Haiti (2026-07-31)

There is currently one non-international armed conflict (NIAC) ongoing in Haiti as of June 2026 – Haiti (supported by the Gang Suppression Force) v the Viv Ansanm coalition, which includes the Gran Grif gang operating in the Artibonite department as a coalition member (see section 5 below for the legal analysis)

Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Additional Protocol II of 1977, and customary international humanitarian law (IHL) apply to this conflict.

In 1791, enslaved people in the French colony of Saint-Domingue rose up against colonial rule in what would become the Haitian Revolution.¹. Black revolutionaries organized, fought, and governed, challenging the core contradiction of Atlantic liberalism: the proclamation of universal rights in Paris and Philadelphia alongside the preservation of racial slavery and colonial extraction.² Under the military and political leadership of Toussaint Louverture and Jean-Jacques Dessalines, who served as Louverture’s lieutenant, the revolutionary forces defeated French, Spanish, and British attempts to suppress the rebellion.³ Louverture was captured by French forces in 1802 and died in captivity in France on April 7, 1803.⁴ Dessalines continued the struggle and declared Haiti’s independence on January 1, 1804, establishing the first Black republic in the modern world.⁵ The newly independent republic was subjected to a trade boycott and a demand for compensation by the Napoleonic Empire in France. Haiti had been the wealthiest French colony in the West Indies but was isolated in its post-colonial circumstances.⁶ Haiti paid eighty per cent of its annual income over 122 years in compensation to French former plantation owners.⁷ In the 200 years following independence, Haiti has suffered more than thirty coups d’état and coup attempts,⁸ numerous foreign interventions,⁹ and the dictatorial rule of François Duvalier from 1957 to 1986, who was succeeded by his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier.¹⁰

In 1990, under international pressure, and following widespread protests, Haiti held elections that were judged fair, free, and democratic and were won by Catholic priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide.¹¹ A year later, Aristide was forcibly removed from office and expelled from the country following a military coup in September 1991.¹² A 1994 military intervention led by the United States (US), ‘Operation Restore Democracy’, which was supported by the United Nations (UN), returned Aristide to power until 1996.¹³ René Préval then held office as president for four years until 2000,¹⁴ after which Aristide was re-elected.¹⁵ Former Duvalier supporters organized widespread resistance to his authority.¹⁶ Aristide demanded that reparations be paid by France while US officials denounced his administration’s involvement in drug trafficking.¹⁷ In February 2004, President Aristide was forced to resign after rebel forces established control over large parts of the country.¹⁸ The United States aided Aristide’s flight from Haiti, which he later called a kidnapping;¹⁹ an allegation rejected by the United States.²⁰ In the aftermath, a UN peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), was deployed to Haiti to restore security.²¹

In addition to the political instability, Haiti has, since 2004, been struck by a series of devastating natural disasters.²² In September 2004, the full force of tropical storm Jeanne hit the country leading to severe flooding that claimed at least 2,000 lives.²³ In 2008, three severe hurricanes killed about 800 people in Haiti and further worsened the situation.²⁴ In 2010, the country was hit by a devastating 7.0 magnitude earthquake which left approximately 220,000 people dead, 300,000 injured, and 1.5 million homeless.²⁵

In 2011, Michel Martelly, a popular Haitian musician, was elected president.²⁶ His election was reportedly enabled by US support, although the US government has denied this.²⁷ Martelly’s popularity fell after he failed to create progress in reconstructing Haiti after the 2010 earthquake. There were reports of corruption, and presidential elections were postponed twice, which led to the president governing by decree for more than a year.²⁸ Widespread protests escalated after the dissolution of the parliament in January 2015.²⁹ Presidential elections were held in November 2015 with Jovenel Moïse emerging as the winner.³⁰ A new wave of violence following the announcement of the election results led to the annulment of the results.³¹ Only in February 2017 was Moïse officially sworn in as president.³²

Jovenel Moïse’s assassination in July 2021, reportedly by a group of foreign mercenaries, marked the beginning of the spiralling gang violence which continues in Haiti today.³³ For several years, the capital, Port-au-Prince, and several rural towns and villages have been, in large part, controlled by armed gangs.³⁴ The civilian population is frequently the target of the violence.³⁵ Haiti is the most poverty-stricken nation in the western hemisphere with more than half of the population living below the poverty line.³⁶ According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, at the end of 2024, about one million people were internally displaced.³⁷

In October 2022, the UN Security Council established a sanctions regime on Haiti, comprising a targeted arms embargo, travel bans and asset freezes, which it renewed annually thereafter.³⁸ The following year, amid a collapse in security and a CARICOM call for a UN-mandated stabilisation force, Kenya agreed to lead a multinational police mission, and the Security Council authorised the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission for an initial one-year period on 2 October 2023.³⁹ Kenya’s commitment faced repeated domestic legal challenges over the government’s authority to deploy police abroad, delaying the mission’s eventual arrival by several months.⁴⁰

That same October, a series of criminal proceedings arising from Moïse’s 2021 assassination advanced in the US and Haiti: former senator Joseph Joel John pleaded guilty in a US court, and was later sentenced to life imprisonment; a retired Colombian army officer received a life sentence; and Haitian authorities arrested former justice ministry official Joseph Félix Badio.⁴¹ In February 2024, a Haitian judge issued charges against a further fifty-one individuals, including Martine Moïse, the former president’s widow.⁴² The Security Council separately expanded its sanctions list in December 2023 to include four gang leaders, and the UK and US sanctioned various former officials over human rights violations and corruption.⁴³

The rival G9 and G-Pèp gang confederations, briefly reconciled by a mid-2023 truce, resumed clashing following the September 2023 assassination of G9 leader Tyson and the November 2023 death of G9 founder Iskar Andrice.⁴⁴ On 29 February 2024, new G9 leader Jimmy ‘Barbecue’ Chérizier announced that the two confederations had merged into the ‘Viv Ansanm’ (‘living together’) coalition, launching a coordinated offensive on police stations, ports and the airport in Port-au-Prince to prevent then-Prime Minister Ariel Henry’s return to the country.⁴⁵ Amid this escalation and a wave of protests, Henry stepped down on 24 April 2024, and Haitian political actors established a transitional government, the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC), which appointed Edgard Leblanc as its president.⁴⁶ Kenya’s deployment plan was reinstated following the TPC’s installation, and the first contingent of Kenyan police officers arrived on 25 June 2024.⁴⁷

The Haitian police, now supported by the MSS, conducted a series of operations against Viv Ansanm through the second half of 2024: the killing of Delmas 95 gang leader Ernst Julme in March, weapons seizures in April, and the regaining of access to Port-au-Prince’s Varreux oil terminal and Toussaint-Louverture airport in May.⁴⁸ Police director Frantz Elbé was replaced by Normil Rameau in June, and the government declared states of emergency in gang-controlled areas that July and September.⁴⁹ The MSS supported the recapture of the strategic Artibonite town of Petite-Rivière de l’Artibonite in early December 2024.⁵⁰

Political turnover continued in parallel: the TPC nominated Garry Conille as prime minister in May 2024, but dismissed him in November in favour of Alix Didier Fils-Aimé amid growing tensions, while Leblanc had already been replaced as TPC president by Leslie Voltaire the previous month amid corruption allegations against three council members.⁵¹ The US sanctioned former president Michel Martelly that August over alleged gang sponsorship, drug trafficking and money laundering, and the UN Security Council sanctioned gang leader Luckson Elan — leader of the Gran Grif gang in the Artibonite department — and former parliamentarian Prophane Victor the following month.⁵²

Civilian self-defence groups grew increasingly active over the same period. The Bwa Kalé movement, which emerged in April 2023, was reported to have killed at least 224 suspected gang members by late June 2023 using improvised weapons, and similar groups expanded through 2024, driving gang members from several neighbourhoods in and beyond the capital.⁵³ In September 2024, the TPC created a Provisional Electoral Council tasked with organising Haiti’s first elections in a decade, finalised that December with the appointment of nine council members.⁵⁴ Discussion also began that autumn over transforming the Kenyan-led mission into a UN peacekeeping operation: TPC presidents Leblanc, in September, and Voltaire, in October, both requested such a transformation to secure more stable funding, but Russia and China opposed the proposal at a Security Council meeting on 20 November, citing funding concerns.⁵⁵

Continuing funding and troop shortfalls in the Kenyan-led mission

Funding troubles culminated in early February 2025, when the US government froze funding to the international security mission’s trust fund, but approved a waiver of $40.7 million in aid for the mission and the Haitian police.⁵⁶ That same month, 70 soldiers from El Salvador and 144 officers from Kenya joined the mission, bringing its total personnel to approximately 1,000.⁵⁷ On 2 July 2025, the UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, appointed Carlos Ruiz Massieu as his new Special Representative for Haiti and head of BINUH.⁵⁸ On 14 July 2025, the UN Security Council extended BINUH’s mandate until January 2026 and expressed its commitment to establish without delay a UN support office to assist the Kenyan-led security forces.⁵⁹

Sanctioning of the Viv Ansanm coalition and Gran Grif

On 8 July 2025, the UN Security Council sanctioned the Viv Ansanm coalition (see below for details of the coalition’s composition) and the Gran Grif gang, which controls significant areas of the Artibonite department in central Haiti.⁶⁰ The European Union (EU) Council sanctioned gang leaders Micanor Altès, Christ-Roi Chéry, and Jeff Larose on 15 July 2025.⁶¹

Internal cohesion and fragmentation within the Viv Ansanm coalition

Despite the coalition’s cohesion, deadly clashes broke out between three constituent gangs on 11 September 2024, illustrating persistent fragility.⁶² In an announcement on 10 November 2024, Chérizier indicated that the ‘observation stage’ had come to an end, and that the stage had now been set for a street battle with the objective of toppling the government.⁶³ The following day, gangs instigated a new wave of coordinated attacks in the capital, leading schools, businesses, and several embassies to close.⁶⁴

