Colombia (2026-07-23)

As oy May 2026, multiple non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) were ongoing in Colombia. At least four NIACs took place to which Colombia was a party:

Colombia v. Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)
Colombia v. Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC) (formerly Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC))
Colombia v. Estado Mayor Central (EMC)
Colombia v. Comandos de la Frontera (CDF)

Additionally, at least six other NIACs between armed groups were ongoing:

ELN v. the EGC
ELN v. Frente 33 of the Estado Mayor de los Bloques y el Frente (EMBF)
EMC v. Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez
EMC v. the EGC
EMC v. the ELN
EMC v. Segunda Marquetalia (SM)
EMC v. the EMBF

Colombia is a State Party to Additional Protocol II of 1977. All four of the NIACs to which Colombia is a party continue to meet the additional requirements of Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II, meaning that this treaty is applicable in addition to the rules of customary international humanitarian law (IHL).

Additional Protocol II does not apply to the NIACs between organized armed groups who are not fighting the territorial State (Colombia in this case) as Article 1(1) of the Protocol is limited to situations where the territorial State is confronting a non-State armed group.¹ The law of NIAC, in particular Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other rules of customary IHL, applies to these situations.

During the 1960s, Marxist campesino and student guerrilla groups emerged in Colombia in response to conditions of an unequal land distribution and land ownership policy that benefitted large landowning interests, multinational agribusiness, and mining companies.² Between 1948 and 1958, Colombia experienced a decade of political violence known as La Violencia. It is in this period that the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo(FARC-EP) and the ELN were established.³ Subsequently, landowners organized to protect themselves against guerrilla groups and, in turn, spurred the emergence of right-wing paramilitary groups in the 1980s. The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) was the largest of these paramilitary groups.⁴

The FARC-EP and the ELN have a history of relying on violence, abduction and extortion to raise revenue and gain leverage over their adversaries. Allegedly, Colombian guerrilla groups kidnapped more than 25,000 people between 1970 and 2010.⁵

Historically, the illicit trade in drugs has been a driver of the conflict in Colombia.⁶ At the start of the twenty-first century, Colombia was responsible for up to ninety per cent of global cocaine production. Simultaneously, multiple non-State armed groups profited from the cocaine trade and competition over territory among these groups provoked further armed violence.⁷

In 2002, Álvaro Uribe won the presidential elections and took a strong stance against the guerrilla groups. Uribe managed to reduce significantly the number of murders and kidnappings, although human rights groups accused the government of human rights abuses. In 2004, the AUC disarmed during the Uribe presidency. However, red flags were raised concerning possible ties between Uribe and the paramilitary groups.⁸

In 2010, Juan Manuel Santos, the Minister of Defence under President Uribe, was himself elected president of Colombia. In 2012, formal peace talks with the FARC-EP were initiated by his government. By the middle of 2016, the Colombian government under Santos and the FARC-EP led by Rodrigo Londoño had agreed to a ceasefire, which the leadership signed in Cartagena in September 2016.⁹

As a result of the peace agreement, more than 13,000 FARC-EP members have laid down their weapons. The FARC-EP formed a political party under the name ‘Comunes’ and was awarded five guaranteed seats in the Senate and the House of Representatives for the period of two subsequent legislative sessions.¹⁰

Post-peace agreement arrangements include the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, which is tasked with supporting the peace agreement.¹¹ The agreement included the creation of a transitional justice system called the Comprehensive System for Peace, which is comprised of the Truth Commission, the Unit for the Search of Missing Persons (UBPD), and the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP).¹²

However, some members of the former FARC-EP did not participate in the peace agreement and set up dissident groups. In 2021, these groups engaged in violent attacks in different parts of Colombia despite the initial reduction in conflict-related violence resulting from the 2016 peace agreement.¹³ Further, 2021 marked the rise of historically large nationwide protests as a consequence of the stalled implementation of the peace agreement and tax reforms.

In August 2022, Gustavo Petro was elected Colombia’s first left-wing president. His election revived efforts to restart the peace process that had stalled.¹⁴ President Petro’s government announced a ‘Paz Total’ (‘Total Peace’) policy, which aims to achieve a full implementation of the 2016 peace agreement and ensure structural and social reform. The government is negotiating with ten armed groups as part of this strategy. Despite reaching temporary bilateral ceasefires with certain groups, no substantive peace agreements had been formalized as of end May 2026.¹⁵Indeed, since the middle of 2024, the level of violence has escalated significantly. Additionally, a surge in splintering processes within numerous armed groups was observable during 2023 and 2024 due to a divide between members who were in support of or opposed to entering peace talks with the Colombian government (see previous version).

Escalating tension between armed groups in Catatumbo

The Catatumbo region, which is rich in mineral resources and provides ideal climatic conditions for coca cultivation, has been a traditional stronghold of the ELN, whose control was recently threatened by the growing presence of the Frente 33 of the EMBF, leading to an increase in armed clashes.¹⁶ On 16 January 2025, the ELN initiated a coordinated offensive in Catatumbo during which the group undertook house-to-house searches for former FARC fighters and conducted attacks on Catatumbo-based encampments of the EMBF’s Frente 33. The offensive continued until the end of the month, and resulted in the killing of more than 80 people, the forcible confinement of 24,000, and the displacement of a further 48,000.¹⁷ In response to this heightened armed group activity, on 31 January 2025, the Colombian and Venezuelan governments announced a joint “anti-narcotics military operation” in Catatumbo.¹⁸

Ceasefires and the ‘total peace’ process

During 2025 and 2026, several ceasefire agreements were reached and hostilities suspended as a part of President Petro’s ‘total peace’ policy. The Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada (ACSN) initiated peace talks with the government in February 2025.

The talks with the ACSN are ongoing as of May 2026.¹⁹ Following Segunda Marquetalia’s (SM) disengagement from the total peace process in late 2024, ²⁰ Colombia’s Attorney General reactivated arrest warrants against six former members of SM’s delegation to the peace talks in July 2025.²¹ In October 2025, the Colombian government also revoked SM leader Iván Márquez’s status as a peace negotiator due to inactivity.²²

After peace talks with the ELN had resumed in November 2024, they were again suspended in January 2025 following attacks carried out by the ELN in the Catatumbo region.²³ On 13 October 2025, Petro signalled his interest in reopening talks with the ELN.²⁴ Two months later, in December 2025, one of the ELN’s leading figures, Antonio García, indicated the group’s willingness to return to the negotiating table.²⁵ In February 2026, the ELN met with government representatives and members of the ‘International Community and the Colombian Episcopal Conference’ to discuss the possibility of resuming negotiations. They further declared a unilateral ceasefire on 23 February 2026 to ensure stability leading up to the 8 March 2026 congressional elections and one on 20 May 2026 ahead of the presidential elections.²⁶ As of end May 2026, peace talks between both parties have not formally resumed.

A bilateral ceasefire with the EMBF, which remained at the negotiating table after the split from EMC, was extended until 15 April 2025.²⁷ On 17 April 2025, President Petro’s government formally declared that the ceasefire with the EMBF would not be renewed, while emphasizing that the decision not to extend the truce under its original terms did not imply the suspension of or end to the peace talks.²⁸ However, only a few hours after the announcement of the end of the ceasefire, the Colombian president ordered a suspension of the offensive and of the special military operations by the police against members of the EMBF until 18 May 2025 and conditionally extended the previous ceasefire de facto.²⁹ The president concluded the ‘Catatumbo’ agreement with the EMBF’s Frente 33 in May 2025 to create a ‘Temporary Location Zone’ in a rural area of Tibú.³⁰ This zone could operate in a manner analogous to the areas established for the surrender of weapons and a return to civilian life for former guerrillas of the FARC-EP.³¹ In the aftermath of the failed renewal of the bilateral ceasefire between the Colombian government and the EMBF, the group requested to hold renewed talks on 16 June 2025.³² Both parties returned to the negotiating table on 23 July 2025 and talks the months.³³ An agreement was reached during the seventh round of negotiations in November 2025, and involved pledges to de-escalate the conflict.³⁴

On 19 December 2024, at the government’s dialogue table with Comuneros del Sur there was an agreement to introduce a 180-day ceasefire from January 2025 and for a process to be initiated to destroy the group’s weapons.³⁵ At the end of a meeting with the Comuneros del Sur on 6 April 2025, during which the armed group agreed to progressively disarm, the President ordered the destruction of more than 500 explosive devices that were handed over as a part of the peace agreement. This is widely recognized as the first significant achievement of Gustavo Petro’s ‘total peace’ process.³⁶ The remainder of the weapons were expected to be handed over and destroyed before the end of July 2025 and the process is subject to international verification.³⁷ The Comuneros del Sur further consented to replacing 5,000 hectares under coca cultivation (for cocaine) with an alternative crop.³⁸ The seventh round of talks between Gustavo Petro’s government and the Comuneros del Surwas held in Nariño on 10 June 2025. During the talks, the group reached four agreements, one of which was the creation of a Temporary Location Zone in the municipality of Mallama, Nariño.³⁹ The eighth round of talks concluded in February 2026 with the group pledging neutrality in the March 2026 congressional elections and approving the protocols for the operation of and movement to the Temporary Location Zone in Mallama.⁴⁰

