Libya

There were no non-international armed conflict (NIACs) remaining in Libya between 1 July 2024 and the end of 2025.

A NIAC between the western Libya-based GNU and the eastern-based LAAF ended with the October 2020 ceasefire agreement.¹ The conflict between Libya (the Government of National Unity, GNU) andIslamic State Libya (IS-Libya) ended in 2023 as did those between the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) and IS-Libya, and between the LAAF and the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT).

Libya is a State party to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocols I and II of 1977.

This entry employs the term ‘LAAF’ to refer to the forces under General Khalifa Haftar who is based in the east of the country. His forces were previously called ‘Libyan National Army’.²

In February 2011, following a series of popular uprisings across northern Africa and the Middle East, protests broke out in several Libyan cities.³ In an endeavour to suppress the protests by using lethal force against demonstrators, the regime of Muammar al-Qaddafi escalated the situation.⁴ The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011 which authorized military intervention to protect civilians in Libya.⁵ The First Libyan Civil War, which saw between 12,000 and 15,000 deaths, culminated in the capture and killing of al-Qaddafi in October 2011.⁶

The transition process initiated after the fall of the al-Qaddafi regime achieved some successes, including parliamentary elections in July 2012, following which the transitional government relinquished its authority to the General National Congress (GNC) and its 200 members.⁷ Despite this initial success, Libya has struggled to rebuild State institutions.⁸ Initially, unrest and fighting flared up only sporadically,⁹ but the security situation deteriorated amid the disunity of successive transitional governments and due to jihadist groups gradually becoming more active in Benghazi, Darna, and Sirte.¹⁰

In May 2014, General Haftar initiated Operation Dignity, a military operation by the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) that targeted Islamist militant groups in various regions of eastern Libya, including Benghazi.¹¹ This operation met with fierce opposition from Islamists in a coalition of armed groups known as Libya Dawn.¹² The fighting spread to Tripoli and a nationwide power struggle escalated into the Second Libyan Civil War.¹³

A series of talks overseen by two former UN Special Envoys to Libya culminated in the establishment of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) and the formation of the UN-supported Government of National Accord (GNA) in December 2015.¹⁴ According to the LPA, the Presidency Council (PC) was to oversee the GNA.¹⁵ The Council faced a major difficulty in establishing a stable and unified government as the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk whose endorsement was required, refused to give it.¹⁶ Two blocs materialized, with political power effectively divided between rival administrations in Tripoli (in the west) and Tobruk (in the east).¹⁷ Both coalitions endorsed their own governance institutions and appointed separate military chiefs.¹⁸

In the years following, Haftar centralized control in the east. Slowly, he expanded territory without encountering significant resistance from the GNA, eventually gaining control over the entire east of the country.¹⁹ Meanwhile, a number of foreign States took an active interest in Libya’s political situation.²⁰ Egypt, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) provided military support to the LAAF under Haftar, while the UN-backed GNA received military support from Türkiye through oil and gas deals with the government.²¹

As part of the competition for dominance, the coalitions proceeded to establish their own central banks and disputed control over Libya’s oil fields, which resulted in the largest, El Sharara, closing in December 2018.²²Following Haftar’s offensive against Tripoli in April 2019, a broad coalition of armed groups formed behind the GNA, which, with Turkish support, repelled the assault in June 2019 and temporarily weakened Haftar.²³ A nationwide ceasefire was formally agreed in October 2020, marking the end of the Second Libyan Civil War. The 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) was established to implement a ceasefire and address security issues.²⁴ Despite mutual mistrust, the level of violence stayed low after the 2020 truce, which facilitated the reopening of political dialogue.²⁵

Following the ceasefire, UN-led negotiations developed a plan for the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections, which were initially scheduled to take place on 24 December 2021.²⁶ In accordance with the plan the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) established a provisional government, the Government of National Unity (GNU), in March 2021, which replaced the previous GNA, and appointed Abdul Hamid Dabaiba of the western faction as Prime Minister and Mohamed Menfi of the eastern faction as President of the PC.²⁷ However, the High National Electoral Commission was compelled to indefinitely postpone the planned election, owing to disagreement about candidate eligibility and the distribution of presidential and parliamentary powers.²⁸

In March 2022, the eastern-based HoR formally endorsed an alternate cabinet that appointed Fathi Bashagha as Prime Minister, effectively establishing a rival government based in Sirte in the east.²⁹ Bashagha unsuccessfully attempted to establish his authority over Tripoli during fighting in the capital in August 2022.³⁰

Today, Libya remains divided into two broad areas of influence.³¹ The internationally recognized GNU controls the north-west of the country with the help of powerful militias and Turkish military bases.³² Haftar and his sons have established a stronghold over the eastern, central, and southern regions of the country with the assistance of the Russian military.³³ The eastern, so-called, Government of National Stability (GNS), first under the leadership of Prime Ministers Fathi Bashagha (2022–23) and subsequently Osama Hamad (since 2023), functions as a civilian front in the regions under the control of the Haftar family.³⁴

The political deadlock is further complicated by Libya’s involvement in regional disputes concerning oil deposits, arms dealing, and migration.³⁵ Libya is one of Africa’s largest oil producers and its economy is entirely dependent on oil exports, which account for more than 80 per cent of all Libyan exports.³⁶ Haftar’s sphere of influence covers most oil production areas and export ports, but revenues go from the National Oil Corporation (NOC) to the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) in Tripoli.³⁷ Since 2016, Haftar has repeatedly halted oil production and demanded more money.³⁸

With reference to arms dealing, the former head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), which has been in Libya since 2011,³⁹asserts that the presence of surplus weaponry from previous conflicts transformed Libya into an ‘open supermarket’ for arms, exacerbating domestic political discord and regional tensions.⁴⁰ Haftar has been accused of providing weapons to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan’s civil war.⁴¹

The ongoing migration issues are causing significant humanitarian concerns.⁴² The porous nature of Libya’s borders, coupled with its fractured security situation, has led it to become a primary transit point for individuals migrating into Europe.⁴³ People smugglers operate out of Libya, using unsafe and overcrowded vessels to transport migrants across the Mediterranean.⁴⁴ The UN reports that Libyan authorities are responsible for significant violations of the human rights of migrants detained in Libyan facilities, including forced labour, extortion, torture, and sexual assault.⁴⁵

Despite these developments, Libya has exhibited the most substantial advance of any nation in the Global Peace Index (GPI) since 2020, ascending by twenty-five positions in the global rankings.⁴⁶ This positive measure is reflected in the decreasing number of internally displaced persons (IDPs).⁴⁷ When the conflict began in 2011, 498,000 IDPs were recorded,⁴⁸ but by the end of 2024 this figure had fallen to nearly 107,000, the lowest since 2013.⁴⁹

Developments in the oil sector

Libya’s economy is entirely dependent on oil exports. The distribution of oil revenues has, therefore, long been heavily contested by the country’s rival governments.⁵⁰ In the face of a continuing threat to halt oil production should Tripoli fail to allocate a portion of its oil revenues directly to the eastern authorities in June and July 2023,⁵¹ Mohamed Menfi, Chairman of the Tripoli-based PC, in early July 2023, announced the establishment of a financial committee comprising delegates from eastern and western Libya, with the purpose of fairly distributing oil revenues.⁵² In the ensuing days, the UN, the European Union (EU) and the majority of Western embassies expressed their support for the decision.⁵³ The committee held its first meeting in the city of Sirte on 20 July 2023.⁵⁴

The establishment of the High Financial Oversight Committee, however, was unsuccessful in halting the turbulence that affects the oil sector at a local level.⁵⁵ On 7 January 2024, the State-owned NOC declared force majeure at the Sharara Oil Field when protestors closed the site in response to deteriorating economic conditions in the southern region.⁵⁶ On 21 January 2024, the NOC lifted the force majeure declaration following a negotiated agreement with the protestors.⁵⁷ On 25 February 2024, Petroleum Facilities Guard militiamen closed oil facilities throughout the nation in a dispute over remuneration.⁵⁸ The following day, the strike was suspended after Tripoli-based Prime Minister Dabaiba consented to an increase in their salaries.⁵⁹

In early 2025, the Head of the NOC, Farhat Ben Ghadara, was reportedly replaced due to concerns regarding his health.⁶⁰ The role was filled on an interim basis by Masoud Suleiman.⁶¹ Suleiman’s called for an investigation into oil contracts and was met with a positive response, with many observers expressing hope that it would lead to greater transparency in the sector.⁶² Shortly thereafter, the UN released the latest report of its Panel of Experts on Libya, which prompted Libyan institutions alleged to have contributed to billions of dollars in lost oil revenues to attempt to deflect responsibility.⁶³ Notably, the NOC announced it was ending the oil-for-fuel swap system⁶⁴ and the General Electricity Company of Libya (GECOL) denied any fuel smuggling.⁶⁵

In another significant development the Tripoli-based Central Bank of Libya (CBL) published a report on 18 March 2025 that indicated a substantial decrease in oil revenues during the first half of the month.⁶⁶ The report stated that the decline exacerbated the pressure on foreign reserves as a persistent rise in public expenditure by the Tripoli-based and by the eastern-based parallel governments produced a heightened demand for foreign currency.⁶⁷ In an effort to reinvigorate the State’s energy sector, the NOC subsequently initiated a new bidding cycle for hydrocarbon exploration licenses on 3 March 2025, marking the first such initiative since 2007.⁶⁸

Dispute over control of the Central Bank of Libya (CBL)

The CBL is unique in that it functions as the government’s fiscal implementing partner, holding its bank accounts and disbursing operational funds to State entities and salaries to public-sector employees, rather than executing monetary policy as other central banks do.⁶⁹ The CBL has been the focal point of numerous disputes since 2014; the parallel governments contend for dominance.⁷⁰ On 20 August 2023, Sadiq al-Kabir, the governor of the CBL, delivered a statement in which he announced the re-establishment of the CBL as a unified institution, nearly a decade after a division into rival branches.⁷¹ However, the statement did not provide an indication as to whether the necessary procedures for operationalizing reunification had been initiated.⁷²

A year later a renewed contest erupted over the CBL leadership when the western-based PC announced the dismissal of al-Kabir on 12 August 2024 and summoned Mohammed Shukri to take up the post and establish a new board of directors.⁷³ However, on 16 August 2024, the eastern-based HoR confirmed that al-Kabir rejected the calls for his resignation and he would stay in office.⁷⁴ In the aftermath of this dispute, Musam Msallem, a bank executive, was kidnapped by an armed group in Tripoli, which led al-Kabir to suspend the CBL’s operations.⁷⁵ In response, the eastern-based government instructed the shutdown of all oilfields under its command.⁷⁶ Shortly afterwards, the UN voiced concerns about a worsening situation,⁷⁷ which had prompted al-Kabir and other senior bank officials to flee the country and to seek exile.⁷⁸ On 3 September 2024, the Court of Appeals in Benghazi declared the PC’s decision to replace al-Kabir as governor of the CBL illegal.⁷⁹

In an effort to find a solution to the crisis, UNSMIL arranged negotiations between the HoR, the HSC and the PC from 2 September 2024 onwards.⁸⁰ On 26 September 2024, the UN confirmed that the HoR and the HSC had agreed on Naji Issa as the new CBL governor and Maraai al-Baraasi as his deputy.⁸¹ The agreement met with the approval of international actors, including the UNSC.⁸² The new governor and his deputy took up their posts on 2 October 2024, bringing an end to the rivalry between the east- and west-based governments over control of the CBL.⁸³ The resolution of this dispute led to the resumption of international financial transactions and oil production after the August 2024 shutdown.⁸⁴ The CBL’s new board, comprising three individuals with ties to Haftar and three with ties to Dabaiba, met for the first time on 10 November 2024.⁸⁵ The following day, they unveiled a ninety-day plan designed to enhance banking transparency and enforce regulatory standards.⁸⁶

Devastating floods in eastern Libya

On 11 September 2023 in eastern Libya the impact of Storm Daniel caused two dams to collapse and led to severe flooding in the city of Derna and its surroundings.⁸⁷ An estimated 5,000 people died.⁸⁸ National and international actors provided aid on a large scale,⁸⁹ nevertheless, the rivalry between the eastern- and western-based governments persisted. To claim credit for the rescue mission, Eastern-based officials refused access by western-based authorities and the media to the city of Derna.⁹⁰ International help came from Haftar-allies such as the UAE and Egypt, as well as from Dabaiba-allies, including Qatar and Türkiye.⁹¹

In the aftermath of the storm, a wave of protests broke out in Derna on 18 September 2023. The protestors accused the eastern-based HoR and the Speaker, Aguila Saleh, of failing to carry out necessary maintenance on the dams which caused their collapse.⁹²Following the protests a prominent prosecutor had several officials allegedly involved in the circumstances leading to the collapse of the dams detained on 25 September 2023.⁹³The initiation of an investigation, however, failed to defuse the anger of the local population.⁹⁴ An international conference for the reconstruction of Derna was held on 1 and 2 November 2023 by the eastern-based government which excluded the Tripoli-based government and Western diplomats.⁹⁵ Several months after the devastating floods occurred, on 28 July 2024 a Libyan court found twelve officials responsible for the collapse of the dams in Derna.⁹⁶

UN-backed attempts at holding national elections amid the political deadlock

The UN, through UNSMIL, and since the beginning of the reporting period in July 2023, has urged political actors to implement as soon as possible the roadmap to general elections (see above).⁹⁷ The UN view is that elections should be held before an official government unification of the eastern- and western-based authorities.⁹⁸ Contrary to this position, the eastern-based HoR adopted a plan on 25 July 2023 for the formation of an interim unity government ahead of presidential and parliamentary elections.⁹⁹ With a change in leadership in the Tripoli-based HSC from Khaled Mishri to Mohamed Takala on 6 August 2023, shortly after the announcement of the HoR plan, it was at first unclear whether the HSC would endorse the initiative to form an interim unity government.¹⁰⁰ In a parallel development, the UN special envoy for Libya, Abdoulaye Bathily, briefed the UNSC on 22 August on the ‘imperative’ importance of the formation of a unified government before elections in Libya, seemingly, reversing the position long held by the UN (see above).¹⁰¹ Bathily later reiterated his position in a meeting held with Libyan officials on 5 September 2023.¹⁰²

