreign Relations, 11 January 2017.
5
C. Klobucista and D. Renwick, ‘Colombia’s Civil Conflict’, Council of Foreign Relations, 11 January 2017.
6
‘United States Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs: International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 1: Drug and Chemical Control’, United States Department of State, March 2025, 168; ‘Colombia: Events of 2024’, Human Rights Watch.
7
C. Klobucista and D. Renwick, ‘Colombia’s Civil Conflict’, Council of Foreign Relations, 11 January 2017.
8
C. Klobucista and D. Renwick, ‘Colombia’s Civil Conflict’, Council of Foreign Relations, 11 January 2017.
9
C. Klobucista and D. Renwick, ‘Colombia’s Civil Conflict’, Council of Foreign Relations, 11 January 2017.
10
M. L. Perez, ‘Kolumbien’, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 31 March 2025.
11
‘Colombia’, Servicestelle Friedensbildung Baden-Württenberg.
12
M. L. Perez, ‘Kolumbien’, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 31 March 2025.
13
‘Colombia’, Servicestelle Friedensbildung Baden-Württenberg.
14
M. L. Perez, ‘Kolumbien’, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 31 March 2025.
15
M. L. Perez, ‘Kolumbien’, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 31 March 2025.
16
‘Colombia y Venezuela lanzan una operación militar conjunta en la convulsa región de Catatumbo’, Europa Press, 31 January 2025.
17
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group.
18
‘Colombia y Venezuela lanzan una operación militar conjunta en la convulsa región de Catatumbo’, Europa Press, 31 January 2025; ‘Venezuela y Colombia inician operación militar conjunta en la frontera’, Voice of America, 31 January 2025; J. Frexies, ‘Colombia and Venezuela Launch Joint Military Operation in Catatumbo’, Colombia One, 31 January 2025.
19
S. Rivas, ‘Las Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia lanzan la Operación Perseo contra la guerrilla’, Pucará defensa, 12 October 2024; J. P. C. ‘¿En qué va la operación Perseo en contra de las disidencias de las Farc en el Cañón del Micay?’, Cambio, 1 January 2025.
20
J. P. Contreras Ríos, ‘El Plateado: así se vive tras 100 días de la operación para retomar fortín del EMC’, El Espectador, 25 January 2025.
21
J. P. Contreras Ríos, ‘El Plateado: así se vive tras 100 días de la operación para retomar fortín del EMC’, El Espectador, 25 January 2025.
22
‘Conquering Self Defense Forces of the Sierra Nevada (ACSN)’, InSight Crime, 11 October 2024; ‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group; ‘Decreto 2659 de 2022’, Función pública, 31 December 2022; ‘Decreto 2660 de 2022’, Función pública, 31 December 2022.
23
O. Fajardo, ‘Comienza en Caracas la mesa de diálogo entre el Gobierno de Colombia y Segunda Marquetalia’, CNN Colombia, 24 June 2024; V. Amaya, ‘Comenzó la mesa de diálogo entre Gobierno colombiano y Segunda Marquetalia en busca de la paz’, RFI, 25 June 2024; V. Peñaloza and L. Pérez, ‘Gobierno nacional y Autodefensas Conquistadoras anuncian primeros compromisos de los diálogos de paz’, Radio Nacional de Colombia, 13 March 2025; J. Bernal, ‘Gobierno Petro comenzará diálogos de paz con las Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada’, Infobae, 23 February 2025.
24
‘ACSN Peace Talks Timeline’, ABColombia; ‘Segunda Marquetalia: Peace Talks with Colombian Government’, ABColombia.
25
M. Pérez Gallardo, ‘Colombia: entra en vigor el cese al fuego de 180 días entre el Gobierno y la guerrilla del ELN’, France 24, 4 August 2023; D. Díaz, ‘El cese al fuego más esperado de la Paz Total entra en vigor’, El Pais, 3 August 2023.