A peace process is underway between the Colombian government and a splinter group of SM, Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB). At the close of a third round of talks in Bogotá on 12 February 2025, Geovany Andrés Rojas, alias Araña, was arrested by agents of the Attorney General’s Office, acting on an Interpol Red Notice of Extradition. The arrest temporarily suspended negotiations, the CNEB agreed to renew talks in April.⁴¹ The preliminary agreements, reached at the fourth round of talks on 10 April 2025, include support for the voluntary substitution of illicit crops, the CNEB respecting IHL, and the definition of a ‘roadmap’ towards a definitive peace agreement.⁴² The government also formally acknowledged the formation of so-called Temporary Location Zones on 25 May 2025 for demobilization, disarmament and reintegration programmes for dissident fighters and further aspects of the peace talks.⁴³ In July 2025, Agreement No 12 was ratified, establishing the ‘Delivery, Verification and Progressive Destruction of War Material’ and approving the ‘Protocol on the Process of Destruction of War Material’.⁴⁴ The dialogue suffered a setback on 12 September 2025, when negotiations were suspended in the aftermath of an attack that killed two soldiers in Putumayo. Talks resumed on 8 October 2025 and led to the handing over of the first batch of the group’s armaments in mid-October.⁴⁵ The sixth round of talks was held in early December 2025, leading to the agreement on the implementation of two Temporary Location Zones.⁴⁶ Although peace talks were suspended multiple times during early 2026, parties formally declared the resumption of negotiations on 26 April 2026.⁴⁷

After months of rapprochement efforts, the Colombian government announced in August 2025 that it would formally hold peace talks with the EGC in Doha mediated by Qatar.⁴⁸ The first round of talks was held between 14 and 18 September 2025.⁴⁹ On 13 October 2025, EGC pledged neutrality in the May 2026 presidential elections.⁵⁰ During the second round of talks in early December 2025, the parties agreed to launch more pilot projects to reduce violence and promote rural development, as well as the establishment of three Temporary Location Zones where EGC fighters are expected to gather from 1 March 2026 as part of a phased disarmament process.⁵¹ Although the US authorities designated the EGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on 16 December 2025, they later provided cautious encouragement for Qatar’s mediation initiative.⁵² In February 2026, the negotiations suffered a setback when EGC temporarily halted its participation in the talks after its leader was placed on the government’s capture list, but the talks later resumed.⁵³ The Colombian government issued arrest warrants for EGC leaders on 9 March 2026, claiming that the group had failed to fulfil its commitments under the Doha talks.⁵⁴However, to revive the ongoing peace process with the group, President Petro formally requested Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office to suspend arrest warrants and extradition requests for the EGC leaders on 8 May 2026.⁵⁵ This move was, however opposed by Colombia’s judiciary.⁵⁶

Unprecedented series of bombings by EMC in June 2025 following the attempted assassination of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe in Bogotá

On 10 June 2025, the FARC-EP dissident group EMC, led by a commander known as ‘Iván Mordisco’, launched an unparalleled series of synchronised bombings across the departments of Cauca and Valle de Cauca along the Pacific coast.⁵⁷ About twenty-six attacks, which included car bombs and drones, were directed at police stations and patrols, some of which took place in Colombia’s third-largest city, Cali.⁵⁸

The towns of Buenos Aires, Caloto, Corinto, Jamundí, and Morales have been hit by further attacks, according to the Ministry of Defence.⁵⁹ Carlos Fernando Triana, the national police chief, stated that the attackers had used a variety of weapons in their attack, including car bombs, motorcycle bombs, rifle fire, and a suspected drone.⁶⁰ At least two police officers and five civilians were killed in the attacks, and at least fifty people were wounded.⁶¹ In response, operations were immediately launched by security forces against the EMC in the region.⁶² The assaults occurred just days after an attempted assassination of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe on 7 June 2025 in Bogotá (see below), which put the country on heightened alert and signalled an escalation in Colombia’s security crisis.⁶³

Death of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe

Miguel Uribe, Colombian senator and May 2026 presidential candidate for the right-wing opposition party Democratic Centre (Centro Democrático), was attacked at a campaign event in Colombia’s capital Bogotá on 7 June 2025.⁶⁴ The assailant shot him once in the leg and twice in the head with a 9mm Glock at close range, firing a dozen times in total. Uribe survived emergency surgery,⁶⁵ but remained in intensive care for nine weeks and underwent numerous additional surgeries.⁶⁶ In response to this uptick in political violence, a wave of protests dubbed ‘March of Silence’ broke out in major Colombian cities on 15 June 2025.⁶⁷

On 5 July 2025, an arrest was made in connection to the 7 June shooting – José Arteaga Hernández, alias ‘El Costanzo’, was accused of organizing the logistics for the attack.⁶⁸ Reports later emerged that the Attorney General’s office suspected a senior member of SM, known as ‘Zarco Aldinever’, of involvement in the shooting.⁶⁹ As of end May 2026, a total of six people have been arrested in connection with the incident, including a teenage boy who is the alleged shooter. He was reportedly hired by a local drug lord.⁷⁰ On 11 August 2025, two months after the assassination attempt, Uribe succumbed to his injuries. He was thirty-nine years old.⁷¹

Following another incident on 13 August 2025, in which congressman Julio César Triana’s vehicle came under attack,⁷² Defence Minister Pedro Sánchez presented plans for large-scale security deployments ahead of the 2026 election.⁷³

Former President Álvaro Uribe found guilty of witness tampering

On 28 July 2025, a Colombian district court found Álvaro Uribe, the former President of the country between 2002 and 2010, guilty of witness tampering and bribery.⁷⁴ The underlying case, which served as the basis for this conviction, saw Uribe accuse left-wing senator Iván Cepeda of plotting to link him to right-wing paramilitaries in Colombia in 2012. In 2018, the Supreme Court dismissed the case against Cepeda and launched an inquiry into whether Uribe had bribed and coerced imprisoned former paramilitaries who had revealed his connections with the United Self Defence Forces of Colombia into altering their testimony.⁷⁵ The July 2025 case constituted the first-ever criminal conviction of a former Colombian head of State.⁷⁶ Uribe was given a twelve-year prison sentence.⁷⁷ The sentence was, however, overturned by the Appeals Court on 21 October 2025, which order twelve years’ house arrest instead.⁷⁸

Heightened tensions between Colombia and United States

The feud between President Trump and President Petro began shortly after Trump’s re-election when both leaders exchanged threats on social media regarding the fate of two United States (US) deportation flights on 26 January 2025.⁷⁹ During 2025 and 2026, the relations between Colombia and the US sharply deteriorated. In late June 2025, President Petro claimed that there was a planned coup d’état against him involving Colombian and American politicians, after El País published recordings suggesting that former Foreign Minister Álvaro Leyva was involved. Following these allegations, the US government recalled its chargé d’affaires to Colombia, John McNamara. In response, the Colombian government recalled its ambassador to Washington for ‘consultation’.⁸⁰ In a further sign of escalation, on 30 July 2025, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio accused Colombia’s judicial authorities of engaging in a political smear campaign, following the conviction of Álvaro Uribe (see above).⁸¹

Against the backdrop of disagreements over drug policy and armed group negotiations as well as the record-high levels of coca crop cultivation and cocaine production during Petro’s presidency, the United States decertified Colombia for failing to cooperate in the ‘war on drugs’ on 15 September 2025. This was the first time this had happened since 1996. The US decision, however, came with a full National Interest Waiver, which permits the continuation of financial support and cooperation.⁸² Despite this political ‘warning shot’, the fact that Colombia was not materially cut off speaks to the closeness of the cooperation between the two States and their interdependence, which is rooted in their joint fight against organized crime.⁸³ Petro denounced the move as political, publicly declared that Colombia would no longer purchase weapons from the United States, and critiqued US drug policy at the United Nations General Assembly on 23 September 2025.⁸⁴ Tensions mounted further after Petro attended a pro-Palestine march in New York on 26 September 2025, on the sidelines of the General Assembly, and called on US troops to ‘not point their rifles at humanity’ and to defy Trump’s orders. This move caused the US government to annul his visa.⁸⁵

The relationship remained strained over the following months. On 8 October 2025, Petro publicly denounced the US military operations in the southern Caribbean and Venezuela.⁸⁶ US President Trump, in turn, made accusations of drug trafficking against Petro and threatened to withdraw all remaining aid to the country on 19 October 2025. The Colombian government swiftly denied these allegations.⁸⁷ In an unprecedented move, Petro and his family, as well as Colombia’s Interior Minister, Armando Benedetti, were sanctioned by the US Treasury on 24 October 2025 for supposedly permitting drug cartels to ‘flourish’.⁸⁸

On 10 December 2025, Trump threatened to take military action against Colombia, stating that Petro ‘will be next’ after Venezuela.⁸⁹ He reiterated this threat after Petro publicly denounced the US ‘Operation Absolute Resolve’ in Venezuela on 3 January 2026, which led to the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.⁹⁰ In response, Petro called for mass protests to defend Colombian sovereignty, adding that he would consider taking up arms if necessary.⁹¹

