Myanmar (2026-07-22)

As of end-June 2026, Myanmar was engaged in four non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) on its territory involving various ethnic armed groups (EAGs), notably the following:

Myanmar v Arakan Army (AA)
Myanmar v Chin National Defence Force (CNDF)
Myanmar v Kachin Independence Army (KIA)
Myanmar v Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), (supported by PDFs)

In contrast, two armed conflicts ongoing in 2025 had ended:

Myanmar v Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) (ended April 2025)
Myanmar v Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) (ended October 2025)

These armed conflicts are all governed by Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and customary international humanitarian law (IHL). Myanmar is not a State Party to Additional Protocol II of 1977.

In Myanmar, multiple NIACs are ongoing between the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) and various EAGs. An EAG may be a stand-alone entity or a coalition of groups claiming to represent a specific ethnic identity.¹

Myanmar, located in South-east Asia, has an ethnically and culturally diverse population. Both prior to and during British colonial rule, ethnic minorities – primarily concentrated in border regions – traditionally exercised autonomous self-governance.²Formerly known as Burma, the country gained independence from British rule in 1948. Since then, it has experienced persistent internal tensions, largely driven by its ethnic diversity and a colonial legacy that exacerbated divisions among communities.³

The conflicts in Myanmar are predominantly still rooted in ethnic divisions, and various EAGs have engaged in prolonged armed resistance against the Tatmadaw.⁴ Following independence in 1948, Myanmar experienced a military coup in 1962, after which, until 2011, the country was governed by a military junta.⁵ On numerous occasions between 1962 and 2011, the junta clashed with ethnic minority groups that were seeking enhanced autonomy.⁶ The military regime’s rule has intensified the strength of the insurgency, triggered economic decline, and resulted in significant international isolation, including through the imposition of sanctions.⁷

In 1974, a new constitution was introduced in an attempt to transfer power to a civilian assembly. However, persistent tensions with ethnic minorities, particularly the Karen, Kachin, and Shan groups, undermined the process. ⁸ Another coup followed in 1988 leading to the establishment of the State Law and Order Restoration Council ⁹ which further suppressed pro-democracy movements and continued armed operations against EAGs. ¹⁰ In 1989, the State Law and Order Restoration Council officially changed the country’s name from the Union of Burma to the Union of Myanmar.¹¹

In 1990, general elections were held and decisively won by the National League for Democracy (NLD),¹² signalling the public’s desire to transition away from military rule.¹³ However, the military rejected the results, claiming the elections were intended only to determine whether a new constitution was necessary.¹⁴ In the aftermath of electoral defeat, the junta launched a series of campaigns in the 1990s and 2000s against ethnic groups including the Karen, Kachin, Shan, and Rohingya.¹⁵

Another new constitution was adopted by the junta in 2008, granting the military extensive powers, including control over key ministries and a guaranteed allocation of parliamentary seats. In 2010, the junta organized a general election, but the NLD boycotted the vote in protest against newly imposed electoral laws that prevented fair competition and restricted the ability to contest the results.¹⁶ The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) secured victory in this election.¹⁷ Although the military junta was formally dissolved in 2011, real power remained with the military as a transitional, military-dominated civilian government was formed which was presided over by a former general, Thein Sein.¹⁸

In 2015, the first multi-party elections were held,¹⁹ which the NLD, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won convincingly.²⁰ But due to the provisions in the 2008 Constitution, the NLD was required to enter into a power-sharing agreement with the military. As a result, while it led the civilian parliament, the military maintained control over the ministries in the executive. In 2015, clashes between Kokang separatists and government forces in Shan state intensified.²¹ Despite peace efforts and various ceasefire agreements between the government and approximately sixteen rebel groups,²² conflict persists across the country.²³

In 2017, the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar intensified significantly.²⁴ The Rohingya are a Muslim ethnic minority who have been the victims of violence perpetrated by the Tatmadaw, described as constituting war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.²⁵ Whether the violence against the Rohingya amounts to genocide is being adjudicated before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).²⁶

In August 2017, the crisis escalated dramatically; the United Nations has described the events as the “most significant exodus” of the Rohingya during which more than 740,000 people fled to Bangladesh to escape a renewed military crackdown.²⁷

In June 2019, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) emerged, consisting of the Arakan Army (AA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), marking a major shift in the balance of power. ²⁸ The 3BHA launched a high-impact military offensive dubbed ‘Operation 1027’ against the Tatmadaw in October 2023 (see 2023 version). In November 2020, the NLD once again won a decisive victory in Myanmar’s general election, securing an even greater number of parliamentary seats than in the 2015 election. ²⁹ The results were, however, rejected by the military-backed USDP, which, along with the military leadership, alleged electoral fraud. However, the Union Election Commission upheld the integrity of the election, with international and domestic observers endorsing the results as generally free and fair.³⁰ The dispute over the election outcome served as a precursor to the military coup that followed.³¹

On 1 February 2021, the day Myanmar’s newly elected parliament was scheduled to convene, the military staged a coup, seizing control of the government.³² President Win Myint, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, and several other senior NLD officials were arrested. The military then installed Vice President Myint Swe, a retired general, as acting president.³³ Ms Suu Kyi remains in prison, serving a thirty-three-year sentence for corruption and other crimes, including breaching COVID-19 public safety rules.³⁴

The military coup of February 2021 triggered widespread anti-coup protests across Myanmar. These protests were met with a brutal crackdown by the security forces, which involved widespread extrajudicial killings and the destruction of homes and other civilian objects.³⁵ In addition to violent attacks, thousands of protesters were detained, imprisoned, and, in some cases, sentenced to death.³⁶

In response to escalating State violence, the mass political protests and acts of civil disobedience evolved into further support for organized armed resistance.³⁷ Civilians began arming themselves and joining local militia groups.³⁸ Simultaneously, ousted political figures and representatives of various ethnic groups established a parallel government, the National Unity Government (NUG), to coordinate diplomatic efforts and armed resistance against the military regime.³⁹

The 2021 coup ultimately saw the emergence of several new NIACs. However, the threshold for classification as a NIAC under IHL – most notably the criteria set out in the Tadić case – was not immediately satisfied by the mass protests in the initial aftermath of the coup. According to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), a NIAC requires protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups themselves, displaying a minimum level of intensity and organization. But in February 2021, most civilian resistance consisted of loosely coordinated self-defence groups that lacked a unified command structure or a sustained operational capacity.⁴⁰

Following the widespread protests and military-provoked confrontations in the aftermath of the February 2021 coup, the military responded with excessive force, including with intentional lethal use of force.⁴¹ The military employed live ammunition, tear gas, and other riot control methods against protesters who relied on improvised weapons during this period.⁴² Although attacks on civilians escalated during February 2021, the situation in Myanmar lacked combat between identifiable organized parties and at that stage the crisis could be characterized as violent political upheaval. The escalation drew international condemnation, most notably through a Presidential Statement by the UN Security Council (UNSC) condemning violence against peaceful protestors.⁴³

During March 2021, the nature of the violence shifted as civilians organized into resistance groups opposing the military junta.⁴⁴ The frequency and nature of attacks also changed in the period between March and May 2021.⁴⁵

Between March and May 2021, the situation in Myanmar worsened significantly, with EAGs and newly formed local defence forces mounting coordinated attacks against the Tatmadaw. Notable among these actors are the KIA and the Chinland Defence Forces (CDF), which launched sustained operations targeting military bases and infrastructure.⁴⁶ Initially, the newly formed EAGs carried hunting rifles and other makeshift weapons, but they quickly began to use improvised explosive devices.⁴⁷ The Tatmadaw responded by increased use of heavy weapons and airstrikes in civilian areas.⁴⁸ Clashes were no longer sporadic but frequent, often occurring simultaneously in different regions.⁴⁹

Based on the scale, intensity, and degree of organization evident at this stage, it is reasonable to conclude that the situation between the Tatmadaw and opposing organized armed groups met the threshold for classification as a NIAC during the period from March to May 2021. These NIACs have persisted into 2026 (see below).⁵⁰

In early September 2021, the NUG had formally ‘declared war’ on the junta and formed an armed division called the People’s Defence Force (PDF), an umbrella group supported by various militias.⁵¹ Several EAGs also joined the NUG in its fight against the junta.⁵² The final quarter of 2021 saw an intensification of the conflict and was marked by events such as the Mo So massacre, also known as the Christmas Eve massacre, during which the Tatmadaw burned more than thirty civilians beyond recognition in their vehicles, ⁵³ and the capturing of a military outpost in Chin state by the CDF and the Chin National Army (CNA) in September 2021.⁵⁴

Among the main non-State armed groups engaged in the NIAC against the Tatmadaw during 2021 were the CNA, the CDF, ⁵⁵the PDF, ⁵⁶ the KIA, ⁵⁷ and the KNLA.⁵⁸ Despite international condemnation, including statements by the UN Security Council (UNSC), ⁵⁹ and regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN,⁶⁰ tangible diplomatic or peacekeeping interventions have been absent. Sanctions and symbolic gestures of support for the NUG and the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw have been declared by the United States, ⁶¹ but these measures have done little to stem the violence.

Fighting continued during 2022 and 2023, and by June 2023, multiple NIACs continued across most administrative regions in Myanmar, in particular, the Dry Zone, Shan, Sagaing, Kayin, and Chin states.⁶² By then, a diverse range of armed groups were fighting Myanmar’s State Administration Council (SAC), comprising newly formed anti-junta forces and long-standing EAGs. The anti-SAC groups emerged in response to the 2021 coup and the violent repression of peaceful protestors, while EAGs existed long before then, pursuing various ethno-nationalist agendas. In the aftermath of the coup, new alliances developed between these two categories of armed actors, significantly eroding the SAC’s authority, particularly in rural and ethnic-minority regions.⁶³

The nominal ‘People’s Defence Force’ is a term describing armed groups protecting civilians from military violence. By 2023, the term had come to include three types of anti-SAC forces: PDFs, which are larger and recognised by the NUG; People’s Defence Teams (PDTs), which are smaller village- or neighbourhood-based security units also established by the NUG; and Local Defence Forces (LDFs), which operate independently of the NUG but share its anti-junta objectives.⁶⁴ Estimates suggest these groups have a total of 95,000 fighters between them, of whom 65,000 are allied with the NUG and 30,000 being LDF fighters. The numbers fluctuate due to ongoing consolidation under the NUG umbrella.⁶⁵ Initially disorganized and inexperienced, many anti-SAC fighters were civilians – teachers, civil servants, and activists – who were motivated by the SAC’s crackdown on non-violent dissent. Over time, these groups evolved tactically, shifting from sporadic attacks and sabotage to sustained clashes, such as a February 2023 battle in Sagaing region where PDF forces resisted a military assault for three days.⁶⁶

However, not all EAGs support the NUG. The AA, which controls large areas of Rakhine state, remains sceptical of the SAC as well as the NUG because of the NLD’s past repression of Rakhine nationalism. After concluding a temporary ceasefire with the military following the 2020 elections, the AA resumed hostilities in 2022 before ending their military operations later that year. Other EAGs, particularly in Shan state – including the United Wa State Army (UWSA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and Shan State Progress Party – focus on preserving their autonomy and economic interests and often respond to Chinese pressure to remain neutral.⁶⁷

By the middle of 2023, several EAGs were involved in NIACs against the Tatmadaw and against other EAGs. The main non-State actors that are party to the NIACs are the AA, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), the MNDAA, and the TNLA.⁶⁸ EAGs such as the KNLA, the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force, and the CNA, continue to mount joint campaigns and exercise de facto control over parts of the country.⁶⁹ Other resistance groups such as the Urban Owls and Ye Belu carried out targeted assassinations and sabotage operations, particularly in urban and coastal regions in the period up to June 2023.⁷⁰

The Gambia v Myanmar case before the International Court of Justice

Since January 2025, there have been further developments in the case. For ease of reference, the report provides a brief overview of events prior to 1 July 2023. On 11 November 2019, The Gambia filed an application with the International Court of Justice (ICJ or the Court), launching an application against Myanmar for violations of the Genocide Convention against its Rohingya minority.⁷¹ The Gambia submitted that the Court’s jurisdiction was derived from Article IX of the 1948 Genocide Convention. The application sought provisional measures, which were ordered on 23 January 2020. Myanmar was, among other things, ordered to take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of all acts within the scope of Article II of the Genocide Convention, and to ensure that its military, as well as any irregular armed units, do not commit genocide.⁷² On 20 January 2021, Myanmar registered preliminary objections to the Court’s jurisdiction, but in a ruling on 22 July 2022, the Court determined the case could proceed to the merits phase.

On 15 November 2023, the Maldives filed a declaration of intervention in the case pursuant to Article 63 of the Court’s Statute.⁷³ On the same date, a joint declaration was filed by Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (the ‘Joint Declarants’).⁷⁴ Myanmar expressed its objection to the admissibility of the declarations of intervention. On 3 July 2024, however, the Court held the declarations admissible, insofar as they pertain to the interpretation of the Genocide Convention. During the latter half of 2024, four other States filed declarations of intervention, namely, Slovenia (on 22 November 2024),⁷⁵ the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (on 11 December 2024),⁷⁶ Belgium (on 12 December 2024),⁷⁷ and Ireland (on 20 December 2024).⁷⁸ These interventions were declared admissible by the Court on 29 July 2025.⁷⁹ The case moved to the next phase in early 2026 when the ICJ held hearings on the merits between 12 and 29 January.⁸⁰

Criminal proceedings initiated against Myanmar’s military leader

In early February 2026, Timor-Leste’s judicial authorities appointed a prosecutor to examine alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by Myanmar’s military against the Chin population after the 2021 coup. Investigations were opened following a complaint submitted by the Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO) based on the principle of universal jurisdiction. Having only joined the ASEAN regional body four months prior, Timor-Leste’s investigations into this case represent the first time one ASEAN Member State has initiated such proceedings against another.⁸¹

In a parallel development, Indonesian authorities accepted a criminal complaint filed against Myanmar’s then-military leader Min Aung Hlaing on 6 April 2026, accusing him of genocide and other international crimes against the Rohingya population during the 2016 and 2017 military operations in Rakhine State. The complaint was jointly brought by the Rohingya Maìyafuìnor Collaborative Network, THEMIS Indonesia, and the Myanmar Accountability Project (MAP) and submitted under Indonesia’s universal-jurisdiction provisions.⁸²