26
M. A. Rodríguez, ‘Gobierno y ELN: cese al fuego bilateral será sometido a evaluación para definir nueva prórroga’, Infobae, 29 January 2024; ‘El Gobierno de Colombia y el ELN acuerdan extender el cese del fuego hasta el 5 de febrero’, CNN Español, 29 January 2024.
27
‘Colombia y ELN anuncian una ampliación del cese al fuego’, Deutsche Welle, 6 February 2024; ‘Colombia agrees with ELN rebel group to extend truce’, Al Jazeera, 6 February 2024.
28
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group; B. F. Valencia Ríos, ‘Finalizó el cese al fuego con el ELN y no hubo prórroga, ¿diálogos de paz en veremos? ’, El Colombiano, 4 August 2024.
29
‘ELN Peace Talks Timeline’, ABColombia; W. Gazeau, ‘El Gobierno colombiano y el ELN anuncian que reactivarán las negociaciones de paz’, France24, 7 November 2024; ‘Presidente Petro suspende diálogos con el Eln tras “crímenes de guerra” en el Catatumbo’, Presidencia, 17 January 2025.
30
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group; ‘Decreto 1684 de 2023: Nivel Nacional’, Régimen legal de Bogotá DC, 16 October 2023.
31
‘Decreto de cese al fuego bilateral y temporal de carácter nacional entre el gobierno nacional y el autodenominado EMCFARC’, Indepaz, 16 October 2023; C. A. Morales Castillo and G. Castrillón Pulido, ‘Con decreto de cese al fuego, se instala mesa de diálogo con disidencia de Mordisco’, El Espectador,17 October 2023.
32
P. A. Marín Molano, ‘2024 año crucial en la Mesa de Diálogos entre el EMC y el Gobierno Nacional’, Pares, 18 January 2024; ‘Gobierno extiende hasta julio el cese al fuego con el Estado Mayor Central tregua de las Farc’, Radio Nacional de Colombia, 14 January 2024.
33
R. Cué Barberena, ‘El Gobierno colombiano finaliza tregua con el EMC, aunque la mantiene con algunas facciones’, France 24, 17 July 2024; ‘Gobierno de Colombia suspende cese al fuego con una parte del EMC’, Voice of America, 16 July 2024.
34
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group; ‘Gobierno de Colombia suspende cese al fuego con una parte del EMC’, Voice of America, 16 July 2024.
35
‘General Staff of Blocks and Front (EMBF)’, InSight Crime, 31 July 2025.
36
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group; R. Cué Barberena, ‘El Gobierno colombiano finaliza tregua con el EMC, aunque la mantiene con algunas facciones’, France 24, 17 July 2024; ‘Gobierno de Colombia suspende cese al fuego con una parte del EMC’, Voice of America, 16 July 2024.
37
‘Es oficial: Gobierno no autorizó ampliación del cese el fuego con disidencia de Calarcá’, El Espectador, 17 April 2025; J. Márquez, ‘Alerta máxima en el Catatumbo tras fin del cese al fuego bilateral con el EMBF de las FARC’, Caracol Radio, 17 April 2025; Observatorio de Derechos Humanos y Conflictividades de Indepaz, ‘Prórroga de un mes del cese al fuego con el EMBF: Impactos y Perspectivas’, Indepaz, 18 April 2025.
38
‘Gobierno prorroga cese al fuego bilateral, únicamente con cuatro grupos del denominado Estado Mayor al mando de alias ‘Calarcá’: Mindefensa’, Presidencia, 19 April 2025; ‘Gobierno prorroga por un mes cese al fuego con disidencias de las Farc’, Legis ámbito jurídico, 21 April 2025.
39
J. Camilo Colorado, ‘Gobierno y disidencias de las Farc acuerdan zona de paz en la región de Catatumbo’, La Republica, 4 May 2025; ‘Presidente destaca acuerdo con el Frente 33 para la creación de zona de paz en el Catatumbo’, Presidencia, 3 May 2025.