In a sign of de-escalation, Trump and Petro held their first direct phone call on 7 January 2026, during which Petro labelled the disagreement as a misunderstanding and expressed a readiness to take stricter action against the ELN. Both leaders agreed to meet at the White House ‘in the near future’.⁹² Shortly afterward, on 13 January 2026, Colombia’s Defence Minister Pedro Sánchez visited Washington DC and called for greater US military support in the fight against drug trafficking.⁹³ Following an eight-month freeze, the Colombian government declared its intention to reinstate deportation flights from the United States in January 2026 after Trump had threatened the imposition of tariffs.⁹⁴ Meanwhile, several Colombian guerrilla groups, including the EMC and the ELN, formed plans to join forces against US ‘imperialism’.⁹⁵

On 3 February 2026, Petro and Trump held their first face-to-face meeting at the White House in Washington. Both Presidents described the meeting as productive and positive. Petro reiterated his commitment to counter-narcotics cooperation, vowing to ramp up efforts to apprehend high-value targets such as ‘Chiquito Malo’ of the EGC, ‘Pablito’ of the ELN, and ‘Iván Mordisco’ of the EMC. Petro also sought Trump’s assistance in mediating the escalating trade dispute with Ecuador (see below).⁹⁶ Since the talks, tensions between the two governments have eased significantly. On 20 March 2026, however, reports emerged that the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) had labelled Petro a ‘priority target’ amid an investigation by US federal prosecutors into his alleged involvement in drug trafficking. Petro repeatedly denied these allegations. As a consequence, on 31 March US officials decided not to bring criminal charges against him for the time being.⁹⁷

Petro hardens his stance towards armed groups

During a speech in Valledupar on 21 August 2025, Colombian President Petro declared that his government would designate the EGC, EMC and SM as ‘terrorist organizations’ and called on the international community to do the same. This statement was made in the context of attacks that had occurred the day prior in Amalfi and Cali, which resulted in the death of eight National Police officers and two civilians. He further announced that the Colombian government will initiate legal actions so that the leaders of these armed groups are prosecuted for crimes against humanity and that it will request the International Criminal Court (ICC) to advance investigations in this regard.⁹⁸

First Special Jurisdiction for Peace sentences issued

Colombia’s Special Jurisdiction for Peace (Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz, JEP) is a tribunal forming part of the transitional justice framework called Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non-Repetition (Sistema Integral de Verdad, Justicia, Reparación y No Repetición, SIVJRNR) established by the 2016 peace agreement (see above).⁹⁹ The JEP handed down its first convictions on 16 and 18 September 2025. On 16 September 2025, seven ex-FARC secretariat officials were convicted of orchestrating the kidnapping more than 21,000 people. They were sentenced to eight years of community service, which includes assisting in the search for the missing, demining, and working in environmental conservation and historical preservation. On 18 September 2025, the court sentenced twelve former soldiers for their involvement in 135 extrajudicial executions in Cesar department.¹⁰⁰ The rulings sparked controversy,, however, with several actors criticizing the sentences for being too lenient.¹⁰¹

Developments and security concerns in the run-up to March 2026 congressional and May 2026 presidential elections

On 26 October 2025, Petro’s governing leftist Historical Pact (Pacto Histórico) coalition nominated senator Iván Cepeda Castro as its presidential candidate for the May 2026 election.¹⁰² A few weeks later, on 17 November 2025, Cepeda announced through a statement on social media that his campaign was supported by other liberal factions, and a ‘Broad Front’ uniting left-wing, centrist, and democratic liberalism forces had been formed.¹⁰³ He emerged victorious in a poll conducted by Centro Nacional de Consultoria on 18 November 2025, with far-right candidate Abelardo de la Espriella coming in second.¹⁰⁴

At the same time, political violence and security threats continued to rise ahead of the elections in March and May 2026. In February 2026 alone, several high-profile political figures such as Senator Jairo Castellanos, Senator Aída Quilcué Vivas, Mayor of Morales Óscar Guachetá Arrubla, congressional candidate Lucy Amparo Guzmán González, as well as parliamentary candidates Ana Libia Guetio and Andrés Vásquez Mejía were attacked by the ELN and other armed assailants. Some of them were kidnapped and later freed by security forces.¹⁰⁵ Additionally, armed groups damaged infrastructure, including by burning numerous billboards in Norte de Santander department.¹⁰⁶ The Electoral Observation Mission expressed concern that electoral violence could affect 339 municipalities nationwide.¹⁰⁷

On 8 March 2026, legislative elections and numerous presidential primaries were held. The results produced a fragmented Congress. Five candidates advanced to the first round of presidential elections on 31 May 2026.¹⁰⁸ The security situation remained tense, with three soldiers reportedly killed while on duty guarding polling stations in Caquetá department.¹⁰⁹ Similarly, campaign offices of right-wing candidate Paloma Valencia were attacked. Several presidential candidates received death threats, including Valencia and Abelardo de la Espriella.¹¹⁰ Reports emerged on 17 April 2026 of US intelligence information regarding a potential assassination plot against Cepeda.¹¹¹ On 16 May 2026, Rogers Mauricio Devia, a former mayor affiliated with Abelardo de la Espriella, and his campaign assistant Eder Fabián Cardona were assassinated after a campaign event in Meta department. The same day, an attempt was made to assassinate Julián Cardona, a former mayoral candidate associated with the Democratic Centre.¹¹²

Intelligence–military scandal involving Colombian government

Reports emerged on 23 November 2025 of alleged links between senior State officials, namely an army general and a senior National Intelligence Directorate (DNI) figure, and the EMBF. Radio Caracol reported about alleged meetings in Bogotá, attended by army officers in civilian clothes, during which a ‘non-aggression pact’ was supposedly coordinated between the public force and the dissidents in Catatumbo, Antioquia and southern Bolívar departments. Army officers allegedly provided the dissidents with classified information, including about military operations against the group, and apparently offered protection for the dissidents’ movements in certain conflict areas by establishing a legitimate security company as a front.¹¹³ Accusations also emerged that the Attorney General’s Office had held relevant evidence for an extended period before acting. In reaction to these allegations, the Inspector General temporarily suspended both officials involved in the scandal from their positions. Petro’s government questioned the credibility of the evidence and denied the allegations.¹¹⁴ As of May 2026, no criminal convictions in connection with this scandal have been issued.

Tensions between Colombia and Ecuador

In January 2026, Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa imposed a thirty per cent ‘security tariff’ on Colombian imports due to an alleged lack of measures taken by Colombia to combat drug trafficking along both countries’ shared border. In response, Petro not only reciprocated the measure imposed by Ecuador, but also indefinitely suspended electricity exports to it.¹¹⁵ Over the ensuing weeks, the trade spat escalated as both countries expanded the tariffs to hundreds of products with a percentage of up to 100 per cent imposed on certain goods.¹¹⁶ As a consequence, bilateral trade between the States fell sharply.¹¹⁷ In addition to the ongoing trade issues, Colombian authorities found an unexploded aerial explosive device on Colombian soil in Ipiales, which is in close proximity to the Ecuadorian border. The device was attributed to the Ecuadorian military, which raised suspicions of Ecuador having conducted an airstrike in Colombian territory. However, on 25 March 2026, both governments clarified publicly that the device had landed on Colombian soil by accident and declared their intention to hold further talks on border security.¹¹⁸ On 8 May 2026, the Andean Community (CAN) trade bloc intervened in the ongoing trade spat and ordered both countries to lift trade restrictions.¹¹⁹ In a sign of de-escalation, the following day, Ecuador began reducing tariffs.¹²⁰

Increasing reliance on drone warfare by armed groups

One of the most evident tactical shifts in the context of the ongoing conflicts in Colombia during 2025 and 2026 has been the rapidly increasing use of drones by armed groups. The first operational drone attack in Colombia occurred in 2023. According to ACLED, a rapid escalation in the number of drone attacks was observable in the ensuing years, from just one operational attack in 2023 to thirty-eight in 2024 and 149 in 2025.¹²¹ The first months of 2026 have also seen numerous drone attacks, with seven happening in January alone. It is estimated that nearly all key armed groups employed militarized drones by 2025, often targeting police, army patrols, and other armed groups. Some armed groups have even formed specialized drone units (‘droneros’) within their ranks. In a worrying development, the number of civilians caught in the crossfire or deliberately targeted by drones has also sharply risen between 2024 and 2025.¹²² Many of the drones are purchased commercially and then modified with improvised explosive devices.¹²³

Increasing numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the worsening humantiarian situation

It is reported that around 7.2 million people were internally displaced at the end of 2025 due to ongoing conflict and drug-related violence.¹²⁴ While the number of IDPs has stayed relatively stable comparedhis figure represents a very large increase on the 5.1 million recorded in 2023.¹²⁵ However, some of the increase is attributable to the government’s adjustment of the number of individuals who continue to encounter vulnerabilities associated with their displacement.¹²⁶ Norte de Santander, the Catatumbo region that borders Venezuela, witnessed a substantial surge in violence and displacement, particularly towards the end of 2024, resulting in a significant influx of individuals into urban areas.¹²⁷ In Colombia, however, it is difficult to attribute IDPs exclusively to NIAC-related fighting or to the omnipresent gang violence associated with the drug trade.¹²⁸

Non-international armed conflict between the EMC and the EMBF (2026-07-23)

Background

The EMBF is a group that, in April 2024, splintered from, and is now fighting, the EMC, a group comprised of the general staff of the dissident faction of the former FARC-EP.¹ One reason for the EMBF separating from the EMC was a wish to continue peace talks with the Colombian government,² In these peace talks, the EMBF and the government have discussed an action plan for reducing the violence generated by the EMBF. ³

Intensity

The EMC and EMBF clashed twice during January 2025 in Calamar (Guaviare department).⁴ The first series of clashes occurred from 18 to 19 January. Twenty-four fighters were killed and an unknown number of civilians were displaced.⁵ The second clash, which occurred on 21 January 2025, resulted in twenty-seven casualties and the recruitment of six children by the armed groups.⁶

Clashes between the EMC and EMBF lasted a total of three days (the first perhaps forty-eight hours and the second which resumed briefly on the 18^th of January 2025). The fighting resulted in approximately fifty-one recorded casualties, the recruitment of six children, and internal displacement. President Petro determined the fighting sufficient to declare a state of emergency in northeastern Catatumbo.⁷ At this stage the threshold of intensity for a NIAC, though, was not yet satisfied.