Weakening of the Three Brotherhood Alliance and Operation 1027

The 3BHA, comprising the AA, the MNDAA, and the TNLA, launched a coordinated high-profile military offensive, dubbed ‘Operation 1027’ in late October 2023, which was primarily aimed at capturing territory from the Myanmar military regime. After the AA, the TNLA, and the MNDAA had jointly seized large swathes of territory between late 2023 and mid-2025⁸³, the AA continued making significant territorial gains during the second half of 2025, including capturing fourteen of Rakhine state’s seventeen townships and Paletwa township in neighbouring Chin state.⁸⁴ By this point, however, the original 3BHA was no longer acting as a fully coordinated force. The MNDAA signed a ceasefire with the junta under Chinese mediation in January 2025 and ceased large-scale combat operations against the Tatmadaw⁸⁵ The TNLA, in turn, continued fighting the Myanmar military in northern Shan state until October 2025. During the second half of 2025, the Tatmadaw launched numerous counteroffensives and recaptured several towns, including Nawnghkio, Kyaukme, and Hsipaw, from the TNLA.⁸⁶ In late October 2025, the TNLA signed a Chinese-brokered ceasefire with the junta. As part of the deal, the TNLA agreed to withdraw from Mogok and Momeik townships. After the TNLA pulled out its troops, other EAGs (including the KIA and other PDFs) continued to exert pressure on junta troops in both townships.⁸⁷ As of end-June 2026, the AA remained the only member of the 3BHA engaged in sustained, large-scale combat against the junta.⁸⁸ On 14 March 2026, armed confrontations broke out between the TNLA and the MNDAA in northern Shan state’s Kutkai town, when the MNDAA launched coordinated attacks against TNLA positions. The MNDAA had captured the town from the TNLA by 16 March 2026, but by 18 March 2026 both parties had agreed to a ceasefire. This incident signals a further rift within the 3BHA and is described by analysts as a strategic alignment of the MNDAA with Beijing.⁸⁹

Chinese influence on Myanmar’s conflict

China seems eager to see an end to the violent turmoil that has consumed its southern neighbour since the military coup in 2021, as it has extensive economic interests in Myanmar, including energy pipelines and mining projects.⁹⁰ China backs the military junta but maintains contact with the rebels, especially those on its border.⁹¹ China’s relations with the junta were strained in the months leading up to the January 2024 ceasefire negotiations over its failure to crack down on online scams that Beijing claims target Chinese citizens.⁹²

China’s support is indispensable to the junta, as the junta needs Beijing’s backing to stop insurgent offensives in northern Shan state and to gain international legitimacy.⁹³ In return, the junta has endorsed Beijing’s ‘One China’ policy and has enacted the Private Security Service Law to protect Chinese investment by allowing Chinese security firms to enter and to operate in Myanmar.⁹⁴

On 12 January 2024, the Tatmadaw and the 3BHA entered into a ceasefire agreement during Chinese-mediated talks.⁹⁵ The talks took place on 10 and 11 January in the Chinese city of Kunming in Yunnan Province which borders Myanmar.⁹⁶ The Haigeng Agreement, named after the hotel in Kunming that hosted the talks, led to a 40 per cent drop in political violence from the previous month in northern Shan state, which had seen intense fighting in the preceding months.⁹⁷ However, other states did not benefit from this lull in fighting. In northern Shan, the temporary ceasefire agreement between the Myanmar junta and the 3BHA broke down and clashes resumed in several townships in the last week of June 2024.⁹⁸ China kept urging all sides to talk while simultaneously putting pressure on the insurgents through border closures and by cutting off essential supplies such as fuel.⁹⁹ Under pressure from China, the MNDAA and TNLA agreed to a renewed four-day ceasefire in Shan state from 14 to 18 July 2024.¹⁰⁰ This ceasefire was later extended to 31 July 2024. The ceasefire, however, was not agreed to by the third member of the alliance, the AA. ¹⁰¹

On 3 December 2024, the MNDAA announced an immediate ceasefire in its areas to protect the civilian population and to stabilise the border between China and Myanmar. It emphasized the importance of the resolution of conflicting issues, including those in Lashio, through dialogue and under China’s facilitation.¹⁰² Over the course of several rounds of meetings in Kunming, during which China detained the group’s leader, Peng Deren, China applied sufficient pressure on the MNDAA to surrender Lashio to the junta.¹⁰³

In April 2025, a Chinese ceasefire monitoring team was sent to Lashio to supervise the handover of the capital of northern Shan state to the Myanmar military.¹⁰⁴ On 21 April, regime troops and officials began returning to Lashio town. ¹⁰⁵ In essence, China helped the Tatmadaw achieve an outcome it was unable to achieve on the battlefield. It is claimed that China’s interference in Lashio’s handover could set a worrying precedent that could see it pressuring other armed groups to give up territory.¹⁰⁶

Despite the ceasefire, the AA persisted in its efforts to expel the regime from Rakhine state, intensifying its attacks on Kyaukphyu township since late April 2025.¹⁰⁷

China has strongly influenced Myanmar’s conflict dynamics, including by negotiating ceasefires between the MNDAA and the junta in January 2025,¹⁰⁸ Beijing has reportedly exerted pressure on other EAGs, such as the KIA, to enter into negotiations with the government.¹⁰⁹ Analysts expect the AA, as the last remaining active member of the 3BHA, to be the next target of the Chinese pressure campaign.¹¹⁰ Chinese intervention and the acquisition of Chinese-made drones and aerial warfare technologies reportedly enabled Myanmar’s troops to retake numerous towns in the first half of 2026 (see above).¹¹¹

Developments related to the December 2025 elections

In early 2025, junta leader Min Aung Hlaing announced that Myanmar was scheduled to hold general elections in December 2025, marking the first general elections since the 2021 coup.¹¹² The deadline for new political parties to register for the expected elections expired on 9 May 2025, with no major opposition parties putting forward applications.¹¹³ On 5 July 2025, regime forces publicly urged anti-junta resistance forces, such as the NUG and the PDFs, to abandon armed struggle and participate in the junta’s planned elections. The NUG immediately rejected the junta’s ‘sham election’.¹¹⁴ In a move to pave the way for the planned election, Myanmar’s military junta officially revoked the post-coup state of emergency in parts of the country on 31 July 2025. Junta leader Min Aung Hlaing nonetheless secured his authority by chairing a newly created ten-member State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC), established to oversee preparations for the planned election and for the transition to a new government. On the same day, following the reorganization of the Union Government, General Nyo Saw was appointed Prime Minister.¹¹⁵ In the aftermath of an early-August stakeholder meeting organized by the Malaysian government in Kuala Lumpur, which included representatives of the NUG, civil society organizations, and several EAGs, Malaysia’s Foreign Minister Mohamad Hasan announced he would lead an ASEAN delegation to Myanmar on 19 September 2025 to seek clarification from the authorities on the planned elections.¹¹⁶ In a further development, the Election Commission announced on 18 August 2025 that the first phase of elections would take place on 28 December 2025 in 102 out of 330 townships.¹¹⁷

On 9 September 2026, Myanmar’s junta reiterated its call upon anti-junta forces to participate in the planned elections. At the same time, the Election Commission announced the dissolution of four political parties for failing to meet requirements under the Political Parties Registration Law. The Commission further declared on 14 September 2025 that fifty-six townships would be barred from the first round of voting.¹¹⁸ In a parallel development, junta leader Min Aung Hlaing conducted a visit to China between 30 August and 6 September 2025, where he met with Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The visit was aimed at strengthening ties between these countries in preparation for the December 2025 elections.¹¹⁹ Min Aung Hlaing further visited Russia to hold bilateral meetings with Putin, for the fourth time in 2025, on 25 September.¹²⁰ During October 2025, public criticism of the regime emerged concerning alleged errors and omissions in the published voter lists.¹²¹ As agreed in the stakeholder meeting in early August 2025, Malaysian Foreign Minister Hasan visited Myanmar on 9 October 2025 discussing ASEAN engagement and the planned December elections, while also calling for the cessation of violence and humanitarian access as laid down in ASEAN’s Five-Point-Consensus. During the meeting, junta representatives invited ASEAN to send a delegation of election observers to Myanmar in December 2025.¹²² Reports emerged in early November 2025 about a pressure campaign directed at cultural and media figures in Myanmar. For example, numerous filmmakers were ordered to encourage participation in the planned elections, while those who refused to do so were detained.¹²³ ASEAN repeatedly called for inclusive and fair elections. It declined the junta’s offer to send a delegation of election observers.¹²⁴

In early December 2025, the Election Commission declared the partial or entire cancellation of voting in more than 150 townships citing security concerns. Simultaneously, repressive acts against regime critics continued. By 16 December 2025, junta authorities announced that more than 200 people had been charged with infringing the newly passed Election Protection Law. The first phase of elections was held on 28 December 2025 without major violence.¹²⁵ The second and third phases of the election were held on 11 and 25 January, respectively, with sporadic incidents of election-related violence. International reactions to the voting process were split, with allies such as China expressing their support for the elections while the Philippines, the ASEAN chair at the time, announcing that the body would not endorse the results of the election.¹²⁶ The results of the elections were announced on 3 February 2026, with a landslide victory declared for the pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party.¹²⁷ Immediately afterwards, a number of amendments were made to bolster the powers of the president and limit institutional checks on executive authority.¹²⁸

New nominally civilian pro-military government took office

Following the December 2025 and January 2026 elections (see above), the lower and upper houses held their first meetings on 16 and 18 March 2026, confirming Min Aung Hlaing allies as parliamentary speaker and deputy speaker. In a parallel development, Min Aung Hlaing stepped down as commander-in-chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces on 30 March 2026. He was replaced by former military intelligence chief General Ye Win Oo. A day later, Min Aung Hlaing was declared the presidential nominee by the lower house.¹²⁹ Earlier that month, on 2 March 2026, the junta had announced the release of over 7,000 prisoners convicted under Myanmar’s Counter-Terrorism Law for lower-level support or association with anti-junta resistance groups offenses.¹³⁰

On 10 April 2026, Min Aung Hlaing officially became President, with Nyo Saw and Nan Ni Ni Aye from pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party installed as Vice Presidents.¹³¹During the first meeting of the new cabinet on 20 April 2026, Min Aung Hlaing called upon EAGs and other resistance forces to engage in peace talks within 100 days, setting a deadline for 31 July 2026.¹³² The EAGs, however, created their own coordination mechanism, dubbed Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF), with the purpose coordinating efforts toward establishing a federal democratic union and replacing military rule under the coordination of the NUG.¹³³

The new government announced a second and third wave of amnesties for political prisoners. On 17 April 2026, 4,500 detainees were released, including former President Win Myint. On 30 April 2026, an additional 1,500 prisoners were freed. The twenty-seven-year prison sentence of former State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi was reduced to eighteen years.¹³⁴

International reactions to the new government in Myanmar remained divided. Several States, including China and India, expressed their intention to enhance their cooperation with the new administration. Following up on this announcement, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi conducted a visit to Nay Pyi Taw on 25 April 2026.¹³⁵ Some members of the regional body ASEAN, however, notably Singapore and Malaysia, remained cautious.¹³⁶ In contrast, on 22 April 2026, Thailand’s Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow declared that his country supported Myanmar’s re-entry into ASEAN.¹³⁷ Following Thailand’s initiative during the ASEAN meeting between 7 and 9 May 2026, the regional body compromised on inviting Myanmar’s Foreign Minister Tin Maung Swe to an online meeting on the sidelines of the upcoming ASEAN Foreign Minister summit in July 2026.¹³⁸ At the same time, he received delegations from individual ASEAN members such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and Laos.¹³⁹ Washington’s policy toward Myanmar’s new administration continued to be uncertain, with reports indicating hesitation over whether and how to distribute approximately $121 million in previously allocated assistance for Myanmar-related programmes.¹⁴⁰

The evolving violent situation between the ARSA and the AA

The ARSA and the AA have been sporadically clashing, predominantly in the border regions between Myanmar and Bangladesh. An assessment of the facts reveals that this situation, by end-June 2026, falls below the threshold of a NIAC.

In 2017, Harakah al-Yaqin changed its name to the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA).¹⁴¹ This group represents the Rohingya, who originate from the region of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.¹⁴² ARSA operates in the state of Rakhine in western Myanmar ¹⁴³ as well as in refugee camps in Bangladesh.¹⁴⁴ ARSA aims to achieve autonomy and self-governance for the Rohingya in Rakhine.¹⁴⁵ The authorities in Myanmar, however, paint a very different picture; they accuse ARSA of being Islamist ‘terrorists’ who want to impose Sharia law.¹⁴⁶

Until 2023, ARSA actively fought the military government in Myanmar, but at that point it allied with the Tatmadaw and conducted joint operations against the AA in Rakhine state.¹⁴⁷ On 19 March 2025, the Bangladeshi police arrested Ataullah Abu Ammar Jununi, the leader of ARSA, on charges including murder, illegal entry, and militant activity, and on 22 April 2025, he was jailed.¹⁴⁸ The organizational structure of ARSA allowed Jununi to be temporarily replaced with the current spokesperson, Maulana Borhan, who is the acting chief in Jununi’s absence.¹⁴⁹

A distressing development reflects the activity of ARSA in the refugee camps in Bangladesh. The group utilises a narrative of being ethno-nationalist liberators of the Rohingya people as a part of a recruitment drive.¹⁵⁰ It is reported that at least as early as April 2025, forced recruitment drives were carried out in the Bangladeshi refugee camps.¹⁵¹

Little information is available concerning the ferocity of fighting between ARSA and the AA. Sporadic clashes between them commenced in 2023.¹⁵² Sporadic low intensity clashes continued throughout the first quarter of 2025.¹⁵³ The AA has launched clearance operations to drive ARSA from the border area in the western Arakan sate. The operations, which began on 14 February 2025, produced fighting that lasted for four days.¹⁵⁴ A clearance operation against ARSA between 1 to 8 April 2025 resulted in the death of forty ARSA fighters.¹⁵⁵ On 16 September 2025, ARSA attacked AA outposts in the northern Maungdaw township. In the aftermath, the AA alleged that Bangladeshi border security (BGB) personnel were actively supporting ARSA and called upon the Bangladeshi government to launch an investigation into the matter and take swift action.¹⁵⁶ In early February 2026, reports emerged about several ARSA fighters infiltrating AA-controlled territory in the Mayu Mountains in southern Maungdaw township by crossing the border with Bangladesh.¹⁵⁷ In mid-2026, the Bangladeshi government announced plans to build a 270-kilometre-long fence along its shared border with Myanmar aimed at strengthening border security.¹⁵⁸

From the limited information available, the violent incidents are akin to law enforcement activities. The AA are essentially policing the territory under their control by employing operations to chase ARSA from the Myanmar territory across the border to Bangladesh. The violence resulting from these operations does not equate to protracted armed violence, and domestic law regulates the evolving situation between ARSA and the AA.