40
‘Gobierno y Frente 33 de disidencia Calarcá acuerdan zona de preagrupamiento en Catatumbo’, El Espectador, 4 May 2025.
41
J. Pablo Patiño, ‘Gobierno y Comuneros del Sur acordaron cese al fuego y destrucción de armas, ¿cómo será?’, eColombiano, 20 December 2024; C. Burgos, ‘Gobierno nacional y Comuneros del Sur acordaron cese al fuego bilateral de seis meses’, Radio Nacional de Colombia, 22 December 2024.
42
‘Gobierno nacional y Comuneros del Sur firmaron este sábado dos acuerdos históricos como parte del proceso paz territorial en Nariño’, Presidencia, 5 April 2025; ‘La guerrilla disidente colombiana del ELN acuerda desarmarse, aunque la ‘paz total’ sigue siendo difícil de alcanzar’, WOLA, 6 May 2025; ‘La negociación con el frente Comuneros Sur: primera victora de la paz total de Petro’, Pares, 8 April 2025.
43
‘Las claves de la entrega de armas de Comuneros del Sur, la primera en Gobierno Petro’, El Espectador, 7 April 2025; S. Rodriguez Álverez, ‘Comuneros del Sur: Petro se anota un triunfo y avanza en nuevo modelo de paz’, La Silla Vacía, 7 April 2025.
44
M. Saiz, ‘Comuneros del Sur Disarming Marks Small Win for Colombia’s Total Peace’, InSight Crime, 9 April 2025; ‘La guerrilla disidente colombiana del ELN acuerda desarmarse, aunque la ‘paz total’ sigue siendo difícil de alcanzar’, WOLA, 6 May 2025.
45
‘Gobierno Petro anuncia otra Zona de Ubicación: será con Comuneros del Sur’, El Espectador, 10 June 2025; P. T. C. and P. G. T., ‘Las dudas de la mesa con Comuneros del Sur, la disidencia del ELN en Nariño’, Fundación ideas para la paz, 7 July 2025.
46
S. Torrado, ‘Claves de los diálogos de paz con la Segunda Marquetalia y la Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano’, El Pais, 13 February 2025; N. R. Matta Colorado, ‘Alias Araña cayó por traficar mientras negociaba la paz’, eColombiano, 14 February 2025; L. Martínez, ‘Gobierno y Coordinadora Nacional del Ejército Bolivariano, continuarán con diálogos’, Asuntos Legales, 16 March 2025.
47
F. Saavedra, ‘Así quedó el acuerdo entre el Gobierno y la Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano para erradicar 30.000 hectáreas de coca en Putumayo y Nariño’, Infobae, 2 April 2025; ‘Gobierno y Coordinadora Bolivariana firman tres acuerdos preliminares’, Agencia Prensa Rural, 11 April 2025.
48
A. Alsema, ‘Colombia to create three guerrilla demobilization zones’, Colombia Reports, 26 May 2025; ‘Colombia to Create Three Guerrilla Demobilization Zones’, International Center for Transitional Justice, 26 May 2025.
49
E. J. Alonso Dorado, ‘Gobierno y CNEB firman acuerdo para la entrega y destrucción de más de 13 toneladas de material de guerra’, El Tiempo, 20 July 2025.
50
L. Caicedo, ‘Comuneros del Sur: ¿cómo es el frente ‘rebelde’ que se separó del ELN?’, Caracol Radio, 8 May 2024.
51
‘El Frente Comuneros del Sur, la primera disidencia del ELN’, Cambio, 9 May 2024.
52
L. Caicedo, ‘Comuneros del Sur: ¿cómo es el frente ‘rebelde’ que se separó del ELN?’, Caracol Radio, 8 May 2024.
53
‘National Liberation Army (Colombia)’, Mapping Militants Project, 3 December 2024; ‘Colombia recognizes dissident ELN faction as independent organization’, Reuters, 8 May 2024.