However, on 26 May 2025, the EMC’s 44^th Front (Amazonas Bloc) imposed an armed blockade in Guaviare department which triggered fighting between the EMC and the EMBF on 3 June 2025. The fighting was one part of a continuous battle between the two organized armed groups for territory in Caquetá, Meta, and Guaviare departments. The fighting between EMC and EMBF in May 2025 caused the confinement of approximately 10,000 civilians.⁸ Crisis Watch described hostilities which continued throughout June 2025 between the EMC and EMBF as ‘fierce’.⁹ Colombia’s Office of the Ombudsperson expressed concern over this situation, stating that 65,000 people were displaced between January and April 2025 due to the ongoing violence in Catatumbo.¹⁰

Although not all clashes are recorded, reports suggest an escalation of fighting between the EMC and the EMBF from mid-2025 through to mid-2026.¹¹ The drivers of these clashes seem to be vested in the illicit drug trade, including control over coca-plantations and key drug trafficking routes.¹² Between 16 and 19 January 2026, armed confrontations between EMC and EMBF were reported in El Retorno (Guaviare department). Authorities later discovered twenty-six bodies. Initial reports described the deaths as combat casualties from the clashes, but by 22 January 2026, Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office said forensic evidence suggested many of the twenty-six dead EMC members may actually have been executed rather than killed in open combat.¹³ Another major armed clash between EMC and EMBF occurred on 27 May 2026 in Guaviare department. Initial reports of militant fatalities ranged between twenty and fifty.¹⁴ Defence Minister Pedro Sánchez Suárez said that the dissident groups in Mordisco and Calarcá clashed due to disputes over drug trafficking, extortion and other illicit economies.¹⁵

The fighting between the EMBF and the EMC equates to protracted armed violence, satisfying the notion of intensity as demanded under IHL.

Organization

Both non-State actors engaged in this NIAC are sufficiently organized under IHL. For an analysis of the organisation of the EMBF and EMC, see above.

As the notion of intensity is met, these FARC dissident groups are engaged in a NIAC.

1
‘United Nations Verifications Mission in Colombia’, UN Doc S/2025/188, 27 March 2025, para 4; ‘COI Focus: Colombia: Veiligheidssituatie’, CGRS, 10 April 2025, 2. ↩︎
2
L. C. Barrios Sabogal and J. Wolff, ‘Escalation of Violence amidst Colombia’s Struggle for Peace: Causes and Implications of Catatumbo’s Humanitarian Crisis’, Research center: Transformations of political violence, Policy Brief No 8, 2025, 4 which are ongoing. ↩︎
3
‘United Nations Verifications Mission in Colombia’, UN Doc S/2025/188, 27 March 2025, paras 33 and 41. ↩︎
4
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group; T. Breda, ‘Expert Comment: January 2025 was Colombia’s deadliest month since President Gustavo Petro took office’, ACLED, 29 January 2025. ↩︎
5
J. Pardo, ‘La guerra entre Iván Mordisco y las disidencias de alias Calarcá en Guaviare ya tiene colapsada la morgue: los cuerpos llegan en volquetas’, Infobae, 20 January 2025; ‘Emergencias humanitarias en Colombia hoy’, Defensoría del pueblo, 16 February 2025. ↩︎
6
‘United Nations Verifications Mission in Colombia’, UN Doc S/2025/188, 27 March 2025, para 36. ↩︎
7
A. Pannell, ‘Colombia’s President Petro declares state of emergency in northeastern Catatumbo region’, The Bogotá Post, 22 January 2025. ↩︎
8
‘Guerra entre Mordisco y Calarcá en Guaviare provoca el confinamiento de 10.000 personas’, El Espectador, 4 June 2025. ↩︎
9
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, July 2025. ↩︎
10
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, June 2025; ‘July 2025 Monthly Forecast: Colombia’, Security Council Report, 30 June 2025; ‘El Catatumbo padece la emergencia humanitaria más grande desde que hay registro en Colombia, a causa del conflicto armado’, Defensoría del Pueblo Colombia, 6 May 2025. ↩︎
11
E. Dickinson, ‘Los cuatro frentes de batalla del Estado Mayor Central’, La Silla Vacía, 4 September 2025; ‘DFAT Country Information Report Colombia’, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Australian Government, 28 January 2026. ↩︎
12
V. Parada Lugo, ‘La Fiscalía halla indicios de asesinato en la muerte de 26 disidentes en Guaviare’, El País, 22 January 2026. ↩︎
13
‘Unos 30 muertos habría dejado enfrentamiento entre las disidencias de ‘Mordisco’ y ‘Calarcá’ en el Guaviare’, El Heraldo, 17 January 2026; V. Parada Lugo, ‘La Fiscalía halla indicios de asesinato en la muerte de 26 disidentes en Guaviare’, El País, 22 January 2026; ‘Guerra de disidencias por la coca en Guaviare deja 27 muertos y agrava crisis de mesa de paz’, El Espectador, 20 January 2026; S. Boni, et al, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: February 2026’, ACLED, 9 February 2026; A. Cabrera, ‘Medicina Legal identifica 4 menores de edad entre los 26 cuerpos rescatados en Guaviare tras los combates entre disidencias de Mordisco y Calarcá’, Radio Santa Fe, 21 January 2026. ↩︎
14
‘Colombia investiga combate entre disidencias de las FARC que habría dejado “múltiples víctimas” de esos grupos’, France 24, 28 May 2026; ‘Investigan combate entre disidencias de las FARC con decenas de muertos en Colombia’, Swiss Info, 28 May 2026; N. R. Matta Colorado, ‘Enfrentamiento entre disidentes de Farc habría dejado decenas de muertos en Guaviare; autoridades tratan de confirmar’, El Colombiano, 27 May 2026. ↩︎
15
Pedro Arnulfo Sanchez S. Orgullosamente Colombiano, X, 28 May 2026. ↩︎

State Parties

Colombia

Non-State parties

Comuneros del Sur
Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)
Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC) (formerly Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC))
Estado Mayor de los Bloques y el Frente (EMBF)
Comandos de la Frontera (CDF) of Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB)
Estado Mayor Central (EMC)
Segunda Marquetalia (SM)
Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez (Frente 57)

Non-State Actors

Comuneros del Sur
Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB)