AA accused of massacres against Rohingya in 2024 and deteriorating humanitarian situation in Rakhine state

On 3 and 4 August 2025, Rohingya advocacy groups accused the AA of killing more than 600 Rohingya civilians in Htan Shauk Kan village, Buthidaung township during the AA’s offensive against the Myanmar military on 2 May 2024. The AA had allegedly accused the victims of the massacre of collaborating with the Tatmadaw.¹⁵⁹ The AA denied their responsibility on 11 August 2025, claiming that the remains were those of soldiers killed during fighting, including Rohingya recruits.¹⁶⁰

At the same time, a World Food Programme report revealed the deteriorating humanitarian situation in central Rakhine state citing a significant increase in families not being able to afford basic food needs from thirty-three per cent in December 2024 to fifty-seven per cent in August 2025.¹⁶¹ Similarly, the situation in Cox’s Bazaar, one of the biggest Rohingya refugee camps located on the Bangladeshi side of the shared border with Myanmar’s Rakhine state, has become increasingly tense as of March 2026. Within one year, the number of Rohingya refugees in the camp surged by 179,000.¹⁶²

The nature and shifting alliances of the PDF

Hundreds of armed resistance groups, known as PDFs, emerged in Myanmar following the 2021 coup. The PDF moniker was initially attached to the NUG’s announcement of a ‘People’s Defense Force’, but this label has since evolved into a catch-all term representing the wide variety of new armed formations.¹⁶³ The PDFs are diverse in typology and range from large, autonomous combat forces to local self-defence forces as well as urban guerrilla cells and mobile tactical units. Some PDFs are integrated into EAG command structures, some are aligned with the NUG, while others have evolved into organized armed groups in their own right.¹⁶⁴

PDFs differ greatly in terms of ideology, size, allies, and capabilities.¹⁶⁵ Some mid-to-high-capacity PDFs have imposed parallel governance structures in areas under their control.¹⁶⁶

What the PDFs initially had in common was their mutual opposition to the Tatmadaw. As of June 2026, however, a growing trend saw some PDFs distancing themselves from the NUG and choosing instead to align with EAGs that offer them support and patronage.¹⁶⁷

For purposes of classification, the circumstances relevant to the various PDFs should, therefore, be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

Crack-down on cyber scam operations along Thai-Myanmar border

Since early September 2025, junta authorities have been conducting a rigorous crack-down on multiple online scam centres operating from Kayin state’s Myawaddy township.¹⁶⁸ Myanmar’s military junta claimed that the KNU ethnic armed group benefited from land leases and security feesrelated to the notorious ‘KK Park’ scam compound located along the Thai-Myanmar border in Myawaddy. In a statement issued on 26 October 2025, the KNU categorically denied these allegations.¹⁶⁹ By November 2025, the regime claimed to have destroyed more than 100 buildings at KK Park. Additionally, the Tatmadaw conducted a raid at the Shwe Kokko in Myawaddy township on 20 November 2025, reportedly detaining 346 foreigners. However, reports emerged alleging that resistance groups controlling some of the major scam hubs, such as KK Park, had advance information of planned junta raids, enabling them to remove equipment and relocate workers to other compounds before security forces arrived. In a parallel development, international pressure on the junta to dismantle Myanmar-based cyber scam operations grew, especially from China, Thailand, and the United States.¹⁷⁰ Reports of destructions of infrastructure and arrests at KK Park and Shwe Kokko continued throughout December 2025.¹⁷¹ In mid-February 2026, the junta regime dismissed Lieutenant-General Tun Tun Naung after only two months in office as the chair of the junta’s anti-scam committee for allegedly accepting protection payments from cyber scam syndicates.¹⁷²

Escalation of airstrikes and drone attacks carried out by Myanmar’s military

There has been a notable increase in the Tatmadaw’s reliance on airstrikes and drone warfare in 2025 as compared to 2024. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), the increase is estimated at around thirty per cent, with April 2025 representing the month with the highest number of incidents since the 2021 coup. This shift in operational tactics can partially be attributed to defeats or stalemates on the battlefield and the weakening of ground power which led to the Tatmadaw losing territory, especially during the 3BHA’s Operation 1027¹⁷³. Additionally, changes to command procedures have allowed lower ranking officers to authorize pre-emptive airstrikes, making airpower more flexible. It is, however, not only the regime that relies on such aerial strikes. Resistance groups also increasingly rely on the use of drones in combat. As of late November 2025, Myanmar ranked third globally, after Russia and Ukraine, for the number of recorded armed drone events.¹⁷⁴ The number of airstrikes by the Myanmar military remained high during the first half of 2026.¹⁷⁵

Non-international armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army

Background

The AA was founded in April 2009 in Kachin state on the border of Myanmar and China.¹ Initially, the establishment of AA was supported by the KIA and the two groups often fought alongside each other until the AA refocused its attention on Rakhine state (formerly Arakan state).² The AA fosters the political goal of creating an ‘Arakan Nation’ through the ‘way of Rakhita’ – an ideology encapsulating the national liberation struggle of the people of Arakan and the restoration of the sovereignty of Arakan.³ The AA aims to represent all people living in Rakhine state, which is different from other EAGs that view the struggle explicitly as nationalists, basing the fight exclusively on ethnic lines.⁴

The AA has engaged in a NIAC with the Tatmadaw since 2009.⁵ The intensity of the conflict peaked between 2018 and 12 November 2020, when a ceasefire agreement was reached.⁶ Fighting between the Tatmadaw and the AA reignited on 5 July 2022 and intensified in August 2022, ending the existing ceasefire.⁷ Another humanitarian ceasefire agreement was reached on 2 November 2022.⁸ Fighting resumed again in 2023 with Operation 1027 (see above).⁹

Intensity

The Myanmar Peace Monitor has documented a total of 855 clash days between the AA and the Tatmadaw in the period between January 2020 and June 2026.¹⁰ Specifically, a total of 191 conflict events occurred between the Tatmadaw and the AA between January 2025 and May 2026.¹¹

The Tatmadaw has, on various occasions, employed heavy weaponry as well as other military tactics such as drone strikes and other forms of aerial strikes against the AA.¹² The AA’s communications and military tactics are sophisticated. This prompted the NLD to make an unparalleled demand to all mobile service providers in 2019 to prevent internet services in nine townships with a high AA presence, leading to the world’s longest internet blackout, lasting one and half years.¹³ In clashes with the Tatmadaw, the AA has captured sophisticated heavy military weapons including tank destroyers and 105mm M101 howitzers.¹⁴ The AA retains consolidated control over mainland Rakhine,¹⁵ and, as of May 2026, had captured and maintained control of multiple Tatmadaw bases along the borders of Rakhine, Magway, Bago, and Ayeyarwady.¹⁶

In March 2025, OCHA reported the resumption of the conflict in Rakhine between the AA and Tatmadaw.¹⁷ On various occasions, the United Nations has expressed concern over this situation. On 28 February 2025, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, expressed his ‘deep concern’ over the escalation of violence in the region.¹⁸ Since this resumption of fighting, clashes continued escalating and in response to the increased intensity of these confrontations, the Tatmadaw repositioned its forces from existing military bases including Dhanyawady Naval Headquarters, Battalion 32, Infantry Battalion 542, and Infantry Battalion 543, in order to create a defensive posture enabling the deployment of approximately seventy soldiers in areas where the AA was active, such as Kyaukphyu. The Tatmadaw also restocked its bases for increased combat readiness.¹⁹

Clashes between the AA and Tatmadaw were frequent throughout 2025 including those reported during May,²⁰ June,²¹ July,²² September,²³ October,²⁴ November,²⁵ and December 2025.²⁶ Clashes continued in 2026, including in January,²⁷ February,²⁸ March,²⁹ April,³⁰May,³¹ and June.³²

Significant clashes between the AA and Tatmadaw occurred during May 2025. The AA and Tatmadaw have increasingly clashed in the vicinity of Kyaukphyu township in Rakhine state, due to increased movement by the AA. The Chinese government has vested interests in Kyaukphyu as China has oil and gas pipelines in this township (see above). Consequently, increased movement of AA fighters in this part of Myanmar triggered a coordinated response by the Myanmar military, including the deployment of defensive aerial drone strikes by the Tatmadaw from Yangon and the Dhanyawady Naval Base. On 11 May 2025, Tatmadaw ground forces moved towards Laek Khamaw and Malakyun villages where they were ambushed by the AA.³³ On 19 May 2025, the AA managed to overtake a military outpost in Mindat Taung village. On 22 May 2025, the Tatmadaw responded through aerial bombardment, employing fighter jets as well as (suspected) Russian and Chinese supplied drones and paramotors.³⁴ On 25 May 2025, AA snipers killed five soldiers. The AA also managed to detain soldiers after successfully overtaking the Hnanpe Taung military outpost in Kyaukphyu.³⁵ The May 2025 clashes led to civilian casualties and injuries, and an increase in IDP numbers.³⁶

During June 2025, the AA made territorial gains of about five kilometres during its advance on Kyaukphyu township. The Tatmadaw continued to direct aerial bombardment at AA strongholds in this area.³⁷ It is reported that the AA killed several soldiers during clashes throughout June 2025. Notably, an intense clash on 11 June 2025 between the AA and the military in Pyaing Say Kay village in Kyaukpyu township, killed a large number of soldiers. Exact numbers were not made public.³⁸ These clashes triggered more internal displacement of villagers living in or near the Kyaukphyu township.³⁹ During July 2025, the Tatmadaw increased its aerial campaign against the AA, and it was reported that the nature of military explosives employed by the Tatmadaw was of a higher military grade by then.⁴⁰

The Tatmadaw launched military operations against the AA on the Rakhine state border by simultaneously attacking from three different directions during September 2025. The purpose of these military operations was to push the AA back into the western States. The AA was victorious following battles in the Sum Tat Village in Magwe’s Ngape township, forcing the Tatmadaw to retreat.⁴¹ The AA claimed to have killed ‘dozens’ of soldiers during clashes on 7 September 2025 in the hills of Ngape township in Magway region.⁴² News outlets report that the AA claims more specific numbers, namely up to seventy soldiers killed, following the two counteroffensives at Sum Tat Village.⁴³ The AA also benefited from military weaponry and equipment left as the soldiers fled after their defeat. The Tatmadaw deployed more than 1,500 soldiers (mostly conscripts) in Bago Region in an attempt to retake areas under AA control. The third direction from which the Tatmadaw attacked the AA was Ayeyarwady’s Lemyethna township, which triggered frequent clashes between the enemies.⁴⁴

September 2025 attacks had a significant civilian death toll. Governmental aerial strikes launched between 11 and 12 September 2025 in Thayet Thapin village in Kyaukphyu township killed at least nineteen civilian students and left approximately twenty students injured.⁴⁵ The Tatmadaw made some gains in Kyaukphyu as part of the September 2025 military campaign against the AA as it recaptured an electrical substation previously held by the AA.⁴⁶

During October 2025, the AA encircled the Tatmadaw’s strategic Nat Ye Kan mountain base in Ngape township, Magway Region. In response, the Tatmadaw air force employed aerial bombardment to prevent the AA from taking over this base. Reports suggest that the base had fallen into the hands of the AA, but as of 15 October 2025, this was being refuted by locals.⁴⁷ The military advantage of seizing the Nat Ye Kan base for the AA is that it serves as a major artillery and air defence hub for the junta.⁴⁸ Between 14 and 23 October 2025, the AA managed to secure all of the Tatmadaw’s remaining defensive positions around the Nat Ye Kan mountain base.⁴⁹ Clashes leading up to this were severe and continuous.⁵⁰

Clashes continued throughout November 2025. Of significance were strategic ambushes by the AA in Thaing Chaung and Min Pyin which led to the AA regaining territories briefly held by the Tatmadaw. The government used aerial support, including heavy artillery strikes, to assist its soldiers in retreating from these positions as intensive fighting continued between the AA and Tatmadaw.⁵¹ Government airstrikes were reported as consistent and almost daily during November 2025 which, together with ground clashes, further increased the internal displacement figures in this region.⁵²

Strategic attacks by the AA against government outposts, namely outposts safeguarding the Thaing Chaung Dam and the Min Pyin weather radar station in Kyaukphyu township in Rakhine state, occurred in early December 2025. Capturing these outposts holds a potential significant military advantage in that they are the central military observance points for the Thain Chaung Dam.⁵³ Aerial bombardment by drones and coordinated artillery strikes by the AA against the Tatmadaw were reported during December 2025 and January 2026, showing how the use of technology in the hands of this non-State actor is escalating violence in the Rakhine region. Barracks at the Dhanyawady Navy base were hit, causing extensive structural damage and leaving many soldiers injured.⁵⁴

The period from January to June 2026 saw a continued escalation in fighting between the AA and the Tatmadaw. During January 2026, the AA specifically targeted two outposts as part of its campaign to control the regional military base in Rakhine state.⁵⁵ Attacks by the AA towards these outposts servicing the military headquarters (Dakasa) located in Sittwe in Rakhine state were so severe that by 12 January 2026 at least forty-nine soldiers, including from the Tatmadaw’s elite combat units, had deserted their positions.⁵⁶ The Tatmadaw responded through indiscriminate aerial bombardment which killed at least twenty-one people and left approximately thirty people injured. These numbers include detained Tatmadaw soldiers.⁵⁷ The Tatmadaw continued its aerial campaign, dominated by drone strikes, in Rakhine state throughout February⁵⁸ and March 2026.⁵⁹ The impactful attacks launched by the AA up to February 2026 saw the Tatmadaw send additional forces to the south of Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine state, in early February 2026.⁶⁰ Four hundred soldiers were deployed to a government military post in Kyaukphyu township.⁶¹ Intensive fighting towards this military post in Sittwe continued to escalate throughout March,⁶² April,⁶³ May,⁶⁴ and June 2026.⁶⁵ This includes the Tatmadaw’s use of aerial bombardment in support of their soldiers still manning this base.⁶⁶ Owing to the gains made by the AA during this period, the Tatmadaw tried to send reinforcements, but the AA ambushed these soldiers on 23 March 2026⁶⁷ and again ambushed Tatmadaw reinforcements coming from the direction of Sane Town on 10 May 2026.⁶⁸ The ongoing protracted armed violence throughout March 2026 led to the increase of IDPs from Sittwe.⁶⁹

The AA continues to increase its geographic footprint. It was reported that by mid-2026, the AA controlled fourteen of the seventeen townships in Rakhine state as well as Paletwa township in Chin state bordering India.⁷⁰ Territorial control remains contested between the AA and the Tatmadaw in Sittwe in Kyaukpyu (which hosts strategic Chinese infrastructure projects), and the small island township of Man Aung. The AA exercises control over the totality of Myanmar’s border with Bangladesh and an almost 740-kilometre-long stretch of coastline.⁷¹ The AA implements governance structures in areas under its control and divides its territorial jurisdiction into three military regions referred to as Alpha, Victor, and Nova, each comprising three to four subunits.⁷²

Territorial control by a non-State actor indicates that the threshold of protracted armed violence is met.⁷³

Clearly, the conflict situation between the AA and the Tatmadaw continues to satisfy the notion of protracted armed violence.