Several months later, inter-gang violence resurfaced as 400 Mawozo and Chen Mechan members fought each other on 6 and 7 June 2025 in the Santo 17 area, located to the north of the capital, over a dispute concerning a toll booth.⁶⁵ This incident marks the first armed confrontation between gangs affiliated with the Viv Ansanm coalition in 2025, and it is reported that at least two senior Chen Mechan leaders were killed.⁶⁶ However, in anticipation of the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) presidency rotation ceremony (see below), Chérizier made a commitment on behalf of the Viv Ansanm coalition on 7 August 2025 to continue trying to overthrow the government.⁶⁷

The coalition’s internal structure became clearer in 2026. The International Crisis Group found that Viv Ansanm has no unitary command: decisions affecting the alliance as a whole are reached through consultation among the leaders of its constituent gangs, and each gang retains its own chain of command interests.⁶⁸ The UN Panel of Experts corroborated this, describing Chérizier’s role as that of coalition spokesperson rather than supreme commander.⁶⁹

This decentralized structure produced continued clashes between coalition members throughout 2026. In March 2026, fighting broke out in the Village Renaissance area between Pierre 6 and Chen Mechan/Canaan.⁷⁰ In mid-April 2026, Chen Mechan, Taliban (Canaan) and 400 Mawozo launched a joint offensive against Pierre 6 and Terre Noire in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac, displacing approximately 1200 people.⁷¹ A further clash took place over the weekend of 10-11 May 2026 in Cité Soleil and Croix-des-Bouquets.⁷²Haitian economist Réginald Surin has characterized these episodes not as fragmentation of the coalition but as violence directed at disciplining peripheral or non-aligned members and extending the coalition’s grip.⁷³

Formation of the Transitional Presidential Council

Between April and June 2025, Port-au-Prince witnessed a new wave of protests reflecting a widely held view that Fils-Aimé and the TPC had failed to counter gang violence and improve the security situation.⁷⁴

Negotiations in the TPC stalled amid internal disagreement among its members.⁷⁵ Laurent Saint-Cry, a Haitian businessman, took on the role of TPC president in August 2025. ⁷⁶ As the TPC’s mandate approached its scheduled expiry in February 2026, a majority of its members – Leslie Voltaire, Edgard Leblanc Fils, Louise Gérald Gilles, Fritz Alphonse Jean and Smith Augustin — attempted, on 23 January 2026 to remove Fils-Aimé from office, but outgoing TPC president Laurent Saint-Cyr declined to publish the dismissal decree.⁷⁷ The United States responded by imposing visa restrictions on the members who had sought Fils-Aimé’s removal and their immediate families, and deployed a naval vessel to waters near Port-au-Prince.⁷⁸

The TPC’s mandate expired as scheduled on 7 February 2026. In a handover ceremony at the Villa d’Accueil, the council transferred all remaining executive power to Prime Minister Fils-Aimé, who became Haiti’s sole head of government with no successor political framework in place.⁷⁹ On 24 February 2026, political parties and civil society groups signed a National Pact for Stability and the Organization of Elections, endorsing Fils-Aimé’s continued sole executive authority pending elections.⁸⁰

Failed preparations for elections

In late January 2025, Leslie Voltaire, Haiti’s transitional president, publicly declared that elections would be held in November 2025 regardless of the continuing violence and serious logistical challenges.⁸¹ Voltaire’s announcement was, though, questioned at a meeting on 6 February 2025 between CARICOM and several Haitian political actors,⁸² as well as during the CARICOM Heads of State summit from 19 to 21 February 2025.⁸³ Some argued that the prevailing security situation did not allow for the holding of democratic general elections.⁸⁴

On 7 May 2025, Prime Minister Fils-Aimé reiterated government plans to hold elections in late 2025. However, several political actors were sceptical of the timeline as envisioned by the transitional government; ⁸⁵ notably, the Forum of Former Prime Ministers of Haiti demanded immediate negotiations to draw up a realistic agenda for the elections. ⁸⁶ As a consequence of the unlikelihood of elections taking place in the agreed timeline, in October 2025 negotiations between TPC members and other political representatives to form a new leadership after the expiration of the TPC’s mandate in February 2026 began.⁸⁷ The lack of an implementable plan to hold elections before February 2026 led to increasing international pressure on the Haitian transitional government by, for example, the United States and the UN Security Council.⁸⁸

In December 2025, the TPC approved an electoral decree and a revised calendar, setting a first round of legislative and presidential elections for 30 August 2026 and a second round, together with local elections, for 6 December 2026.⁸⁹ The Provisional Electoral Council identified twenty-three communes still under gang control as of December 2025 — twelve in the West, eight in Artibonite, three in the Centre, and one in the Northwest — as a significant obstacle to safe electoral operations.⁹⁰

Candidate registration, originally scheduled to run from 13 April to 15 May 2026, was subsequently paused after Prime Minister Fils-Aimé and political parties rejected the CEP’s initial $250 million budget proposal as excessive.⁹¹ The CEP submitted a revised budget in response, with local media reporting a downward revision to approximately $190 million, though sources close to the talks suggested the government had already decided to cap election spending at $150 million.⁹²More than fifteen political parties that had signed the National Pact warned in an April 2026 statement that respecting the 30 August 2026 election date and the 7 February 2027 milestone for installing elected officials required urgent, consensual measures to revive the stalled process.⁹³

State response to gang violence

In early 2025, clashes between the police and security mission staff and gang members broke out in the Makako neighbourhood of Port-au-Prince and in Kenscoff commune, which had come under attack from the gangs in an attempt to expand their territorial footprint.⁹⁴ Both attacks were repelled in a joint effort by local and international security forces.⁹⁵ The fighting reportedly displaced more than 4,000 people and killed at least fifty.⁹⁶

A new specialized task force was established on 1 March 2025 by the TPC and Prime Minister Fils-Aimé (see above).⁹⁷ This force reportedly comprises advisers from foreign private military and security companies (PMSCs) and is reinforced by elements of the prime minister’s Security Unit, as well as the General Security Unit of the National Palace.⁹⁸ Following the creation of the task force, multiple drone strikes were conducted in March 2025, notably in the Delmas 6 commune and areas around the capital, reportedly killing at least sixteen gang members.⁹⁹ It is unclear whether the Haitian police, under Normil Rameau, were informed of the drone strikes in advance.¹⁰⁰ Only in late July 2025 did the police leadership officially start coordinating ground operations and drone strikes with the special task force.¹⁰¹

In March 2025, the Haitian police carried out an operation in which they seized firearms and more than 10,000 rounds of ammunition from gang members.¹⁰² In the course of April and May 2025, at least nine drone strikes were carried out by the special task force in Kenscoff commune.¹⁰³ From early 2025, the Haitian TPC increasingly resorted to the use of paramilitary forces and PMSCs in an effort to tackle escalating gang violence.¹⁰⁴ In an announcement on 3 April 2025, TPC President Fritz Jean declared the planned mobilization of the ‘Brigade de Surveillance des Aires Protégées’, a paramilitary group, to support the Haitian Armed Forces.¹⁰⁵ In a similar development, the Haitian government reportedly reached an agreement with the US-based PMSC Vectus Global, led by former Blackwater-owner Erik Prince, over deployment of fighters to Haiti to help in tackling the gang crisis.¹⁰⁶ This claim later was repeated by several sources, which reported that the company had signed a ten-year contract with the Haitian government – a claim the government denied.¹⁰⁷ According to the Business and Human Rights Centre and Reuters news agency, Vectus Global deployed to Haiti in March 2025.¹⁰⁸ On 20 June 2025, Fritz Jean admitted to hiring a PMSC to reinforce the Haitian police but did not give details.¹⁰⁹

Between May and September 2025, the Haitian police launched multiple operations against gang strongholds.¹¹⁰ Notably, operations were conducted in the Kraze Baryé area of Port-au-Prince in May 2025,¹¹¹ and in the capital’s southern neighbourhoods in June 2025, killing over 100 gang members in drone strikes.¹¹² On 12 June 2025, the National Human Rights Defence Network claimed that more than 300 gang members had been killed in drone attacks since March 2025.¹¹³

In July 2025, clashes between security forces and gang members briefly lulled,¹¹⁴ but reignited in August 2025 when the Haitian police, supported by the Kenyan-led security mission, regained control over an air base in Kenscoff commune previously controlled by Viv Ansanm.¹¹⁵ A drone strike on 20 September 2025 in Port-au-Prince’s Cité Soleil neighbourhood, reportedly mounted by the government’s special task force, sparked public outrage as at least eight children were among the eleven victims.¹¹⁶

This incident proved emblematic of a broader pattern that intensified through to 2026. Human Rights Watch subsequently documented at least 1,243 people killed in 141 drone operations between 1 March 2025 and 21 January 2026, including seventeen children, with some strikes appearing unlawful and potentially amounting to extrajudicial killings.¹¹⁷ A UN human rights report separately found that more than sixty per cent of conflict-related casualties in Haiti between January 2025 and March 2026 occurred during anti-gang operations.¹¹⁸

Amid this continuing escalation, the government declared the Haitian armed forces in a state of maximal emergency, known as ‘Condition D’, applicable across the national territory from 6 April 2026.¹¹⁹ In the days that followed, PNH operations retook several premises previously held by gangs, including the Faculté des Sciences Humaines, UNITEC and the Institut d’Études et de Recherches Africaines d’Haïti.¹²⁰By this point, sustained security operations had reduced Viv Ansanm’s effective control of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area to approximately seventy-two per cent, down from a peak of approximately ninety per cent.¹²¹

Local responses to rising gang violence

In the Artibonite department, members of the “La Coalition” self-defence group assassinated at least fourteen people on 20 May 2025 on the basis of their suspected collaboration with the Gran Grif gang.¹²²

In January 2026, a special security brigade was established in Port-de-Paix by the local government commissioner, explicitly modelled on the approach taken earlier in Nippes.¹²³ As with earlier brigades, the degree of coordination between these groups and State security forces varied considerably across the reporting period, ranging from formal integration into PNH and Task Force operations at one end of the spectrum to substantial operational independence at the other — a distinction with direct bearing on attribution under IHL, an issue addressed further in the legal classification below.