1
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.44. ↩︎
2
M. L. Perez, ‘Kolumbien’, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 31 March 2025. ↩︎
3
C. Klobucista and D. Renwick, ‘Colombia’s Civil Conflict’, US Council of Foreign Relations, 11 January 2017. ↩︎
4
C. Klobucista and D. Renwick, ‘Colombia’s Civil Conflict’, Council of Foreign Relations, 11 January 2017. ↩︎
5
C. Klobucista and D. Renwick, ‘Colombia’s Civil Conflict’, Council of Foreign Relations, 11 January 2017. ↩︎
6
‘United States Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs: International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 1: Drug and Chemical Control’, United States Department of State, March 2025, 168; ‘Colombia: Events of 2024’, Human Rights Watch. ↩︎
7
C. Klobucista and D. Renwick, ‘Colombia’s Civil Conflict’, Council of Foreign Relations, 11 January 2017. ↩︎
8
C. Klobucista and D. Renwick, ‘Colombia’s Civil Conflict’, Council of Foreign Relations, 11 January 2017. ↩︎
9
C. Klobucista and D. Renwick, ‘Colombia’s Civil Conflict’, Council of Foreign Relations, 11 January 2017. ↩︎
10
M. L. Perez, ‘Kolumbien’, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 31 March 2025. ↩︎
11
‘Colombia’, Servicestelle Friedensbildung Baden-Württenberg. ↩︎
12
M. L. Perez, ‘Kolumbien’, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 31 March 2025. ↩︎
13
‘Colombia’, Servicestelle Friedensbildung Baden-Württenberg. ↩︎
14
M. L. Perez, ‘Kolumbien’, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 31 March 2025. ↩︎
15
M. L. Perez, ‘Kolumbien’, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 31 March 2025. ↩︎
16
‘Colombia y Venezuela lanzan una operación militar conjunta en la convulsa región de Catatumbo’, Europa Press, 31 January 2025. ↩︎
17
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
18
‘Colombia y Venezuela lanzan una operación militar conjunta en la convulsa región de Catatumbo’, Europa Press, 31 January 2025; ‘Venezuela y Colombia inician operación militar conjunta en la frontera’, Voice of America, 31 January 2025; J. Frexies, ‘Colombia and Venezuela Launch Joint Military Operation in Catatumbo’, Colombia One, 31 January 2025. ↩︎
19
‘ACSN Peace Talks Timeline’, ABColombia ↩︎
20
‘Segunda Marquetalia: Peace Talks with Colombian Government’, ABColombia ↩︎
21
‘Fiscalía reactiva órdenes de captura contra seis miembros de la Segunda Marquetalia’, Agencia Periodismo Investigativo, 18 July 2025. ↩︎
22
S. Ibañez Pita, ‘Gobierno Nacional revocó la designación de Iván Márquez como negociador de paz’, Asuntos Legales, 9 October 2025; ‘Gobierno retira a alias ‘Iván Márquez’ como representante de ‘Segunda Marquetalia’ en diálogos de paz’, Presidencia, 9 October 2025. ↩︎
23
‘ELN Peace Talks Timeline’, ABColombia; W. Gazeau, ‘El Gobierno colombiano y el ELN anuncian que reactivarán las negociaciones de paz’, France24, 7 November 2024; ‘Presidente Petro suspende diálogos con el Eln tras “crímenes de guerra” en el Catatumbo’, Presidencia, 17 January 2025. ↩︎
24
A. Pannell, ‘Colombia’s Petro welcomes peace talks with ELN rebels’, Latin America Reports, 14 October 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, October 2025; B. Turan, ‘Petro calls for resumption of talks with Colombia’s ELN guerrillas’, Colombia Reports, 14 October 2025. ↩︎
25
M. Fernanda Arocha, et al, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: January 2026’, ACLED, 13 January 2024; ‘En medio de paro armado, el ELN dice a Gobierno que quiere “dar continuidad” a lo pactado en mesa de paz’, El Espectador, 15 December 2025; ‘Colombia halts peace talks with ELN rebels and accuses them of war crimes in northeastern region’, Associated Press, 18 January 2025. ↩︎
26
‘Latin America & Caribbean : Colombia’, February 2026; ‘Colombia’s ELN rebels, FARC dissidents announce ceasefire for presidential election’, Reuters, 20 May 2026; M. Rueda, ‘Colombia’s ELN rebels declare a unilateral ceasefire ahead of key congressional elections’, LMT Online, 23 February 2026. ↩︎
27
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group; R. Cué Barberena, ‘El Gobierno colombiano finaliza tregua con el EMC, aunque la mantiene con algunas facciones’, France 24, 17 July 2024; ‘Gobierno de Colombia suspende cese al fuego con una parte del EMC’, Voice of America, 16 July 2024. ↩︎
28
‘Es oficial: Gobierno no autorizó ampliación del cese el fuego con disidencia de Calarcá’, El Espectador, 17 April 2025; J. Márquez, ‘Alerta máxima en el Catatumbo tras fin del cese al fuego bilateral con el EMBF de las FARC’, Caracol Radio, 17 April 2025; Observatorio de Derechos Humanos y Conflictividades de Indepaz, ‘Prórroga de un mes del cese al fuego con el EMBF: Impactos y Perspectivas’, Indepaz, 18 April 2025. ↩︎
29
‘Gobierno prorroga cese al fuego bilateral, únicamente con cuatro grupos del denominado Estado Mayor al mando de alias ‘Calarcá’: Mindefensa’, Presidencia, 19 April 2025; ‘Gobierno prorroga por un mes cese al fuego con disidencias de las Farc’, Legis ámbito jurídico, 21 April 2025. ↩︎
30
J. Camilo Colorado, ‘Gobierno y disidencias de las Farc acuerdan zona de paz en la región de Catatumbo’, La Republica, 4 May 2025; ‘Presidente destaca acuerdo con el Frente 33 para la creación de zona de paz en el Catatumbo’, Presidencia, 3 May 2025. ↩︎
31
‘Gobierno y Frente 33 de disidencia Calarcá acuerdan zona de preagrupamiento en Catatumbo’, El Espectador, 4 May 2025. ↩︎
32
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, June 2025. ↩︎
33
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, July 2025; M. Fernanda Arocha, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: September 2025’, ACLED, 5 September 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, November 2025. ↩︎
34
S. Boni, et al, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: February 2026’, ACLED, 9 February 2026; ‘Total Peace talks reach new agreements between government and EMBF armed group’, Justice for Colombia, 21 November 2025; ‘Gobierno y disidencia de Calarcá cierran seis acuerdos en el séptimo ciclo’, La Silla Vacía, 21 November 2025. ↩︎
35
J. Pablo Patiño, ‘Gobierno y Comuneros del Sur acordaron cese al fuego y destrucción de armas, ¿cómo será?’, eColombiano, 20 December 2024; C. Burgos, ‘Gobierno nacional y Comuneros del Sur acordaron cese al fuego bilateral de seis meses’, Radio Nacional de Colombia, 22 December 2024. ↩︎
36
‘Gobierno nacional y Comuneros del Sur firmaron este sábado dos acuerdos históricos como parte del proceso paz territorial en Nariño’, Presidencia, 5 April 2025; ‘La guerrilla disidente colombiana del ELN acuerda desarmarse, aunque la ‘paz total’ sigue siendo difícil de alcanzar’, WOLA, 6 May 2025; ‘La negociación con el frente Comuneros Sur: primera victora de la paz total de Petro’, Pares, 8 April 2025. ↩︎
37
‘Las claves de la entrega de armas de Comuneros del Sur, la primera en Gobierno Petro’, El Espectador, 7 April 2025; S. Rodriguez Álverez, ‘Comuneros del Sur: Petro se anota un triunfo y avanza en nuevo modelo de paz’, La Silla Vacía, 7 April 2025. ↩︎
38
M. Saiz, ‘Comuneros del Sur Disarming Marks Small Win for Colombia’s Total Peace’, InSight Crime, 9 April 2025; ‘La guerrilla disidente colombiana del ELN acuerda desarmarse, aunque la ‘paz total’ sigue siendo difícil de alcanzar’, WOLA, 6 May 2025. ↩︎
39
‘Gobierno Petro anuncia otra Zona de Ubicación: será con Comuneros del Sur’, El Espectador, 10 June 2025; P. T. C. and P. G. T., ‘Las dudas de la mesa con Comuneros del Sur, la disidencia del ELN en Nariño’, Fundación ideas para la paz, 7 July 2025. ↩︎
40
J. Bernal, ‘Nuevo acuerdo entre el Gobierno Petro y los Comuneros del Sur: el grupo criminal se comprometió a no interferir en las elecciones del 2026’, Infobae, 3 February 2026; C. Ortega Sarria, ‘Comuneros del Sur pacta en mesa de diálogo acuerdo para garantizar el proceso electoral’, Caracol Radio, 2 February 2026. ↩︎
41
S. Torrado, ‘Claves de los diálogos de paz con la Segunda Marquetalia y la Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano’, El Pais, 13 February 2025; N. R. Matta Colorado, ‘Alias Araña cayó por traficar mientras negociaba la paz’, eColombiano, 14 February 2025; L. Martínez, ‘Gobierno y Coordinadora Nacional del Ejército Bolivariano, continuarán con diálogos’, Asuntos Legales, 16 March 2025. ↩︎
42
F. Saavedra, ‘Así quedó el acuerdo entre el Gobierno y la Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano para erradicar 30.000 hectáreas de coca en Putumayo y Nariño’, Infobae, 2 April 2025; ‘Gobierno y Coordinadora Bolivariana firman tres acuerdos preliminares’, Agencia Prensa Rural, 11 April 2025. ↩︎
43
A. Alsema, ‘Colombia to create three guerrilla demobilization zones’, Colombia Reports, 26 May 2025; ‘Colombia to Create Three Guerrilla Demobilization Zones’, International Center for Transitional Justice, 26 May 2025. ↩︎
44
E. J. Alonso Dorado, ‘Gobierno y CNEB firman acuerdo para la entrega y destrucción de más de 13 toneladas de material de guerra’, El Tiempo, 20 July 2025. ↩︎
45