Organization

The AA has a sophisticated command structure. The AA has a political and a military wing, the latter estimated to have between 15,000⁷⁴ and 40,000 fighters.⁷⁵ High-level decisions are reportedly made by the top five leaders of the political and military wings.⁷⁶ Twan Mrat Naing is the leader of the ULA and Commander-in-Chief of the AA military wing.⁷⁷ Brigadier-General Nyo Twan Awng is the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the United League of Arakan, which is the political wing of the movement, and the Vice Commander-in Chief of the AA.⁷⁸ The leadership of the AA is described as ‘young’, ‘educated’, and able to evolve.⁷⁹ It also incorporates the experiences of an older generation of the Rakhine revolutionary movement.⁸⁰

The military wing of the AA is structured in nine military regional commands to achieve greater coordination and efficiency in executing operations against the Tatmadaw. These military regional commands are directed by colonels and lieutenant-colonels and are supervised by a war office at a secret location, where Twan Mrat Naing and his deputy, Brigadier-General Dr Nyo Twan Aung, are assisted by a group of senior officers. ⁸¹ This sophisticated command structure allows for the structured training of fighters belonging to the AA and thus the AA possesses the ability to comply with IHL. The AA is considered ‘well-trained’.⁸²

There is strict military discipline in the regional command divisions.⁸³ Supplementary to internal disciplinary measures in place, the political wing, the United League of Arakan, has created an administrative and justice system⁸⁴ which supports people in Rakhine state who report criminal incidents.⁸⁵

Initially, the AA employed a mix of guerilla warfare and conventional assaults in its approach to operations against the Tatmadaw.⁸⁶

The AA’s strategic military tactics have been successful and enable it to control trade routes along the Myanmar-Bangladesh border, cutting off key supply lines for the Tatmadaw.⁸⁷ The military tactics and operations employed by the AA in Rakhine state since November 2023 enabled them to make successive territorial gains. By mid-June 2025, it was reported that the AA controlled a number of important former Tatmadaw military bases and fourteen of Rakhine’s seventeen townships (see above).⁸⁸ During October 2025, the AA employed siege warfare tactics to attempt to force soldiers to surrender and hand over the Tatmadaw’s strategic Nat Ye Kan mountain base in Ngape township in Magway region. Siege tactics included encirclement as well as cutting all supply chains and communication to and from this base.⁸⁹ As the Nat Ye Kan mountain base is a major weapons and ammunition supply hub, soldiers had access to ammunition but were cut off from food. In starving the soldiers, the siege resulted in their decision to surrender.⁹⁰ In January 2026, the AA showcased its use of technology as part of its military tactics when it synchronized artillery and aerial bombardment by drone in its battle with the Tatmadaw for the Dhanyawady Navy base in Rakhine state.⁹¹ It is clear that the AA has evolved significantly from the guerilla tactics employed between 2023 and mid-2025.⁹²

Further tactics the AA employs include building and fostering alliances with other EAGs in the region through, e.g. the Northern Alliance, the Federal Political Negotiation and Coordination Committee.⁹³ The AA’s military tactics are considered so successful that it often provides training to resistance forces as well as technical advice to its allies.⁹⁴

The AA is successful in its recruiting initiatives P. Pearson, ‘Arakan Army’, Modern Insurgent, 10 April 2025 and has not engaged in forced recruitment practices.⁹⁵ The AA benefits from a reliance on its allies to source small arms and procure larger equipment, such as artillery and armoured vehicles through their successful clashes with the Tatmadaw.⁹⁶The UWSA is an important logistical partner of the AA and often provides it with arms and other military equipment.⁹⁷ While initially funding its activities through donations and support from allied EAGs, the AA now has established tax collection and allegedly the movement of illicit drugs into Bangladesh (which the AA denies) as new revenue streams. The group also maintains a close trading relationship with India.⁹⁸

The AA is sophisticated in its approach to communication with the outside world.⁹⁹

The AA has an official spokesperson who was, as of mid-2026, Khaing Thu Kha.¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, the AA has its own website where it posts press releases.¹⁰¹

As of the end-June 2026, the AA remained sufficiently organized to constitute an organized armed group under IHL.

1
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023. ↩︎
2
P. Pearson, ‘Arakan Army’, Modern Insurgent, 10 April 2025; See ‘Breaking Away: The Battle for Myanmar’s Rakhine State’, International Crisis Group, 27 August 2024. ↩︎
3
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023; J. T. Davies and H. Oung, ‘Decentralisation by Force: The United League of Arakan/ Arakan Army’s Expansion in Western Myanmar’, Australian National University: ANU Myanmar Research Centre, 16 March 2026. ↩︎
4
P. Pearson, ‘Arakan Army’, Modern Insurgent, 10 April 2025. ↩︎
5
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023. ↩︎
6
S. Strangio, ‘Ceasefire Raises Hopes of Elections in Myanmar’s Rakhine State’, The Diplomat, 7 December 2020. ↩︎
7
‘Six AA Fighters Killed as Myanmar Regime Bombs Outpost in Karen State’, The Irrawaddy, 5 July 2022. ↩︎
8
‘Breaking Away: The Battle for Myanmar’s Rakhine State’, International Crisis Group, 27 August 2024; ‘Informal ceasefire with Myanmar military ‘not permanent’ solution, Arakan Army says’, Myanmar Now, 28 November 2022. ↩︎
9
United League of Arakan/Arakha Army – ULA/AA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024. ↩︎
10
‘Numbers Behind Myanmar’s Conflicts’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 25 June 2026. ↩︎
11
‘The Arakan Army and the Quest for Total Control of Arakan State: How Close?’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 8 June 2026. ↩︎
12
United League of Arakan/Arakha Army – ULA/AA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024. ↩︎
13
S. Long, ‘Rakhine: a precarious ceasefire hangs in the balance’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 26 July 2022. ↩︎
14
War Noir, X, 27 December 2024. ↩︎
15
M. Martin, ‘Arakan Army Posed to “Liberate” Myanmar’s Rakhine State’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 20 February 2025; ‘The State of Myanmar: ISP-Myanmar’s Annual Strategic Review and Foresight 2025-2026’, ISP Myanmar, January 2026 ↩︎
16
L. Thit, ‘Arakan Army Advances to Edge of Sittwe as Fighting Intensifies’, The Irrawaddy, 2 March 2026; L. Thit, ‘Arakan Army Surrounds Myanmar’s Western Naval Bases, Sparking Intense Battles’, The Irrawaddy, 2 June 2026. ↩︎
17
‘Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 45’, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 28 March 2025. ↩︎
18
‘UN rights chief concerned over escalating violence in Myanmar’s Rakhine’, Kuwait News Agency, 28 February 2025. ↩︎
19
‘Kyaukphyu Conflict Escalates Daily’, Burma News International, 13 May 2025. ↩︎
20
‘Kyaukphyu Conflict Escalates Daily’, Burma News International, 13 May 2025; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, May 2025; ‘Three, including a woman, injured in Kyaukphyu airstrikes by the junta’, Burma News International, 26 May 2025 ↩︎
21
L. Thit, ‘Myanmar Junta Reinforces Kyaukphyu as AA Nears China-Backed SEZ Hub’, The Irrawaddy, 11 June 2025; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, June 2025 ↩︎
22
‘Kyaukphyu battle resumes in three locations after week-long standoff’, Burma News International, 11 July 2025 ↩︎
23
‘Air strike on two Myanmar schools: 500-pound bombs dropped as students slept in Rakhine; 19 killed’, The Times of India, 13 September 2025; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, September 2025; ‘Rakhine Rebels Harried on Three Fronts by Myanmar Junta Assaults’, Irrawaddy, 6 September 2025 ↩︎
24
L. Thit, ‘Arakan Army Tightens Siege on Hill Base Guarding Myanmar Junta Arms Plant’, The Irrawaddy, 15 October 2025; ‘AA surrounds Nat Ye Kan base in Magway Region, cutting off all supply routes to junta troops’, Burma News International, 15 October 2025 ↩︎
25
L. Thit, ‘30 Junta Soldiers Reported Dead in AA Ambush in Rakhine’, The Irrawaddy, 17 November 2025 ↩︎
26
‘Analysts warn of escalation in Rakhine State as regime forces advance westward’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 5 December 2025; ‘AA reportedly seizes outposts in Kyaukphyu’, Burma News International, 3 December 2025. ↩︎
27
‘Analysts warn of escalation in Rakhine State as regime forces advance westward’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 5 December 2025; ‘AA drones, heavy weaponry simultaneously attack Dhanyawaddy Naval Base, Police Battalion 32, located in Kyaukphyu, leading to casualties, collapsed barracks’, Burma News International, 9 January 2026; T. New, ‘AA assaults two outposts defending regional military headquarters, Dakasa, in Sittwe’, NarinJara, 8 January 2026; ‘Arakan Army captures two forward outposts of junta’s regional command in Sittwe’, Development Media Group, 10 January 2026; ‘Dozens of Myanmar junta troops desert as Arakan Army encircles Rakhine State capital’, Mizzima, 21 January 2026; ‘The Junta Turns on Its Own: Airstrikes on POW Detention Camps’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 20 March 2026 ↩︎
28
‘Junta Drone Strikes Continue to Rise Across Myanmar’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 6 March 2026; ‘Arakan OSINT Situation Brief – February 2026’, Bangladesh Defence Journal, 11 March 2026 ↩︎
29
‘The Junta Turns on Its Own: Airstrikes on POW Detention Camps’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 20 March 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, March 2026; ‘500 locals flee after junta bombs AA PoW detention center in Ann Township’, Burma News International, 12 March 2026 ↩︎
30
‘Intense battles erupted in Sittwe as AA fighters target junta headquarters’, Myanmar (CRPH) Support Group, 11 April 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, April 2026 ↩︎
31
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, May 2026; ‘Arakan OSINT Situation Brief – May 2026’, Bangladesh Defence Journal, 10 June 2026; ‘Kyaukphyu Conflict Escalates Daily’, Burma News International, 13 May 2025 ↩︎
32
L. Thit, ‘Arakan Army Surrounds Myanmar’s Western Naval Bases, Sparking Intense Battles’, The Irrawaddy, 2 June 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, June 2026. ↩︎
33
‘Kyaukphyu Conflict Escalates Daily’, Burma News International, 13 May 2025. ↩︎
34
‘Three, including a woman, injured in Kyaukphyu airstrikes by the junta’, Burma News International, 26 May 2025. ↩︎
35
‘Arakan Army detains regime troops in Kyaukphyu Township of Rakhine State’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 1 June 2025. ↩︎
36
‘Three, including a woman, injured in Kyaukphyu airstrikes by the junta’, Burma News International, 26 May 2025. ↩︎
37
L. Thit, ‘Myanmar Junta Reinforces Kyaukphyu as AA Nears China-Backed SEZ Hub’, The Irrawaddy, 11 June 2025. ↩︎
38
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, June 2025. ↩︎
39
L. Thit, ‘Myanmar Junta Reinforces Kyaukphyu as AA Nears China-Backed SEZ Hub’, The Irrawaddy, 11 June 2025. ↩︎
40
‘Kyaukphyu battle resumes in three locations after week-long standoff’, Burma News International, 11 July 2025; ‘Air strike on two Myanmar schools: 500-pound bombs dropped as students slept in Rakhine; 19 killed’, The Times of India, 13 September 2025. ↩︎
41
‘Rakhine Rebels Harried on Three Fronts by Myanmar Junta Assaults’, Irrawaddy, 6 September 2025. ↩︎
42
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, September 2025. ↩︎
43
M. Pyae, ‘AA Repels Myanmar Junta Counteroffensive Near Magwe-Rakhine Border’, The Irrawaddy, 11 September 2025. ↩︎
44
‘Rakhine Rebels Harried on Three Fronts by Myanmar Junta Assaults’, Irrawaddy, 6 September 2025. ↩︎
45
‘Air strike on two Myanmar schools: 500-pound bombs dropped as students slept in Rakhine; 19 killed’, The Times of India, 13 September 2025; ‘Military airstrike on schools in western Myanmar kills at least 18 people, most of them students’, Associated Press, 12 September 2025; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, September 2025. ↩︎
46
‘Rakhine Rebels Harried on Three Fronts by Myanmar Junta Assaults’, Irrawaddy, 6 September 2025. ↩︎
47
‘AA surrounds Nat Ye Kan base in Magway Region, cutting off all supply routes to junta troops’, Burma News International, 15 October 2025; L. Thit, ‘Arakan Army Tightens Siege on Hill Base Guarding Myanmar Junta Arms Plant’, The Irrawaddy, 15 October 2025. ↩︎
48
L. Thit, ‘Arakan Army Tightens Siege on Hill Base Guarding Myanmar Junta Arms Plant’, The Irrawaddy, 15 October 2025. ↩︎
49
K. L. Hla, ‘AA issues statement regarding capture of Point 666 hill near Bagan Gway village in Padaung Township’, NarinJara, 16 October 2025; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, October 2025; ‘Arakan Army captures key junta tactical base in Padaung Twsp’, Development Media Group, 30 January 2026. ↩︎
50
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, October 2025. ↩︎
51
‘AA recaptures some military-occupied areas in Kyaukphyu amid intense combat’, Myanmar (CRPH) Support Group, 21 November 2025. ↩︎
52
L. Thit, ‘30 Junta Soldiers Reported Dead in AA Ambush in Rakhine’, The Irrawaddy, 17 November 2025. ↩︎
53
‘AA reportedly seizes outposts in Kyaukphyu’, Burma News International, 3 December 2025; ‘Analysts warn of escalation in Rakhine State as regime forces advance westward’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 5 December 2025. ↩︎
54
‘Analysts warn of escalation in Rakhine State as regime forces advance westward’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 5 December 2025. ↩︎
55
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, January 2026; ‘Arakan Army captures two forward outposts of junta’s regional command in Sittwe’, Development Media Group, 10 January 2026; ‘Dozens of Myanmar junta troops desert as Arakan Army encircles Rakhine State capital’, Mizzima, 21 January 2026. ↩︎
56
‘Dozens of Myanmar junta troops desert as Arakan Army encircles Rakhine State capital’, Mizzima, 21 January 2026; T. New, ‘AA assaults two outposts defending regional military headquarters, Dakasa, in Sittwe’, NarinJara, 8 January 2026. ↩︎
57
‘Junta airstrike kills its own troops and families detained by AA in Kyauktaw’, Burma News International, 23 January 2026; ‘Junta airstrike kills 21 POWs, family members at Kyauktaw detention centre’, Development Media Group, 21 January 2026; ‘The Junta Turns on Its Own: Airstrikes on POW Detention Camps’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 20 March 2026. ↩︎
58
‘Arakan OSINT Situation Brief – February 2026’, Bangladesh Defence Journal, 11 March 2026; B. K. Gokmen, ‘Airstrikes kill at least 26 civilians in Myanmar’s Arakan, Sagaing regions’, AA, 25 February 2026 ↩︎
59
‘Junta Drone Strikes Continue to Rise Across Myanmar’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 6 March 2026. ↩︎
60
‘Arakan Army attacks regime forces in Rakhine State, Bago and Magway regions’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 2 February 2026; ‘Fighting for control of Kyaukphyu intensifies’, Development Media Group, 8 January 2026. ↩︎
61
‘Arakan Army attacks regime forces in Rakhine State, Bago and Magway regions’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 2 February 2026. ↩︎
62
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, March 2026 ↩︎
63
‘Intense battles erupted in Sittwe as AA fighters target junta headquarters’, Myanmar (CRPH) Support Group, 11 April 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, April 2026 ↩︎
64
‘Arakan OSINT Situation Brief – May 2026’, Bangladesh Defence Journal, 10 June 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, May 2026; ‘Kyaukphyu Conflict Escalates Daily’, Burma News International, 13 May 2025 ↩︎
65
L. Thit, ‘Arakan Army Surrounds Myanmar’s Western Naval Bases, Sparking Intense Battles’, The Irrawaddy, 2 June 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, June 2026. ↩︎
66
‘Fierce fighting erupts across Sittwe; residents urged to remain on high alert’, Development Media Group, 7 March 2026; L. Thit, ‘AA Tightens Noose in Battle for Rakhine Capital Sittwe’, The Irrawaddy, 12 March 2026; ‘Fighting escalates near Sittwe as Arakan Army attacks regime positions’, Development Media Group, 28 March 2026; ‘Junta’s push toward Natyaekan base triggers fierce clashes’, Burma News International, 11 March 2026; L. Thit, ‘Arakan Army Advances to Edge of Sittwe as Fighting Intensifies’, The Irrawaddy, 2 March 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, March 2026. ↩︎
67
‘Junta reinforcement convoy to Nat Yay Kan base ambushed; officers among casualties’, Development Media Group, 25 March 2026 ↩︎
68
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, May 2026. ↩︎
69
‘500 locals flee after junta bombs AA PoW detention center in Ann Township’, Burma News International, 12 March 2026. ↩︎
70
‘Rakhine Rebels Harried on Three Fronts by Myanmar Junta Assaults’, Irrawaddy, 6 September 2025. ↩︎
71
J. T. Davies and H. Oung, ‘Decentralisation by Force: The United League of Arakan/ Arakan Army’s Expansion in Western Myanmar’, Australian National University: ANU Myanmar Research Centre, 16 March 2026; S. Mon, ‘From state to nation: The Arakan Army’s ascent in post-coup Myanmar’, ACLED, 31 October 2025; ‘The Arakan Army and the Quest for Total Control of Arakan State: How Close?’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 8 June 2026. ↩︎
72
J. T. Davies and H. Oung, ‘Decentralisation by Force: The United League of Arakan/ Arakan Army’s Expansion in Western Myanmar’, Australian National University: ANU Myanmar Research Centre, 16 March 2026. ↩︎
73
ICC, ‘The Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda’, Judgement, Trial Chamber VI, 8 July 2019, para 717; ICC, ‘The Prosecutor v Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi’, Judgment and Sentence, Trial Chamber VIII, 27 September 2016, para 49; ‘Rakhine Rebels Harried on Three Fronts by Myanmar Junta Assaults’, Irrawaddy, 6 September 2025. ↩︎
74
P. Pearson, ‘Arakan Army’, Modern Insurgent, 10 April 2025 ↩︎
75
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023; B. Lintner, ‘Rebel yell: Arakan Army leader speaks to Asia Times’, Asia Times, 18 January 2022; J. T. Davies and H. Oung, ‘Decentralisation by Force: The United League of Arakan/ Arakan Army’s Expansion in Western Myanmar’, Australian National University: ANU Myanmar Research Centre, 16 March 2026. ↩︎
76
J. T. Davies and H. Oung, ‘Decentralisation by Force: The United League of Arakan/ Arakan Army’s Expansion in Western Myanmar’, Australian National University: ANU Myanmar Research Centre, 16 March 2026. ↩︎
77
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023; B. Lintner, ‘Rebel yell: Arakan Army leader speaks to Asia Times’, Asia Times, 18 January 2022; P. Pearson, ‘Arakan Army’, Modern Insurgent, 10 April 2025; J. T. Davies and H. Oung, ‘Decentralisation by Force: The United League of Arakan/ Arakan Army’s Expansion in Western Myanmar’, Australian National University: ANU Myanmar Research Centre, 16 March 2026. ↩︎
78
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023. ↩︎
79
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023. ↩︎
80
United League of Arakan/ Arakha Army – ULA/AA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024. ↩︎
81
R. Bhattacharyya, ‘5 Factors That Catapulted Arakan Army to Unprecedented Success Against the Myanmar Military’, The Diplomat, 28 December 2024. ↩︎
82
‘Military airstrike on schools in western Myanmar kills at least 18 people, most of them students’, Associated Press, 12 September 2025. ↩︎
83
R. Bhattacharyya, ‘5 Factors That Catapulted Arakan Army to Unprecedented Success Against the Myanmar Military’, The Diplomat, 28 December 2024. ↩︎
84
‘Breaking Away: The Battle for Myanmar’s Rakhine State’, International Crisis Group, 27 August 2024; J. T. Davies and H. Oung, ‘Decentralisation by Force: The United League of Arakan/ Arakan Army’s Expansion in Western Myanmar’, Australian National University: ANU Myanmar Research Centre, 16 March 2026 ↩︎
85
‘The Arakan Army’s Journey: From Rebels to Rulers and A New Arakan Paradigm’, Centre for Arakan Studies, 2 July 2024. ↩︎
86
‘The Arakan Army’s Journey: From Rebels to Rulers and A New Arakan Paradigm’, Centre for Arakan Studies, 2 July 2024; J. P. Leider, ‘The Arakan Army, Rakhine State and the Promise of Arakan’s Independence’, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher Policy Brief Series 128, 2022. ↩︎
87
P. Pearson, ‘Arakan Army’, Modern Insurgent, 10 April 2025. ↩︎
88
‘Military airstrike on schools in western Myanmar kills at least 18 people, most of them students’, Associated Press, 12 September 2025. ↩︎
89
‘AA surrounds Nat Ye Kan base in Magway Region, cutting off all supply routes to junta troops’, Burma News International, 15 October 2025. ↩︎
90
‘AA surrounds Nat Ye Kan base in Magway Region, cutting off all supply routes to junta troops’, Burma News International, 15 October 2025. ↩︎
91
‘AA drones, heavy weaponry simultaneously attack Dhanyawaddy Naval Base, Police Battalion 32, located in Kyaukphyu, leading to casualties, collapsed barracks’, Burma News International, 9 January 2026. ↩︎
92
P. T. Aung, ‘AA vows to take all of Rakhine State by end of next year’, Myanmar Now, 13 April 2026 ↩︎
93
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023; ‘The Arakan Army’s Journey: From Rebels to Rulers and A New Arakan Paradigm’, Centre for Arakan Studies, 2 July 2024 and the 3BHA. ‘Breaking Away: The Battle for Myanmar’s Rakhine State’, International Crisis Group, 27 August 2024; J. T. Davies and H. Oung, ‘Decentralisation by Force: The United League of Arakan/ Arakan Army’s Expansion in Western Myanmar’, Australian National University: ANU Myanmar Research Centre, 16 March 2026. ↩︎
94
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023. ↩︎
95
R. Bhattacharyya, ‘5 Factors That Catapulted Arakan Army to Unprecedented Success Against the Myanmar Military’, The Diplomat, 28 December 2024. ↩︎
96
P. Pearson, ‘Arakan Army’, Modern Insurgent, 10 April 2025. ↩︎
97
S. Ramachandran, ‘The Arakan Army and Tatmadaw’s Tenuous Truces in Myanmar’s Rakhine State’, The Jamestown Foundation, 16 December 2022; ‘The rapid rise of the Arakan Army’, Mizzima, 21 July 2022. ↩︎
98
J. T. Davies and H. Oung, ‘Decentralisation by Force: The United League of Arakan/ Arakan Army’s Expansion in Western Myanmar’, Australian National University: ANU Myanmar Research Centre, 16 March 2026; L. H. Naing, ‘ULA/AA: Junta’s claim linking captured drugs with AA is utterly unfounded and purely a political smear’, NarinJara, 20 March 2025. ↩︎
99
P. T. Aung, ‘AA vows to take all of Rakhine State by end of next year’, Myanmar Now, 13 April 2026; J. T. Davies and H. Oung, ‘Decentralisation by Force: The United League of Arakan/ Arakan Army’s Expansion in Western Myanmar’, Australian National University: ANU Myanmar Research Centre, 16 March 2026. ↩︎
100
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023; ‘The Arakan Army’s Journey: From Rebels to Rulers and A New Arakan Paradigm’, Centre for Arakan Studies, 2 July 2024. ↩︎
101
‘ULA/AA Press-Briefing’, Arakan Army. ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Chin National Defense Force (CNDF)