Massacres carried out by the Gran Grif gang and Viv Ansanm

The second half of 2024 saw two of the most violent gang attacks carried out in Haiti in decades.¹²⁴ The first, on 3 October 2024, described as a ‘massacre’ by local and international news reports, was launched in the town of Pont-Sondé in Artibonite department.¹²⁵ At least 115 civilians were killed and over 6,000 people were displaced.¹²⁶ Shortly after the attack, Luckson Elan, the leader of the Gran Grif gang (treated in this report as a Viv Ansanm coaliton member), who had been sanctioned by the UN Security Council only a few days earlier,¹²⁷ announced that his gang was responsible for the incident and presented it as an act of retaliation against the civilians in the area who allegedly had cooperated with self-defence groups such as the ‘Coalition des Révolutionnaires pour Sauver l’Artibonite’ in carrying out attacks on gang members.¹²⁸ The Haitian police reportedly failed to prevent or to counter this gang offensive.¹²⁹

The deadliest single incident of 2026 took place in the Artibonite. Between 28 and 31 March 2026, Gran Grif attacked at least eight localities across Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite in the early hours, forcing residents from their beds, shooting those who tried to flee, and burning homes with people still inside, in what has become known as the Jean-Denis massacre. The RNDDH, which conducted the most comprehensive investigation, identified fifty-three victims by name, while the BINUH quarterly report for the period gives a total death toll of ninety-five and records more than 13,500 people displaced.¹³³ The RNDDH denounced what it described as the complaisance of state authorities in the face of the attack.¹³⁴ From April 2026, Gran Grif established a joint presence with fellow coalition member Kokorat San Ras in Marchand-Dessalines.¹³⁵ On 5 May 2026, the two gangs jointly demolished the Marchand-Dessalines police station, and on 9 May 2026 carried out an attack on Saint-Marc commune in which at least eight people were killed.

Transformation of the Kenyan-led MSS into a Gang Suppression Force and plans to establish a new mission led by Organization of American States

Amid continued Russian and Chinese opposition to a full UN peacekeeping transformation, UN Secretary-General António Guterres addressed the Security Council through a letter of 24 February 2025 in which he declared a transformation of the mission to be unrealistic but suggested they authorize logistical assistance to the MSS by the UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH).¹³⁶

Only in late September 2025, following a renewed request on 28 August by the US to transform the MSS into a UN peacekeeping mission,¹³⁷ did the UN Security Council vote, with China, Russia, and Pakistan abstaining, to transform the MSS into a Gang Suppression Force (GSF).¹³⁸ The UN Security Council further agreed to provide logistical and operational support to the GSF (5,550 personnel) through UNSOH.¹³⁹ The GSF has an initial twelve-month mandate to ‘neutralize gangs, secure infrastructure, and support humanitarian access’.¹⁴⁰ The legislative transformation formally became effective on 2 October 2025, after the mandate of the MSS had officially ended, amid prevailing uncertainty around the composition of the troop-contributing countries and the funding of stipends.¹⁴¹ On 7 October 2025, the US delivered twenty armoured vehicles to the newly formed GSF, which had still to deploy to Haiti.¹⁴²

Troop generation for the GSF remained slow through the end of 2025. A force-generation meeting was convened at the UN’s Canada mission in New York on 9 December 2025 to canvass potential troop-contributing States.¹⁴³ On 8 December 2025, Kenya rotated in a fifth police contingent of 230 officers, the first foreign unit formally integrated under the restructured force.¹⁴⁴

The GSF established its operational presence on 1 April 2026, when the first Chadian troops arrived in Port-au-Prince and began a mandatory training period ahead of deployment alongside Haitian security forces.¹⁴⁵ UNSOH became operational the same day.¹⁴⁶ As of mid-May 2026, approximately 800 personnel from Chad, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, and Mongolia had deployed, well below the authorized ceiling of 5,500 troops, with full operational deployment expected by October 2026.¹⁴⁷ The GSF is commanded by Major General Erdenebat Batsuuri of Mongolia, who arrived on 14 May 2026 to assume command, reporting to Special Representative of the Secretary-General Jack Christofides of South Africa.¹⁴⁸

In a parallel development, reports emerged in May 2025 of a possible OAS-led security mission, an idea that gained momentum after US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the Kenyan-led MSS could not tackle the situation alone, and Colombian President Gustavo Petro expressed willingness to contribute troops the following month.¹⁴⁹ OAS Secretary-General Albert Ramdin proposed a mission costing between $1.4 billion and $2.6 billion in August 2025, but the initiative did not translate into an operational mission, and none had been established by the end of the reporting period.¹⁵⁰

Terrorist designation of Gran Grif and Viv Ansanm gangs by the United States and arrests of gang members on US territory

On 2 May 2025, the US formally classified the Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif coalitions as foreign terrorist organizations.¹⁵¹ This designation has the consequence that anyone supporting these groups is subject to US sanctions and criminal charges.¹⁵² Secretary of State Rubio clarified on 21 May 2025 that humanitarian groups compelled to remit tolls to gangs while distributing aid to residents would not face criminal charges.¹⁵³

On 17 July 2025, the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security Investigations (ICE) made its first high-level arrest, namely of the Haitian-American businessman Pierre Réginald Boulos, for his alleged affiliation with the gangs.¹⁵⁴ Shortly after, on 12 August 2025, US federal prosecutors indicted gang leader Jimmy Chérizier, as well as US citizen Bazile Richardson on charges of conspiracy to circumvent sanctions placed on Chérizier.¹⁵⁵ The United States revoked the visas of persons supporting the gangs on 15 September 2025, and on 23 September arrested Dimitri Vorbe, a well-known Haitian businessman.¹⁵⁶

On 17 October 2025, the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned Dimitri Herard, a former Haitian police officer imprisoned for his role in the 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse who escaped custody in 2024 and subsequently provided training and firearms to Viv Ansanm gang leaders, and Kempes Sanon, leader of the Bel Air gang, a Viv Ansanm coalition member.¹⁵⁷ The UN Security Council echoed these designations the same day and separately agreed to extend its arms embargo on Haiti.¹⁵⁸ In 2026, the US Department of State’s Rewards for Justice programme began offering a reward of up to $3 million, together with potential relocation, for information leading to the disruption of the financial mechanisms of Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif, covering front companies, financial facilitators and transfers of funds, arms and drones connected to either group.¹⁵⁹

Non-international armed conflict between Haiti and Viv Ansanm

Background

Viv Ansanm is a coalition formed in early 2024 from the merger of the G9 and G-Pèp gang confederations, consisting of both a political and military wing (see Historical Overview above).

From 2026, the Gran Grif gang – active in the Artibonite department under the leadership of Luckson Elan – is treated in this report as a member of the Viv Ansanm coalition, a reclassification addressed in the Organization section below.

Intensity

Most of the attacks launched by Viv Ansanm were not directed at Haitian forces, but rather at Haitian State infrastructure. Initially, these attacks met with no government response. These unilateral attacks are included in this intensity assessment. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) clarifies that the assessment of NIACs includes unilateral use of force, even if not responded to by the opposing party, as long as the opposing party meets the criterion of organization, which the Haitian State forces clearly do.¹ Attacks of this nature were launched by Viv Ansanm throughout 2025 and 2026, including in January ² February,³ March,⁴ August,⁵ and October 2025.⁶ This pattern of sustained attacks against State infrastructure and personnel continued into 2026, evidenced by the government’s own declaration of a state of maximal emergency in April 2026 (see below) and the continuing scale of drone operations conducted in response.

Viv Ansanm’s coordination and frequency of strategic attacks allowed this non-State actor to expand its control over even more territory in Haiti. Specifically, the coalition managed to consolidate additional territorial control in Port-au-Prince during the period under review. ⁷ Territorial control by a non-State actor indicates that the threshold of protracted armed violence may be met.⁸

In Boškoski and Tarčulovski, the Trial Chamber stated that:

At a more systemic level, an indicative factor of internal armed conflict is the way that organs of the State, such as the police and military, use force against armed groups. In such cases, it may be instructive to analyse the use of force by governmental authorities, in particular, how certain human rights are interpreted, such as the right to life and the right to be free from arbitrary detention, in order to appreciate if the situation is one of armed conflict.⁹

Haitian law enforcement and task forces have responded in a military manner by employing armed drones against Viv Ansanm as of March 2025.¹⁰

These drone attacks resulted in many casualties. ACLED recorded fifty fatalities following seventeen drone operations conducted in March 2025,¹¹ and 101 fatalities as a result of eight drone strikes by law enforcement against Viv Ansanm during May.¹² Particularly deadly drone attacks include those strikes which took place between 9 and 10 June 2025, when law enforcement killed 100 fighters in the southern neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince.¹³

The response by Haitian security forces through drones indicates a shift of the Haitian government’s own assessment of this situation.¹⁴

Several UN agencies monitored casualties resulting from violence generated by Viv Ansanm between 2025 and 2026. At least 5,519 people were killed in Haiti and 2,608 injured between 1 March 2025 and 15 January 2026, according to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).¹⁵

Violence generated by Viv Ansanm often leads to the destruction of property, as wanton destruction of military objectives and civilian objects forms part of the coalition’s military tactics. Destruction is evidenced specifically in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.¹⁶ This pattern of destruction continued and diversified through 2026. In Kenscoff commune, Viv Ansanm carried out a sustained campaign against civilian objects: on 30 January 2026, gang members burned multiple houses in the Tèt Kajak locality.¹⁷ On 7 March, gang members destroyed more than 125 farmers’ houses and properties in Gélin,¹⁸ and across Kenscoff as a whole, at least eighty-eight homes were burned between January and March 2026 alone.¹⁹. The coalition also extended its destruction to civilian cultural infrastructure: on 1 February 2026, members of the 400 Mawozo gang occupied and partially set fire to the Ranch de la Croix-des-Bouquets (also known as the Centre FIFA Goal), a historically significant football development centre with no military function.²⁰ In the Artibonite, at least twenty-three buildings were burned during Gran Grif’s coordinated offensive on Petite-Rivière de l’Artibonite between 28 and 31 March 2026.