54
M. Benavides Cadena, ‘Nueva disidencia en el Valle, ‘Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez’. ¿Quién la lidera?’, Caracol Radio, 2 April 2024.
55
L. S. Cardona Ruiz, ‘Análisis: Así opera el Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez que genera zozobra en el Valle’, El Pais, 30 March 2025; ‘Este es el nuevo frente de las disidencias de las Farc que llegó al norte del Cauca; es comandando por un sanguinario que asesinó a varios cabecillas para llegar al poder’, Semana, 10 August 2024.
56
M. Benavides Cadena, ‘Nueva disidencia en el Valle, ‘Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez’. ¿Quién la lidera?’, Caracol Radio, 2 April 2024.
57
J. P. Contreras Ríos, ‘Así nació el grupo que se separó de Mordisco y que ahora negocia la paz con Petro’, El Espectador, 4 December 2024.
58
‘Lo que debe saber del grupo armado separado de Iván Márquez que negocia con el Gobierno’, El Espectador, 27 November 2024.
59
UNSC, ‘United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia: Report of the Secretary General’, UN Doc S/2024/986, 26 December 2024; L. J. Acosta, ‘Colombia rebel group Segunda Marquetalia splits, but peace talks go on’, Reuters, 20 November 2024; S. Garcia, ‘What an Internal Split Means for Colombia’s Second Marquetalia’, InSight Crime, 27 November 2024.
60
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group; ‘At least seven dead and 50 wounded as Colombia hit with bombings and gun attacks’, The Guardian, 10 June 2025; A. Alsema, ‘At least three killed in wave of bomb attacks in southwest Colombia’, Colombia Reports, 10 June 2025; K. Johnson, ‘Ataques en Cauca y Valle: ¿otra ronda de lo mismo’, Razon Publica, 15 June 2025.
61
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group; ‘At least seven dead and 50 wounded as Colombia hit with bombings and gun attacks’, The Guardian, 10 June 2025; A. Alsema, ‘At least three killed in wave of bomb attacks in southwest Colombia’, Colombia Reports, 10 June 2025; ‘Siete muertos en múltiples ataques con disparos y explosivos de guerrilleros en Colombia’, RFI, 10 June 2025 (Updated 11 June 2025).
62
A. Alsema, ‘At least three killed in wave of bomb attacks in southwest Colombia’, Colombia Reports, 10 June 2025.
63
‘At least seven dead and 50 wounded as Colombia hit with bombings and gun attacks’, The Guardian, 10 June 2025.
64
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group; ‘At least seven dead and 50 wounded as Colombia hit with bombings and gun attacks’, The Guardian, 10 June 2025.
65
‘At least seven dead and 50 wounded as Colombia hit with bombings and gun attacks’, The Guardian, 10 June 2025; S. Jones, ‘Shot Colombian presidential candidate survives emergency surgery’, The Guardian, 8 June 2025; ‘At least 7 killed in explosions and attacks outside police stations in southwest Colombia’, AP News, 11 June 2025; K. Johnson, ‘Ataques en Cauca y Valle: ¿otra ronda de lo mismo’, Razon Publica, 15 June 2025.
66
‘Colombia’, International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 14 May 2025.
67
‘Colombia’, International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 14 May 2025.
68
‘Colombia’, International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 14 May 2025.
69
‘Colombia’, International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 14 May 2025.
70
S. Rodriguez and Georgetown University Latin America & Caribbean Policy Association, ‘Internal Displacement in Colombia: Characterization and Relevant Research Findings’, Georgetown Public Policy Review, 25 January 2024; V. Sainz, ‘Forced to Flee: The Global Impact of Conflict-Driven Internal Displacement’, Atlas Institute for International Affairs, 14 April 2025.

Colombia (2026-05-01)

July 2023 - June 2025

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (between July 2023 and May 2025)