Background

The CNDF is an EAG and the armed wing of the Chin National Organization (CNO), which emerged in 2021 as a civilian response to the coup. ¹ An ethnolinguistic diverse group, the Chin are indigenous to Chin state in western Myanmar.² The Chin response to the Tatmadaw is fragmented – there are two Chin factions. The first is led by the Chin National Front (CNF), an EAG established in 1988, and its allies. The second is the Chin Brotherhood which, as of June 2026, is made up of six resistance groups including the CNDF. The cause of fragmentation among the Chin is based on different approaches to governance of the Chin people.³ Despite various unification attempts, ⁴ there is tension between the two factions, which includes sporadic clashes that have the potential to escalate to the level of NIAC.⁵

Intensity

The CNDF continues to suffer heavy losses in their fighting against the Tatmadaw. A memorial of fallen soldiers is installed at its headquarters in western Myanmar. An honour roll displays the names of eighty fallen fighters killed during May 2021. Airstrikes in November 2024 caused fifty casualties among the CNDF and its allies.⁶ The CNDF did make territorial gains during 2025 as it managed to capture the last junta base in Chin State Town in early April 2025. Consequently, the Chin Brotherhood has full control over the town of Falam in Northern Chin state.⁷ The Myanmar military launched an offensive in Chin state in October 2025 which eventually led to the recapture of Taingen village from the Chin Brotherhood on 9 November 2025. Between 29 October and 7 November 2025, fierce fighting between the junta forces comprising about 400 soldiers and the Chin Brotherhood occurred daily. The fighting led to about forty Tatmadaw soldiers being killed in combat. By 11 November 2025, more than 2,000 residents of the town had to flee their homes due to the armed clashes between regime and Chin resistance forces.⁸ As a part of the same broader campaign, the Tatmadaw launched another offensive against the Chin Brotherhood Alliance (including the CNDF) in October 2025, which involved ground offensives, intense airstrikes, and sustained artillery shelling. The offensive lasted for about six months and culminated in the recapture of Falam town by the Myanmar military on 25 April 2026, which the Chin Brotherhood Alliance had previously controlled for about a year. Shortages in ammunition supplies were cited as one of the main reasons for the resistance forces’ loss of Falam. During the six-month-long operation, a minimum of 109 armed clashes took place between both sides according to the Tatmadaw. In the days following the recapture of Falam, clashes continued in surrounding villages. The months-long fighting reportedly led to both sides suffering ‘significant casualties’.⁹

The CNDF has similar combat capabilities to the Tatmadaw, including man-portable air-defence systems, shoulder-fired anti-tank launchers, and 40mm grenade launchers. These similarities stem from the fact that the CNDF’s weaponry is primarily comprised of captured weapons. But it also relies on locally produced rifles.¹⁰ The Tatmadaw mostly responds through aerial bombardment of the CNDF and its allies.¹¹

It is clear that the intensity of fighting between the CNDF and Tatmadaw equates to protracted armed violence.

Organization

The CNDF has a sophisticated organizational structure. It is reported that the CNDF is made up of ten battalions divided into four brigades.¹² The CNDF’s headquarters are located at Camp Rihli, roughly fifty kilometres south of Rihkhawdar near the India-Myanmar border.¹³ Peter Thang has been reported as either holding the position of deputy chairman or chief of staff, ¹⁴ and Olivia Thawng Luai is the group’s defence secretary.¹⁵ The names of other high-ranking officials are not in the public domain.

The nature of the organizational structure of the CNDF should facilitate the ability to implement IHL and for the commanders to discipline fighters who are non-compliant. Additionally, CNDF fighters have to complete two months of training prior to deployment.¹⁶ Such a training curriculum could be used as a vehicle to implement IHL.

The CNDF employ guerrilla tactics such as ambush tactics and hit-and-run attacks as part of its military strategy. The CNDF strategically designs military operations based on the terrain from where operations are launched. Thus, for example, attacks will differ if launched from dense jungles versus urban settings.¹⁷ Part of the CNDF’s military tactics includes keeping their geographic locations secret in order to maximize the effectiveness of surprise attacks or minimize the risk of aerial bombardments.¹⁸ Finally, military tactics include forming alliances for the purposes of launching joint operations against the Tatmadaw. Allies include the CDF, the CNF and certain PDFs. The CNO and CNDF are a part of the Chin Brotherhood.¹⁹

Territorial control provides the CNDF with greater logistical capacity. Coordination and co-operation with allies such as the AA who also control townships further promotes its logistics.²⁰ The CNDF has had success as of June 2024 with recruitment drives through conscription from Chin state and the neighbouring Sagaing region.²¹ The CNDF manages to source military equipment (including helmets, ammunition, and uniforms) from its allies as well as from ambushes.²² The CNDF also raises funds from international private donors, ²³ and through collecting taxes from its community.²⁴

Finally, the CNDF has its own spokesperson, Salai Timmy, which enables this armed group to speak with a unified voice. ²⁵ It also has an official website which is managed by its Information and Public Relations Department.²⁶

The CNDF is sufficiently organized to constitute an organized armed group under IHL.