In October 2023, a disagreement between the HoR and the HSC surfaced over the adoption of a set of revised election laws, which led to a temporary standstill in the preparation for elections.¹⁰³ On 16 October 2023, Bathily highlighted ‘some progress’ in his report to the UN Security Council, but acknowledged there were difficulties in engaging the rival governments in negotiations for the formation of an interim government.¹⁰⁴ Despite a meeting in Egypt on 8 November 2023 between the head of the HoR, Agiula Saleh, and HSC leader, Mohamed Takala, an agreement could not be reached.¹⁰⁵ Saleh persisted in advocating for creating an interim unity government and the election laws supported by the HoR; Takala, however, did not approve the election laws and opposed the idea of an interim unity government.¹⁰⁶ In response to the standstill, Bathily invited the PC, the HoR, the HSC, the LAAF, and the Dabaiba government to a meeting to discuss an electoral timeline. Hamad’s government was not invited.¹⁰⁷The invited actors set mutually exclusive terms for their participation in the talks, creating an early challenge to Bathily’s initiative.¹⁰⁸

The United States (US) ambassador to Libya, Richard Norland, subsequently engaged in talks with the eastern- and western-based authorities in January 2024 to rally support for Bathily’s initiative.¹⁰⁹ Norland’s commitment proved fruitful as Dabaiba and the head of the HSC confirmed their attendance at Bathily’s meeting on 25 January 2024.¹¹⁰ On 27 February 2024, the UNSC repeated a call for elections to be held in Libya ‘as soon as possible’.¹¹¹ This demand was officially endorsed by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)’s foreign ministers during a meeting in Saudia Arabia on 3 March 2024.¹¹² A few days later, in a sign of rapprochement, during a meeting held in Cairo on 10 March, Saleh, Menfi, and Takala consented to the establishment of a ‘technical committee’ to settle disputes over the electoral laws.¹¹³ Amid mounting pressure, Bathily stepped down from his position as head of UNSMIL in April 2024.¹¹⁴ His deputy, Stephanie Koury, resumed the talks with Libyan officials on 21 May 2024.¹¹⁵ At the same time, the rival governments entered into discussions with Western authorities such as EU Council President Charles Michel, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and Italian Prime Minister Meloni.¹¹⁶ The eastern strongman Haftar, meanwhile, continued to strengthen military cooperation with Russia (see below).¹¹⁷

Despite the political stalemate, the High National Elections Commission opened the registration process for voters in sixty municipalities on 9 June 2024.¹¹⁸ In a sign of progress, at a meeting in Cairo on 18 July, the HoR and the HSC confirmed their agreement to form a unity government and to organize elections.¹¹⁹ Over the ensuing months, the political stalemate persisted, for instance, with regard to the internal election of a new leader of the HSC in August 2024.¹²⁰ Meanwhile, the High National Elections Commission announced 16 November 2024 as the date for municipal elections.¹²¹ The municipal elections were held without any major disruptions and recorded a seventy-four per cent voter turnout.¹²²

On 16 December 2024, acting UNSMIL head Koury declared the establishment of a new advisory committee, whose members are appointed by UNSMIL, which is tasked with reviewing electoral matters and proposing a way to organize elections.¹²³ This announcement was met with mixed reactions among various actors.¹²⁴ Some Tripoli-based factions, Western countries, and the EU expressed their support but the eastern-based government and Russia opposed the Koury initiative.¹²⁵ In a parallel development brought forward by the Libyan Investment Authority, a discussion about reinvesting $30bn in sanctioned funds was started in the UNSC.¹²⁶

During January 2025, Koury’s initiative came to a standstill¹²⁷ but a month later regained momentum when UNSMIL announced the appointment of the members of the new committee on 4 February 2025.¹²⁸ The advisory committee sat for the first time in Tripoli on 9 February 2025.¹²⁹ A Ghanaian, Hanna Tetteh, assumed the position of head of UNSMIL and UN special representative for Libya on 20 February 2025.¹³⁰ Three months after the inaugural meeting, the UN-backed advisory committee published its first report.¹³¹ On 20 June 2025, the UN-backed International Follow-up Committee on Libya held a meeting in Germany, it’s first since October 2021.¹³² A few days later, on 24 June following Tetteh’s briefing of the Security Council, protests broke out in the vicinity of UNSMIL’s headquarters in Tripoli calling for the departure of the mission.¹³³

Rising tension between western and eastern rival forces

After the 2020 ceasefire agreement between the western-based GNA and the eastern-based LAAF (see above) hostilities largely ceased.¹³⁴ The situation remained tense during the reporting period. Notably, forces aligned with Haftar’s LAAF tried to detain former Tripoli-based defence minister Mahdi al-Barghathi on 6 October 2023 while he was visiting his hometown Benghazi and accused him of plotting to rally forces against Haftar.¹³⁵ The incident led to a shoot-out between rival forces; seventeen people were killed, including a son of the former defence minister.¹³⁶ Additionally, the LAAF blocked communications in Benghazi for more than a week.¹³⁷ A few days later, fighting between a western-based government-affiliated militia and armed groups backing Adel Daab, reportedly a supporter of Haftar, in Gharyan city killed eight people.¹³⁸ The situations in Benghazi and Gharyan remained tense over the following months.¹³⁹

Several months later, in April 2025, images of illegal military convoys from Misrata city approaching Tripoli appeared on social media which led the PC to issue warnings on 4 April 2025.¹⁴⁰. In a similar development that month, activity involving Haftar’s forces was reported in the vicinity of Sirte city.¹⁴¹ These movements resulted in the Misrata Revolutionaries Gathering, a coalition of ex-revolutionary fighters, issuing a warning to Haftar and threatening an ‘all-out war’ should he make any further advance on western Libya.¹⁴²

Extension of Turkish military mission in Libya

Following the signature of a military agreement between the Tripoli-based GNA and Türkiye on 21 December 2019,¹⁴³. Türkiye deployed troops to Libya in January 2020.¹⁴⁴ At the time of the deployment of the mission, Tripoli was under attack from forces affiliated with Haftar (see above).¹⁴⁵ With the support of the Turkish forces, the GNA pushed back Haftar and regained control of Tripoli (see above).¹⁴⁶ In the aftermath of this success, the Turkish parliament renewed the mission’s mandate to operate in Libya.¹⁴⁷ On 30 November 2023, the mission’s mandate was further renewed for an additional twenty-four months until January 2026.¹⁴⁸ As a part of the mission Türkiye operates two bases in Misrata (naval and land bases) and in Al-Watiya (an air base).¹⁴⁹

Increasing Russian involvement in Libya

Russia has been involved in Libya since 2010 when it struck a deal to deliver $1.8 billion worth of weapons to the country.¹⁵⁰ By October 2018 reports had emerged that Russia had set up at least two military bases in Libya, one in Benghazi and one in Tobruk, and had sent numerous special forces and mercenaries to Libya.¹⁵¹ Russia, alongside Egypt and the UAE, backed Haftar and his LAAF during their 2019 offensive on Tripoli (see above).¹⁵². Even after Haftar’s defeat in Tripoli (see above), Russia maintained a presence of about 2,000 mercenary troops permanently deployed in Libya.¹⁵³ During the reporting period, between 800 and 1,200 Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group) mercenaries were in Libya, mainly engaged in overseeing key oil production facilities rather than actively fighting.¹⁵⁴ There are numerous Libyan military bases used for Russian military activities and arms deliveries, including al-Khadim, al-Jufra, Brak al-Shati, al-Wigh, Tamanhint, al-Qardabiya, and Matan al-Sarra¹⁵⁵. For Russia, Libya is a strategic location, providing it with a pathway to operations in Sudan, Chad, Niger, and other countries in the Sahel and Central Africa regions.¹⁵⁶

In December 2023, a Russian cargo plane, either delivering equipment to Haftar-allied forces or to a transit point for further transportation to other states in the region, came under a drone attack at Jufra airbase in central Libya.¹⁵⁷ The perpetrator of the attack is unknown; US Africa Command (AFRICOM) rejects responsibility and the ability of the Tripoli-based government to carry out such an attack is disputed among experts.¹⁵⁸

Following a visit by Russian officials who reached Libya on two Russian naval vessels on 16 June 2024 in Tobruk¹⁵⁹ and the subsequent participation of 250 Libyan students in a training programme in Russia,¹⁶⁰ the US stated its concern over Russia’s growing military influence in Libya on 22 June 2024.¹⁶¹ A month later, in July 2024, Italian authorities intercepted a Russian shipment of drones bound for Benghazi in breach of the UNSC’s arms embargo.¹⁶² This process continued throughout early 2025. On 11 February 2025, Jeune Afrique revealed that Russia had transported advanced air defence systems to Libya, specifically to Maaten al-Sarra air base.¹⁶³ In a parallel development, Hamad’s eastern-based government concluded economic and cooperation agreements with Belarus on 10 March 2025.¹⁶⁴

Increase in arbitrary arrests, detentions, enforced disappearances, and killing of civil society activists and political opposition

Numerous incidents of the nature listed in the subheading were reported during the period under review. Notably, on 16 May 2024, Ibrahim al-Dressi, a member of the Libyan House of Representatives, disappeared in Benghazi after he had participated in a rally convened by the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF).¹⁶⁵ It was suspected that he had been abducted, especially after videos appeared almost a year later, in early May 2025, depicting al-Dressi in a locked enclosure and exhibiting visible marks of torture. His immediate release was demanded.¹⁶⁶ In a similar incident, Moatassim al-Areebi, a political activist, was kidnapped by unknown armed assailants in Misrata city on 8 July 2024.¹⁶⁷ Following these incidents, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, issued a statement on 9 July expressing his concern over the worsening human rights situation in Libya and the mounting repression directed at civil society activists and political opponents.¹⁶⁸ Moatassim al-Areebi was subsequently set free on 11 July 2024, after several actors had issued calls for his release.¹⁶⁹ That same month, journalist Ahmed al-Sanussi was arrested in Tripoli by western-based government officials on 11 July 2024 following his investigation into alleged government corruption.¹⁷⁰ After international calls for his release were made, he was freed on 14 July 2024.¹⁷¹

The second half of 2024 saw the arrest of TV journalist, Ikram Rajab, along with two other women by forces allied to eastern strongman Haftar in Benghazi on 18 September.¹⁷² She was released on 22 October 2024 after thirty-two days in detention.¹⁷³ In November 2024, Mustafa Washishi, a security director, and Mohammed al-Sarit, a journalist, were arrested in Tripoli and Benghazi, respectively.¹⁷⁴ Washishi was released on 12 November and al-Sarit was set free on 18 November.¹⁷⁵ A month later, another prominent figure, the director of the NGO Islamic Call Society, Moaz Al-Hashemi, was abducted by an armed group in Tripoli between 16 and 26 December 2024.¹⁷⁶ In an escalation of the situation, unknown armed men launched an attack against the vehicle of the Tripoli-based Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs Adel Jumaa on 12 February 2025 in Tripoli, injuring him.¹⁷⁷

Developments in the sphere of migration

In early December 2023, the PC and Libyan NGOs voiced concern over a development which took place a month earlier in neighbouring Niger.¹⁷⁸ In November 2023, Niger’s military junta revoked a 2015 law aimed at discouraging migration to Europe by criminalising migrants and the services associated with migration which included the transportation of irregular migrants to Libya.¹⁷⁹ Against the backdrop of this decision by Nigerien authorities, and fearing a spike in the number of illegal migrants arriving in Libya, the UN-backed GNU reportedly issued an urgent appeal for EU support to strengthen security on the country’s southern border.¹⁸⁰

Evidence of a major atrocity was uncovered in February 2025 when two mass graves containing migrants, some of whom exhibited signs of gunshot injuries, were unearthed in Jakharrah and Kufra in northeast and southeast Libya.¹⁸¹ The IOM, on 10 February 2025, voiced ‘shock and concern’ over the uncovered evidence¹⁸² and several NGOs and civil society representatives made an urgent plea to the EU Commission on 14 February 2025 to suspend migration funding to Libya.¹⁸³ The following month, on 13 March, Tripoli-based Prime Minister Dabaiba pledged action to enhance security on Libya’s southern border and refuted allegations that the GNU had consented to a migrant resettlement plan with the IOM.¹⁸⁴ At the same time the absence of a concerted strategy to combat smuggling activities resulted in the exacerbation of tensions with Tunisia.¹⁸⁵

Militias leaving Tripoli and giving way to regular police forces

For over a decade Tripoli was controlled by militias who filled the security vacuum left by the ousting of al-Qaddafi in 2011 (see above).¹⁸⁶ On 21 February 2024, Tripoli-based Interior Minister, Imad Trabelsi, announced that an agreement with five militias, namely the General Security Force, the Special Deterrence Force, Brigade 444, Brigade 111, and the Stability Support Authority, had been reached concerning the transfer of power in Tripoli to regular police forces.¹⁸⁷ This deal followed a series of violent confrontations between militias in Tripoli in the preceding months¹⁸⁸ and entailed the militia’s agreement to withdraw from the capital and return to their barracks by 9 April 2024.¹⁸⁹

Renewal of UNSMIL and UNSC sanctions

On 31 October 2024, the UNSC renewed UNSMIL’s mandate for only three months as the mission was still without a leader after Bathily resigned on 16 April 2024 (see above).¹⁹⁰ The renewal, however, entailed the provision that the mandate would be extended automatically for a further nine months if a new UNSMIL head was appointed before February 2025.¹⁹¹ Just ahead of the expiry of this deadline, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres appointed former Ghanaian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hannah Tetteh, as the new head of UNSMIL and the UN special representative for Libya, thereby triggering the automatic extension of UNSMIL for nine months.¹⁹²

In a parallel development the UN Security Council, on 16 January 2025, extended the sanctions on Libya, including an arms embargo, travel bans, assets freezes, and measures concerning illicit oil exports, until May 2026.¹⁹³ The sanctions initially were imposed by resolutions 1970 (2011) and 2146 (2014) and were later amended by subsequent resolutions. ¹⁹⁴ Notwithstanding the extension of sanctions, the UN Security Council authorized the Libyan Investment Authority to reinvest sovereign wealth funds amounting to over $30 billion, which had been frozen since 2011, provided the funds remain frozen.¹⁹⁵

New regional coalition between Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia

In a sign of a reinforcement of regional alliances, the President of the Libyan PC, Mohamed Menfi, the Tunisian President, Kais Saied, and the Algerian President, Abdelmadjid Tebboune, met in Tunis on 22 April 2024 to discuss enhancing regional integration.¹⁹⁶During the meeting, the participants agreed to convene every three months a tripartite meeting at a presidential level with an objective of harmonizing collaborative and cooperative endeavours between the three States, thereby effectively creating a new regional coalition.¹⁹⁷ On 2 May 2024, the interior ministers of the three States met with their Italian counterpart, Matteo Piantedosi, in Rome to deliberate on matters pertaining to the management of illegal migration.¹⁹⁸In a further sign of improved relations, Libya and Tunisia officially agreed to reopen the Ras al-Jedir border crossing between the two States on 12 June 2024.¹⁹⁹ On 16 October 2024, the Algerian President Tebboune announced that a second high-level meeting between the three States would be held ‘soon’.²⁰⁰

Security cooperation between the US and Libya

On a visit to Libya, AFRICOM officials met with Tripoli-based Prime Minister Dabaiba in Tripoli and General Haftar in Benghazi to discuss the potential for furthering military cooperation.²⁰¹ Between 2 and 5 December 2024, renewed meetings between US officials and western as well as eastern-based Libyan military commanders²⁰² discussed exchange of expertise and possible mechanisms to foster collaboration among Libya’s disparate military institutions.²⁰³

Investigations by the International Criminal Court

On 26 February 2011, the UNSC unanimously decided to refer the situation in Libya since 15 February 2011 to the International Criminal Court (ICC).²⁰⁴ Despite Libya not being a party to the Rome Statute, as a consequence of this referral the ICC has jurisdiction over crimes committed during the period in question in Libya.²⁰⁵ On 18 and 19 November 2024, Karim Khan, the Prosecutor of the ICC, travelled to the Libyan city of Tripoli for discussions on the investigation of alleged war crimes committed between 2014 and 2020 by six individuals affiliated with the Al Kaniyat militia in Tarhuna.²⁰⁶

Shortly after the visit, on 18 January 2025, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Osama Njeem (also known as Al-Misry or Elmasry), a member of the security forces reportedly responsible for the management of detention facilities in Tripoli.²⁰⁷ Mr Njeem was formally accused of having committed crimes against humanity and war crimes since February 2015.²⁰⁸ Complying with the arrest warrant, Italian authorities arrested Al-Misry on 19 January 2025 in Turin.²⁰⁹ However, he was released two days later and transferred to Tripoli due to procedural irregularities.²¹⁰ On 12 May 2025, Libya formally recognized the ICC’s jurisdiction over its territory from 2011 until the end of 2027.²¹¹

Escalating militia violence in Tripoli and Anti-Dabaiba protests

During the reporting period, fighting between different militias was regularly reported, posing a significant security threat for the local population.²¹² Fighting between militias took place across the country, including in Tripoli,²¹³ and Al-Zawiya.²¹⁴ The clashes occurred both between GNU and LAAF-affiliated militias as well as within those alliances.²¹⁵

On 12 May 2025, fierce fighting between the Special Deterrence Force (Al-Rada) and pro-Dabaiba units broke out in Tripoli in the aftermath of the assassination of Abdel Ghani al-Kikli, the commander of the Stability Support Authority.²¹⁶ The clashes were some of the most intense confrontations in Tripoli for many years; at least eight civilians were killed.²¹⁷ Two days later, on 14 May, the Tripoli-based government declared a ceasefire and set up a truce committee.²¹⁸ After the announcement of the ceasefire, a wave of protests erupted in Tripoli and at least one police officer was killed.²¹⁹ The protestors called for Prime Minister Dabaiba to step down and several GNU ministers resigned on 16 May 2025 in support of the protests.²²⁰ The HoR was swift in its endorsement of the calls for Dabaiba’s resignation.²²¹ The protests continued throughout June 2025 and were met with a violent response by Dabaiba’s security forces who shot at demonstrators around the GNU’s headquarters.²²² In an attempt to stabilize the situation, Mohamed Menfi, the President of the PC, created the so-called Tripoli Security Directorate Support Force on 23 June 2025 in support of Dabaiba.²²³

Sudan accuses Haftar of involvement in the Sudanese civil war

On 10 June 2025, the Sudanese army accused Haftar’s LAAF of being involved in the Sudanese civil war.²²⁴ More specifically, they accused Haftar of launching attacks on Sudanese border post in coordination with the paramilitary RSF and their allied forces.²²⁵ These allegations mark the first time that Libyan forces have been officially accused of direct intervention in the Sudanese civil war.²²⁶ The Sudanese army had previously accused Haftar of indirectly supporting the RSF by supplying them with weapons.²²⁷

Non-international armed conflict between Libya (GNU) and the Islamic State Libya (IS-Libya)

Background

There was a proliferation of militant Islamist movements in Libya after the ousting of al-Qaddafi in 2011.¹ One of the groups emerging in this context was the so-called ‘Battar Brigade’, which consists of Libyan nationals who fought for the Islamic State (ISIL or IS) in Syria.² Returnees from this group created the ‘Islamic Youth Shura Council’, which was acknowledged as a new branch of ISIL, the ‘Islamic State Libya’ (hereafter IS-Libya), in October 2014.³

Western-based militias initially refrained from engaging with IS-Libya as they were reluctant to engage in a second conflict while already fighting against Haftar’s eastern-based forces.⁴ IS-Libya took advantage of this reluctance, forming local branches in Benghazi and Derna, and taking control of the city of Sirte.⁵

The GNA (now GNU) was officially formed in December 2015,⁶ and shortly after this, in May 2016, it launched a large-scale military offensive on ISIL-Libya fighters in Sirte. It was supported by a coalition of militias dubbed Bunyan al-Marsus and international forces, such as the US.⁷

The US categorized IS-Libya as a terrorist organization in 2016.⁸ The GNA authorized air strikes against IS-Libya in Sirte, which were carried out by AFRICOM starting on 1 August 2016.⁹ By December 2016, the GNA and its support forces had recaptured Sirte from IS-Libya control.¹⁰ AFRICOM airstrikes continued in the ensuing months, targeting IS-Libya fighters who had retreated to rural areas in central and southern Libya.¹¹

This defeat weakened IS-Libya significantly and it never regained its pre-2016 strength.¹² In recent years, the threat of terrorism, including attacks perpetrated by IS-Libya, has gradually decreased.¹³ The latest IS-Libya operations of note in western Libya were reported in October 2022 in Tripoli and the Western Region.¹⁴

Intensity

While IS-Libya was not reported to exercise control over any territory in Libya by the end of 2024, Libyan intelligence reports did reveal that IS-Libya cells remained active in logistical ISIL activities in southern Libya throughout 2025.¹⁵ IS-Libya, although not actively fighting, continues to exist. Although there was no recorded fighting between IS-Libya and the GNU during the reporting period, a weapons stockpile was discovered by Libyan authorities in Sabha, south-western Libya. Authorities found mortars, anti-aircraft guns, explosives, and large quantities of ammunition being stockpiled.¹⁶ The ISIL publication, al-Naba, in an editorial published on 11 September 2025, called for a revitalization of jihad in Libya through IS-Libya.¹⁷

Organization

Abdul Salam Darak Allah is reported to be the leader of IS-Libya.¹⁸ Abdul Salam Darak exercises authority over the military wing of IS-Libya which, as of 2024, consisted of about 150 to 400 fighters.¹⁹ Fighters are divided into cells with approximately thirty to forty fighters each.²⁰ The existence of leadership and a tiered structure (through fighters divided into cells) allows for discipline and the ability to adhere to IHL.

IS-Libya remains sufficiently organized to recruit and distribute fighters to other ISIL affiliates and to raise funds through criminal network activities.²¹ IS-Libya’s logistical capacity is further illustrated by its ability to smuggle arms ²² and oil.²³ IS-Libya raises funds through human trafficking²⁴ and kidnapping.²⁵

All ISIL branches speak with one voice through al-Naba, the ISIL weekly newsletter, which issues statements on behalf of IS-Libya.²⁶

Despite IS-Libya currently being degraded and non-operational on the military front,²⁷ IS-Libya remains sufficiently organized as demanded by IHL.

1
W. Lacher, ‘Where Have All the Jihadists Gone? The Rise and Mysterious Fall of Militant Islamist Movements in Libya’, Stiftung Wissenschraft und Politik, Research Paper 10, June 2024, 5. ↩︎
2
‘ISIS-Libya (ISIS-L)’, Counter Terrorism Guide, June 2023. ↩︎
3
‘ISIS-Libya (ISIS-L)’, Counter Terrorism Guide, June 2023. ↩︎
4
W. Lacher, ‘Where Have All the Jihadists Gone? The Rise and Mysterious Fall of Militant Islamist Movements in Libya’, Stiftung Wissenschraft und Politik, Research Paper 10, June 2024, 8. ↩︎
5
W. Lacher, ‘Where Have All the Jihadists Gone? The Rise and Mysterious Fall of Militant Islamist Movements in Libya’, Stiftung Wissenschraft und Politik, Research Paper 10, June 2024, 8; ‘History of ISIS in Libya’, Libya Security Monitor. ↩︎
6
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024; ‘Libyan Political Agreement As Signed on 17 December 2015’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya; ‘The Libyan Political Agreement: Time for a Reset’, International Crisis Group, 4 November 2016; M. Fitzgerald and M. Toaldo, ‘A quick guide to Libya’s main players’, European Council on Foreign Relations, 19 May 2016 ↩︎
7
E. Estelle Perez, ‘GNA-Allied Forces Seize Momentum against ISIS in Sirte’, Critical Threats, 10 June 2016; ‘History of ISIS in Libya’, Libya Security Monitor. ↩︎
8
‘ISIS-Libya (ISIS-L)’, Counter Terrorism Guide, June 2023. ↩︎
9
‘History of ISIS in Libya’, Libya Security Monitor; S. Ackerman et al, ‘US launches airstrikes against Isis in Libya’, The Guardian, 1 August 2016; ‘Statement by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook on US Air Strike in Libya’, US Department of War, 1 August 2016. ↩︎
10
W. Lacher, ‘Where Have All the Jihadists Gone? The Rise and Mysterious Fall of Militant Islamist Movements in Libya’, Stiftung Wissenschraft und Politik, Research Paper 10, June 2024, 8. ↩︎
11
W. Lacher, ‘Where Have All the Jihadists Gone? The Rise and Mysterious Fall of Militant Islamist Movements in Libya’, Stiftung Wissenschraft und Politik, Research Paper 10, June 2024, 8. ↩︎
12
K. Rempfer, ‘US strikes culled ISIS-Libya encampments, unlikely to return to pre-2016 levels, defense official says’, Army Times, 14 October 2019. ↩︎
13
D. Cristiani, ‘Weakened ISIS Eyes Resurgence in Libya’, Libya Tribune, 25 October 2025. ↩︎
14
‘CTF mobilises in Tripoli in response to ISIS threat’, Libya Security Monitor, 29 October 2022. ↩︎
15
D. Cristiani, ‘Weakened ISIS Eyes Resurgence in Libya’, Libya Tribune, 25 October 2025. ↩︎
16
D. Cristiani, ‘Weakened ISIS Eyes Resurgence in Libya’, Libya Tribune, 25 October 2025. ↩︎
17
D. Cristiani, ‘Weakened ISIS Eyes Resurgence in Libya’, Libya Tribune, 25 October 2025; D. Cristiani, ‘Weakened Islamic State Eyes Resurgence in Libya’, Jamestown, 22 October 2025. ↩︎
18
‘Eighteenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat’, UN Doc S/2024/117, 31 January 2024, para 32; ‘Sixteenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat’, UN Doc S/2023/76, 1 February 2023, para 24. ↩︎
19
‘Eighteenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat’, UN Doc S/2024/117, 31 January 2024, para 32. ↩︎
20
‘Sixteenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat’, UN Doc S/2023/76, 1 February 2023, para 24. ↩︎
21
M. Ahmed, ‘Guterres warns of ISIS in Libya merging with criminal networks in Sahel region’, The Libya Observer, 20 August 2025. ↩︎
22
‘Twenty-first report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat’, UN Doc S/2025/496, 1 August 2025, para 12 ↩︎
23
‘Sixteenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat’, UN Doc S/2023/76, 1 February 2023, para 24. ↩︎
24
‘Eighteenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat’, UN Doc S/2024/117, 31 January 2024, para 32 ↩︎
25
‘Sixteenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat’, UN Doc S/2023/76, 1 February 2023, para para 24. ↩︎
26
D. Cristiani, ‘Weakened ISIS Eyes Resurgence in Libya’, Libya Tribune, 25 October 2025. ↩︎
27
D. Cristiani, ‘Weakened ISIS Eyes Resurgence in Libya’, Libya Tribune, 25 October 2025; A. Shutni, ‘The Islamic State in 2025: an Evolving Threat Facing a Waning Global Response’, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 11 July 2025 ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict between LAAF and IS-Libya

Background

The conflict between LAAF¹ and IS-Libya has its origins in ‘Operation Dignity’ launched on 16 May 2014. The purpose of ‘Operation Dignity’ was to erase Islamist militias from Benghazi.² General Khalifa Haftar, the architect of ‘Operation Dignity’, sought to use this powerplay to strengthen his influence over the eastern part of Libya.³

Despite being at its peak strength, with an estimated 6,000 fighters, and exercising control over the town of Sirte in 2015 and 2016,⁴ IS-Libya was significantly weakened in December 2016 by a coalition made up of western-based authorities and international support, and driven out of Sirte (see above).⁵ A separate operation by Haftar against IS-Libya was launched in 2017 in Derna,⁶ a town previously captured by IS-Libya during 2014.⁷ This operation concluded in June 2018, with LAAF emerging victorious.⁸

A significantly weakened IS-Libya regrouped and started operating in small and mobile cells as of 2018.⁹ The frequency of IS-Libya’s attacks gradually declined after 2018.¹⁰

Intensity

The most recent recorded clash of note between LAAF and IS-Libya took place in November 2022, when seven IS-Libya fighters were killed in an operation launched by LAAF in the border region with Chad.¹¹ Both parties to the former NIAC in Libya continue to exist.