W. Cortés Cañón, ‘Se reactivan diálogos con la disidencia de ‘Walter Mendoza’, que se separó de la Segunda Marquetalia: Gobierno destruirá 14 toneladas de armamento’, Infobae, 7 October 2025; C. A. Morales Castillo, ‘Así se alista el Gobierno para destruir 14 toneladas de armamento de disidencia de Walter Mendoza’, El Espectador, 7 October 2025; L. J. Acosta, ‘FARC dissidents hand over munitions to Colombia in peace gesture’, Reuters, 16 October 2025; S. Torrado, ‘Claves de los diálogos de paz con la Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano, desprendida de la Segunda Marquetalia’, El País, 16 October 2025. ↩︎
46
J. Penagos Ramírez, ‘Gobierno y disidencia de ‘Walter Mendoza’ cerraron sexto ciclo de diálogos con acuerdos para puesta en marcha de dos zonas de ubicación de temporal’, 7 December 2025; M. Alejandro Rodríguez, ‘Proceso de paz entre Gobierno Petro y disidencias de Wálter Mendoza tiene un nuevo país garante: esto es lo que se sabe’, Infobae, 4 December 2025. ↩︎
47
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, April 2026; J. Bernal, ‘Gobierno Petro retomará diálogos con disidencias de ‘Walter Mendoza’ en medio de la polémica por los atentados de ‘Iván Mordisco’’, Infobae, 27 April 2026; M. Alejandro Rodríguez, ‘Proceso de paz entre Gobierno Petro y disidencias de Wálter Mendoza tiene un nuevo país garante: esto es lo que se sabe’, Infobae, 4 December 2025. ↩︎
48
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, August 2025; J. Freixes, ‘Colombia and Gulf Clan Cartel Hold Peace Talks in Qatar’, Colombia One, 20 August 2025. ↩︎
49
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, September 2025; ‘Qatar Announces Conclusion of First Round of Mediation Between the Government of Colombia and the Self- Proclaimed Gaitanista Army of Colombia’, Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 September 2025; A. Alsema, ‘Colombia’s government and EGC paramilitaries initiate formal talks in Qatar’, Colombia Reports, 19 September 2025. ↩︎
50
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, October 2025. ↩︎
51
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, December 2025; ‘Qatar Announces Signing of “Commitment to Peace” by Colombian Government, Self-Designated EGC Following Two Rounds of Mediation in Doha’, Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 December 2025; ‘State Minister at Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Qatar has Cemented its Position as a Key Diplomatic Power in Global Mediation’, Qatar News Agency, 6 December 2025. ↩︎
52
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, December 2025; M. Rubio, ‘Terrorist Designations of Clan del Golfo’, U.S. Department of State, 16 December 2025. ↩︎
53
‘Latin America & Caribbean : Colombia’, February 2026; A. Pannell, ‘Colombia’s EGC suspends Doha peace talks over Petro-Trump meeting’, Al Jazeera, 4 February 2026; A. Pannell, ‘EGC suspends talks with Colombian government after Petro-Trump meeting’, Latin America Reports, 4 February 2026; A. Alsema, ‘Colombia’s paramilitary successors suspend peace talks’, Colombia Reports, 4 February 2026. ↩︎
54
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, March 2026; ‘Gobierno revocó la resolución que suspendía órdenes de captura contra alias Chiquito Malo y otros jefes del Clan del Golfo’, El Heraldo, 13 March 2026; M. Fernanda Latorre, ‘Gobierno confirma que ‘Chiquito Malo’ y ‘Rodrigo Flechas’, tienen suspensión de orden de captura’, Caracol Radio, 5 February 2026. ↩︎
55
L. J. Acosta, ‘Colombia suspends arrest and extradition warrants for 29 Clan del Golfo leaders’, Reuters, 8 May 2026; S. Cifuentes Quintero, ‘Fiscalía le dijo no a Gustavo Petro: mantendrá las órdenes de captura contra 29 miembros del Clan del Golfo, incluido ‘Chiquito Malo’’, Infobae, 12 May 2026; L. J. Acosta, ‘Colombia suspends arrest and extradition warrants for 29 Clan del Golfo leaders’, Internazionale, 8 May 2026. ↩︎
56
A. Alsema, ‘Petro administration clashes with judicial branch over EGC demobilization plans’, Colombia Reports, 19 May 2026. ↩︎
57
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group; ‘At least seven dead and 50 wounded as Colombia hit with bombings and gun attacks’, The Guardian, 10 June 2025; A. Alsema, ‘At least three killed in wave of bomb attacks in southwest Colombia’, Colombia Reports, 10 June 2025; K. Johnson, ‘Ataques en Cauca y Valle: ¿otra ronda de lo mismo’, Razon Publica, 15 June 2025. ↩︎
58
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group; ‘At least seven dead and 50 wounded as Colombia hit with bombings and gun attacks’, The Guardian, 10 June 2025; A. Alsema, ‘At least three killed in wave of bomb attacks in southwest Colombia’, Colombia Reports, 10 June 2025; ‘Siete muertos en múltiples ataques con disparos y explosivos de guerrilleros en Colombia’, RFI, 10 June 2025 (Updated 11 June 2025). ↩︎
59
A. Alsema, ‘At least three killed in wave of bomb attacks in southwest Colombia’, Colombia Reports, 10 June 2025. ↩︎
60
‘At least seven dead and 50 wounded as Colombia hit with bombings and gun attacks’, The Guardian, 10 June 2025. ↩︎
61
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group; ‘At least seven dead and 50 wounded as Colombia hit with bombings and gun attacks’, The Guardian, 10 June 2025. ↩︎
62
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
63
‘At least seven dead and 50 wounded as Colombia hit with bombings and gun attacks’, The Guardian, 10 June 2025; S. Jones, ‘Shot Colombian presidential candidate survives emergency surgery’, The Guardian, 8 June 2025; ‘At least 7 killed in explosions and attacks outside police stations in southwest Colombia’, AP News, 11 June 2025; K. Johnson, ‘Ataques en Cauca y Valle: ¿otra ronda de lo mismo’, Razon Publica, 15 June 2025. ↩︎
64
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, June 2025; H. Barber, ‘Colombian senator Miguel Uribe dies after June campaign shooting’, The Guardian, 11 August 2025; E. Dickinson, ‘Assassination Attempt on Top Politician Stirs Colombian Anxieties’, International Crisis Group, 9 June 2025. ↩︎
65
S. Jones, ‘Shot Colombian presidential candidate survives emergency surgery’, The Guardian, 8 June 2025; E. Dickinson, ‘Assassination Attempt on Top Politician Stirs Colombian Anxieties’, International Crisis Group, 9 June 2025; J. S. Cobb and L. Elliott, ‘Surgery on Colombian senator Uribe went well after shooting, wife says’, Reuters, 9 June 2025 ↩︎
66
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, June 2025; H. Barber, ‘Colombian senator Miguel Uribe dies after June campaign shooting’, The Guardian, 11 August 2025. ↩︎
67
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, June 2025; ‘Massive turnout for ‘March of Silence’ following attack on Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay’, EFE, 15 June 2025; ‘Operan de urgencia a senador colombiano Miguel Uribe por hemorragia cerebral: clínica’, Reuters, 17 June 2025. ↩︎
68
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, July 2025; ‘Capturan a quinta persona acusada de participar en atentado contra senador colombiano Miguel Uribe: fuentes’, Reuters, 5 July 2025; ‘Alleged mastermind behind shooting of Colombian senator and presidential candidate arrested’, Associated Press, 5 July 2025. ↩︎
69
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, July 2025; E. Jaramillo Bernat, ‘La Justicia ordena la captura contra siete mandos de la Segunda Marquetalia por el asesinato de Miguel Uribe’, El País, 24 March 2026; L. Muñoz Medina, ‘Gobierno revocó la designación de alias Zarco Aldinever como negociador de paz tras señalamientos por atentado contra Miguel Uribe’, Infobae, 14 July 2025. ↩︎
70
H. Barber, ‘Colombian senator Miguel Uribe dies after June campaign shooting’, The Guardian, 11 August 2025; L. J. Acosta, ‘Colombian police capture suspected leader in senator’s shooting’, Reuters, 5 July 2025; E. Dickinson, ‘Assassination Attempt on Top Politician Stirs Colombian Anxieties’, International Crisis Group, 9 June 2025. ↩︎
71
H. Barber, ‘Colombian senator Miguel Uribe dies after June campaign shooting’, The Guardian, 11 August 2025; V. Buschschlüter and J. Carlos Cueto, ‘Colombian Senator Miguel Uribe dies two months after being shot’, BBC, 11 August 2025; R. Emblin, ‘Miguel Uribe Turbay Dies at 39 After Assassination Attempt’, The City Paper, 11 August 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, July 2025. ↩︎
72
S. Martin, ‘Another attack in Colombia against an opponent: A congressman’s vehicle is attacked’, Voz, 14 August 2025 ↩︎
73
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, August 2025; ‘“Capacidad de protección pasó de 229 a 520 policías y miembros de la UNP”: mindefensa sobre seguridad de los precandidatos presidenciales’, El Heraldo, 26 August 2025; ‘Colombia announces security reinforcement for candidates in the 2026 electoral elections’, Con El Mazo Dando, 26 August 2025. ↩︎
74