1
L. Lovett, ‘‘Inch by inch’: Myanmar rebels close in on key military base in Chin State’, Al Jazeera, 15 March 2025. ↩︎
2
E. Berridge, ‘Chin National Defense Force’, Modern Insurgent, 19 February 2025. ↩︎
3
L. Lovett, ‘‘Inch by inch’: Myanmar rebels close in on key military base in Chin State’, Al Jazeera, 15 March 2025. ↩︎
4
L. Lovett, ‘‘Inch by inch’: Myanmar rebels close in on key military base in Chin State’, Al Jazeera, 15 March 2025; ‘Two factions of the Chin resistance agree to merge after talks in India’s Mizoram State capital Aizawl’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 28 February 2025 ↩︎
5
‘Disquiet on the Western Front: A Divided Resistance in Myanmar’s Chin State’, International Crisis Group, 19 March 2025. ↩︎
6
L. Lovett, ‘‘Inch by inch’: Myanmar rebels close in on key military base in Chin State’, Al Jazeera, 15 March 2025; ‘Myanmar: Junta Drops ‘More Than 500’ Bombs On Chin State Town During Week Of Clashes’, Eurasia Review, 20 March 2025. ↩︎
7
‘Chin Brotherhood takes over last junta base in Chin State town’, Myanmar Now, 5 April 2025. ↩︎
8
‘Fighting Near Taingen Displaces 2,000, Urgent Aid Needed’, Burma News International, 13 November 2025; ‘Military takes control of strategic village connecting Chin State to Sagaing Region’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 12 November 2025; ‘Myanmar military seizes key hill position from Chin resistance’, Myanmar Now, 11 November 2025. ↩︎
9
‘Junta’s recapture of Falam raises threat to remaining resistance-held areas in Chin State’, Burma News International, 30 April 2026; ‘Military Regains Control of Falam Town’, Channel News Independent, 25 April 2026; ‘Myanmar Regime Recaptures Chin State’s Falam’, The Irrawaddy, 27 April 2026; ‘Military regains control of Chin State’s Falam town from resistance forces’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 26 April 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, May 2026. ↩︎
10
E. Berridge, ‘Chin National Defense Force’, Modern Insurgent, 19 February 2025; ‘Two Dozen Myanmar Junta Troops Killed in Chin State Camp Raid’, The Irrawaddy, 21 April 2023. ↩︎
11
‘Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 45’, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 28 March 2025; ‘Pastor among 13 killed as Myanmar military bombs Chin State villages’, Barnabas Aid, 15 April 2025. ↩︎
12
The Border Lens, ‘In conversation with Salai Peter Thang, Chin National Defence Force (CNDF) Chin State Myanmar’, YouTube, 10 May 2023. ↩︎
13
‘Fractures Deepen Among Chin Resistance Groups’, ISP Myanmar, 24 July 2025. ↩︎
14
‘Myanmar’s junta chief faces growing criticism over military failures: group’, Radio Free Asia, 30 May 2023 ↩︎
15
S. Johnny and L. Lovett, ‘‘How could I do any less?’: Chin State’s Mother of Resistance’, Myanmar Frontier, 6 March 2025; E. Fishbein, ‘Meet the women fighting Myanmar’s junta’, The New Humanitarian, 12 January 2023; L. Lovett, ‘‘I stopped counting after three’: the ‘girl sniper’ fighting on the frontline of Myanmar’s civil war’, The Guardian, 31 March 2025. ↩︎
16
The Border Lens, ‘In conversation with Salai Peter Thang, Chin National Defence Force (CNDF) Chin State Myanmar’, YouTube, 10 May 2023. ↩︎
17
E. Berridge, ‘Chin National Defense Force’, Modern Insurgent, 19 February 2025. ↩︎
18
The Border Lens, ‘In conversation with Salai Peter Thang, Chin National Defence Force (CNDF) Chin State Myanmar’, YouTube, 10 May 2023. ↩︎
19
E. Berridge, ‘Chin National Defense Force’, Modern Insurgent, 19 February 2025. ↩︎
20
‘Chin Brotherhood takes over last junta base in Chin State town’, Myanmar Now, 5 April 2025; ‘Eighty-nine Chin resistance members killed in Falam Township’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 18 April 2025. ↩︎
21
‘Forced recruitment pushes young people into the ranks of the resistance’, Agenzia Fides, 7 June 2024. ↩︎
22
E. Berridge, ‘Chin National Defense Force’, Modern Insurgent, 19 February 2025; ‘Two Dozen Myanmar Junta Troops Killed in Chin State Camp Raid’, The Irrawaddy, 21 April 2023. ↩︎
23
The Border Lens, ‘In conversation with Salai Peter Thang, Chin National Defence Force (CNDF) Chin State Myanmar’, YouTube, 10 May 2023 ↩︎
24
‘We Are Ready to Serve’, Chin National Organisation. ↩︎
25
‘Eighty-nine Chin resistance members killed in Falam Township’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 18 April 2025. ↩︎
26
‘We Are Ready to Serve’, Chin National Organisation. ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)

Background

The Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) is a political group representing the Kachin ethnic minority in northern Myanmar.¹ The KIA is the armed wing of the KIO.²

The KIA was founded on 5 February 1961 with the goal of establishing an autonomous state for the Kachin people.³ Over time, KIA objectives evolved from seeking independence to demanding meaningful autonomy and the protection of Kachin rights and resources.⁴ The term ‘Kachin’ encompasses a diverse group of ethnicities, notably the Jingpo, Rawang, Lisu, Zaiwa, Lashi (Lachik), and Lawngwaw (Maru) peoples.⁵

A ceasefire agreement between the KIA and the Myanmar government was reached in 1994.⁶ In 2010, the military junta issued an ultimatum to all EAOs in Myanmar to transform into a border guard force under command of the military junta or face a resumption of conflict.⁷ The ultimatum was rejected by the KIA and KIO, and the ceasefire broke down in June 2011.⁸ As a consequence, the KIA has been fighting the Tatmadaw as of 2011, resulting in significant internal displacement and a continued humanitarian crisis in Kachin state.⁹

Intensity

According to the Myanmar Peace Monitor, the KIA and allied forces have clashed with the Tatmadaw more than 935 times between September 2020 and June 2026.¹⁰ The KIA has seized more than 300 military installations and fifteen towns in Kachin state, Shan state, and Sagaing region since the 2021 coup.¹¹ In April 2025, clashes between the KIA and Tatmadaw continued to escalate.¹² Following the expiration of KIA’s earthquake-related unilateral ceasefire on 22 April 2025, there was an escalation in fighting between KIA and the military in the Bhamo and Hpakant regions.¹³ Notably, the KIA attempted to capture the regime’s last significant stronghold in Bhamo town.¹⁴

Fighting between the Tatmadaw and the KIA peaked in April and May 2025, specifically in the Bhamo and Hpakant regions as the KIA worked towards capturing the junta’s key military base in Bhamo.¹⁵ The Tatmadaw launched counterattacks against the KIA in Kachin state during June 2025 in an effort to retake Special Region 1, which is a mineral rich economic hub in northern Myanmar.¹⁶ Fighting up to June 2025 enabled the KIA to dominate at least two thirds of the territory in Bhamo.¹⁷ The group captured more than 300 government military bases in Kachin state between 2021 and July 2025.¹⁸ KIA’s territorial gains in Bhamo have specifically caught the attention of the Chinese government which benefits from this mineral-rich region. China has warned the KIA to withdraw from Bhamo.¹⁹

Fighting between the Tatmadaw and KIA escalated once again in August 2025 and September 2025 when the Tatmadaw planned to attack KIA-dominated territory in Bhamo.²⁰ By mid-September 2025, the Tatmadaw had retaken two of its bases as a result of these counteroffensives.²¹ The September 2025 attacks by the Tatmadaw signalled the KIA’s first big military defeat since March 2024.²² During October 2025, however, the KIA gained more ground in Bhamo in attacks against the Tatmadaw.²³ Fighting between KIA and the Tatmadaw intensified in Bhamo and the Hpakant and Waingmaw townships throughout October,²⁴ November,²⁵ and December 2025.²⁶

By 6 January 2026, more than 1,000 civilians were internally displaced as a direct result of the severity of ongoing fighting in this region.²⁷ At the same time, fighting between several groups opposing the Tatmadaw, including the KIA, peaked in Kachin and Sagaing regions as resistance groups encircled the Light Infantry Battalion 309 headquarters (LIB 309).²⁸ On 14 January 2026, the KIA captured the 399 Transport Battalion. Twenty soldiers based at the 399 Transport Battalion surrendered to the KIA,²⁹ leading the Tatmadaw to send 200 soldiers in as reinforcement and launch another aerial campaign against the KIA.³⁰ Fighting continued throughout February 2026.³¹ During May 2025, the Tatmadaw sent more than 400 military vehicles and soldiers to Kachin in order to recapture key military posts held by the KIA.³²

The KIA continues to launch sustained and concerted military operations against the Tatmadaw. As of mid-2026, the KIA controlled eight of eighteen townships in Kachin, including Sumprabum, Injangyang, Tsawlaw, and Chipwi.³³ The fighting between the Tatmadaw and the KIA was sufficiently intense to be of concern to China to the extent that in the first quarter of 2025, it was committed to negotiating a ceasefire.³⁴

The Tatmadaw’s choice of attack against the KIA is often aerial strikes, including sophisticated drone attacks.³⁵ The use of aerial bombardment against the KIA signals an assessment that the KIA is a serious military opponent.³⁶ During June 2025, the KIA responded with employing first-person view (FPV) drones to down a military aircraft by flying the drone into the helicopter’s rudders.³⁷

Weaponry used by the KIA includes AK47s and improvised explosive devices and they are capable of producing weaponry which includes single shot rifles. War Noir, ‘Manufacturing the Revolution: Weapons and Explosives Craft-Produced by Myanmar’s Anti-Junta Fighters’, Militant Wire, 31 October 2022. Among the military tactics of the KIA is the forming of alliances with other EAGs, which includes the successful alliance with the TNLA, and one with the CNDF.³⁸ As noted above, the KIA obtained FPV drone technology as early as June 2025.³⁹

The number of internally displaced persons in Kachin state as of 6 July 2026 was estimated at 244,600 people – a direct result of the severity of fighting in this region.⁴⁰

The intensity of fighting between the KIA and the Tatmadaw is sufficiently intense to equate to protracted armed violence.

Organization

The KIA and KIO are led by General N/Ban and the second in command is General Gam Shawng. Other high-ranking leaders include Sumlut Gam, Wang Hkang Aung Seng La (Commander-in-Chief), and Maran Zau Tawng (Deputy Commander-in-Chief).⁴¹ The precise organizational structure of the KIA is unclear. The Kachin People’s Defence Force (KPDF) operates under the command of the KIA, as is the case with various other PDFs in Kachin.⁴² An executive decision has been taken to subsume PDFs active in areas in which the KIA operates in the command structure of the KIA. An example of this integration is presented by the Myo Hla PDF which was integrated into KIA’s Battalion 28 under its 11^th Brigade.⁴³

The KIA headquarters are based in Laiza, Kachin state.⁴⁴ It is reported the KIA has some 15,000 active fighters organized into between eight and eleven brigades.⁴⁵ Of its eleven brigades, eight operate in Kachin state, while three operate in Northen Shan state. They comprise ‘two mobile regiments, three special battalions, twenty-four regionally based battalions, and twenty-seven mobile battalions that move between regions’.⁴⁶ Little information is available on the group’s disciplinary system, but the organization into battalions headed by brigades could ensure enforcement of discipline among fighters and enable the system of command to implement IHL. The KIA is well-trained,⁴⁷ which should ensure the ability to comply with IHL.

Its military tactics include guerrilla warfare, with claims that the KIA excels in hit-and-run tactics and ambushes, leveraging its knowledge of the terrain in Kachin state.⁴⁸ In recent years, however, the KIA has demonstrated increased capacity for conventional military operations, including the use of artillery and the capture of major military bases.⁴⁹ This development suggests an evolution in military tactics akin to the type employed by conventional armies.⁵⁰The KIA has also repeatedly entered into alliances with other resistance groups such as various PDFs, Chin resistance groups, the AA, and the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF). Following the buildup of regime troops in Kachin state in the first half of 2026, the KIA has temporarily shifted to a defensive strategy.⁵¹

The KIA has sufficient logistical capacity to meet the criteria of organization. For example, the group produces small arms as well as a range of modified AK47s and self-made landmines.⁵² The KIA has built up an arsenal of small arms, mortars, and light artillery captured during clashes with the military junta or procured on the black market.⁵³

The KIA is described as well-equipped and well-supplied.⁵⁴ Its operations are funded from the profits of the group’s interests in jade mining, ⁵⁵ as well as trade in timber and gold.⁵⁶ The ‘taxation’ collected in territories under its control further contributes to financing military operations.⁵⁷ In the past, the KIA has trained and armed other EAGs which adds to its income.⁵⁸

The KIA has an official spokesperson, who acts as the spokesperson for the KIO as well, Colonel Naw Bu, allowing the EAG to speak with a unified voice.⁵⁹ The KIA employs sophisticated media strategies to promote its cause and to maintain support in the Kachin population.⁶⁰

Clearly, the KIA is sufficiently organized to constitute an organized armed group under IHL.