LAAF remains combat-ready as illustrated through its military parades and exercises putting its newly acquired equipment, maritime vessels, and extensive arsenal on full display.¹² Similarly, IS-Libya keeps a stockpile of military-grade weaponry ensuring it remains equipped to engage in conflict.¹³ In addition to the stockpiling of weapons, the UN Secretary-General, in his twenty-first report on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security, found that Africa remained home to the majority of Islamic State activity globally.¹⁴ IS-Libya remained active through community outreach in Sabha, a town under the control of Khalifa Haftar’s forces, as of October 2024, trying to rebuild support from local populations.¹⁵ These efforts indicate that IS-Libya aims to, eventually, regain territorial control over parts of Libya which are currently controlled by the eastern-based authorities.

The risk of resumption of fighting between IS-Libya and LAAF remains real.

Organization

LAAF

LAAF’s military wing is commanded by General Khalifa Haftar.¹⁶ Brigadier General Saddam Haftar served as his deputy¹⁷ and chief of staff as of 16 May 2024.¹⁸ Saddam Haftar’s portfolio includes the LAAF’s land forces, external relations strategy, and economic interests.¹⁹ Major General Ahmed Al-Mismari serves as the spokesperson of the LAAF.²⁰ The military wing of LAAF is divided into brigades and battalions.²¹ As the LAAF’s military wing originated through an alliance of armed groups, there remain a few groups in eastern Libya who are not under the direct control of General Saddam Haftar.²² All top military positions are, however, filled by family members belonging to the Haftar clan or its inner circle.²³

Apart from the formal structures of the military wing, the LAAF structure does include local militias²⁴ and tribal self-defence forces.²⁵ LAAF forces, when not engaged in fighting, patrol areas under LAAF control in southern Libya to ensure stability.²⁶ LAAF fighters have received training from Jordan, Egypt, and the UAE.²⁷ Elements of LAAF forces received training from AFRICOM instructors during the wargames held as part of Operation Flintlock hosted by Ghana during 2024.²⁸ LAAF fighters are disciplined and have the ability to implement IHL owing to the LAAF’s hierarchal structure and military training.

LAAF’s logistical capacity benefits from its control over the territorial waters of eastern Libya and the old Benghazi harbour.²⁹ Exclusive control over the old Benghazi harbour gave LAAF control over maritime traffic and routes in the vicinity of this harbour.³⁰ LAAF raises funds through its fuel smuggling,³¹ human and migrant smuggling,³² as well as gold³³ and drug smuggling.³⁴

LAAF remains sufficiently organized as demanded by IHL.

IS-Libya (see above)

The NIAC between LAAF and IS-Libya ended in 2023.

1
W. Lacher, ‘Who is Fighting Whom in Tripoli? How the 2019 Civil War is Transforming Libya’s Military Landscape’, Small Arms Survey, Briefing Paper, August 2019, Endnote 3; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2022/427, 27 May 2022, Annex 2; ‘Libya: One year after resolution 56/16, the human rights situation remains dire and domestic accountability efforts inadequate’, The International Commission of Jurists, September 2025, 5 ↩︎
2
N. Missaglia, ‘Chaos in Libya: A Background’, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 4 July 2017; T. Eaton and A. R. Alageli, ‘The Development of Libyan Armed Groups Since 2014’, Chatham House, 17 March 2020, Updated 1 June 2021. ↩︎
3
T. Eaton and A. R. Alageli, ‘The Development of Libyan Armed Groups Since 2014’, Chatham House, 17 March 2020, Updated 1 June 2021; E. Badi, ‘Libyan Arab Armed Forces (Libya)’, European Council on Foreign Relations. ↩︎
4
‘ISIS-Libya (ISIS-L)’, Counter Terrorism Guide, June 2023 ↩︎
5
N. Missaglia, ‘Chaos in Libya: A Background’, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 4 July 2017. ↩︎
6
T. Eaton and A. R. Alageli, ‘The Development of Libyan Armed Groups Since 2014’, Chatham House, 17 March 2020, Updated 1 June 2021 ↩︎
7
N. Missaglia, ‘Chaos in Libya: A Background’, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 4 July 2017. ↩︎
8
T. Eaton and A. R. Alageli, ‘The Development of Libyan Armed Groups Since 2014’, Chatham House, 17 March 2020, Updated 1 June 2021. ↩︎
9
‘Sixteenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat’, UN Doc S/2023/76, 1 February 2023, para 24; ‘ISIS-Libya (ISIS-L)’, Counter Terrorism Guide, June 2023. ↩︎
10
J. Warner, et al, ‘Outlasting the Caliphate: The Evolution of the Islamic State Threat in Africa’, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, November/December 2020. ↩︎
11
‘LNA kills 7 ISIS operatives in security operation near Qatrun’, Libya Security Monitor, 16 November 2022. ↩︎
12
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, 2. ↩︎
13
D. Cristiani, ‘Weakened ISIS Eyes Resurgence in Libya’, Libya Tribune, 25 October 2025. ↩︎
14
‘Twenty-first report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat’, UN Doc S/2025/496, 1 August 2025, paras 4 and 10; ‘Counter-Terrorism: Briefing on the Secretary-General’s Strategic-Level Report on ISIL/Da’esh’, Security Council Report, 18 August 2025. ↩︎
15
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, para 26. ↩︎
16
‘Libya, the spokesperson of Haftar’s forces: Reinforcements in the south to protect the borders with Mali, Niger and Chad’, Nova News, 11 August 2024. ↩︎
17
J.Jawhar, ‘Libyan National Army Expands its Influence in the South’, Asharq Al-Awsat, 31 October 2025 ↩︎
18
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, para 21 and Annex 10. ↩︎
19
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, 2. ↩︎
20
‘Libyan Army Spokesperson: We Welcome All Political Solutions to Solve Crisis’, Libyan Review, 18 January 2021. ↩︎
21
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2025/673, 15 September 2023, para 19. ↩︎
22
T. Eaton, ‘The Libyan Arab Armed Forces’, Chatham House, 2 June 2021, Updated 7 June 2021. ↩︎
23
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2025/673, 15 September 2023, para 19. ↩︎
24
‘Libya: One year after resolution 56/16, the human rights situation remains dire and domestic accountability efforts inadequate’, The International Commission of Jurists, September 2025, 5 ↩︎
25
‘Interim Strategic Assessment of EUBAM Libya 2024’, European External Action Service, Working Document, 5 June 2024, para 6. ↩︎
26
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, para 25. ↩︎
27
W. Lacher, ‘Libya’s Militias Have Become the State’, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Comment 44, July 2023, 3. ↩︎
28
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, para 82. ↩︎
29
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, para 19. ↩︎
30
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, para 10. ↩︎
31
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, paras 20 and 106 – 110 ↩︎
32
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, para 51 ↩︎
33
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, para 23 ↩︎
34
W. Lacher, ‘Libya’s Militias Have Become the State’, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Comment 44, July 2023, 2. ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict between the LAAF and the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT) 

Background

The Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT) was established in 2016 with the purpose of ousting then-Chadian President Idriss Déby.¹ The creation of FACT was a result of a split of the former Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD) into three separate groups: the UFDD, led by Mahamat Nouri, the FACT, headed by Mahamat Mahadi, and the Council of Military Command for the Salvation of the Republic under Mahamat Hassani Bulmay.²

FACT is a Chadian rebel group operating mainly from Libyan territory, crossing into Chad to conduct attacks and then retreating back into Libya.³ FACT was initially based in Jufra, Libya,⁴ until LAAF took this territory during 2017.⁵. After LAAF’s takeover of Jufra, FACT maintained its presence in the town and agreed to a non-aggression pact with LAAF in 2017.⁶ During LAAF’s offensive on Tripoli in 2019 and 2020 (see above), FACT forces were supporting LAAF in their fight against the western-based authorities.⁷ During that time, FACT fighters were trained and armed by LAAF forces.⁸

The relationship between these two non-state actors, however, deteriorated during the first half of 2021 due to differences of opinion concerning the distribution of profits from fuel smuggling and the composition of internal hierarchies.⁹ FACT moved its headquarters away from Jufra, to Um al-Aranib town which is closer to the Libya-Chad border.¹⁰ Despite LAAF’s former non-aggression pact with FACT, Libya’s eastern-based government and LAAF now officially position themselves against FACT. The purpose of this policy change is to uphold LAAF’s security partnership and relationship with the Chadian government.¹¹

Intensity

The only recorded clash between LAAF and FACT during this reporting period occurred on 22 August 2023. LAAF employed airstrikes against FACT on the Libyan side of the Libya-Chad border following a ceasefire breach by FACT.¹²

Nevertheless, given the sustained absence of further hostilities since the 22 August 2023 airstrikes and the absence of any real risk of resumption, the NIAC between LAAF and FACT is assessed to have ended in August 2023.

As detailed above, LAAF has officially positioned itself against FACT in order to strengthen its security partnership with the Chadian government, and has conducted airstrikes against FACT positions to support the Chadian government in its fight against FACT in the past.¹³ As of June 2025, FACT remains one of the most prominent and active rebel groups carrying out regular attacks in Chad.¹⁴

Organization

Very little information is known about the command structure of FACT. What is known is that its overall commander is Mahamat Mahadi Ali who is also the group’s founder.¹⁵ Ali also serves as the spokesperson for FACT, which communicates through issuing public statements.¹⁶ FACT fighters received training from LAAF and LAAF supporters, such as Russia and the UAE, prior to 2021.¹⁷ Such training enables military discipline, military tactics, and the ability to comply with IHL.

FACT regularly employs cross-border guerrilla-style attacks¹⁸ from its military bases in the mountainous border regions of Southern Libya as its modus operandi.¹⁹ On 30 October 2023, FACT’s military wing had approximately 2,000 fighters speaking to its recruitment capabilities, and 400 armoured vehicles which confirms its logistical capacity.²⁰ FACT generates funding to support its conflict efforts through illicit cross-border trading in Libyan resources, such as oil²¹ and mercenary work.²²

FACT remains sufficiently organized as demanded by IHL.

1
AM. Bissada.‘Chad: Six things to know about the rebel group FACT’, The Africa Report, 22 April 2021; F. E. Şefkatli, ‘The Problem of Foreign Mercenaries in Libya: the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT)’, ORSAM Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 27 April 2021. ↩︎
2
‘Who are Chad’s FACT rebels and what are their goals?’, Al Jazeera, 21 April 2021. ↩︎
3
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, Annex 19. ↩︎
4
F. E. Şefkatli, ‘The Problem of Foreign Mercenaries in Libya: the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT)’, ORSAM Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 27 April 2021 ↩︎
5
‘Who are Chad’s FACT rebels and what are their goals?’, Al Jazeera, 21 April 2021 ↩︎
6
F. E. Şefkatli, ‘The Problem of Foreign Mercenaries in Libya: the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT)’, ORSAM Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 27 April 2021; ‘Who are Chad’s FACT rebels and what are their goals?’, Al Jazeera, 21 April 2021; F. E. Compassionate, ‘The Problem of Foreign Mercenaries in Libya: The Front for Change and Adaptation in Chad (FACT)’, Libya Tribune, 4 May 2021. ↩︎
7
A. Bish, ‘Déby’s death will fuel instability and criminal opportunity in the Sahel’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 23 April 2021. ↩︎
8
A. Bish, ‘Déby’s death will fuel instability and criminal opportunity in the Sahel’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 23 April 2021. ↩︎
9
A. Bish, ‘Déby’s death will fuel instability and criminal opportunity in the Sahel’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 23 April 2021. ↩︎
10
A. Bish, ‘Déby’s death will fuel instability and criminal opportunity in the Sahel’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 23 April 2021. ↩︎
11
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, Annex 19. ↩︎
12
‘Libya’s LNA launches operations against Chad rebels along border’, Al Jazeera, 25 August 2023; ‘LNA launches campaign against FACT targets in southern Libya following Chadian airstrikes’, Libya Security Monitor, 22 August 2023; ‘Libya’s LNA launches operation near southern border after Chad clashes’, Reuters, 25 August 2023. ↩︎
13
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, Annex 19. ↩︎
14
‘Chad’, Freedom House. ↩︎
15
‘Who are Chad’s FACT rebels and what are their goals?’, Al Jazeera, 21 April 2021. ↩︎
16
S. Alharathy, ‘Rebel group FACT ends ceasefire with Chadian army after attack on bases in Libya’, The Libya Observer, 20 August 2023; A. Bish, ‘Déby’s death will fuel instability and criminal opportunity in the Sahel’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 23 April 2021. ↩︎
17
A. Bish, ‘Déby’s death will fuel instability and criminal opportunity in the Sahel’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 23 April 2021. ↩︎
18
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, Annex 19 ↩︎
19
‘Chad’, The World Factbook, 15 December 2025; D. Ekonde, ‘Chad’s latest marshal’, Africa is a Country, 20 February 2020; ‘Union of Forces for Democracy and Development’, EBSCO, 2023; A. Bish, ‘Déby’s death will fuel instability and criminal opportunity in the Sahel’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 23 April 2021. ↩︎
20
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, Annex 19. ↩︎
21
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, Annex 19 ↩︎
22
A. Bish, ‘Déby’s death will fuel instability and criminal opportunity in the Sahel’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 23 April 2021. ↩︎

State Parties

Libya (the Government of National Unity, GNU)

Non-State parties

Islamic State Libya (IS-Libya
Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF)
Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT)