The intensity of violence continued unabated into 2026. An estimated 6.4 million people — more than half of Haiti’s population — required emergency humanitarian assistance in 2026, an increase of 6.7 per cent on the previous year.²¹ Internal displacement reached 1.45 million people by the end of 2025, approximately one in eight of the population, with children constituting fifty-three per cent of all IDPs.²² The Artibonite department, previously less affected by the conflict, saw a dramatic intensification of violence culminating in the Jean-Denis massacre of 28–31 March 2026, discussed in Major Developments above, in which at least ninety-five civilians were killed and more than 13,500 people displaced.²³ Haitian security forces’ use of armed drones also escalated sharply: Human Rights Watch documented at least 1,243 people killed in 141 drone operations between March 2025 and January 2026, including at least seventeen children.²⁴ By April 2026, sustained security operations, now supported by the Gang Suppression Force (see below), had reduced Viv Ansanm’s territorial control of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area to approximately seventy-two per cent, down from a peak of approximately ninety per cent.²⁵ Internal displacement reached 1,466,862 people by May 2026, approximately twelve per cent of the population, a figure that has risen more than eightfold since the end of 2022.²⁶ This overall figure masked sharply divergent regional trends: displacement in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area rose by six per cent, exceeding 300,000 people for the first time, driven principally by the March and May 2026 clashes in Cité Soleil, while the Artibonite department recorded a five per cent increase due to recurrent attacks.²⁷

Owing to further escalation in violence in Haiti, the UN Security Council, in late September 2025, authorized Member States to transition the MSS mission to the ‘Gang Suppression Force’ (GSF).²⁸ The resolution authorized Member States participating in the GSF, ‘in strict compliance with international law, including international human rights law’ to ‘neutralize, isolate, and deter gangs that continue to threaten the civilian population, abuse human rights and undermine Haitian institutions’. They were also tasked with providing security for critical infrastructure sites ‘together and in coordination with the Haitian National Police (HNP) and the Haitian armed forces’.²⁹

The intensity of violence generated in the situation between Haiti and Viv Ansanm equates to protracted armed violence and meets the intensity requirement demanded by IHL to constitute a NIAC.

Organization

Viv Ansanm’s organisational structure is examined here from its reactivation in February 2024 (see Historical Overview above).

On an organizational level, Viv Ansanm has displayed a high level of internal discipline.³⁰ As can be expected, inter-gang tensions do sometimes occur (see above). However, ‘the Viv Ansanm coalition has preserved its cohesion, with frictions underscoring its capacity to manage disputes through structured coordination and negotiated restraint’.³¹ This illustrates that the fighters from individual gangs who are united under the Viv Ansanm military wing are organized in a united manner responding to the hierarchical leadership structure of this non-State actor and no longer acting as individual gangs.

This characterization requires refinement in light of findings from 2026. The UN Panel of Experts confirmed that the coalition has no single leader or structured chain of command, and that each constituent gang maintains its own chain of command and interests, with Jimmy Chérizier acting as spokesperson rather than supreme commander.³² For IHL purposes, the coalition nonetheless satisfies the organisation threshold notwithstanding this decentralized structure, given its sustained offensive capacity, territorial control, and demonstrated ability to coordinate large-scale operations — membership being evidenced not by subordination to a central authority but by documented operational coordination and mutual support among constituent gangs.³³ By 2026, the coalition was understood to comprise twenty-three major constituent gangs, operating across Port-au-Prince and its environs as well as the Artibonite and Centre departments.³⁴

Viv Ansanm engages in systematic extortion through aligned criminal governance in controlled areas.³⁵ Revenue is generated at gang level as different gangs who constitute the military wing of Viv Ansanm have different illicit portfolios that fuel its income stream. ³⁶ Much of the revenue generated by Viv Ansanm is invested in weapons and ammunition acquisition through the consolidated arms supply network established by its member gangs. Supply networks include those from the US, the Dominican Republic, as well as from Jamaica.³⁷

Viv Ansanm’s overall military tactics are geared towards its goal to violently oppose the Haitian transitional government. To achieve its objective, it launches coordinated attacks against critical Haitian State infrastructure.³⁸ By June 2025, this non-State actor refocused its strategic and coordinated attacks against what is referred to as the ‘last free bastions of the capital’, including Pétion-Ville, Haut Delmas, and Kenscoff communes.³⁹

Territorial gains enabled Viv Ansanm to streamline coordinated attacks, and expand its territorial control.⁴⁰ This ability to control territory enables it to implement IHL. Territorial control is an additional indicator that a non-State armed group is organized under IHL.⁴¹

Viv Ansanm has managed to establish a media presence and promote a united public image.⁴² Jimmy Chérizier often makes statements or releases propaganda videos on behalf of Viv Ansanm.⁴³ These media releases indicate unity of voice.

Gran Grif’s membership of the Viv Ansanm coalition

The weight of evidence accumulated during 2025 and early 2026 supports the reclassification of Gran Grif as a Viv Ansanm coalition member. Gran Grif is listed as a full member of the Viv Ansanm alliance — under the designation HTe.001, led by Luckson Elan — in the UN Panel of Experts’ gang profiles table, compiled on the basis of interviews with residents of gang-controlled areas, gang and political analysts, foreign intelligence representatives, PNH officers and government sources.⁴⁴ The International Crisis Group’s December 2025 report similarly lists Gran Grif among Viv Ansanm’s constituent gangs and treats its Artibonite operations as part of the coalition’s broader franchise expansion.⁴⁵ Gran Grif has been listed by the UN Security Council’s Haiti sanctions committee since September 2024, alongside its leader Luckson Elan.⁴⁶

Between September and December 2025, Gran Grif coordinated closely with fellow coalition members 400 Mawozo, Canaan and 5 Segonn, including through the provision of personnel, weapons, ammunition and, in some instances, financial compensation.⁴⁷ In February 2026, Gran Grif’s operational capacity, weakened in early January, was reportedly reconstituted with further support from Canaan, which provided munitions and firearms.⁴⁸ During the 28–31 March 2026 offensive on Petite-Rivière de l’Artibonite, Gran Grif was supported by ‘allies of the Viv Ansanm coalition’, according to the Centre d’Analyse et de Recherche en Droits de l’Homme.⁴⁹ From April 2026, Gran Grif’s joint operations with fellow coalition member Kokorat San Ras in Marchand-Dessalines provided further evidence of sustained inter-gang coordination consistent with coalition membership.⁵⁰

Viv Ansanm, composed of multiple gangs, is sufficiently organized under IHL to constitute a party to a NIAC.

Classification of organized civilian self-defence groups

A related actor-classification question arises in relation to the organized civilian self-defence groups discussed in Major Developments above, which operated across the metropolitan area and the Artibonite throughout 2026. The evidence points to a spectrum of relationships with the State: at one end, certain brigades — most notably the Communal Brigade of Kenscoff (BRICK) — were formally integrated into PNH and Task Force operations, with public endorsement from PNH leadership and police-facilitated access to weapons; at the other, rural brigades in the Artibonite acted with substantial independence from State command and without direct State oversight.⁵¹ Mere coordination with State forces is not, however, sufficient to meet the threshold of belonging to a party under IHL.⁵² Accordingly, only the most explicitly integrated brigades — those operating under a degree of direction and control going beyond coordination — are treated in War WATCH as State agents, with their conduct attributable to Haiti. The conduct of less integrated groups, including the more autonomous Artibonite brigades, does not meet this threshold and is not attributed to a party to the NIAC. Where members of such groups were directly participating in hostilities at the time of the conduct in question, they may have lost their civilian immunity from attack,⁵³ and acts committed in that context may engage individual criminal responsibility under international law.⁵⁴

Thus, a NIAC between Haiti and Viv Ansanm is ongoing.