1
C. Stutte, ‘Who is the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)?’, Geopolitical Report, 4 February 2025. ↩︎
2
‘Kachin Independence Organisation/ Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA)’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 5 September 2024. ↩︎
3
M. Martin, ‘Update on the Armed Resistance in Myanmar’s Kachin State’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 17 July 2024; C. Stutte, ‘Who is the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)?’, Geopolitical Report, 4 February 2025. ↩︎
4
M. Martin, ‘Update on the Armed Resistance in Myanmar’s Kachin State’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 17 July 2024. ↩︎
5
‘The Kachin Independence Army: A Comprehensive Overview’, A Complicated War. ↩︎
6
‘Dossier: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Myanmar’, Global Counter-Terrorism Institute, 7 September 2024; ‘Memoirs of Kachin Peace Efforts (1994)’, Kachinland News, 31 October 2024. ↩︎
7
H. Beech, ‘On Burmese New Year, a String of Attacks’, Time Magazine, 19 April 2010. ↩︎
8
M. Martin, ‘Update on the Armed Resistance in Myanmar’s Kachin State’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 17 July 2024. ↩︎
9
‘The Kachin Independence Army: A Comprehensive Overview’, A Complicated War. ↩︎
10
‘Numbers Behind Myanmar’s Conflicts’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 25 June 2026. ↩︎
11
M. Martin, ‘The Importance of Kachin State to Myanmar’s Revolution’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 22 July 2025. ↩︎
12
‘Heavy fighting erupts as KIA ambushes advancing Myanmar junta troops near Hpakant’, Mizzima, 27 April 2025; M. Maung, ‘Battles resume in Kachin State’, Myanmar Now, 28 April 2025; M. Maung and M. Shwe Wah, ‘Myanmar military attacks KIA-controlled territories, including Laiza, with aircraft and drones’, Myanmar Now, 27 February 2025; ‘KIA Resumes Bhamo Attacks on Myanmar Junta After Quake Ceasefire’, The Irrawaddy, 30 April 2025. ↩︎
13
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
14
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
15
‘KIA Resumes Bhamo Attacks on Myanmar Junta After Quake Ceasefire’, The Irrawaddy, 30 April 2025; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, May 2025; H. Altman and T. Rogoway, ‘Mi-17 Appears To Have Been Downed By FPV Drone In Myanmar’, The War Zone, 22 May 2025. ↩︎
16
‘Myanmar Junta Attacks to Reclaim KIA’s Jade and Rare Earth Strongholds’, The Irrawaddy, 16 June 2025. ↩︎
17
‘KIA controls two-thirds of Bhamo after six months of battle, clashes continue near junta strongholds’, Mizzima, 14 June 2025. ↩︎
18
M. Martin, ‘The Importance of Kachin State to Myanmar’s Revolution’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 22 July 2025. ↩︎
19
‘Myanmar: KIA Clash Risks China’s Rare Earth Imports’, Strat News Global, 8 July 2025; N. B. Han et al, ‘Why China’s ultimatum to Myanmar rebels threatens global supply of heavy rare earths’, Reuters, 8 July 2025; M. Martin, ‘The Importance of Kachin State to Myanmar’s Revolution’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 22 July 2025. ↩︎
20
M. Pyae, ‘KIA Says Myanmar Junta Retakes Two More Bases in Bhamo but Fighting Continues’, The Irrawaddy, 15 September 2025. ↩︎
21
M. Pyae, ‘KIA Says Myanmar Junta Retakes Two More Bases in Bhamo but Fighting Continues’, The Irrawaddy, 15 September 2025; ‘16 civilians killed as Myanmar junta fleet makes its way down the Ayeyarwady’, Myanmar Now, 11 September 2025. ↩︎
22
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, September 2025. ↩︎
23
M. Pyae, ‘KIA Seizes Camps From Myanmar Military in Bhamo, Waingmaw’, The Irrawaddy, 9 October 2025. ↩︎
24
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, October 2025; M. Pyae, ‘KIA Seizes Camps From Myanmar Military in Bhamo, Waingmaw’, The Irrawaddy, 9 October 2025 ↩︎
25
C. Thar and M. Maung, ‘Among three Kachin State battlefronts, clashes in Bhamo remain fiercest’, Myanmar Now, 1 December 2025 ↩︎
26
A. Htoi, ‘Myanmar Junta Losing Grip on Key Sagaing Stronghold as KIA-Led Forces Advance’, The Irrawaddy, 6 January 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, December 2025. ↩︎
27
‘Over 1,000 war-displaced Kathan residents seek refuge in Monghnyin’, Burma News International, 6 January 2026. ↩︎
28
‘Resistance Forces March Into Katha on the Irrawaddy’, The Irrawaddy, 2 January 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, January 2026. ↩︎
29
‘KIA forces seize Myanmar junta outpost in Bhamo, 20 soldiers surrender’, Burma News International, 17 January 2026 ↩︎
30
‘Kachin Independence Army resumes fight with military for control of Kachin State’s Bhamo’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 15 January 2026. ↩︎
31
‘General Gun Maw says KIA’s Bhamo offensive as necessary’, Burma News International, 12 February 2026; ‘Clashes erupt in four Kachin State townships within a week’, Burma News International, 10 February 2026. ↩︎
32
‘Junta reinforces troops to open multiple fronts in Kachin State operations’, Burma News International, 26 May 2026. ↩︎
33
‘For Peace or for Military Entrenchment?’, Kachin News, 10 March 2026; ‘The State of Myanmar: ISP-Myanmar’s Annual Strategic Review and Foresight 2025-2026’, ISP Myanmar, January 2026; ‘KIA Announces Shift to Defensive Strategy as Regime Troops Pour into Kachin State’, The Irrawaddy, 19 May 2026. ↩︎
34
M. Micheals, ‘Crossing the Rubicon: Are Myanmar’s ethnic armies prepared to go all in?’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2025. ↩︎
35
M. Maung and M. Shwe Wah, ‘Myanmar military attacks KIA-controlled territories, including Laiza, with aircraft and drones’, Myanmar Now, 27 February 2025; M. Maung and M. Shwe Wah, ‘Myanmar junta strikes Kachin armed group’s stronghold as clashes in Bhamo continue’, Myanmar Now, 27 January 2025. ↩︎
36
‘Junta Airstrike Kills Nearly 40 Trainees at KIA Camp Amid Crisis’, Kachin News, 1 April 2025; ‘Myanmar’s junta seeks to regain air edge with foreign night vision drones’, Radio Free Asia, 15 March 2025. ↩︎
37
H. Altman and T. Rogoway, ‘Mi-17 Appears To Have Been Downed By FPV Drone In Myanmar’, The War Zone, 22 May 2025. ↩︎
38
‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, March 2025, 22. ↩︎
39
H. Altman and T. Rogoway, ‘Mi-17 Appears To Have Been Downed By FPV Drone In Myanmar’, The War Zone, 22 May 2025. ↩︎
40
‘Myanmar’ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Operational Data Portal, Updated 6 July 2026. ↩︎
41
‘Kachin Independence Organisation/ Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA)’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 5 September 2024; ‘Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)’, ISP Myanmar, 20 August 2025. ↩︎
42
‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, March 2025, 4. ↩︎
43
‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, March 2025, 13. ↩︎
44
‘Kachin Independence Organisation/ Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA)’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 5 September 2024. ↩︎
45
‘Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)’, ISP Myanmar, 20 August 2025; ‘Kachin Independence Organisation/ Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA)’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 5 September 2024; ‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, March 2025, 13. ↩︎
46
‘Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)’, ISP Myanmar, 20 August 2025. ↩︎
47
‘Dossier: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Myanmar’, Global Counter-Terrorism Institute, 7 September 2024 ↩︎
48
‘Dossier: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Myanmar’, Global Counter-Terrorism Institute, 7 September 2024; C. Stutte, ‘Who is the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)?’, Geopolitical Report, 4 February 2025. ↩︎
49
C. Stutte, ‘Who is the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)?’, Geopolitical Report, 4 February 2025. ↩︎
50
‘The Long War Pt. 4; The Kachin Independence Army (KIA)’, Military Matters, 30 November 2020. ↩︎
51
‘KIA Announces Shift to Defensive Strategy as Regime Troops Pour into Kachin State’, The Irrawaddy, 19 May 2026; ‘Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)’, ISP Myanmar, 20 August 2025. ↩︎
52
‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, March 2025, 22. ↩︎
53
‘Dossier: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Myanmar’, Global Counter-Terrorism Institute, 7 September 2024. ↩︎
54
‘The Long War Pt. 4; The Kachin Independence Army (KIA)’, Military Matters, 30 November 2020. ↩︎
55
‘The Kachin Independence Army: A Comprehensive Overview’, A Complicated War; M. Micheals, ‘Myanmar regime brings significant escalation to the doorstep of key opponent’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 2023 ↩︎
56
‘Dossier: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Myanmar’, Global Counter-Terrorism Institute, 7 September 2024; ‘The Kachin Independence Army: A Comprehensive Overview’, A Complicated War. ↩︎
57
‘Dossier: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Myanmar’, Global Counter-Terrorism Institute, 7 September 2024; ‘The Kachin Independence Army: A Comprehensive Overview’, A Complicated War. ↩︎
58
‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, March 2025, 22; ‘KIA Announces Shift to Defensive Strategy as Regime Troops Pour into Kachin State’, The Irrawaddy, 19 May 2026. ↩︎
59
‘KIA Expects Kachin State Conflicts to Escalate in 2025’, Burma News International, 3 January 2025. ↩︎
60
C. Stutte, ‘Who is the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)?’, Geopolitical Report, 4 February 2025. ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Karen National Union (KNLA)

Background

The KNLA is the military wing of the political movement, the Karen National Union (KNU).¹ Formed in 1949, it is the oldest EAG in Myanmar.² Post-World War II, the situation reflected the fact that the Karen people had sided with British forces, whereas the Burmese had co-operated with Imperial Japan.³ Since Myanmar’s independence from Britain, the KNLA has engaged in a conflict against the military junta. This NIAC between the KNLA and the Tatmadaw (and previous versions of the military junta) has lasted for more than seventy-five years.⁴

The KNU’s objectives include ensuring the autonomy and self-determination of the Karen people through the establishment of a democratic Karen state.⁵ The KLNA describes its mission as being to serve as a self-defence force for the protection of the Karen people and the KNU.⁶ The KLNA believes that to be able successfully to act in self-defence it must defend against Tatmadaw aggression, aim to ban narcotics, provide village security, and provide security for humanitarian relief missions.⁷

Intensity

KNLA brigades control their own territory in a relatively autonomous way under a central command.⁸ Stable territorial control confirms the KNLA has the capacity to oppose the Tatmadaw by its military operations and the territory to evade government control. The military tactics the KNLA employs include maintaining a defensive force and engaging in guerilla warfare and ambush tactics suited to the jungle environment.⁹ The junta, too, deploys special forces for special operations against the KNLA. ¹⁰

Part of the KNLA strategy is to form alliances. As of 2023, the KNLA was associated with more than a dozen other insurgent groups; it is a part of the 4K Coalition which consists of the Karenni Army, the Karenni National People’s Liberation Front and the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force. Other allies are the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO), the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front, the AA, the Bamar People’s Liberation Army, DKBA-5, the KIA, and the PDF.¹¹ The KNLA/KNU openly allies with the NUG, which was founded on 31 January 2007 by Major-General Saw Htein Maung, the commander of the KNLA’s 7^th Brigade. ¹²

Similarly, in the south-eastern Tanintharyi region, the KNLA and the KNDO, in collaboration with other resistance forces, captured the last remaining regime position at the Htee Khee base on 9 May 2025, which serves as the overland route from Thailand to the regional capital, Dawei. On 7 May 2025, regime bases along the Thai border came under attack from KNLA and KNDO forces in neighbouring Kayin state.¹³ Fighting was so intense that more than 327 civilians crossed the border into Thailand and sought refuge there.¹⁴

On 6 and 10 June 2025, the KNLA and allied resistance forces gained further ground against the regime by capturing bases in Kyaukkyi township (Bago region) and Dawei township (Tanintharyi region). Additionally, the large Thay Baw Boe base in Kayin state was seized by the KNLA on 3 June 2025 following a ten-day offensive, with forty government troops reportedly killed.¹⁵ The KNLA continued capturing smaller government military outposts along the Myanmar-Thailand border throughout July 2025,‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, July 2025 often employing armed drones.¹⁶ Fighting during the beginning of July was so severe that around ninety soldiers and 3,000 civilians fled across the border into Thailand.¹⁷ By 15 July 2025, the KNLA captured the military base of Ukrit Hta on the Myanmar side of the border with Thailand. This was a significant base for the Tatmadaw, and the successful attack was not only a strategic victory for the KNLA, but it also gave them access to weapons, including a mortar and ammunition, left behind by soldiers fleeing into Thailand.¹⁸

During August 2025, the Tatmadaw attacked the KNLA to regain control over Demoso township in Kayah (Karenni) state.¹⁹ The KNLA disputed claims of victory by the Tatmadaw.²⁰ The Tatmadaw did recapture two military bases in Thingannyinaung village in Kayin state during September 2025.²¹ In October 2025, the Tatmadaw recaptured further bases along the border previously held by the KNLA, including Shwe Khin Thar Camp and the Swel Taw Kone Camp.²² Fighting remained intense throughout November 2025, as the Tatmadaw continued to regain more territory along the border.²³

In April 2026, intense fighting between the Tatmadaw and the KNLA was reported.²⁴ The KLN successfully ousted the Tatmadaw from Lay Kay military base in Mon state’s Bilin township by 12 April 2026. This base is significant due to its location is between the Mon and Karen states in Myanmar.²⁵ Fighting displaced approximately 13,000 Bilin residents.²⁶ A battle for Way Lay military base triggered a strong aerial response by the Tatmadaw towards the end of April 2026.²⁷ On 19 May 2026, the Tatmadaw managed to recapture the Mawtaung town on the Thai border.‘Regime recaptures Tonzang and Mawtaung from resistance forces’, Development Media Group, 20 May 2026. The Tatmadaw also recaptured Tonzang base, close to the border with India.²⁸

Fighting significantly escalated between the Tatmadaw and the KLNA throughout 2025 up until June 2026. This NIAC remains sufficiently protracted to satisfy the intensity threshold demanded by IHL.

Organization

The KNLA is a part of the sophisticated organizational structure of the KNU. The Karen Defence Department was formed in 1956 and comprises the KNLA and the KNDO, as well as militia and home guard units.²⁹ The KNLA command structure is as follows: seven brigades and three battalion headquarters. Each brigade is divided into five battalions, each battalion consists of four companies, and each company has three platoons. A majority of the PDFs operating in Karen are under the KNLA umbrella. Each brigade has a joint coalition committee. In this case, where a PDF is a part of a KNLA brigade, the commander is from the KNLA, and the deputy is from the PDF.³⁰ The KLNA has three central branches: the General Staff Office, an Adjutant General Office and a Quartermaster Office.³¹ The organizational structure of the KNLA corresponds to that of a modern military. According to analysts from the International Crisis Group, the KNLA was ‘in its strongest position in decades’ as of June 2026. It governs large swathes of territory, especially along the Myanmar-Thailand border.³²

The KNLA/KNU’s organizational structure satisfies the requirement that it has the capacity to comply with IHL and enforce discipline amongst its fighters. The KNU’s declared core values, which include honesty and equality, further support discipline in all departments³³ and are published on its website as an expression of humanitarian policy.³⁴

In 2015, Geneva Call presented and explained the international norms pertaining to children affected by armed conflict and exposed sexual and gender-based violence and gender discrimination to nearly forty officers from the KNLA, from six of the seven KNU brigade areas, as well as from the associated KNDO and the Karen National Police Force. Geneva Call demonstrated how these norms are refined and appear in a condensed form in its Deeds of Commitment protecting children in armed conflict and prohibiting sexual violence and gender discrimination. These commitments were agreed to by the KNU in 2013.³⁵

The proper functioning of the disciplinary system was evident when, in 2022, KNU suspended Nerdah Bo Mya, at the time the commander-in-chief of an armed force, for killing twenty-five civilians. It was explicitly stated that his suspension was the result of the accused contravening the Geneva Conventions.³⁶

The KNU has an official website³⁷ on which it releases official statements,³⁸ hosts official documents such as ceasefire agreements,³⁹ and posts news related to the KNLA. ⁴⁰

Clearly, the KNLA is sufficiently organized to constitute an organized armed group under IHL.