1
‘Agreement for a Complete and Permanent Ceasefire in Libya (unofficial Translation)’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 23 October 2020. ↩︎
2
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2022/427, 27 May 2022, Annex 2; W. Lacher, ‘Who is Fighting Whom in Tripoli? How the 2019 Civil War is Transforming Libya’s Military Landscape’, Briefing Paper, Small Arms Survey, August 2019, endnote 3; ‘Libya: One year after resolution 56/16, the human rights situation remains dire and domestic accountability efforts inadequate’, International Commission of Jurists, September 2025, p 5. ↩︎
3
W. Lacher, ‘Libyen’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 12 August 2024; ‘Libya Revolt of 2011’, Britannica; C. Million, ‘The fires of Libya’s 10-year war’, Geopolitical Intelligence Services, 3 April 2020. ↩︎
4
W. Lacher, ‘Libyen’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 12 August 2024; ‘Libya Revolt of 2011’, Britannica. ↩︎
5
W. Lacher, ‘Libyen’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 12 August 2024; UNSC, ‘Resolution 1973 (2011)’, 17 March 2011; ‘Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions’, United Nations, 17 March 2011. ↩︎
6
C. Million, ‘The fires of Libya’s 10-year war’, Geopolitical Intelligence Services, 3 April 2020; ‘Libya’s crisis: A timeline of events since the 2011 uprising’, Reuters, 14 May 2025; ‘Fact Sheet: 2011, the Arab Spring & Libya’, Tactics Institute, 9 February 2021. ↩︎
7
W. Lacher, ‘Libyen’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 12 August 2024; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024 B. Smith, ‘Libya’s General Assembly election 2012’, UK Parliament: House of Commons Library, 18 July 2012; P. Salem and A. Jehani, ‘The Aftermath of Libya’s First Elections’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 10 July 2012. ↩︎
8
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024; B. Mikail, ‘The multiple challenges of Libya’s Reconstruction’, Foundation for International Relations and Foreign Dialogue, Policy Brief 114, January 2021; A. Obeidi, ‘An Introductory Study on the Status, Challenges and Prospects of Governance and Institutions in Libya: Part III of a Baseline Study for the Libya Socioeconomic Dialogue Project’, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, 2020. ↩︎
9
W. Lacher, ‘Libyen’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 12 August 2024 ↩︎
10
W. Lacher, ‘Libyen’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 12 August 2024; C. Grant, ‘Libya’s Islamists: Who They Are – And What They Want’, Wilson Center, 8 August 2017; W. Lacher, ‘Where Have All the Jihadists Gone? The Rise and Mysterious Fall of Militant Islamist Movements in Libya’, Stiftung Wissenschraft und Politik, Research Paper 10, June 2024. ↩︎
11
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024; M. Fitzgerald, ‘General Haftar’s anti-Islamist campaign divides Libyans’, BBC News, 7 June 2014; C. Tawil, ‘Operation Dignity: General Haftar’s Latest Battle May Decide Libya’s Future’, Jamestown, 30 May 2014; M. Fitzgerald, ‘Libyan renegade general Khalifa Haftar claims he is winning his war’, The Guardian, 24 June 2014. ↩︎
12
C. Million, ‘The fires of Libya’s 10-year war’, Geopolitical Intelligence Services, 3 April 2020; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024; B. Fishman, ‘Libya’s Armed Group Catch-22’, Washington Institute, 15 February 2024. ↩︎
13
W. Lacher, ‘Libyen’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 12 August 2024; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024; ‘Second Libyan Civil War’, EBSCO, 2023; M. Ilardo, ‘Conflict Analysis: The Second Libyan Civil war – and how to avoid a third one’, Austria Insitut Für Europa und Sicherheitspotlik, September 2019; ‘The Second Civil War in Libya, a Timeline’, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 15 February 2021. ↩︎
14
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024; ‘The Libyan Political Agreement: Time for a Reset’, International Crisis Group, 4 November 2016; ‘Libyan Political Agreement As Signed on 17 December 2015’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya. ↩︎
15
‘The Libyan Political Agreement: Time for a Reset’, International Crisis Group, 4 November 2016; ‘Libyan Political Agreement As Signed on 17 December 2015’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya; M. Fitzgerald and M. Toaldo, ‘A quick guide to Libya’s main players’, European Council on Foreign Relations, 19 May 2016. ↩︎
16
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024; ‘The Libyan Political Agreement: Time for a Reset’, International Crisis Group, 4 November 2016; M. Fitzgerald and M. Toaldo, ‘A quick guide to Libya’s main players’, European Council on Foreign Relations, 19 May 2016. ↩︎
17
C. Million, ‘The fires of Libya’s 10-year war’, Geopolitical Intelligence Services, 3 April 2020; ‘The Libyan Political Agreement: Time for a Reset’, International Crisis Group, 4 November 2016; M. Fitzgerald and M. Toaldo, ‘A quick guide to Libya’s main players’, European Council on Foreign Relations, 19 May 2016. ↩︎
18
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024; B. Fishman, ‘Libya’s Armed Group Catch-22’, Washington Institute, 15 February 2024; ‘The Libyan Political Agreement: Time for a Reset’, International Crisis Group, 4 November 2016. ↩︎
19
W. Lacher, ‘Libyen’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 12 August 2024; W. Lacher, ‘Libya’s Militias Have Become the State’, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Comment 44, July 2023. ↩︎
20
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024. ↩︎
21
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024; N. T. Yasar, ‘From Tripoli to Benghazi: Turkey’s Expanding Footprint in Libya’s Fragmented Landscape’, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 8 September 2025; A. Brahimi, ‘Will Egypt and Turkey’s Opposing Views on Libya’s Longrunning Conflict Doom their Rapprochement?’, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 23 December 2024; M. Ellmer, ‘Libyan Civil War: Saudi Arabia & UAE Involvement’, Grey Dynamics, 15 April 2021; C. Lovotti and A. Pavia, ‘Libya is the crucial hub for Moscow’s activities in Africa’, Atlantic Council, 30 July 2024. ↩︎
22
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024; ‘UNSMIL Statement on the Deteriorating Situation in Southern Libya, the Shutting Down of Sharara Oil field’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 17 October 2025; A. Calik, ‘Libya’s NOC Forced To Shut In Key El Sharara Field’, Mees, 14 December 2018; A. Elumami and A. Al-Warfalli, ‘Libya is shutting down El Sharara after field seized by tribesmen: sources’, Reuters, 10 December 2018. ↩︎
23
W. Lacher, ‘Libyen’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 12 August 2024; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024; P. Wintour, ‘Tripoli hit by airstrikes as Haftar steps up assault on Libyan capital’, The Guardian, 21 April 2019; ‘Timeline: Haftar’s months-long offensive to seize Tripoli’, Al Jazeera, 19 February 2020; ‘Turkey warns Haftar against attacking its forces in Libya’, Al Jazeera, 27 December 2020. ↩︎
24
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024; ‘Second Libyan Civil War’, EBSCO, 2023; ‘Fleshing Out the Libya Ceasefire Agreement’, International Crisis Group, 4 November 2020; ‘UN salutes new Libya ceasefire agreement that points to ‘a better, safer, and more peaceful future’’, UN News, 23 October 2020. ↩︎
25
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024; ‘Country policy and information note: security situation, Libya, April 2025 (accessible)’, Gov.UK, April 2025; J. Fengler, ‘Libya’s Peace Paradox: Less Violence, More Fragility’, Vision of Humanity, 6 August 2025. ↩︎
26
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024. ↩︎
27
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024; W. Lacher, ‘Libya’s Flawed Unity Government’, Stiftung Wissenschraft und Politik, 22 April 2021; L. Scazzieri, ‘Europe can’t ignore Libya’, Centre for European Reform, 2 August 2021. ↩︎
28
W. Lacher, ‘Libyen’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 12 August 2024; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024; ‘Why Libya’s election got postponed: A quick guide’, Al Jazeera, 23 December 2021. ↩︎
29
W. Lacher, ‘Libyen’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 12 August 2024; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024; ‘Libyan parliament swears in new PM as crisis deepens’, Al Jazeera, 3 March 2022; W. Abdullah, ‘Libyan parliament chooses Fathi Bashagha as new prime minister’, AA, 10 February 2022. ↩︎
30
W. Lacher, ‘Libyen’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 12 August 2024; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024; ‘Deadly clashes between rival armed groups erupt in Libyan capital’, Al Jazeera, 27 August 2022; ‘Deadly battles erupt across Tripoli, raising fears of wider Libya war’, Reuters, 27 August 2022; ‘Libya suffered its deadliest fighting in years. Here’s what to know about the crisis’, CNN, 29 August 2022. ↩︎
31
W. Lacher, ‘Libyen’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 12 August 2024; ‘Libya Country Report 2024’, Bertelsmann Stiftung: BTI Transformation Index, 2024. ↩︎
32
W. Lacher, ‘Libyen’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 12 August 2024; G. Aftandilian, ‘Libya: Despite Talks on a Unified Government, Impasse Remains’, Arab Center Washington DC, 27 March 2024; M. Demirhan, ‘Erdogan reaffirms support for Libya’s Government of National Unity’, TRT World, 15 January 2025. ↩︎
33
W. Lacher, ‘Libyen’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 12 August 2024; G. Aftandilian, ‘Libya: Despite Talks on a Unified Government, Impasse Remains’, Arab Center Washington DC, 27 March 2024; ‘Russia Reaffirms Support for Haftar’s Role in Regional Security’, Libya Review, 10 May 2025. ↩︎
34
W. Lacher, ‘Libyen’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 12 August 2024; ‘Libya’, Freedom House, 2024; ‘Bashagha removed by eastern-based parliament amid Libya’s shifting sands’, The Arab Weekly, 17 May 2023. ↩︎
35
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024. ↩︎
36
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024; ‘Dependence on oil’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 18 August 2025; ‘Libya Economic Outlook’, African Development Bank Group, 2024; ‘Libya Oil: Unveiling Africa’s Largest Reserves and Global Market Impact 2025’, Qabas. ↩︎
37
W. Lacher, ‘Libyen’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 12 August 2024; N. Belmonte, ‘Libya’s oil: an added spoil in the battle for control of Tripoli’, Atalayar, 31 August 2022. ↩︎
38
W. Lacher, ‘Libyen’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 12 August 2024; ‘Libyan Gen Haftar threatens to stop oil production’, APA News, 20 May 2025; M. Aydemir, ‘Libya oil production comes to halt, affects economy’, AA, 1 June 2020. ↩︎
39
‘Background’, United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara ↩︎
40
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024; ‘UN envoy decries continued political stalemate in Libya’, United Nations News, 14 May 2024. ↩︎
41
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024; B. Faucon, et al, ‘Libyan Militia and Egypt’s Military Back Opposite Sides in Sudan Conflict’, Wall Street Journal, 19 April 2023; ‘Haftar denies supplying RSF with weapons, rejects Sudan’s allegations’, The Arab Weekly, 29 June 2024. ↩︎
42
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024; ‘Libya’, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. ↩︎
43
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024; M. Di Maio, et al, ‘Migration in Libya: A Spatial Network Analysis’, Joint Data Center on Forced Displacement, 2020; ‘Libya’, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. ↩︎
44
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024; ‘Desperate Journeys: Refugees and migrants arriving in Europe and at Europe’s borders, January – December 2018’, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; ‘A Somali migrant says: “I survived and I would ask the world to help me.”’, Médecins Sans Frontières, 19 June 2015; A. Baker, ‘A week on board a refugee recovery ship’, Time, 8 September 2016. ↩︎
45
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024; ‘Report of the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya (A/HRC/52/83) (Advance Edited Version) [EN/AR]’, Reliefweb, 27 March 2023; ‘Libya: Events of 2023’, Human Rights Watch. ↩︎
46
J. Fengler, ‘Libya’s Peace Paradox: Less Violence, More Fragility’, Vision of Humanity, 6 August 2025; ‘Global Peace Index 2025: Identifying and Measuring the Factors that Drive Peace’, Institute for Economics and Peace, June 2025. ↩︎
47
‘Libya’, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 24 May 2023. ↩︎
48
‘Libya’, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 24 May 2023 ↩︎
49
‘Libya’, IDMC, 24 May 2023. ↩︎
50
‘Libya Economic Outlook’, African Development Bank Group, 2024; ‘Dependence on oil’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 18 August 2025; ‘Libya Oil: Unveiling Africa’s Largest Reserves and Global Market Impact 2025’, Qabas. ↩︎
51
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Analysts: Haftar ‘Warmongering’ Over Libya’s Oil Revenues’, Voice of America, 6 July 2023; ‘Looming threat of another Libya oil blockade’, Menas, 10 July 2023, Updated 17 July 2023; ‘Libyan putschist Haftar issues new threat over oil revenue’, Libya Tribune, 7 June 2023 ↩︎
52
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; M. Wanis, ‘Libya’s unity government to form committee for distributing oil revenues’, AA, 6 July 2023; B. Abdullah, ‘One Landscape, Three Variables: The Libyan Conflict’s Recent Dynamics and Trajectories’, Emirates Policy Center, 18 September 2023; ‘United Nations Support Mission in Libya: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2023/589, 8 August 2023. ↩︎
53
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘EU Ambassador Urges Fair Distribution of Libya’s Oil Revenues’, Libya Review, 24 August 2023; ‘Statement by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya on the establishment of a High Financial Oversight Committee’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 8 July 2023. ↩︎
54
‘United Nations Support Mission in Libya: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2023/589, 8 August 2023. ↩︎
55
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
56
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Libya’s NOC declares force majeure at Sharara oilfield’, Reuters, 7 January 2024; ‘Production Halt at Sharara Oilfield – Declaration of Force Majeure’, National Oil Corporation, 7 January 2024; C. Carpenter, ‘Libya’s NOC declares force majeure on Sharara after protesters shut oil field’, S&P Global, 7 January 2024. ↩︎
57
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; J. Onsat, ‘Libya Lifts Force Majeure on Sharara Oil Field’, Rig Zone, 23 January 2024; N. Ugal, ‘African state player lifts force majeure on huge oilfield, resumes production’, Up Stream, 22 January 2024. ↩︎
58
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘[Libya] Oil guards leave oil and gas complex after weekend wage protest’, GPA, 1 March 2024; S. Zaptia, ‘Dinar crashes as oilfields are closed by Petroleum Facilities Guards seeking improved pay’, Libya Herald, 25 February 2024. ↩︎
59
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; C. Mitchell, ‘Libyan production, exports resume after guards’ protest at oil field and gas pipeline called off’, S&P Global, 26 February 2024. ↩︎
60
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; S. Zaptia, ‘NOC Chairman Bengdara resigns for health reasons – Masoud Sulieman Mousa appointed as temporary Acting Chairman’, Libya Herald, 17 January 2025; S. Alharathy, ‘Libya’s oil chief steps down due to health issues’, The Libya Observer, 18 January 2025. ↩︎