1
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 14 – 15.
2
‘Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant to resolution 2752 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/356, 10 June 2025, paras 24, 26, 29, and 40; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; J. L. Franciotti and M. F. Arocha, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: February 2025’, ACLED, 7 February 2025
3
ACLED_07/03/25; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant to resolution 2752 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/356, 10 June 2025, paras 23, 27, 33, and 42
4
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; M. F. Arocha et al, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: May 2025’, ACLED, 8 May 2025; ‘Haïti/insecurité: près de 6000 déplacements forcés enregistrés à Mirebalais et Saut-d’Eau en deux jours, selon l’OIM’, Gazette Haiti, 2 April 2025
5
M. F. Arocha et al, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: September 2025’, ACLED, 5 September 2025 September,‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; M. F. Arocha et al, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: October 2025’, ACLED, 3 October 2025
6
M. F. Arocha et al, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: October 2025’, ACLED, 3 October 2025.
7
‘Viv Ansanm’, UNSC.
8
ICC, ‘The Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda’, Judgement, Trial Chamber VI, 8 July 2019, para 717; ICC, ‘The Prosecutor v Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi’, Judgment and Sentence, Trial Chamber VIII, 27 September 2016, para 49.
9
ICTY, ‘Prosecutor v Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovski’, Judgment, Trial Chamber II, 10 July 2008, para 178.
10
M. F. Arocha et al, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: October 2025’, ACLED, 3 October 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; R. Alphonse, ‘Drone explosif et hélicoptère utilisés contre les gangs à Kenscoff’, le Nouvelliste, 24 July 2025; J. Coenen et al, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: August 2025’, ACLED, 8 August 2025; J. Coenen, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: July 2025’, ACLED, 4 July 2025; Primature de la Rèpublique d’Haïti, X, 2 March 2025.
11
L. C. Fuentes et al, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: April 2025’, ACLED, 3 April 2025
12
L. C. Fuentes et al, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: June 2025’, 6 June 2025.
13
J. Coenen, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: July 2025’, ACLED, 4 July 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group.
14
ICTY, ‘Prosecutor v Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovski’, Judgement, Trial Chamber II, 10 July 2008, para 178.
15
‘Gangs expand reach in Haiti amid persistent deadly violence – UN Human Rights Office report’, OHCHR, 24 March 2026.
16
‘Viv Ansanm’, United Nations Security Council; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant to resolution 2700 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/704, 30 September 2024, paras 139–141.
17
‘Attaque des gangs à Kenscoff: au moins sept morts’, Juno7, 30 January 2026; ‘Zapping Haïti’, Haiti Libre, 30 January 2026.
18
‘Zapping Haïti’, Haiti Libre; ACLED event data.
19
‘Haïti-Criminalité: Marigot en quête de renaissance après ses blessures’, AlterPresse, 29 April 2026, citing UN partner data; BINUH SG Report, para 23
20
‘Le Ranch de la Croix-des-Bouquets pillé, vandalisé et partiellement incendié’, Haiti Libre, 1 February 2026.
21
OCHA, ‘Haiti: 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan – Executive Summary’, December 2025.
22
‘Situation of human rights in Haiti’, Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/61/74, 23 March 2026; UNICEF, ‘Haiti Humanitarian Situation Report No 1’, 31 March 2026.
23
BINUH, ‘Rapport trimestriel sur la situation des droits humains en Haïti (janvier–mars 2026)‘, May 2026; IOM, ‘Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 88.2’, 6 April 2026.
24
Human Rights Watch, ‘Haiti: Drone Strikes Put Residents at Risk’, 10 March 2026.
25
‘Zapping Haïti du 11 avril 2026’, Haiti Libre, 11 April 2026.
26
‘Haiti — Report on the internal displacement situation — Round 13 (May 2026)’, International Organization for Migration, May 2026.
27
‘Haiti — Report on the internal displacement situation — Round 13 (May 2026)’, International Organization for Migration, May 2026
28
‘Resolution 2793 (2025)’, 30 September 2025, para 1.
29
‘Resolution 2793 (2025)’, 30 September 2025, operative para 1(a) and (b).
30
‘From Criminal Governance to Community Fragmentation: Addressing Haiti’s Escalating Crisis’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, September 2025, 14.
31
‘From Criminal Governance to Community Fragmentation: Addressing Haiti’s Escalating Crisis’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, September 2025, 14.
32
UN Panel of Experts on Haiti, UN Doc S/2026/241, 27 March 2026, Annex 4, pp 42–44.
33
International Crisis Group, ‘Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance‘, Latin American & Caribbean Report No 110, 15 December 2025; UN Panel of Experts on Haiti, UN Doc S/2026/241, 27 March 2026, Annex 4, p 44.
34
International Crisis Group, ‘Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance‘, Latin American & Caribbean Report No 110, 15 December 2025; UN Panel of Experts on Haiti, UN Doc S/2026/241, 27 March 2026, Annex 4, p 44.
35
‘From Criminal Governance to Community Fragmentation: Addressing Haiti’s Escalating Crisis’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, September 2025, 14.
36
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant to resolution 2700 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/704, 30 September 2024, para 156.
37
‘Last Chance: Breaking Haiti’s Political Criminal Impasse’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, January 2025, 5–6.
38
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant to resolution 2700 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/704, 30 September 2024, para 14.
39
‘Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant to resolution 2752 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/356, 10 June 2025, para 24.
40
‘Last Chance: Breaking Haiti’s Political Criminal Impasse’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, January 2025, 5.
41
ICTY, ‘Prosecutor v Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovski’, Judgement, Trial Chamber II, 10 July 2008, para 199 – 203; ICTR, ‘Prosecutor v Alfred Musema’,Judgment and Sentence,Trial ChamberI, 27 January 2000,para 258; ICTY, ‘Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj and Lahi Brahimaj’, Judgement, Trial Chamber I, 3 April 2008, para 60; ‘2025 Commentary to Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949: Article 3 – Conflicts not of an international character’, ICRC, para 501.
42
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant to resolution 2700 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/704, 30 September 2024, para 49.
43
‘Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant to resolution 2752 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/356, 10 June 2025, paras 18 and 28; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant to resolution 2700 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/704, 30 September 2024, Annex 4; ‘From Criminal Governance to Community Fragmentation: Addressing Haiti’s Escalating Crisis’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, September 2025, 14.
44
UN Panel of Experts on Haiti, UN Doc S/2026/241, 27 March 2026, Annex 4, p 44.
45
International Crisis Group, ‘Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance‘, Latin American & Caribbean Report No 110, 15 December 2025.
46
UN Security Council, ‘Gran Grif‘, Haiti Sanctions List, n.d.; UN Security Council, ‘Luckson Elan’, Haiti Sanctions List, 27 September 2024.
47
Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, ‘Brokers and Patrons: Unstitching Gangs from Haiti’s Political Fabric’, March 2026.
48
BINUH Q1 2026.
49
Centre d’Analyse et de Recherche en Droits de l’Homme (CARDH), ‘Massacre à Jean Denis: Nécessité d’un cadre juridique d’urgence et de nouvelles stratégies pour protéger la population’, 1 April 2026.
50
J. Alcidor, ‘Artibonite: cohabitation inédite des gangs “Kokorat San Ras” et “Gran Grif” à Marchand-Dessalines‘, Ted Actu, 3 April 2026; H. Noël, ‘”Gran-Grif” et “Kokorat san ras” envahissent la commune de Dessalines, la PNH reste introuvable’, Rezo Nodwes, 2 April 2026.
51
ACLED, ‘Last Line of Defense’.
52
International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, para 115; International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v Duško Tadić, Judgment (Appeals Chamber) (Case No IT-94-1-A), 15 July 1999, paras 131–37.
53
Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, ICRC, 2009, pp 27–36.
54
Ibid., pp 74–82; ICRC, ‘Rule 6: Civilians’ Loss of Protection from Attack’, Customary IHL Database.

State Parties

Haiti (supported by the Gang Suppression Force, GSF)

Non-state parties

Viv Ansanm (including, from 2026, Gran Grif as a coalition member — see section 5 above)

Other actors

Vectus Global (US PMSC led by Blackwater-founder Erik Prince)
Brigade de Surveillance des Aires Protégées (a paramilitary force)
Organized civilian self-defence groups, whose attribution to Haiti depends on the degree of State direction and control exercised over each group — see section 5 above

Foreign Involvement

United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH)
Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission to Haiti [until 2 October 2025]
Gang Suppression force (GSF) [since 2 October 2025; operational from 1 April 2026, with contributing troops from Chad, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica and Mongolia]
United Nations Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH) [operational from 1 April 2026]