‘Colombia’s former president Álvaro Uribe found guilty of witness tampering’, The Guardian, 28 July 2025; E. Dickinson, ‘Verdict in Landmark Case Finds Colombian Ex-President Guilty of Bribery’, International Crisis Group, 29 July 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, July 2025. ↩︎
75
E. Dickinson, ‘Verdict in Landmark Case Finds Colombian Ex-President Guilty of Bribery’, International Crisis Group, 29 July 2025; ‘Colombia’s former president Álvaro Uribe found guilty of witness tampering’, The Guardian, 28 July 2025. ↩︎
76
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, July 2025; E. Dickinson, ‘Verdict in Landmark Case Finds Colombian Ex-President Guilty of Bribery’, International Crisis Group, 29 July 2025. ↩︎
77
‘Colombia’s former president Álvaro Uribe found guilty of witness tampering’, The Guardian, 28 July 2025; L. Niño, ‘Juicio Álvaro Uribe: esto es lo que pasaría con la pensión vitalicia del expresidente si es hallado culpable’, Infobae, 28 July 2025; E. Dickinson, ‘Verdict in Landmark Case Finds Colombian Ex-President Guilty of Bribery’, International Crisis Group, 29 July 2025. ↩︎
78
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, October 2025; ‘Court overturns conviction of Colombian ex-president Álvaro Uribe’, The Guardian, 21 October 2025; A. Rogers, et al, ‘Colombian appeals court strikes down ex-President Uribe’s conviction’, Al Jazeera, 21 October 2025; D. Jordan, ‘Colombian court overturns former president’s conviction’, BBC, 21 October 2025. ↩︎
79
‘‘A great honor’: Key takeaways from Trump’s meeting with Colombia’s Petro’, Al Jazeera, 4 February 2026; I. Alexander, ‘Petro versus Trump’, Al Jazeera, 4 February 2025. ↩︎
80
‘US and Colombia recall envoys as diplomatic rift deepens’, Al Jazeera, 4 July 2025; A. Suárez, ‘US recalls top diplomat in Colombia as tensions with President Petro escalate’, Associated Press, 4 July 2025; D. Psaledakis, ‘US, Colombia recall their ambassadors in diplomatic tussle’, Reuters, 3 July 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, July 2025. ↩︎
81
‘Colombian politicians criticise US Secretary of State Rubio’s interference in Uribe guilty verdict’, Justice for Colombia, 30 July 2025; P. Laya, ‘Petro Rebukes US Over Rubio’s Criticism of Colombia Judiciary’, Bloomberg, 29 July 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, July 2025. ↩︎
82
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, September 2025; E. Dickinson, ‘Booming Coca and Bilateral Chill Drive U.S. Move to Decertify Colombia’, International Crisis Group, 16 September 2025; ‘Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2026’, U.S. Department of State, 15 September 2025; M. Fernanda Arocha, et al, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: October 2025’, ACLED, 3 October 2025. ↩︎
83
E. Dickinson, ‘Booming Coca and Bilateral Chill Drive U.S. Move to Decertify Colombia’, International Crisis Group, 16 September 2025. ↩︎
84
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, September 2025; M. Fernanda Arocha, et al, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: October 2025’, ACLED, 3 October 2025; G. Zegarra, ‘Petro criticó la descertificación de EE.UU.: “Nosotros no vamos a estar bajo chantaje”’, CNN Colombia, 16 September 2025; ‘At UN, Colombian President Petro slams global inaction, calls for urgent reform’, United Nations News, 23 September 2025; L. G. Fadul, ‘Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro slams US policies on drugs, migration’, AA, 24 September 2025. ↩︎
85
‘US revokes visa for Colombian president Gustavo Petro after ‘reckless’ actions in New York’, The Guardian, 27 September 2025; S. Lau and I. Aikman, ‘US revokes Colombian president’s visa over ‘reckless and incendiary’ remarks’, BBC, 27 September 2025; D. Mendoza and T. Symons, ‘US revokes visa of Colombia’s Petro after he called on soldiers to disobey Trump’, CNN, 27 September 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, September 2025; M. Fernanda Arocha, et al, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: October 2025’, ACLED, 3 October 2025. ↩︎
86
J. Turkewitz and R. Jimison, ‘Colombia’s President Says Boat Bombed by U.S. Was Carrying Colombians’, The New York Times, 8 October 2025; N. Bocanegra and A. Villegas, ‘Colombia’s Petro suggests last vessel bombed by US was Colombian’, Reuters, 9 October 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, October 2025. ↩︎
87
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, October 2025; O. Empson, ‘Trump calls Colombia president ‘illegal drug dealer’ as US says it hit another ship’, The Guardian, 19 October 2025; ‘Trump calls Colombia’s Petro ‘a drug leader’, says US to cut aid to country’, Al Jazeera, 19 October 2025; B. Kleln, ‘Trump escalates back-and-forth with Colombia’s president, announcing end of US payments to country’, CNN, 19 October 2025. ↩︎
88
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, October 2025; ‘Treasury Sanctions Colombian President Gustavo Petro and His Support Network’, U.S. Department of the Treasury, 24 October 2025; C. Neff, ‘US places sanctions on Colombian president over alleged failure to stop cartels’, The Guardian, 25 October 2025; D. Psaledakis, et al, ‘US sanctions Colombia’s president, accuses him of allowing expansion of drug trade’, Reuters, 25 October 2025; R. Comerford, ‘US imposes sanctions on left-wing Colombian President Petro’, BBC, 25 October 2025. ↩︎
89
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, December 2025; ‘US military aggression towards Venezuela presents threat to Colombia’, Justice for Colombia, 16 December 2025; H. Fuller, ‘Trump Warns Colombia Its President Could Be “Next” in U.S. “Anti-drug” Campaign’, Military.com 14 December 2025; B. Canakci, ‘Colombia’s Petro pushes back after Trump warns he ‘will be next’’, AA, 11 December 2025. ↩︎
90
‘U.S. strikes in Venezuela trigger regional and global alarm’, NPR, 4 January 2026; M. Villamil, ‘Petro fija postura de Colombia tras ataque aéreo a Caracas y llama a desescalada y respeto al derecho internacional’, Infobae, 3 January 2026; S. Torrado, ‘Gustavo Petro rechaza la “agresión a la soberanía de Venezuela” y ordena desplegar a los militares en la frontera’, El País, 3 January 2026; M. Fernanda Arocha, et al, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: January 2026’, ACLED, 13 January 2024. ↩︎
91
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, January 2026; B. Osgood, ‘Colombia’s Petro promises to defend homeland amid Trump threats’, Al Jazeera, 5 January 2026; ‘Petro Calls Colombians to the Streets After Trump Raises Military Option’, The City Paper, 7 January 2026. ↩︎
92
M. Fernanda Arocha, et al, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: January 2026’, ACLED, 13 January 2024; ‘Petro y Trump dialogan tras las amenazas de EEUU a Colombia y se reunirán “en un futuro cercano” en la Casa Blanca’, Cadena SER, 8 January 2026; A. Correal and M. Bearak, ‘How an Abrupt Call Between Trump and Colombia’s President Averted a Crisis’, The New York Times, 9 January 2026; ‘Trump invites Colombia’s Petro to White House after earlier threat of military action’, Reuters, 8 January 2026. ↩︎
93
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, January 2026; J. Freixes, ‘Colombian Defense Minister Visits US to Boost Anti-Drug Cooperation Ahead of Petro’s Trip’, Colombia One, 13 January 2026. ↩︎
94
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, January 2026; V. Buschschlüter and I. Aikman, ‘Colombia yields on US deportation flights to avert trade war’, BBC, 27 January 2025; T. Rogero and E. Helmore, ‘Colombia lifts ban on deportation flights after Trump tariff threat’, The Guardian, 27 January 2025; C. Dorado Suaza, ‘Colombia resumes U.S. deportation flights ahead of Petro’s meeting with Trump’, Latin America Reports, 2 February 2026. ↩︎
95
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, January 2026; ‘Colombian guerrilla group ELN backs pact to fight US ‘to defend the homeland’’, Le Monde, 16 January 2026; ‘Colombian guerrillas vow to confront US ‘imperialism’’, France 24, 4 January 2026. ↩︎
96
C. Vasquez and B. Debusmann Jr, ‘After months of acrimony, Colombia’s Petro is about to meet Trump’, BBC, 3 February 2026; ‘‘A great honor’: Key takeaways from Trump’s meeting with Colombia’s Petro’, Al Jazeera, 4 February 2026; ‘Latin America & Caribbean : Colombia’, February 2026; J. Otis, ‘An uneasy détente: Trump and Colombia’s Petro meet at White House’, NPR, 3 February 2026. ↩︎
97
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, March 2026; J. Mustian, et al, ‘DEA names Colombian President Petro ‘priority target’ amid U.S. probe of drug trafficker ties’, PBS, 20 March 2026; J. Mustian, et al, ‘DEA names Colombian president ‘priority target’ as US prosecutors probe ties to drug traffickers’, Associated Press, 21 March 2026. ↩︎
98