61
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; S. Zaptia, ‘NOC Chairman Bengdara resigns for health reasons – Masoud Sulieman Mousa appointed as temporary Acting Chairman’, Libya Herald, 17 January 2025; S. Alharathy, ‘Libya’s oil chief steps down due to health issues’, The Libya Observer, 18 January 2025. ↩︎
62
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘NOC reassures global energy companies about contracting mechanisms’, Libyan Investment, 16 March 2025. ↩︎
63
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024. ↩︎
64
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; A. Assad, ‘Libya’s NOC to stop oil-for-fuel trade next March’, The Libya Observer, 21 January 2025; ‘National Oil Corporation to End Oil-for-Fuel Trade System by March 2025’, Zahaf & Partners, 28 January 2025 ↩︎
65
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; S. Alharathy, ‘GECOL rejects UN report alleging fuel smuggling’, The Libya Observer, 9 February 2025. ↩︎
66
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; A. Assad, ‘CBL says oil revenues’ plummet threatens monetary stability’, The Libya Observer, 19 March 2025; S. Zaptia, ‘CBL expresses distress over March’s low oil revenues – threatening fiscal sustainability’, Libya Herald, 19 March 2025. ↩︎
67
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; A. Assad, ‘CBL says oil revenues’ plummet threatens monetary stability’, The Libya Observer, 19 March 2025; S. Zaptia, ‘CBL expresses distress over March’s low oil revenues – threatening fiscal sustainability’, Libya Herald, 19 March 2025. ↩︎
68
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; D. Nikše, ‘Libya launches first oil & gas bid round since 2007’, Offshore Energy, 10 March 2025; ‘Home’, National Oil Corporation; ‘Libya announces first bidding round for oil exploration in 17 years’, Reuters, 3 March 2025. ↩︎
69
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
70
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
71
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; S. Zaptia, ‘CBL announces that it has returned into a reunified sovereign institution’, Libya Herald, 21 August 2023; ‘Libya’s central bank reunifies after almost a decade’, The Arab Weekly, 20 August 2023; ‘UNSMIL Welcomes the Announcement of the Reunification of the Central Bank Of Libya’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 20 August 2023; ‘Central Bank of Libya reunified after almost a decade’, Central Bank of Libya, 20 August 2023. ↩︎
72
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
73
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Getting Past Libya’s Central Bank Standoff’, International Crisis Group, 1 October 2024; ‘Africa Media Review for September 4, 2024’, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 4 September 2024; ‘Libya’s Presidential Council Appoints New Central Bank Governor’, Libya Review, 18 August 2024. ↩︎
74
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Getting Past Libya’s Central Bank Standoff’, International Crisis Group, 1 October 2024; A. Assad, ‘House of Representatives retracts decision to appoint replacement for CBL governor Al-Kabir’, The Libya Observer, 17 August 2024. ↩︎
75
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Libyan central bank halts work after IT director abducted’, Central Banking, 19 August 2024; ‘Libya central bank halts operations over employee abduction’, DW, 19 August 2024; ‘Libya’s central bank ‘suspends operations’ after official abducted’, The Guardian, 18 August 2024; ‘Libya central bank reopens after kidnapped official freed’, BBC, 19 August 2024. ↩︎
76
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; A. Werfali, ‘Libya’s eastern government says all oilfields to close’, Reuters, 16 August 2024; ‘Libya’s eastern government says oilfields closed over central bank spat’, Al Jazeera, 26 August 2024. ↩︎
77
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘UN expresses fears over Libya’s ‘rapidly’ deteriorating situation’, The Arab Weekly, 21 August 2024; ‘Amid Rapidly Deteriorating Political, Economic Situation, Ordinary People in Libya Fear Re-emergence of War, Top UN Official Warns Security Council’, UN, 20 August 2024 ↩︎
78
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Libya central bank governor, other bankers flee to avoid militias, FT says’, Reuters, 30 August 2024; ‘Libya’s central bank chief flees country over militia threats: Report’, Al Jazeera, 30 August 2024. ↩︎
79
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group ‘Getting Past Libya’s Central Bank Standoff’, International Crisis Group, 1 October 2024; ‘Libyan Court Suspends Presidential Council’s Orders on Central Bank Leadership’, Libya Review, 3 September 2024. ↩︎
80
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Getting Past Libya’s Central Bank Standoff’, International Crisis Group, 1 October 2024; ‘Statement on the Preliminary Outcomes of the Consultations between the House of Representatives and High Council of State on the Crisis of the Central Bank of Libya’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 17 October 2025. ↩︎
81
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Getting Past Libya’s Central Bank Standoff’, International Crisis Group, 1 October 2024; ‘UNSMIL welcomes the appointment of the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Libya’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 17 October 2025; ‘Acting Head of UNSMIL’s Remarks at the Signing Ceremony of the Agreement Between the HoR and HCS on the Central Bank of Libya’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 17 October 2025. ↩︎
82
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Security Council press statement on Libya – 9 October 2024’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 17 October 2025. ↩︎
83
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Remarks by Officer-in-Charge /Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary- General Stephanie Koury to the Security Council – 9 October 2024’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 17 October 2025; ‘(Naji Issa) officially assumes his duties as Governor of the Central Bank of Libya’, Libyan News Agency, 2 October 2024. ↩︎
84
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; M. S. Al Ashry, ‘Why Libyan Oilfields Are Opening Now: Navigating The Central Bank Crisis’, Libya Tribune, 25 October 2024; S. El Wardany and H. Mohareb, ‘Libya resumes oil production, ending embargo and easing political crisis’, World Oil, 3 October 2024. ↩︎
85
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; S. Zaptia, ‘CBL holds first complete board meeting after ousting of former Governor El-Kaber’, Libya Herald, 10 November 2024; ‘The Central Bank Board of Directors approves the activation of the clearing system between Tripoli and Benghazi’, Libyan News Agency, 10 November 2024. ↩︎
86
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
87
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘‘Bodies everywhere’: Thousands feared dead as Storm Daniel hammers Libya’, Al Jazeera, 11 September 2023; ‘Storm Daniel leads to extreme rain and floods in Mediterranean, heavy loss of life in Libya’, World Meteorological Organization, 12 September 2023. ↩︎
88
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘‘Bodies everywhere’: Thousands feared dead as Storm Daniel hammers Libya’, Al Jazeera, 11 September 2023; ‘Storm Daniel leads to extreme rain and floods in Mediterranean, heavy loss of life in Libya’, World Meteorological Organization, 12 September 2023; H. Alkhshali, et al, ‘More than 5,000 presumed dead in Libya after catastrophic flooding breaks dams and sweeps away homes’, CNN, 13 September 2023. ↩︎
89
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group ↩︎
90
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; S. Dadouch, ‘Libyan officials limit media and aid groups in Derna’, The Washington Post, 19 September 2023; L. Harding, ‘Eastern Libya orders journalists out of flood-hit Derna after protests’, The Guardian, 19 September 2023. ↩︎
91
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Qatar sends medical aid, rescue team to flood-stricken Libya’, Al Jazeera, 22 September 2023; I. al-Khazen, ‘Egypt sends aircraft carrier to Libya for flood relief’, AA, 17 September 2023, Updated 18 September 2023; S. Kasap, ‘Turkish Red Crescent sends over 150 tons of humanitarian aid to flood-hit Libya’, AA, 20 September 2023; ‘Breaking / UAE President directs urgent relief aid, search and rescue teams to Libya’, United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 September 2023. ↩︎
92
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; S. Dadouch, ‘Libyan officials limit media and aid groups in Derna’, The Washington Post, 19 September 2023; L. Harding, ‘Eastern Libya orders journalists out of flood-hit Derna after protests’, The Guardian, 19 September 2023. ↩︎
93
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Libya orders arrest of eight officials in probe into deadly dam collapse’, France24, 25 September 2023; ‘Libya’s top prosecutor orders eight officials arrested after flood disaster’, Al Jazeera, 25 September 2023; P. Wintour, ‘Officials detained as Libya awaits inquiry into deadly floods’, The Guardian, 25 September 2023. ↩︎
94
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
95
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; S. Zaptia, ‘Derna International Reconstruction conference inaugurated with ‘‘wide international participation’’’, Libya Herald, 2 November 2023; ‘Libya: International Efforts in the Wake of Derna’s Devastation’, Africa News, 13 August 2024. ↩︎
96
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; C. Sala and N. Booty, ‘Libyan officials jailed over deadly floods’, BBC, 28 July 2024; ‘Libyan court jails 12 officials over deadly floods’, Reuters, 28 July 2024. ↩︎
97
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
98
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Changing tack, UN to seek a ‘unified Libyan government’ before elections’, Al Jazeera, 23 August 2023; ‘UN urges countries, organisations to send election observers to Libya’, The Arab Weekly, 11 September 2021. ↩︎
99
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; C. Gazzini, ‘Forming a Unity Government May be Libya’s Best Bet for Healing Rift’, International Crisis Group, 7 August 2023. ↩︎
100
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Libya’s High State Council elects new leader as political gridlock deepens’, Al Jazeera, 6 August 2023; ‘Libya’s High State Council votes to replace leader’, Reuters, 6 August 2023; U. N. Tasci, ‘Mishri out, Takala in: Libya’s perpetual political gridlock’, The New Arab, 16 August 2023. ↩︎
101
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; B. Abdullah, ‘One Landscape, Three Variables: The Libyan Conflict’s Recent Dynamics and Trajectories’, Emirates Policy Center, 18 September 2023; ‘Changing tack, UN to seek a ‘unified Libyan government’ before elections’, Al Jazeera, 23 August 2023; ‘Presidential, Parliamentary Elections in Libya Only Way to Restore Legitimacy of Country’s Institutions, Delegates Tell Security Council’, UN, 22 August 2013. ↩︎
102
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘UN Libya Envoy Meets Local Leaders in Al-Aziziyah, Discusses Elections and Reconciliation’, Libya Update, 7 September 2023. ↩︎
103
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
104
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; A. Assad, ‘Bathily: UNSMIL ready to help in forming unified government leading to Libya elections’, The Libya Observer, 16 October 2023; ‘Remarks by SRSG Abdoulaye Bathily to the United Nations Security Council – 16 October 2023’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 17 October 2025. ↩︎
105
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Libyan Parliament: Saleh & Takala Agree on Need for Libyan-led Solution’, Libya Review, 10 November 2023. ↩︎
106
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Libyan Parliament: Saleh & Takala Agree on Need for Libyan-led Solution’, Libya Review, 10 November 2023. ↩︎
107
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Libya: Briefing and Consultations’, Security Council Report, 15 December 2023; ‘UN envoy to Libyan leaders: Resolve impasse, do not fail the people’, United Nations News, 18 December 2023; ‘Special Representative Abdoulaye Bathily invites institutional stakeholders to a meeting to discuss next steps of the electoral process’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 17 October 2025; ‘Remarks by SRSG Abdoulaye Bathily to the Security Council – 18 December 2023 [EN/AR]’, Reliefweb, 18 December 2023. ↩︎
108
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘UN envoy to Libyan leaders: Resolve impasse, do not fail the people’, United Nations News, 18 December 2023. ↩︎
109
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘US delegation visits Benghazi, holds discussions on advancing Libyan political process towards elections with Marshal Haftar’, Alwasat, 23 January 2024; ‘American diplomatic delegation welcomes the participation of the Supreme Council of State in the efforts made by Batili’, Libyan News Agency, 25 January 2024; A. Assad, ‘Head of Libya’s Presidential Council explains to Norland his vision for ending political stalemate’, The Libya Observer, 24 January 2024. ↩︎
110
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
111
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Security Council Press Statement on Libya’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 27 February 2024. ↩︎
112
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Final Statement of the 159th Session of the GCC Ministerial Council Meeting’, Saudi Press Agency, 4 March 2024. ↩︎
113
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Libyan leaders agree to form new unified government’, The Arab Weekly, 10 March 2024. ↩︎
114
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; T. Eaton, ‘As yet another UN Libya envoy quits, his successor must be bolder’, Chatham House, 25 April 2024; ‘UN’s Libya envoy Bathily resigns citing stalled political progress’, France24, 17 April 2024; ‘UN’s Libya envoy resigns citing no hope for political progress’, Al Jazeera, 16 April 2024. ↩︎
115
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘UN reaffirms support for Libyan-led political process’, Xinhua, 23 May 2024; Ahmad, ‘Stephanie Khoury conducts a series of meetings with Libyan officials’, Northern Africa News, 24 May 2024; ‘Libya: UN official highlights need for inclusive talks to end stalemate’, United Nations News, 19 June 2024. ↩︎
116
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; S. Zaptia, ‘Aldabaiba visits Brussels, meets EU President Charles Michel – migration, flight ban and alternative energies discussed’, Libya Herald, 16 May 2024; ‘EU Reaffirms Support for Stability in Libya’, Libya Review, 17 May 2024; ‘President Meloni visits Libya’, Italian Government, 7 May 2024; ‘Italian prime minister signs cooperation agreements with Libya’, Voice of America: Africa, 7 May 2024. ↩︎
117
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
118
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Libya kicks off municipal council elections’, Xinhua, 10 June 2024; ‘Libyans Overwhelmingly Want Political Agreement, Credible Elections ‘to Restore Legitimacy to All Institutions’, Briefer Tells Security Council’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 19 June 2024. ↩︎
119
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; A. Assad, ‘Several HoR and HCS members agree in Cairo to form new Libyan government’, The Libya Observer, 18 July 2024; ‘Egyptian FM Discusses Libya’s Stability Efforts’, Libya Review, 30 June 2024. ↩︎
120