1
‘Haitian Revolution’, Britannica
2
S. Buck-Morss, ‘Hegel and Haiti’, Critical Inquiry 26, 2000.
3
‘Jean-Jacques Dessalines’, Britannica; ‘Toussaint Louverture’, Britannica, 2026.
4
‘Toussaint Louverture’, National Museum of African American History and Culture.
5
‘Jean-Jacques Dessalines’, Britannica.
6
T. Glawion, ‘Haiti’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 17 October 2024; D. Roy and R. Cara, ‘Haiti’s Troubled Path to Development’, Council on Foreign Relations, 5 November 2025; M. L. Daut, ‘200 years ago, France extorted Haiti in one of history’s greatest heists – and Haitians want reparations’, The Conversation, 16 April 2025; G. K. Gaillard-Pourchet, ‘Haiti’s independence debt. The slave as a unit of account (1794-1922)’, Bibliothèque nationale de France, November 2023; Vijay, ‘Two Hundred Years Ago, France Strangled the Haitian Revolution with an Inhumane Debt: The Seventeenth Newsletter (2025)’, The Tricontinental, 24 April 2025.
7
D. Roy and R. Cara, ‘Haiti’s Troubled Path to Development’, Council on Foreign Relations, 5 November 2025; G. Rosalsky, ‘‘The Greatest Heist In History’: How Haiti Was Forced To Pay Reparations For Freedom’, NPR, 5 October 2021; ‘Haiti: Free from slavery, not yet free from debt’, Debt Justice; ‘How Haiti paid for its freedom – twice over’, UN News, 19 April 2025.
8
T. Glawion, ‘Haiti’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 17 October 2024; ‘Timeline: Haiti’s history and current crisis, explained’, Concern Worldwide US, 18 January 2025
9
T. Glawion, ‘Haiti’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 17 October 2024; ‘Timeline: Haiti’s history and current crisis, explained’, Concern Worldwide US, 18 January 2025; B. Osgood, ‘What is the history of foreign interventions in Haiti?’, Al Jazeera, 14 March 2024
10
T. Glawion, ‘Haiti’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 17 October 2024; ‘Timeline: Haiti’s history and current crisis, explained’, Concern Worldwide US, 18 January 2025; E. C. Burks, ‘Duvalier Rules Haiti by the Gun and Carries One’, The New York Times, 2 March 1965; ‘Haiti: The truth must not die with Jean-Claude Duvalier’, Amnesty International, 7 October 2014.
11
T. Glawion, ‘Haiti’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 17 October 2024; D. Roy and R. Cara, ‘Haiti’s Troubled Path to Development’, Council on Foreign Relations, 5 November 2025; ‘Profile: Jean-Bertrand Aristide’, BBC News, 3 March 2011; ‘Haitians Celebrate Their First Democratic Election’, UN Photo, 17 December 1990.
12
T. Glawion, ‘Haiti’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 17 October 2024; D. Roy and R. Cara, ‘Haiti’s Troubled Path to Development’, Council on Foreign Relations, 5 November 2025; ‘Haiti: Background to the 1991 Overthrow of President Aristide’, Every CRS Report, 22 October 1993; S. Filippova et al, ‘From coup to chaos: 20 years after the US ousted Haiti’s president’, Responsible Statecraft, 1 March 2024; ‘The Overthrow of Haiti’s Aristide’, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training; ‘Today in history: 1991 coup removes Aristide, sparking mass migration to the US’, The Haitian Times, 30 September 2025.
13
T. Glawion, ‘Haiti’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 17 October 2024; D. Roy and R. Cara, ‘Haiti’s Troubled Path to Development’, Council on Foreign Relations, 5 November 2025; S. Filippova et al, ‘From coup to chaos: 20 years after the US ousted Haiti’s president’, Responsible Statecraft, 1 March 2024; C. Méheut et al, ‘Demanding Reparations, and Ending Up in Exile’, The New York Times, 20 May 2022; ‘Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1993 – 2000: Intervention in Haiti, 1994–1995’, US Department of State: Office of the Historian.
14
‘Haiti: Human Rights Development’, Human Rights Watch, 1997; ‘Visit to the Commission by the President of Haiti, Mr Rene Preval’, European Commission, 10 June 1996; ‘Haiti Inaugurates Relief President’, Time, 7 February 1996; A. Wilentz, ‘René Préval: The Unassuming President Who Wanted to Save Haiti’, Politico, 28 December 2017
15
T. Glawion, ‘Haiti’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 17 October 2024; S. Filippova et al, ‘From coup to chaos: 20 years after the US ousted Haiti’s president’, Responsible Statecraft, 1 March 2024; C. Méheutet al, ‘Demanding Reparations, and Ending Up in Exile’, The New York Times, 20 May 2022; D. Gonzalez, ‘Aristide’s Return: Bad News Perhaps for Him and Haiti’, The New York Times, 24 November 2000.
16
T. Glawion, ‘Haiti’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 17 October 2024; C. Méheut et al, ‘Demanding Reparations, and Ending Up in Exile’, The New York Times, 20 May 2022.
17
M. L. Daut, ‘200 years ago, France extorted Haiti in one of history’s greatest heists – and Haitians want reparations’, The Conversation, 16 April 2025; C. Méheut et al, ‘Demanding Reparations, and Ending Up in Exile’, The New York Times, 20 May 2022; M. Fisher, ‘The Long Road Ahead for Colonial Reparations’, 27 August 2022; J. Gautheret, ‘The grim legacy of Haiti’s ‘double debt’’, Le Monde, 17 April 2025.
18
‘Haiti: Events of 2004’, Human Rights Watch; ‘Attacks on the Press in 2004 – Haiti’, Refworld, February 2025; ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Haiti’, UN Doc S/2004/300, 16 April 2004.
19
M. Wines, ‘Aristide Says He Was Duped By U.S. Into Leaving Haiti’, The New York Times, 14 March 2004; ‘Aristide’s kidnapping claims upset Central African hosts’, NBC News, 12 February 2004; ‘Violence in Haiti Forces President Aristide Out, US Steps In – 2004-03-10’, Voice of America, 20 October 2009.
20
‘Violence in Haiti Forces President Aristide Out, US Steps In – 2004-03-10’, Voice of America, 20 October 2009; R. Carroll, ‘Exiled Aristide urges Haitian resistance’, The Guardian, 9 March 2004; ‘US dismisses Aristide kidnap claim’, Al Jazeera, 2 March 2004.
21
T. Glawion, ‘Haiti’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 17 October 2024; ‘MINUSTAH Fact sheet’, MINUSTAH.
22
T. Glawion, ‘Haiti’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 17 October 2024; D. Maçon et al, ‘In Haiti, disaster risks linger as another earthquake anniversary passes’, Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems, 14 January 2022.
23
‘Haiti: Events of 2004’, Human Rights Watch; ‘Devastation Caused by Tropical Storm Jeanne to Inhabitants of Haiti’, United Nations Photo, 19 September 2004; ‘Floods in Gonaives, Haiti’, Earth Observatory: NASA, 22 September 2004.
24
T. Glawion, ‘Haiti’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 17 October 2024; ‘Hurricanes Fay, Gustav, Hanna, and Ike 2008 Haiti Post Disaster Needs Assessment’, Prevention Web, 12 November 2021; R. M. Perito, ‘Haiti After the Storms: Weather and Conflict’, US Institute of Peace, 11 November 2008.
25
T. Glawion, ‘Haiti’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 17 October 2024; ‘Haiti – 2010 – PDNA estimated the earthquake impacts equivalent to 120% of GDP’, Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery; ‘UN marks anniversary of devastating 2010 Haiti earthquake’, UN News, 12 January 2022.
26
T. Glawion, ‘Haiti’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 17 October 2024; D. Roy and R. Cara, ‘Haiti’s Troubled Path to Development’, Council on Foreign Relations, 5 November 2025; ‘Singer ‘Sweet Micky’ Is Haiti’s President-Elect’, NPR, 5 April 2011; ‘Michel Martelly officially declared Haitian president’, BBC, 21 April 2011.
27
D. Roy and R. Cara, ‘Haiti’s Troubled Path to Development’, Council on Foreign Relations, 5 November 2025; ‘Haiti election: Pressure to include Michel Martelly’, BBC News, 21 January 2011.
28
T. Glawion, ‘Haiti’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 17 October 2024; D. Roy and R. Cara, ‘Haiti’s Troubled Path to Development’, Council on Foreign Relations, 5 November 2025; J. Charles, ‘Martelly’s one-man rule comes to an end in Haiti’, Miami Herald, 10 January 2016.
29
D. Roy and R. Cara, ‘Haiti’s Troubled Path to Development’, Council on Foreign Relations, 5 November 2025; ‘Haiti’s parliament dissolved after last-ditch negotiations to avert crisis fail’, The Guardian, 13 January 2015; ‘Political uncertainty in Haiti as parliament is dissolved’, BBC News, 14 January 2015; A. Baron, ‘Haiti enters uncertain political phase as parliament dissolved’, Reuters, 13 January 2015.
30
D. Roy and R. Cara, ‘Haiti’s Troubled Path to Development’, Council on Foreign Relations, 5 November 2025; ‘Jovenel Moise elected president of Haiti’, CBC, 28 November 2016; ‘Haiti presidential election ‘won by Jovenel Moise’’, BBC News, 29 November 2016.
31
D. Roy and R. Cara, ‘Haiti’s Troubled Path to Development’, Council on Foreign Relations, 5 November 2025; ‘Haiti annuls presidential poll result, sets new election date’, France 24, 7 June 2016.
32
T. Glawion, ‘Haiti’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 17 October 2024; ‘Haiti: Jovenel Moise confirmed winner of presidential election’, BBC News, 4 January 2017; C. Domonoske, ‘14 Months After Elections Began, Haiti Finally Has A President-Elect’, NPR, 4 January 2017; ‘Jovenel Moise sworn in as Haiti’s new president’, Al Jazeera, 7 February 2017.
33
T. Glawion, ‘Haiti’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 17 October 2024; ‘UN condemns ‘abhorrent’ assassination of Haiti President Jovenel Moïse’, UN News, 7 July 2021; ‘Haiti president’s assassination: What we know so far’, BBC, 1 February 2023; ‘Jovenel Moise: Haiti’s president assassinated at age 53’, Al Jazeera, 7 July 2021.
34
T. Glawion, ‘Haiti’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 17 October 2024; ‘Gang Violence and unrest in Haiti’, Amnesty International; ‘Haiti’s gangs have ‘near-total control’ of the capital, U.N. says’, NPR, 3 July 2025.
35
‘Haiti: Children suffering gang recruitment, attacks and sexual violence amid escalating crisis – new report’, Amnesty International, 12 February 2025; H. Isaac and S. Morland, ‘Haitian gang slaughters at least 70 people as thousands flee’, Reuters, 5 October 2024; ‘‘An unending horror story’: Gangs and human rights abuses expand in Haiti’, UN News, 11 July 2025; ‘Haiti: Violence and displacement driving humanitarian crisis as funding needs go unmet’, UN News, 23 July 2025.
36
D. Roy and R. Cara, ‘Haiti’s Troubled Path to Development’, Council on Foreign Relations, 5 November 2025; ‘UN marks anniversary of devastating 2010 Haiti earthquake’, UN News, 12 January 2022.
37
‘Haiti’, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 14 May 2025.
38
‘Security Council Establishes Sanctions Regime on Haiti, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2653 (2022)’, UN Press release, 21 October 2022.
39
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘Security Council Authorizes Multinational Security Support Mission for Haiti for Initial Period of One Year, by Vote of 13 in Favour with 2 Abstentions’, UN Press release, 2 October 2023.
40
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group.
41
‘Haiti ex-senator pleads guilty for role in president’s 2021 assassination’, Reuters, 11 October 2023; F. Robles and D. C. Adams, ‘Key Suspect in Assassination of Haiti’s President Is Arrested’, The New York Times, 19 October 2023; ‘Retired Colombian army officer gets life sentence in 2021 assassination of Haiti’s president’, El Pais, 27 October 2023.
42
D. C. Adams and A. Paultre, ‘The Wife of Haiti’s Assassinated President Is Accused in His Killing’, The New York Times, 19 February 2024.
43
‘Security Council 2653 Sanctions Committee Adds 4 Entries to Its Sanctions List’, Press release, 8 December 2023; ‘The Haiti (Sanctions) (Amendment) Regulations 2023’, Legislation.gov.uk.
44
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘G9 vs. G-PEP – The Two Gang Alliances Tearing Haiti Apart’, InSight Crime, 21 July 2022.
45
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘It’s estimated about 200 gangs operate in Haiti. This is what we know about the leader known as ‘Barbecue”, ABC News, 13 March 2024.
46