M. Fernanda Arocha, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: September 2025’, ACLED, 5 September 2025; ‘Presidente Petro le pide al mundo declarar organizaciones terroristas a Junta del Narcotráfico y a grupos de ‘Iván Mordisco’, Segunda Marquetalia y Clan del Golfo’, Presidencia, 21 August 2025; ‘Petro declarará como organizaciones terroristas a las disidencias de las FARC y Clan del Golfo’, EFE, 22 August 2025; A. Cabrera, ‘Petro pide al mundo declarar organizaciones terroristas a junta del narcotráfico y a los grupos de Iván Mordisco, segunda Marquetalia y clan del golfo’, Radio Sante Fe, 21 August 2025. ↩︎
99
‘JEP peace court issues first sentences over human rights violations during armed conflict’, Justice for Colombia, 25 September 2025; E. Tassel-Maurizi and M. Merchán Duque, ‘Colombia’s Peace Process: an unprecedented tribunal hands down its first convictions’, EJIL: Talk!, 9 October 2025. ↩︎
100
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, September 2025; ‘A Milestone for Transitional Justice in Colombia: ICTJ Welcomes the First Sentences of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace’, International Center for Transitional Justice, 19 September 2025; ‘JEP peace court issues first sentences over human rights violations during armed conflict’, Justice for Colombia, 25 September 2025; A. Pannell, ‘Landmark ruling convicts seven FARC ex-leaders of wartime crimes’, Al Jazeera, 16 September 2025. ↩︎
101
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, September 2025; J. C. Echeverry, ‘Mala justicia’, El País, 21 September 2025. ↩︎
102
‘Colombia’s left picks Ivan Cepeda as 2026 presidential candidate’, Reuters, 27 October 2025; ‘Progressive senator Iván Cepeda nominated as Historic Pact presidential candidate’, Justice for Colombia, 29 October 2025; ‘Ivan Cepeda’, Colombia Reports, 20 August 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, October 2025. ↩︎
103
‘Candidato Iván Cepeda recibe apoyo de un sector liberal a su campaña presidencial’, Caracol Radio, 17 November 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, November 2025; ‘Pacto Histórico anuncia respaldo de “sector representativo del liberalismo” en frente amplio’, El Espectador, 18 November 2025. ↩︎
104
S. Torrado, ‘Iván Cepeda se dispara en la encuesta presidencial del Centro Nacional de Consultoría en Colombia’, El País, 18 November 2025; ‘Cepeda lidera actualmente intención de voto en Colombia, según sondeo’, Prensa Latina, 18 November 2025. ↩︎
105
‘Latin America & Caribbean : Colombia’, February 2026; L. Calderón Fuentes, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: March 2026’, ACLED, 9 March 2026; S. Torrado, ‘Dos candidatos al Congreso desaparecen en distintas regiones de Colombia’, El País, 26 February 2026; L. Reynoso, ‘Un atentado contra la caravana de seguridad del senador Jairo Castellanos en Arauca deja dos muertos’, El País, 5 February 2026; D. Díaz, ‘La senadora indígena Aida Quilcué es liberada tras varias horas de secuestro’, El País, 10 February 2026; D. Ospina, ‘Alcalde de Morales, Óscar Guachetá, sufrió ataque y breve secuestro en la vía Panamericana: ya está a salvo’, Infobae, 11 February 2026; D. Ospina, ‘Candidata a la Cámara Lucy Amparo Guzmán fue retenida en Cauca: le robaron camioneta y armas de su esquema’, Infobae, 15 February 2026. ↩︎
106
‘Latin America & Caribbean : Colombia’, February 2026; ‘Queman vallas del precandidato presidencial Juan Carlos Pinzón en el Catatumbo’, Semana, 8 February 2026. ↩︎
107
L. Calderón Fuentes, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: March 2026’, ACLED, 9 March 2026; D. Jerez, ‘Elecciones 2026: MOE alerta riesgo de violencia en 339 municipios del país’, LA FM, 4 February 2026. ↩︎
108
L. J. Acosta, ‘Colombians elect fragmented Congress in low-turnout election’, Reuters, 8 March 2026; A. Suárez, ‘Colombians are electing a new Congress and choosing presidential candidates’, Associated Press, 9 March 2026; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, March 2026. ↩︎
109
‘Tres soldados murieron en combates durante instalación de puestos de votación en Caquetá’, El Espectador, 4 March 2026; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, March 2026. ↩︎
110
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, April 2026; ‘Gobierno reforzará seguridad de Paloma Valencia tras denuncias de amenazas y vandalismo’, Noticias RCN, 12 April 2026; C. Osorio, ‘Las amenazas contra Paloma Valencia y Abelardo de la Espriella reviven el temor a un magnicidio’, El País, 15 April 2026. ↩︎
111
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, April 2026; ‘Petro dice que la CIA tiene «datos reales» sobre un posible atentado contra el candidato Cepeda en Colombia’, EFE, 17 April 2026; ‘Petro dice que la CIA tiene “datos reales” sobre posible atentado contra candidato Cepeda’, Infobae, 17 April 2026. ↩︎
112
‘Former mayor shot dead in central Colombia during election campaign’, Associated Press, 16 May 2026; L. Reynoso, ‘La violencia electoral se recrudece con dos atentados en el Meta a dos semanas de las presidenciales’, El País, 17 May 2026. ↩︎
113
‘¿Cómo fue la supuesta infiltración de disidentes con general de Ejército y alto funcionario de DNI?’, Noticias Caracol, 24 November 2025; A. Alsema, ‘FARC dissidents infiltrated Colombia’s military, intelligence agency: report’, Colombia Reports, 24 November 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, November 2025. ↩︎
114
‘¿Cómo fue la supuesta infiltración de disidentes con general de Ejército y alto funcionario de DNI?’, Noticias Caracol, 24 November 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, November 2025; L. Reynoso, ‘La Procuraduría suspende al general y al directivo de inteligencia señalados de tener vínculos con las disidencias de Calarcá’, El País, 27 November 2025. ↩︎
115
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, January 2026; S. Hurtado, ‘The Ecuador-Colombia Trade Spat Is a Zero-Sum Game’, America Quarterly, 29 January 2026; J. S. Cobb and A. Valencia, ‘Colombia halts electricity sales to Ecuador and imposes tariffs in trade, drug trafficking spat’, Reuters, 23 January 2026; G. González Calanche, ‘Ecuador Ignites Trade Spat with Colombia over Border Crime’, International Crisis Group, 23 January 2026. ↩︎
116
L. O’Sullivan, ‘Ecuador raises tariffs on Colombia to 50% as trade dispute intensifies’, Latin America Reports, 27 February 2026; A. Valencia and N. Bocanegra, ‘Andean trade bloc orders Colombia, Ecuador to lift trade curbs’, Reuters, 8 May 2026. ↩︎
117
‘Ecuador-Colombia Tariff War: Bilateral Trade Down 44% as Ecuador Prepares 100% Duties in May’, Ecuador Brief 29 April 2026. ↩︎
118
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, March 2026; L. Gamba, ‘Colombian President Petro claims 27 killed in alleged cross-border bombing by Ecuador’, AA, 18 March 2026; A. Pannell, ‘Colombia’s Petro accuses Ecuador of bombing near border’, Al Jazeera, 17 March 2026; ‘Colombia – Ecuador rift widens over cross-border bombings’, The City Paper, 17 March 2026; M. Martín, ‘Colombia muestra cómo la bomba lanzada por Ecuador cayó en su territorio de forma accidental’, El País, 23 March 2026. ↩︎
119
A. Valencia and N. Bocanegra, ‘Andean trade bloc orders Colombia, Ecuador to lift trade curbs’, Reuters, 8 May 2026. ↩︎
120
J. S. Vergara, ‘Ecuador Reduces Tariffs on Colombian Products as Trade Tensions Begin to Ease’, Finance Colombia, 9 May 2026. ↩︎
121
H. Barber, ‘Drones reshape war in Colombia as deaths and injuries mount’, The Guardian, 18 May 2026; R. Emblin, ‘ELN Modifies Drones To Target Colombia’s Security Forces’, The City Paper, 22 July 2025; V. P. Lugo, ‘El aumento del uso de drones con explosivos cambia la dinámica del conflicto en Colombia’, El País, 22 May 2026; ‘Drones con explosivos, nueva arma de las disidencias de las Farc’, Cambio Colombia, 15 May 2023. ↩︎
122
H. Barber, ‘Drones reshape war in Colombia as deaths and injuries mount’, The Guardian, 18 May 2026; S. Rodriguez Álvarez, ‘Drones en conflicto colombiano: militares se preparan para nueva amenaza’, La Silla Vacía, 21 May 2024; R. Emblin, ‘ELN Modifies Drones To Target Colombia’s Security Forces’, The City Paper, 22 July 2025. ↩︎
123
E. Dickinson, ‘Los cuatro frentes de batalla del Estado Mayor Central’, La Silla Vacía, 4 September 2025. ↩︎
124
‘Colombia’, International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 14 May 2025. ↩︎
125
‘Colombia’, International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 14 May 2025. ↩︎
126
‘Colombia’, International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 14 May 2025. ↩︎
127
‘Colombia’, International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 14 May 2025. ↩︎
128
S. Rodriguez and Georgetown University Latin America & Caribbean Policy Association, ‘Internal Displacement in Colombia: Characterization and Relevant Research Findings’, Georgetown Public Policy Review, 25 January 2024; V. Sainz, ‘Forced to Flee: The Global Impact of Conflict-Driven Internal Displacement’, Atlas Institute for International Affairs, 14 April 2025. ↩︎

Colombia

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (between January 2025 and May 2026)