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘UNSMIL Statement on the election results for the President of the High Council of State’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 9 August 2024. ↩︎
121
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; A. Assad, ‘Elections in 60 municipal councils across Libya to kick off on November 16’, The Libya Observer, 28 October 2024; ‘UNSMIL Welcomes announcement of municipal councils’ election date’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 29 October 2024. ↩︎
122
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; M. Ertima and R. A. Shamala, ‘Libya concludes municipal voting in 16 councils with 68% turnout; counting underway’, AA, 18 October 2025; ‘Libya, high turnout in municipal elections: first phase completed in 58 municipalities’, Nova News, 17 November 2024; ‘Libya records 74 per cent turnout in municipal elections’, Libyan Express, 17 November 2024. ↩︎
123
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘DSRSG Koury’s remarks to the UN Security Council – 16 December 2024’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 16 December 2024. ↩︎
124
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Libya’, Security Council Report, 31 March 2025. ↩︎
125
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Libya’, Security Council Report, 31 March 2025; ‘Statement of the European Union Delegation and the diplomatic missions of EU Member States to Libya on the announcement of the establishment of the Advisory Committee’, Delegation of the European Union to Libya, 2 April 2025. ↩︎
126
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
127
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group ↩︎
128
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘UNSMIL announces the establishment of the Advisory Committee’, United Nations Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, 4 February 2025. ↩︎
129
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘The Advisory Committee holds its first meeting, convened by UNSMIL’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 9 February 2025. ↩︎
130
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Hanna Serwaa Tetteh: Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and Head’, United Nations Secretary-General; ‘Statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary General and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, Ms. Hanna Tetteh’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 20 February 2025. ↩︎
131
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘UNSMIL shares Advisory Committee recommendations, prepares for public consultation’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 20 May 2025. ↩︎
132
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Remarks at a UN Security Council Briefing on Libya’, United States Mission to the United Nations, 24 June 2025; ‘Strengthening the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union on issues of peace and security in Africa, including the work of the United Nations Office to the African Union: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/532, 25 August 2025; ‘Statement by the Co-Chairs of the International Follow-up Committee on Libya – 20 June 2025’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 17 October 2025. ↩︎
133
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘SRSG Hanna S. Tetteh remarks to the Security Council on the situation in Libya – 24 June 2025’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 24 June 2025. ↩︎
134
‘IHL in Focus: Annual Report: Assessing Compliance in Contemporary Armed Conflicts, July 2023 – June 2024’, Geneva Academy, 128. ↩︎
135
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Libya’, Security Council Report, 30 November 2023; ‘Libya: Reveal fate and whereabouts of 19 men forcibly disappeared a year ago’, Amnesty International, 3 October 2024; ‘Clashes break out in Benghazi as LNA attempts to seize Barghati’, Libya Security Monitor, 6 October 2023. ↩︎
136
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Libya’, Security Council Report, 30 November 2023; ‘Clashes break out in Benghazi as LNA attempts to seize Barghati’, Libya Security Monitor, 6 October 2023. ↩︎
137
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Clashes reported in Libya’s Benghazi amid communications blackout’, Reuters, 9 October 2023. ↩︎
138
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; A. Assad, ‘Two killed, four injured in armed clashes in Libya’s Gharyan’, The Libya Observer, 29 October 2023; ‘6 killed and dozen wounded in Gharyan armed clashes’, Libya Update, 30 October 2023; ‘GNU mobilises forces as clashes erupt in Ghariyan following return of Adel Daab’, Libya Security Monitor, 29 October 2023. ↩︎
139
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group. Mahdi al-Barghathi later died in the custody of the eastern authorities.‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘UN mission in Libya confirms death of former Defense Minister Al-Barghathi’, Yemen Press Agency, 22 December 2023; ‘Strongman Haftar and sons tighten grip on eastern Libya’, France24, 15 June 2024. ↩︎
140
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Libya: Tensions in Tripoli, Presidential Council warns against unilateral military actions’, Nova News, 4 April 2025; Libya – The Vision of Omar Mukhtar, Facebook, 5 April 2025 ↩︎
141
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Clashes in Libya’s Capital: Civil War Revival or Move Toward Military Unity?’, Alestiklal, 6 May 2025. ↩︎
142
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
143
M. Jégo, ‘Accord entre Ankara et Tripoli pour l’envoi de forces turques en Libye’, Le Monde, 21 December 2019; AS. Vial and E. Bouvier, ‘Türkiye, the new regional power in Africa (3/3). A military presence that is now greater than that of the former European powers’, Les Clés Moyen Orient, 6 March 2025 ↩︎
144
D. Jones, ‘Turkey Starts Military Deployment in Libya as International Pressure Rises’, Voice of America, 6 January 2020; ‘Turkey deploys troops to Libya’, DW, 5 January 2020; ‘Turkey’s parliament approves military deployment to Libya’, Al Jazeera, 2 January 2020; P. Wintour, ‘Turkish troops deploy to Libya to prop up embattled government’, The Guardian, 5 January 2020. ↩︎
145
AS. Vial and E. Bouvier, ‘Türkiye, the new regional power in Africa (3/3). A military presence that is now greater than that of the former European powers’, Les Clés Moyen Orient, 6 March 2025; M. Fetouri, ‘Turkey’s gambit in Libya: From tactical intervention to regional powerbroker’, The New Arab, 30 September 2025. ↩︎
146
AS. Vial and E. Bouvier, ‘Türkiye, the new regional power in Africa (3/3). A military presence that is now greater than that of the former European powers’, Les Clés Moyen Orient, 6 March 2025; ‘Libya conflict: GNA regains full control of Tripoli from Gen Haftar’, BBC, 4 June 2020. ↩︎
147
AS. Vial and E. Bouvier, ‘Türkiye, the new regional power in Africa (3/3). A military presence that is now greater than that of the former European powers’, Les Clés Moyen Orient, 6 March 2025; S. Alharathy, ‘Turkish Parliament votes to extend military mission in Libya’, The Libya Observer, 22 June 2022. ↩︎
148
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; A. Assad, ‘Turkish Parliament approves extension of army mission in Libya for additional 24 months’, The Libya Observer, 10 November 2023; ‘Turkey extends troop mandate in Libya’, Libya Security Monitor, 30 November 2023. ↩︎
149
AS. Vial and E. Bouvier, ‘Türkiye, the new regional power in Africa (3/3). A military presence that is now greater than that of the former European powers’, Les Clés Moyen Orient, 6 March 2025; S. Abdulrazek, ‘Turkey Prepares to Set Up Base in Misrata’, Asharq Al-Aswat, 2 July 2020; ‘Al-Watiya – From A Libyan Super Base To Turkish Air Base’, Oryx, 12 February 2021. ↩︎
150
‘Libya profile – Timeline’, BBC News, 15 March 2021; ‘Russia, Libya Sign $1.8 Billion Arms Deal’, Voice of America, 29 January 2010; ‘Libya, Russia agree $1.8 billion arms deal: Putin’, Reuters, 30 January 2010. ↩︎
151
S. Salacanin, ‘Championing rogue warlord Haftar, Russia reveals true agenda in Libya’, The New Arab, 22 January 2019; A. Pavia, ‘Libya Is the Crucial Hub for Moscow’s Activities in Africa’, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 30 July 2024; M. A. Suchkov, ‘Reports on Russian troops in Libya spark controversy’, Libya Tribune, 14 October 2018. ↩︎
152
‘Libya’s crisis: A timeline of events since the 2011 uprising’, Reuters, 14 May 2025; A. Pavia, ‘Libya Is the Crucial Hub for Moscow’s Activities in Africa’, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 30 July 2024; S. Ramani, ‘Russia’s Strategy in Libya’, RUSI, 7 April 2020 ↩︎
153
A. Pavia, ‘Libya Is the Crucial Hub for Moscow’s Activities in Africa’, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 30 July 2024; S. Khalel, ‘US says 2,000 Russia-backed mercenaries are fighting in Libya’, Middle East Eye, 17 June 2020. ↩︎
154
A. Pavia, ‘Libya Is the Crucial Hub for Moscow’s Activities in Africa’, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 30 July 2024; N. Ibrahim and B. Ochieng, ‘Wagner’s network in Africa faces uncertain future’, BBC, 27 June 2023; ‘What does the Wagner Group do? Operations in Africa and the rest of the world explained’, Reuters, 30 June 2023. ↩︎
155
.‘Libya’s Al-Khadim airbase becomes a hub for Russian arms in the Sahel’, RFI, 23 June 2025; A. McGregor, ‘Russia Increasing Military Presence in Africa by Reviving Desert Airbase in the Libyan Sahara’, Jamestown, 17 April 2025; S. Elsaidi, ‘Libya’s Haftar ‘rerouting’ supplies to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces’, Middle East Eye, 10 July 2023; A. Assad, ‘Haftar gives Russian forces a military base near border with Chad and Sudan’, The Libya Observer, 15 January 2025 ↩︎
156
A. Pavia, ‘Libya Is the Crucial Hub for Moscow’s Activities in Africa’, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 30 July 2024. ↩︎
157
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; C. Faulker, et al, ‘Africa Corps: Has Russia Hit a Ceiling in Africa?’, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, December 2024; ‘Drone strike destroys Russian transport aircraft at al-Jufra airbase’, Libya Security Monitor, 15 December 2023; A. Assad, ‘Russian aircraft destroyed in Libya’s Al-Jufra base’, The Libya Observer, 16 December 2023. ↩︎
158
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group. A few months later, in February 2024, reports surfaced about a renewed delivery of Russian equipment to Haftar’s LAAF in Tobruk, including forty Russian T72 tanks.‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Russia has sent 40 tanks to Libya and is building a base’, Axar.az, 17 February 2024. The reports later were confirmed by an LAAF official.‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group. Russian armoured personnel carriers and rocket launchers arrived in Tobruk on 14 April 2024 on a Russian warship.‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; T. Kington, ‘Russia funneling weapons through Libyan port, eying gateway to Africa’, Defense News, 19 April 2024. ↩︎
159
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Libya: two Russian military ships on a “courtesy visit” to Tobruk’, Libya Tribune, 20 June 2024; C. Okafor, ‘Russian warships touched down in Libyan naval base’, Business Insider Africa, 20 June 2024; R. Fleming-Stewart, ‘Libya: Two Russian warships arrive in Tobruk’, Maghrebi.org, 20 June 2024 ↩︎
160
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Russian Warships Dock in Libya’s Tobruk’, Libya Review, 17 June 2024 ↩︎
161
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘US Officials Concerned Over Russian Military Presence in Libya’, Libya Review, 22 June 2024; A. Assad, ‘US concerned about Russian ships’ unloading of military equipment in Libya’, The Libya Observer, 22 June 2024. ↩︎
162
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Security Council Renews Arms Embargo on Libya for Six Months, Adopting Draft Resolution 2780 (2025) by Vote of 13 in Favour, 2 Abstentions’, UN, 29 May 2025; ‘Italy seizes Chinese-made military drones destined for Libya’, Reuters, 2 July 2024; M. Loh, ‘China-made military drones similar to the MQ-9 Reaper were disguised as wind turbines in shipments to Libya: Italian officials’, Business Insider, 5 July 2024; T. Kington, ‘Italy seizes Chinese military drones heading to Libya, authorities say’, Defense News, 2 July 2024. After President Assad’s Syrian government fell on 8 December 2024,‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; M. Gebeily and T. Azhari, ‘Syrian rebels topple Assad who flees to Russia in Mideast shakeup’, Reuters, 9 December 2024; ‘What happened in Syria? How did al-Assad fall?’, Al Jazeera, 8 December 2024 Russia began transferring its military assets from Syria to Libya.‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; C. Schaer, ‘Russian military: Moving from Syria to Libya?’, DW, 18 December 2024; N. Vasilyeva, ‘Its Syrian Bases in Doubt, Russia Sends Cargo Flights to Libya’, The New York Times, 19 December 2024; N. Bertrand and A. Schmitz, ‘Russian military has begun large-scale withdrawal from Syria, US and Western officials say’, CNN, 16 December 2024. ↩︎
163
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; M. Maillard, ‘Comment la Russie conquiert le Sahel, de base en base’, Jeune Afrique, 11 February 2025, Updated 14 February 2025. ↩︎
164
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; S. Alharathy, ‘East-based Government signs agreements with Belarus’, The Libya Observer, 10 March 2025. ↩︎
165
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Libyan MP Disappeared for Over a Year: Ibrahim al-Dersi’, Amnesty International, 10 June 2025. ↩︎
166
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Libyan MP Disappeared for Over a Year: Ibrahim al-Dersi’, Amnesty International, 10 June 2025; ‘UNSMIL calls for independent investigation into disappearance of HoR member Ibrahim Al-Dersi and circulating torture video’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 6 May 2025; Press and Information Team of the EU Delegation to Libya, ‘Joint Statement by the Delegation of the European Union and the Diplomatic Missions of the EU Member States to Libya on the case of Mr. Ibrahim Al Dirsi and all cases of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance’, Delegation of European Union to Libya, 6 May 2025. ↩︎
167
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘UN mission to Libya says political activist abducted in Misrata’, Reuters, 10 July 2024; ‘World News in Brief: Ukraine rescue efforts, Libyan activist abducted, climate impacts on fish stocks, SDG ‘wake-up call’’, United Nations Office at Geneva, 10 July 2024. ↩︎
168
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘“Peace and stability in Libya go hand in hand with human rights,” says High Commissioner’, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 9 July 2024. ↩︎
169
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Political Activist Released After Kidnapping in Libya’s Misrata’, Libya Review, 11 July 2024; U.S. Embassy – Libya, X, 10 July 2024; ‘UNSMIL calls for the release of abducted activist in Misrata, and all arbitrarily detained in Libya’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 9 July 2024. ↩︎
170
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Libyan TV host Ahmed al-Sanussi arrested after corruption report’, Committee to Protect Journalist, 12 July 2024. ↩︎
171