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; M. Bubalo and H. Khalil, ‘Haiti PM Ariel Henry resigns as transitional council is sworn in’, BBC, 25 April 2024.
47
‘Kenyan police contingent arrives in Haiti as protests roil Nairobi’, Al Jazeera, 25 June 2024.
48
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; H. Issac and R. T. Erol, ‘Haiti gang leader killed as transition council nears completion’, Reuters, 22 March 2024.
49
‘Haiti to replace national police chief in effort to counter gang violence’, Al Jazeera, 15 July 2024.
50
J. Blaise and O. Joseph, ‘Families in Haiti’s Petite-Rivière de l’Artibonite report climbing death toll following brutal attack’, The Haitian Times, 11 December 2024.
51
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; J. Whitehead, ‘Haiti’s prime minister ousted after six months’, BBC, 11 November 2024.
52
‘Treasury Sanctions Former Haitian President for Drug Trafficking’, US Department of the Treasury, 20 August 2024; ‘Security Council 2653 Sanctions Committee Adds 2 Entries to Its Sanctions List’, Press release, 27 September 2024.
53
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; UN Doc S/2023/492, 3 July 2023, para 33.
54
J. Flécher, ‘Haiti announces a new Provisional Electoral Council’, The Haitian Times, 20 September 2024.
55
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; J. Blaise et al, ‘Russia, China block UN mission for Haiti amid rising gang violence’, The Haitian Times, 21 November 2024.
56
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; M. Nichols, ‘US freezes some funding for security mission tackling Haiti’s gangs’, Reuters, 6 February 2025; ‘More Kenyan police arrive in Haiti to shore up security mission after US funding limbo’, Reuters, 7 February 2025.
57
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘200 Kenyan police officers arrive at UN mission in Haiti’, Voice of America, 6 February 2025; J. Blaise, ’70 Salvadoran soldiers arrive in Haiti to bolster multinational mission against gangs’, The Haitian Times, 4 February 2025.
58
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; UN, ‘Secretary-General Appoints Carlos G. Ruiz Massieu of Mexico Special Representative for Haiti, Integrated Office Chief’, Press release, 3 July 2025.
59
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; UN, ‘Security Council Extends Mandate of United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2785 (2025)’, Press release, 14 July 2025.
60
‘Security Council 2653 Sanctions Committee Adds 2 Entries to Its Sanctions List’, Press release, 8 July 2025.
61
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘Security Council 2653 Sanctions Committee Adds 2 Entries to Its Sanctions List’, Press release, 8 July 2025; ‘Haiti: EU lists three individuals and renews sanctions regime for an additional year’, European Council, 15 July 2025.
62
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group.
63
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group.
64
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; M. F. Arocha et al, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: November 2024’, ACLED, 9 December 2024.
65
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti: April – June 2025’, UN Integrated Office in Haiti; ‘From Criminal Governance to Community Fragmentation: Addressing Haiti’s Escalating Crisis’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, September 2025.
66
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti: April – June 2025’, United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti; ‘From Criminal Governance to Community Fragmentation: Addressing Haiti’s Escalating Crisis’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, September 2025.
67
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group.
68
‘Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance‘, International Crisis Group, Latin American & Caribbean Report No 110, 15 December 2025.
69
‘Letter dated 27 March 2026 from the Panel of Experts on Haiti addressed to the President of the Security Council‘, UN Panel of Experts on Haiti, UN Doc S/2026/241, Annex 4.
70
International Crisis Group, Haiti Watch Page, April 2026.
71
R. Surin, ‘Dans la Plaine, la coalition se fissure‘, Le Nouvelliste, 5 May 2026.
72
R. Surin, ‘Dans la Plaine, la coalition se fissure‘, Le Nouvelliste, 5 May 2026.
73
R. Surin, ‘Dans la Plaine, la coalition se fissure‘, Le Nouvelliste, 5 May 2026.
74
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘Haiti: Protesters demand end of violence; Gang takes over community radio station’, Monitor: Tracking Civic Space, 25 September 2025; ‘Security Alert: Potential for Widespread Protests on Wednesday (April 16, 2025)’, US Embassy in Haiti, 15 April 2025.‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘Haiti: Protesters demand end of violence; Gang takes over community radio station’, Monitor: Tracking Civic Space, 25 September 2025.
75
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; J. Blaise and F. D. Octave, ‘Haiti’s Transitional Presidential Council faces major hurdles in installation process’, The Haitian Times, 6 April 2024.
76
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; J. Blaise, ‘Laurent Saint-Cyr assumes leadership of Haiti’s presidential council with familiar promises’, The Haitian Times, 9 August 2025.
77
‘From Criminal Governance to Community Fragmentation: Addressing Haiti’s Escalating Crisis’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, September 2025; J. Charles, ‘Haiti’s transitional leaders end controversial effort to rewrite 1987 constitution’, Miami Herald, 10 October 2025; ‘From Criminal Governance to Community Fragmentation: Addressing Haiti’s Escalating Crisis’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, September 2025; ‘Haiti’, Security Council Report, 31 March 2025.Alix Didier Fils-Aimé becomes Haiti’s de facto head of state after CPT’s exit‘, The Haitian Times, 8 February 2026.
78
‘Haiti’s transitional council hands power to US-backed prime minister‘, Al Jazeera, 7 February 2026.
79
‘Alix Didier Fils-Aimé becomes Haiti’s de facto head of state after CPT’s exit‘, The Haitian Times, 8 February 2026.
80
‘2026 Haitian general election‘, Wikipedia, accessed June 2026.
81
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; S. Morland, ‘Haiti leader says long-awaited general elections penned for November’, Reuters, 29 January 2025; C. Frilet and JM. Hauteville, ‘Haiti’s transitional president Leslie Voltaire announces November 2025 elections’, Le Monde, 31 January 2025.
82
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/226, 14 April 2025, para 4
83
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘Communique – 48th Regular Meeting Of Conference Of CARICOM Heads of Government’, Barbados Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, 28 February 2025.
84
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group.
85
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group
86
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; J. J. Celestin, ‘Ex-Prime Ministers Caution Against Potential Political Crisis on February 7, 2026’, Le Nouvelliste, 10 September 2025.
87
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group.
88
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; J. Blaise, ‘US pressures Haiti transitional government to organize elections’, The Haitian Times, 7 October 2025; ‘Time to ‘Turn the Tide of Violence’, Special Representative for Haiti Tells Security Council, amid Calls for Dialogue, Unity in Tackling Gang Violence’, UN Press release, 22 October 2025; J. Blaise, ‘US pressures Haiti transitional government to organize elections’, Canada Caribbean Institute, 7 October 2025.
89
‘Haiti publishes revised electoral calendar, sets August 2026 election dates’, Caribbean National Weekly, 27 December 2025.
90
‘Haiti publishes revised electoral calendar, sets August 2026 election dates‘, Caribbean National Weekly, 27 December 2025.
91
‘Haiti’s electoral council revises $250M budget after government pushback‘, The Haitian Times, 1 May 2026.
92
‘Haiti’s electoral council revises $250M budget after government pushback‘, The Haitian Times, 1 May 2026.
93
‘Haiti’s electoral council revises $250M budget after government pushback’, The Haitian Times, 1 May 2026.
94
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘Haiti – News: Zapping…’, Haiti Libre, 2 January 2025; ‘Haiti Report, January 3, 2025’, Haiti Response, 3 January 2025.
95
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘Gangs attack neighborhood in Haiti that’s home to country’s elite’, Voice of America, 3 February 2025; ‘Haiti Report, February 11, 2025’, Haiti Response, 11 February 2025.
96
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; J. Charles and F. Fils-Aimé, ‘‘They are throwing live babies into the flames’: Victims of Haiti gang attack plead for help’, Miami Herald, 25 February 2025; ‘Today’s top news: Occupied Palestinian Territory, Haiti, Ukraine’, OCHA, 20 February 2025.
97
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘Assessment of progress achieved on the key benchmarks pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 2752 (2024): Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/588, 18 September 2025, para 16; ‘United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/418, 27 June 2025, para 20; ‘Haiti: Protection Analysis Update’, Global Protection Cluster, September 2025, 4.
98
‘Assessment of progress achieved on the key benchmarks pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 2752 (2024): Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/588, 18 September 2025, para 16; ‘Haiti: Protection Analysis Update’, Global Protection Cluster, September 2025, 4.
99
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; K. Ives, ‘Government Drone Attack on Delmas 6 Neighborhood Kills Two, Wounds 14’, Haïti Liberté, 5 March 2025.
100
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group.
101
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘Haiti: Protection Analysis Update’, Global Protection Cluster, September 2025, 4.
102
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; K. Guilbert, ‘Haiti police vow to ramp up fight against gangs after fresh attacks in the capital’, Euro News, 13 March 2025; E. Sanon, ‘Gangs unleash new attack on Haiti’s capital as police vow to hold them back’, AP News, 12 March 2025; J. Blaise, ‘Gangs tighten grip on Mirebalais after deadly raid frees 500 inmates, forcing residents to flee’, The Haitian Times, 1 April 2025.
103
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group.
104
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; N. Forsans, ‘Haiti is enlisting the help of mercenaries in its battle against gang violence’, The Conversation, 6 October 2025; W. Kemp and R. Le Cour Grandmaison, ‘Guns for hire: Should private military companies take on organized crime?’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 8 September 2025.
105
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘Grogne populaire: Fritz A. Jean promet sécurité et élections avant février 2025’, Gazette Haiti, 3 April 2025; J. Charles, ‘‘We are at war’: Why Haiti’s leaders are turning to a rogue brigade to help fight gangs’, Miami Herald, 3 April 2025; ‘Vers le jumelage de la BSAP avec les forces de l’ordre’, Vant Bèf Info, 3 April 2025.
106
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; N. Forsans, ‘Haiti is enlisting the help of mercenaries in its battle against gang violence’, The Conversation, 6 October 2025; W. Kemp and R. Le Cour Grandmaison, ‘Guns for hire: Should private military companies take on organized crime?’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 8 September 2025; R. Bunker et al, ‘Third Generation Gangs Strategic Note No. 58: Contracting of Former PMC Blackwater Founder Erik Prince by the Haitian Government for Port-au-Prince Intervention’, Small Wars Journal, 18 June 2025.
107
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; N. Forsans, ‘Haiti is enlisting the help of mercenaries in its battle against gang violence’, The Conversation, 6 October 2025; ‘Haiti: Human rights group warns of risks as Vectus Global deploys private military force under 10-year contract’, Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, 14 August 2025.
108
‘Haiti: Human rights group warns of risks as Vectus Global deploys private military force under 10-year contract’, Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, 14 August 2025; A. Hirtenstein et al, ‘Exclusive: Trump ally Erik Prince plans to keep personnel in Haiti for 10 years to fight gangs and collect taxes’, Reuters, 14 August 2025.
109
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; J. Charles, ‘Haiti’s presidential council confirms use of mercenaries in anti-gang fight’, Miami Herald, 21 June 2025; J. Odigène, ‘Garry Jean Baptiste: Fritz Jean Can Lead the Country Thanks to PNH’s Continued Operations’, Le Nouvelliste, 24 June 2025.
110
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group.
111
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; O. Chéry, ‘Cap-Haïtien police arrest wanted Port-au-Prince gang leader Tapè’, The Haitian Times, 14 May 2025; ‘Haiti – Security: Review of operations carried out by the PNH (video)’, Haiti Libre, 28 May 2025
112
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group.
113
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; F. Robles, ‘Haiti is Using Drones to Fight Gangs. Here’s Why That’s Likely Illegal’, The New York Times, 17 June 2025; ‘Drone warfare is hitting Haiti’, The Economist, 19 June 2025; H. Shuldiner, ‘Drone Strikes Shake Haiti’s Gangs but Leave Legal and Strategic Questions’, InSight Crime, 24 June 2025.
114
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group
115
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; J. Blaise and O. Joseph, ‘Haitian police and MSS forces retake Kenscoff base near vital aviation facility’, The Haitian Times, 26 August 2025.
116
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘Deadly Haiti drone attack kills eight children in capital Port-au-Prince’, Al Jazeera, 23 September 2025; ‘Ten children killed in ten days in Port-au-Prince: Statement by UNICEF Representative in Haiti, Geeta Narayan’, UNICEF, 24 September 2025; ‘Haiti: at least eight children among 13 killed in drone attack on birthday party’, The Guardian, 23 September 2025.
117
‘Haiti: Drone Strikes Put Residents at Risk’, Human Rights Watch, 10 March 2026.
118
‘Situation of human rights in Haiti’, Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/61/74, 23 March 2026.
119
ACLED, ‘CrisisWatch: March 2026 Trends and April 2026 Alerts’, April 2026.
120
‘Zapping Haïti du 11 avril 2026’, Haiti Libre, 11 April 2026.
121
‘Zapping Haïti du 11 avril 2026’, Haiti Libre, 11 April 2026.”
122
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group.
123
‘Port-de-Paix security brigade’, The Haitian Times, 18 January 2026.
124
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; E. Sanon and PR. Luxama, ‘The death toll in a gang attack on a Haitian town rises to at least 115’, AP News, 10 October 2024; ‘Will the Artibonite massacre be a turning point in Haiti?’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 9 October 2024; ‘Haïti – Suivi des Urgences 49 – Déplacements suite aux attaques armées dans la commune de Saint Marc (03 – 04 octobre 2024)’, IOM, 4 October 2024.
125
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘Will the Artibonite massacre be a turning point in Haiti?’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 9 October 2024; S. Pellegrini, ‘Pont-Sondé massacre marks a surge in Gran Grif’s deadly campaign in Artibonite, ACLED Insight’, ACLED, 11 October 2024; R. Corp, ‘Children among 70 killed in Haiti gang ‘massacre’’, BBC, 4 October 2024.
126
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘Will the Artibonite massacre be a turning point in Haiti?’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 9 October 2024; ‘Haïti – Suivi des Urgences 49 – Déplacements suite aux attaques armées dans la commune de Saint Marc (03 – 04 octobre 2024)’, IOM, 4 October 2024; ‘‘They tried to murder everyone’: Haiti reels after deadly gang attack’, Al Jazeera, 7 October 2024; E. Sanon and PR. Luxama, ‘The death toll in a gang attack on a Haitian town rises to at least 115’, AP News, 10 October 2024.
127
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘Will the Artibonite massacre be a turning point in Haiti?’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 9 October 2024; ‘Security Council 2653 Sanctions Committee Adds 2 Entries to Its Sanctions List’, UN Press release, 27 September 2024
128
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; S. Pellegrini, ‘Pont-Sondé massacre marks a surge in Gran Grif’s deadly campaign in Artibonite, ACLED Insight’, ACLED, 11 October 2024; ‘Massacre at Pont-Sondé: National Human Rights Defense Network (RNDDH) Demands Immediate Protection of the Population from State Authorities’, National Human Rights Defense Network, 4 October 2024.
129
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘Will the Artibonite massacre be a turning point in Haiti?’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 9 October 2024; ‘Massacre de Pont-Sondé: le bilan s’alourdit’, Le Nouvelliste, J.J. Celestin, 4 October 2024.
130
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘Haiti – Wharf Jérémie massacre (10 December 2024)’, Ministère de L’Europe et des Affaires Étrangèrses, 10 December 2024; S. Pellegrini, ‘December 6 & 7 massacre in Wharf Jérémie, Haiti – Expert Comment’, ACLED, 9 December 2024; ‘Over 207 executed in Port-au-Prince massacre: UN report’, UN News, 23 December 2024.
131
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘Haiti – Wharf Jérémie massacre (10 December 2024)’, Ministère de L’Europe et des Affaires Étrangères, 10 December 2024; S. Pellegrini, ‘December 6 & 7 massacre in Wharf Jérémie, Haiti – Expert Comment’, ACLED, 9 December 2024; ‘Over 207 executed in Port-au-Prince massacre: UN report’, UN News, 23 December 2024.
132
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘Over 207 executed in Port-au-Prince massacre: UN report’, UN News, 23 December 2024.
133
‘Rapport trimestriel sur la situation des droits humains en Haïti (janvier–mars 2026)’, BINUH, May 2026; Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains (RNDDH); ‘Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 88.2 — Updates on displacement following armed attacks in Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite and Dessalines (28 March – 6 April 2026)’, IOM, 6 April 2026.
134
‘Massacre à Jean Denis: le RNDDH dénonce la complaisance des autorités étatiques face aux attaques meurtrières des gangs armés’, Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains, 11 April 2026.
135
‘Artibonite: cohabitation inédite des gangs “Kokorat San Ras” et “Gran Grif” à Marchand-Dessalines’, J. Alcidor, Ted Actu, 3 April 2026.
136
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘Letter dated 24 February 2025 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council’, UN Doc S/2025/122, 27 February 2025; ‘Haiti’, Security Council Report, 1 March 2025.
137
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘Haiti’ Security Council Report, 29 August 2025; ‘Remarks at a UN Security Council Briefing on Haiti’, United States Mission to the United Nations, 28 August 2025
138
‘UN Security Council Resolution 2793, adopted on 30 September 2025 by twelve votes to nil with three abstentions (China, Pakistan, and Russia), operative para 1. Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; V. Mishra, ‘UN Security Council approves new ‘suppression force’ for Haiti amid spiralling gang violence’, UN News, 30 September 2025; ‘Haiti: new ‘suppression force’ for Haiti amid gang violence’, United Nations Delegate, 3 October 2025.
139
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; V. Mishra, ‘UN Security Council approves new ‘suppression force’ for Haiti amid spiralling gang violence’, UN News, 30 September 2025; ‘Haiti: new ‘suppression force’ for Haiti amid gang violence’, United Nations Delegate, 3 October 2025.
140
V. Mishra, ‘UN Security Council approves new ‘suppression force’ for Haiti amid spiralling gang violence’, UN News, 30 September 2025; ‘Haiti: new ‘suppression force’ for Haiti amid gang violence’, United Nations Delegate, 3 October 2025; D. Dickinson, ‘Fighting back against the gangs: What is Haiti’s new UN-backed force?’, UN News, 1 October 2025.
141
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; D. Dickinson, ‘Fighting back against the gangs: What is Haiti’s new UN-backed force?’, UN News, 1 October 2025.
142
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘Haiti – FLASH : The United States has delivered 20 new armored vehicles to Haiti’, Haiti Libre, 8 October 2025; T. Cerullo, ‘US Govt Delivers 20 New Armoured Vehicles to Boost Anti-Gang Operations in Haiti’, Kenyans.co.ke, 8 October 2025; J. Clark, ‘US delivers armored vehicles to Haiti’s new Gang Suppression Force’, Caribbean National Weekly, 12 October 2025.
143
‘Haiti in-depth: The new Gang Suppression Force and what it means for Haitians’, The New Humanitarian, 3 December 2025.
144
‘Deployment of the fifth Kenyan police contingent in Haiti as the newest foreign unit of the anti-gang force’, The Haitian Times, 9 December 2025.
145
‘First troops from UN-backed Gang Suppression Force arrive in Haiti’https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/1/first-troops-from-un-backed-gang-suppression-force-arrive-in-haiti, Al Jazeera, 1 April 2026.
146
‘Establishment of the United Nations Support Office in Haiti’, United Nations, 1 April 2026.
147
‘UN-appointed anti-gang force commander arrives in Haiti to lead expanded mission‘, The Haitian Times, 15 May 2026; J. Charles, ‘What you need to know about the new Gang Suppression Force deploying in Haiti’, Miami Herald, 25 May 2026.
148
‘UN-appointed anti-gang force commander arrives in Haiti to lead expanded mission‘, The Haitian Times, 15 May 2026.
149
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; J. Charles, ‘Rubio: U.S. will not punish humanitarian-aid groups in Haiti forced to pay gang tolls’, Miami Herald, 21 May 2025.
150
‘U.S. Remarks: OAS Haiti Road Map – Permanent Council’, US Mission to the Organization of American States, 20 August 2025.
151
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; M. Rubio, ‘Terrorist Designations of Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif’, US Department of State, 2 May 2025.
152
M. Rubio, ‘Terrorist Designations of Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif’, US Department of State, 2 May 2025.
153
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘Haiti Report, May 26, 2025’, Haiti Response, 25 May 2025.
154
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘ICE arrests Haitian engaged in violence and destabilization of Haiti, in support of Department of State’, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 21 July 2025.
155
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; M. Matza and W. Grant, ‘US announces criminal charges against Haitian gang leader Barbecue’, BBC, 12 August 2025; ‘Haitian Gang Leader ‘Barbecue’ Indicted for Conspiracy to Violate U.S. Sanctions’, US Department of Justice, 12 August 2025.
156
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Haiti’, International Crisis Group; ‘ICE arrests illegal alien from Haiti connected to criminal terrorist organizations’, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 25 September 2025; ‘US seeks to deport second prominent Haitian businessman’, Reuters, 25 September 2025; D. Coto, ‘ICE agents arrest one of Haiti’s most powerful and wealthy businessmen on US soil’, AP News, 24 September 2025.
157
‘Treasury Sanctions Terrorist Viv Ansanm Affiliates’, US Department of the Treasury, 17 October 2025.
158
‘US sanctions ex-police officer, gang leader in Haiti over criminal ties’, Al Jazeera, 17 October 2025.
159
‘U.S. DOS Offers Reward for Information on Haitian Criminal Orgs Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif’, US Embassy in Haiti.

Haiti

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (between January 2025 and June 2026)