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Libya frees investigative journalist who uncovered corruption’, The Arab Weekly, 16 July 2024; ‘Journalist Ahmed al-Senussi released after three days in Tripoli detention’, Libya Security Monitor, 11 July 2024; ‘UN mission to Libya calls for immediate release of detained journalist’, Reuters, 13 July 2024; Press and Information Team of the EU Delegation to Libya, ‘Joint Statement of the Delegation of the European Union and EU Member States’ Diplomatic Missions in Libya on Detained Journalist Ahmed Sanussi’, Delegation of the European Union to Libya, 14 July 2024. ↩︎
172
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Libya: Women Press Freedom Denounces Ikram Rajab’s Unlawful Detention’, Women Press Freedom, 18 September 2024; ‘2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Libya’, U.S. Department of State. ↩︎
173
‘2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Libya’, U.S. Department of State; A. Assad, ‘Ikram Al-Saiti released after detention in Benghazi over complaint by Minister of Women’s Affairs’, The Libya Observer, 23 October 2024; ‘Journalist Ikram Rajab released from ISA detention’, Libya Security Monitor, 22 October 2024. ↩︎
174
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; L. Mohammed, ‘Official in Libyan Intelligence Service kidnapped’, The Libya Observer, 9 November 2024. ↩︎
175
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
176
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Islamic Call Society Leader Kidnapped in Libyan Capital’, Libya Review, 17 December 2024; ‘Report: Human Rights Violations in Libya during December 2024’, Libya Crimes Watch, 5 January 2025. ↩︎
177
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Minister in Libya’s national unity government injured in gun attack on car’, Al Jazeera, 12 February 2025; ‘Libyan state minister survives assassination attempt in Tripoli, govt says’, Reuters, 12 February 2025. ↩︎
178
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Libyan NGO expresses concern over Niger’s repeal of anti-migration law’, Libya Security Monitor, 3 December 2023; ‘NCHRL warns against the impact of the removal of migration laws in Niger’, Libyan News Agency, 4 December 2023. ↩︎
179
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger junta revokes law aimed at curbing migration to Europe’, Info Migrants, 28 November 2023; ‘Niger junta repeals law aimed at slowing migration to Europe’, Reuters, 27 November 2023; ‘Was ist los in Niger?’, Rosa Lux: Linx, July 2024; S. Stille, ‘The criminalization of mobility in Niger: The case of Law 2015-36’, Global Sylum Governance and the European Union’s Role, November 2023; J. Garver-Affeldt, ‘The criminalization of mobility in Niger: the case of Law 2015-36’, Mixed Migration Center, 13 December 2023. ↩︎
180
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
181
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Two mass graves of migrants uncovered in Libya’, United Nations News, 10 February 2025; ‘Libya finds two mass graves with bodies of nearly 50 migrants, refugees’, Al Jazeera, 9 February 2025; ‘Migrants’ bodies in Libya mass graves had gunshot wounds, IOM says’, Reuters, 10 February 2025. ↩︎
182
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘IOM Deeply Alarmed by Mass Graves Found in Libya, Urges Action’, International Organization for Migration, 10 February 2025 ↩︎
183
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Civil society organisations call for EU-Libya migration funding freeze as mass graves discovered’, European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, 14 February 2025. ↩︎
184
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Trabelsi pledges to secure Libya’s south amid migrant resettlement controversy’, Libya Security Monitor, 13 March 2025. ↩︎
185
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Libya & Tunisia Face Border Crisis Over Smuggling & Arrests’, Libya Review, 19 March 2025. ↩︎
186
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; A. Durbin, ‘Libya government says militias to leave Tripoli after deal struck’, BBC, 22 February 2024; ‘Libya: Ten years after uprising abusive militias evade justice and instead reap rewards’, Amnesty International, 17 February 2021. ↩︎
187
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; A. Durbin, ‘Libya government says militias to leave Tripoli after deal struck’, BBC, 22 February 2024; ‘Libya armed groups agree to leave Tripoli after deadly fighting: Minister’, Al Jazeera, 21 February 2024; ‘Libya Armed Groups Agree to Leave Tripoli After Deadly Fighting: Minister’, International Center for Transitional Justice, 22 February 2024. ↩︎
188
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; M. Muchiri, ‘Libya militias battle in Tripoli after commander’s arrest’, BBC, 16 August 2023 ↩︎
189
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Libya Armed Groups Agree to Leave Tripoli After Deadly Fighting: Minister’, International Center for Transitional Justice, 22 February 2024; ‘Militias agree to leave Tripoli’, Legal Brief, 26 February 2024; N. E. Abdulrasheed, ‘A New Dawn in Tripoli: Militias Agree to Withdraw in Historic Pact’, Libya Tribune, 24 February 2024. ↩︎
190
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Security Council Adopts Resolution 2755 (2024), Renewing Libya Mandate until 31 January 2025, with Automatic 9-Month Extension upon Mission Head Appointment’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 31 October 2024; ‘Libya: Vote on UNSMIL Mandate Renewal’, Security Council Report, 31 October 2025; UNSC, ‘Resolution 2755 (2024)’, 31 October 2024. ↩︎
191
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; UNSC, ‘Resolution 2755 (2024)’, 31 October 2024. ↩︎
192
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Ms. Hanna Serwaa Tetteh of Ghana – Special Representative for Libya and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 24 January 2025; D. Guldogan, ‘UN chief appoints Hanna Serwaa Tetteh as special representative for Libya’, AA, 24 January 2025. ↩︎
193
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; UNSC, ‘Resolution 2769 (2025)’, 16 January 2025; ‘Security Council Updates Sanctions Regime on Libya, Extends Mandate until May 2026, Adopting Resolution 2769 (2025) with 14 Members in Favour, 1 Abstaining’, UN, 16 January 2025. ↩︎
194
UNSC, ‘Resolution 1970 (2011)’, 26 February 2011; and ‘Resolution 2146 (2014)’, 19 March 2014. ↩︎
195
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; UNSC, ‘Resolution 2769 (2025)’, UN 16 January 2025; ‘Security Council Updates Sanctions Regime on Libya, Extends Mandate until May 2026, Adopting Resolution 2769 (2025) with 14 Members in Favour, 1 Abstaining’, UN, 16 January 2025. ↩︎
196
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Tunisian, Algerian, Libyan leaders discuss security and economic issues’, The Arab Weekly, 23 April 2024; ‘The first consultative meeting begins in Tunisia between Menfi, Saied and Tebboune’, Libyan News Agency, 22 April 2024. ↩︎
197
‘The first consultative meeting begins in Tunisia between Menfi, Saied and Tebboune’, Libyan News Agency, 22 April 2024; ‘Tunisia, Algeria and Libya create new regional coalition’, Voice of America: Africa, 24 April 2024; ‘Tunisia: tripartite meeting with the leaders of Algeria and Libya in Tunis on Monday’, Nova News, 21 April 2024. ↩︎
198
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; A. Assad, ‘Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Italy’s Interior Ministers discuss solutions to illegal immigration’, The Libya Observer, 2 May 2024. ↩︎
199
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; M. Wanees, ‘Libya reopens Ras Ijdir border crossing with Tunisia after 3-month closure’, AA, 1 July 2024; A. Assad, ‘Libya, Tunisia reopen Ras Ajdair border after 100 days of closure’, The Libya Observer, 1 July 2024. ↩︎
200
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Algeria announces ‘imminent’ summit with Libya and Tunisia’, Middle East Monitor, 17 October 2024; ‘Libya to Host Summit on New Alliance with Tunisia & Algeria’, Libya Review, 19 October 2024. ↩︎
201
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Readout of Assistant Secretary of Defense Dr. Celeste Wallander’s Travel to Libya and Malta’, U.S. Department of War, 26 September 2024; ‘Dabaiba discusses cooperation with US security officials’, 23 September 2024. ↩︎
202
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘US-Libya Military Cooperation Discussed in Tripoli’, The Tripoli Post, 20 December 24; ‘Libya & US Officials Discuss Ways to Enhance Military Cooperation’, Libya Review, 23 December 2024. ↩︎
203
‘Libya & US Officials Discuss Ways to Enhance Military Cooperation’, Libya Review, 23 December 2024. ↩︎
204
UNSC, ‘Resolution 1970 (2011)’, 26 February 2011; ‘Libya’, International Criminal Court; M. du Plessis and C. Gevers, ‘UNSC Referral of Libya Gives ICC the Opportunity to Prove its Worth’, Institute for Security Studies, 4 March 2011. ↩︎
205
‘Libya’, International Criminal Court. ↩︎
206
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Statement of ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC to the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in Libya, pursuant to Resolution 1970 (2011)’, International Criminal Court, 20 November 2024; ‘ICC prosecutor visits Libya ahead of UNSC briefing’, Libya Security Monitor, 18 November 2024. ↩︎
207
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Situation in Libya: ICC arrest warrant against Osama Elmasry Njeem for alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes’, International Criminal Court, 22 January 2025; ICC, ‘Situation in Libya: Decision unsealing the ‘Warrant of Arrest for Mr Osama Elmasry/Almasri Njeem’, issued on 18 January 2025’, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 24 January 2025. ↩︎
208
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Situation in Libya: ICC arrest warrant against Osama Elmasry Njeem for alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes’, International Criminal Court, 22 January 2025; ICC, ‘Situation in Libya: Decision unsealing the ‘Warrant of Arrest for Mr Osama Elmasry/Almasri Njeem’, issued on 18 January 2025’, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 24 January 2025. ↩︎
209
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Situation in Libya: ICC arrest warrant against Osama Elmasry Njeem for alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes’, International Criminal Court, 22 January 2025; A. Giuffrida, ‘Libyan general released after arrest in Turin on ICC warrant for alleged war crimes’, The Guardian, 21 January 2025. ↩︎
210
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; L. P. Rossetti, ‘The failure to arrest and surrender Osama Elmasry Njeem: “That Awful Mess” in Rome’, EJIL: Talk!, 27 January 2025; Corte di Apello di Roma, ‘Ordinanza: NJEEM Osema Almasri Habish’, 21 January 2025. ↩︎
211
‘Libya’, International Criminal Court; ‘Libya’s acceptance of the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction: stakes and implications’, The International Commission of Jurists, August 2025; M. Hanafy, ‘Libya’s Acceptance of the International Criminal Court’s Jurisdiction: Stakes and Implications’, Opinio Juris, 8 August 2025; ‘Libya accepts ICC jurisdiction over alleged crimes from 2011 to the end of 2027’, International Criminal Court, 15 May 2025. ↩︎
212
F. S. Fasanotti, ‘Libya is caught in an ever-deepening vicious circle’, Geoploitical Intelligence Services, 24 March 2025; K. Mahmoud, ‘Tensions Rise between Militias in Western Libya’, Ashraq Al-Awsat, 7 April 2025. ↩︎
213
‘Why did clashes break out in Libya’s Tripoli?’, Al Jazeera, 17 August 2023 Benghazi,‘Clashes break out in Benghazi as LNA attempts to seize Barghati’, Libya Security Monitor, 6 October 2023; S. Alharathy, ‘Clashes in Benghazi, communications disrupted amid conflicting reports of Al-Barghathi’s arrest’, The Libya Observer, 7 October 2023 Gharyan,A. Assad, ‘Two killed, four injured in armed clashes in Libya’s Gharyan’, The Libya Observer, 29 October 2023; ‘Fighting in western Libya town kills eight people’, Reuters, 31 October 2023 Jufra,‘Drone strike destroys Russian transport aircraft at al-Jufra’, Libya Security Monitor, 15 December 2023; S. Alharathy, ‘Russian aircraft destroyed in Libya’s Al-Jufra base’, The Libya Observer, 16 December 2023 ↩︎
214
‘1 Killed & 6 Injured in Armed Clashes in Libya’s Al Zawiya’ Libya Review, 18 May 2025. ↩︎
215
‘Fighting flares up in Libya’s Gharyan as Tripoli loyalists re-establish control’, The Arab Weekly, 1 November 2023. ↩︎
216
C. Gazzini, ‘Tense Times in Tripoli’, International Crisis Group, 8 September 2025; ‘Armed clashes erupt in Libya’s Tripoli after reported killing of armed group leader’, Reuters, 13 May 2025; ‘Heavy gunfire, clashes in Libya’s Tripoli after killing of militia leader’, Al Jazeera, 12 May 2025; ‘Libya: UN announces “truce committee” as ceasefire holds after violence clashes in Tripoli’, Africa News, 19 May 2025. ↩︎
217
‘Libya: UN announces “truce committee” as ceasefire holds after violence clashes in Tripoli’, Africa News, 19 May 2025; ‘Libya: Civilians Caught in Militia Clashes’, Human Rights Watch, 20 May 2025; L. Tondo, ‘Six killed in Tripoli clashes after killing of militia leader’, The Guardian, 13 May 2025; ‘Most intense fighting for years rocks Libyan capital’, CNN, 14 May 2025. ↩︎
218
‘Libya: UN announces “truce committee” as ceasefire holds after violence clashes in Tripoli’, Africa News, 19 May 2025; ‘International Support Critical to Turn ‘Fragile Truce’ in Libya into Permanent Ceasefire, Create Accountable Government, Special Representative Tells Security Council’, UN, 24 June 2025; ‘Libya fighting eases after announcement of truce’, Reuters, 14 May 2025; UNSMIL, X; ‘UNSMIL and Presidency Council launch a truce committee’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 18 May 2025. ↩︎
219
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Policeman shot dead in Libya during protests near prime minister’s office’, TRT World, 17 May 2025; ‘Libyan policeman shot dead during protests near premier’s office in Tripoli’, AA, 17 May 2025. ↩︎
220
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Protest erupts in Libya’s Tripoli, senior officials resign’, Xinhua, 17 May 2025; ‘Libyan ministers resign as protesters call for government to step down’, Al Jazeera, 17 May 2025; ‘Libyan protesters demand prime minister quit as three ministers resign’, Reuters, 17 May 2025. ↩︎
221
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
222
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; Paint Contractors in Texas, ‘Tripoli protesters call on the Presidential Council to rule Libya until elections’, Facebook, 23 May 2025. ↩︎
223
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; S. Alharaty, ‘Menfi forms joint security force to bolster Tripoli stability’, The Libya Observer, 14 June 2025; ‘PC issues new security arrangements in Tripoli as situation de-escalates’, Libya Security Monitor, 10 June 2025. ↩︎
224
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Sudanese army accuses Libya’s Haftar forces of border attack’, Reuters, 11 June 2025. ↩︎
225
‘Middle East and North Africa: Libya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Sudanese army accuses Libya’s Haftar forces of border attack’, Reuters, 11 June 2025; ‘Sudanese army accuses Libya’s Haftar of joint border attack with RSF’, Al Jazeera, 10 June 2025. ↩︎
226
‘Sudanese army accuses Libya’s Haftar forces of border attack’, Reuters, 11 June 2025; ‘Sudanese army accuses Libya’s Haftar of joint border attack with RSF’, Al Jazeera, 10 June 2025. ↩︎
227
‘Sudanese army accuses Libya’s Haftar forces of border attack’, Reuters, 11 June 2025; ‘Sudanese army accuses Libya’s Haftar of joint border attack with RSF’, Al Jazeera, 10 June 2025. ↩︎

Non-international Armed Conflicts in Libya

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (between 2023 and 2025)

Non-International Armed Conflict

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Parties to the Conflict

State Parties

Non-State parties