1
M. Hughey, ‘Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)’, Modern Insurgent, 11 June 2024. ↩︎
2
S. Loong, ‘The Karen National Union in Post-Coup Myanmar’, Stimson, 7 April 2022. ↩︎
3
M. H. Aung and D. I. Steinberg, ‘The British in Burma, 1885–1948’, Britannica. ↩︎
4
M. Hughey, ‘Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)’, Modern Insurgent, 11 June 2024. ↩︎
5
‘About KNU’, Karen National Union. ↩︎
6
‘Department of Defence’ Karen National Union. ↩︎
7
‘Department of Defence’ Karen National Union. ↩︎
8
H. M. Kyed and M. Gravers, ‘Non-state armed groups in the Myanmar peace process: What are the future options?’, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2014. ↩︎
9
M. Hughey, ‘Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)’, Modern Insurgent, 11 June 2024; A. Nachemson, ‘How the Karen became crucial to Myanmar’s anti-coup resistance’, Al Jazeera, 6 May 2022. ↩︎
10
M. Hughey, ‘Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)’, Modern Insurgent, 11 June 2024; S. Y. Naing, ‘‘Special Force’ Joins KNLA on High Alert’, The Irrawaddy, 19 October 2010. ↩︎
11
M. Hughey, ‘Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)’, Modern Insurgent, 11 June 2024. ↩︎
12
M. Hughey, ‘Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)’, Modern Insurgent, 11 June 2024. ↩︎
13
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
14
‘Hundreds Flee Across Thai Border After Attack On Myanmar Military’, Barron’s, 8 May 2025; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, May 2025. ↩︎
15
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group; ‘KNU/KNLA recaptures camps including Te Baw Boe camp near Thai-Myanmar border; just four camps remain to be retaken’, Myanmar (CRPH) Support Group, 6 June 2025; ‘KNLA seizes Bawdi border post on Thai-Myanmar border after three-day battle’, Mizzima, 13 June 2025. ↩︎
16
‘Karen resistance forces seize regime ‘Living Fence’ outpost along Myanmar-Thailand border’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 13 July 2025. ↩︎
17
‘Karen resistance forces seize regime ‘Living Fence’ outpost along Myanmar-Thailand border’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 13 July 2025. ↩︎
18
L. H. Naing, ‘KNLA-led forces capture key Ukrit Hta military base on Thai border, maintain assault on Wawlay military base’, NarinJara, 15 July 2025. ↩︎
19
‘Myanmar junta claims control of Demoso town, resistance forces dispute narrative’, Mizzima, 23 August 2025. ↩︎
20
‘Myanmar Junta Claims Capture of Demoso From Karenni Forces’, The Irrawaddy, 20 August 2025. ↩︎
21
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, September 2025. ↩︎
22
‘Myanmar army regains control of KK Park, KNU and PDF bases’, The Nation Thailand, 20 October 2025. ↩︎
23
‘Myanmar Junta Pushes to Retake Asian Highway, Igniting Fierce Battles With KNU’, The Irrawaddy, 10 November 2025. ↩︎
24
P. Tar, ‘Karen Resistance Captures Two Regime Bases Over Thingyan Holidays’, The Irrawaddy, 16 April 2026. ↩︎
25
P. Tar, ‘Karen Resistance Captures Two Regime Bases Over Thingyan Holidays’, The Irrawaddy, 16 April 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, April 2026. ↩︎
26
‘Over 13,000 Bilin residents unable to return home amid ongoing fighting with Myanmar military’, Mizzima, 18 April 2026. ↩︎
27
P. Tar, ‘Myanmar Regime Stronghold Teeters as Karen Forces Launch Waw Lay Assault’, The Irrawaddy, 27 April 2026. ↩︎
28
‘Myanmar military recaptures 2 strategic border towns from ethnic militias’, Associated Press, 21 May 2026. ↩︎
29
‘Department of Defence’ Karen National Union. ↩︎
30
A. Nachemson, ‘How the Karen became crucial to Myanmar’s anti-coup resistance’, Al Jazeera, 6 May 2022; ‘Mizzima Weekly: Analysis and Insight’, Mizzima, 21 May 2026. ↩︎
31
‘Department of Defence’ Karen National Union. ↩︎
32
T. Kean, ‘Bracing for a Long War in Myanmar’s Karen State’, International Crisis Group, 12 June 2026. ↩︎
33
‘About KNU: Values’, Karen National Union ↩︎
34
‘Policies’, Karen National Union. ↩︎
35
‘Burma/Myanmar: 40 high-ranking officers from the Karen National Liberation Army are trained on child protection’, Geneva Call, 25 November 2015. ↩︎
36
S. Loong, ‘Southeast Myanmar: a shared struggle for federal democracy’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 23 September 2022. ↩︎
37
Karen National Union ↩︎
38
‘Statements’, Karen National Union ↩︎
39
‘Peace Process’, Karen National Union ↩︎
40
‘News’, Karen National Union. ↩︎

Non-International Armed Conflict between Myanmar and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)

Background

The MNDAA, also known as the Kokang Army,¹ originated from the remnants of the military wing of the Communist Party of Burma, which was disbanded in 1989. The MNDAA represents the Kokang ethnic Chinese community.² The MNDAA operates in the northern Shan state of Myanmar, in close proximity to the Chinese border.³

Founded in March 1989,⁴ it has been actively engaged in a NIAC against the Tatmadaw since August 2009.⁵ The MNDAA is currently part of the 3BHA, formed in June 2019,⁶ which also consists of the AA and the TNLA.⁷ As of June 2026, the 3BHA had, however, been significantly weakened, especially since the MNDAA entered into a Chinese-brokered ceasefire with the Myanmar military junta in January 2025 and subsequently handed back control over the town of Lashio to the authorities in April 2025 (see below).

Intensity

Up until the implementation of the MNDAA’s ceasefire with the junta in April 2025 (see above), clashes with the Tatmadaw occurred frequently, often lasting for several days,⁸ and resulting in many casualties.⁹

The MNDAA employed heavy weaponry in such clashes. For the most part, the weapons had been seized from the Tatmadaw and included grenades, mortar shells, RPGs, and bombs.¹⁰ The MNDAA and the other members of the 3BHA were also reported to have access to anti-aircraft weapons.¹¹

As of June 2026, the MNDAA continues to hold territory in northern Shan state, including the town of Kutkai which it captured from the TNLA in March 2026 (see above).¹² As a result of the second phase of Operation 1027 in mid-2024, the MNDAA captured additional territory, including the capital Lashio and the Northeast Military Command headquarters of the Tatmadaw, and held control for eight months prior to ceasefire negotiations with the junta¹³ according to which it handed over Lashio city to the Myanmar government by 21 April 2025.¹⁴ China’s concern over the conflict escalating further led to its facilitation and monitoring of the 2025 ceasefire agreement. ¹⁵ No violent incidents were reported between the MNDAA and the Tatmadaw since the implementation of the ceasefire agreement in April 2025.

Organization

The Kokang EAG has a political wing, a military wing and a justice department.¹⁶ The political wing of the Kokang EAG is the Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party (MNTJP). The military wing, the MNDAA, has a sophisticated command structure. The military wing consists of a Central Military Commission,¹⁷ and deploys several battalions. From 2015, the MNDAA formed political and supply departments as well as command and control, and artillery battalions. The MNDAA has at least four brigades: Brigade 211, Brigade 311, Brigade 511 and Brigade 611. ¹⁸

The close working relationship between the Justice Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission ensures the imposition of discipline among MNDAA fighters.¹⁹ The MNDAA has set up parallel governance structures in the areas under its control which are described as ‘state-like apparatus[es]’. Further, the MNDAA has installed a punitive system on the basis of Kokang customary law.²⁰

As of June 2026, Peng Daxun (Peng Deren) is the MNDAA’s Commander-in-Chief as well as the MNTJP’s General Secretary and the Chairman of the Special Region 1 (Kokang) Administrative Committee.²¹ The deputy Commander-in-Chief is Yang Winxian, the secretary is Pheung Ah Di (aka U Tun Myat Linn) and in charge of external relations is Pheung Win Naing. Yang Guanghua is deputy Chief-of-Staff of Allied Command of the MNDAA.²²

It is estimated that by the end of April 2025, the MNDAA had 6,000 to 8,000 active fighters.²³ There have been reports of the MNDAA engaging in forced recruitment activities in areas under its control by exploiting personal data of residents gathered during a registration campaign.²⁴ MNDAA fighters are well-trained and provide training for other EAGs.²⁵ The MNDAA pays its fighters a monthly salary.²⁶ The fact that other EAGs use the MNDAA to train fighters speaks to the MNDAA’s command of military tactics and discipline. Further testament to the MNDAA’s success in military tactics is the leading role it played in the planning and execution of a joint operation, Operation 1027.²⁷

The MNDAA training programmes are sufficiently effective that rapidly after completion fighters are deployed and have the ability to operate independently after undergoing training.²⁸ The training programme and sophisticated command structure²⁹ confirm the ability of the MNDAA to comply with and implement IHL.

The MNDAA are capable of securing weaponry and are able to finance military expenses owing to profits from the drug trade, in particular the harvesting of opium, heroin refining, and the production of methamphetamine.³⁰ Also, it is claimed that the group operates a gold mine in north-eastern Myanmar.³¹ The MNDAA also engages in tax collection in areas under its control.³² Since the January 2025 ceasefire (see above), the MNDAA has further established gradually closer ties with the Chinese government. As of June 2026, it controls Lashio-Muse Road, which is essential for border trade with China.³³ Lastly, the MNDAA speaks with one voice through an official spokesperson and information officer who is, as of June 2026, Li Kyar Win.³⁴

As of end-June 2026, the MNDAA was sufficiently organized to constitute an organized armed group under IHL.

Under IHL, NIACs end when a fighting non-State actor ceases to exist (or be sufficiently organized), or if an effective peace agreement is agreed upon. In view of the lack of armed clashes between the MNDAA and the Tatmadaw since the implementation of the ceasefire agreement in April 2025, the NIAC between Myanmar and the MNDAA was therefore no longer ongoing as of May 2025.

1
‘Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/ Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang Army) – MNTJP/MNDAA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024 ↩︎
2
‘The Brotherhood Alliance and Operation 1027: Reshaping Myanmar’s Conflict’, Human Development Forum Foundation, 21 April 2025. ↩︎
3
‘What is Myanmar’s Three Brotherhood Alliance that’s resisting the military?’, Al Jazeera, 16 January 2024. ↩︎
4
‘Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/ Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang Army) – MNTJP/MNDAA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024 ↩︎
5
Y. Xian, ‘Good Rebels or Good Timing?: Myanmar’s MNDAA and Operation 1027’, The Diplomat, 5 January 2024. ↩︎
6
‘The Brotherhood Alliance and Operation 1027: Reshaping Myanmar’s Conflict’, Human Development Forum Foundation, 21 April 2025 ↩︎
7
Z. Abuza, ‘Operation 1027 poses rare challenge to Myanmar junta’, Radio Free Asia, 10 November 2023. ↩︎
8
H. Regan and A. Watson, ‘Myanmar rebels are claiming their biggest victory yet over junta forces. Could it be a turning point in the brutal civil war?’, CNN, 2 August 2024 ↩︎
9
N. Swe, ‘MNDAA reports major weapons seizure from Myanmar army’, Myanmar Now, 5 January 2022; ‘MNDAA attack kills junta brigadier general’, Myanmar Now, 8 December 2023. ↩︎
10
N. Swe, ‘MNDAA reports major weapons seizure from Myanmar army’, Myanmar Now, 5 January 2022. ↩︎
11
‘MNDAA to use seized anti-aircraft guns for air defense’, Than Lwin Times Media, 7 November 2023. ↩︎
12
M. K. Jar, ‘MNDAA to Surrender Lashio but Hold Surrounding Country’, The Irrawaddy, 7 April 2025; ‘The State of Myanmar: ISP-Myanmar’s Annual Strategic Review and Foresight 2025-2026’, ISP Myanmar, January 2026; ‘MNDAA seizes full control of Kutkai Town following TNLA dispute’, Burma News International, 17 March 2026; ‘Kokang Armed Group Using Local ID Registry for Forced Conscription, Residents Say’, Burma News International, 14 July 2026; S. Wansai, ‘KOKANG SPECIAL REGION 1: The Rise of an Authoritarian Enclave in Northern Shan State’, Shan Herald Agency for News, 15 June 2026; ‘Bilateral Ceasefires: Fragmentation of Elusive Peace Process in Myanmar’, ISP Myanmar, June 2026, 24. ↩︎
13
‘Implications of the MNDAA & Military Council’s Negotiations in Kunming’, MoeMaKa, 25 March 2025 ↩︎
14
‘MNDAA to hand over administration of Lashio Town to Myanmar junta in April’, Mizzima, 6 April 2025. ↩︎
15
‘China sends team to monitor Myanmar ceasefire, spokesperson confirms’, CGTN, 22 April 2025; C. Tan, ‘China deploys ceasefire monitors to Myanmar border region’, Nikkei Asia, 2 May 2025. ↩︎
16
‘Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/ Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang Army) – MNTJP/MNDAA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024. ↩︎
17
S. Wansai, ‘MNDAA: Beating a bold revolutionary path to fulfill the people’s aspirations?’, Shan Herald Agency for News, 10 January 2023 ↩︎
18
‘Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party’, Spring Sprouts. ↩︎
19
S. Wansai, ‘MNDAA: Beating a bold revolutionary path to fulfill the people’s aspirations?’, Shan Herald Agency for News, 10 January 2023. ↩︎
20
S. Wansai, ‘KOKANG SPECIAL REGION 1: The Rise of an Authoritarian Enclave in Northern Shan State’, Shan Herald Agency for News, 15 June 2026. ↩︎
21
‘Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/ Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang Army) – MNTJP/MNDAA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024. ↩︎
22
‘Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party’, Spring Sprouts. ↩︎
23
‘The Brotherhood Alliance and Operation 1027: Reshaping Myanmar’s Conflict’, Human Development Forum Foundation, 21 April 2025; ‘Myanmar rebels prepare to hand key city back to junta, China says’, France24, 22 April 2025. ↩︎
24
S. Wansai, ‘KOKANG SPECIAL REGION 1: The Rise of an Authoritarian Enclave in Northern Shan State’, Shan Herald Agency for News, 15 June 2026; ‘Fractured Heartland: Shan Politics and Conflict in Post-coup Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, 27 November 2025. ↩︎
25
K. Oo, ‘Myanmar’s Spring Revolution Aided by Ethnic Kokang Armed Group’, The Irrawaddy, 8 March 2023. ↩︎
26
‘Fractured Heartland: Shan Politics and Conflict in Post-coup Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, 27 November 2025. ↩︎
27
‘Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/ Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang Army) – MNTJP/MNDAA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024. ↩︎
28
S. Wansai, ‘MNDAA: Beating a bold revolutionary path to fulfill the people’s aspirations?’, Shan Herald Agency for News, 10 January 2023. ↩︎
29
K. Oo, ‘Myanmar’s Spring Revolution Aided by Ethnic Kokang Armed Group’, The Irrawaddy, 8 March 2023. ↩︎
30
‘Kokang rebels produce drugs in Asia World Company dam sites’, Burma News International, 14 July 2010; ‘Synthetic Drugs in East and Southeast Asia: Latest Developments and Challenges’ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2023; Y. Xian, ‘Good Rebels or Good Timing?: Myanmar’s MNDAA and Operation 1027’, The Diplomat, 5 January 2024. ↩︎
31
‘6 shot dead after confrontation over Myanmar gold mine operation’, Radio Free Asia, 7 March 2025. ↩︎
32
‘Fractured Heartland: Shan Politics and Conflict in Post-coup Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, 27 November 2025. ↩︎
33
S. Wansai, ‘KOKANG SPECIAL REGION 1: The Rise of an Authoritarian Enclave in Northern Shan State’, Shan Herald Agency for News, 15 June 2026; ‘Fractured Heartland: Shan Politics and Conflict in Post-coup Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, 27 November 2025. ↩︎
34
DVB English News, X, 1 December 2023; ‘6 shot dead after confrontation over Myanmar gold mine operation’, Radio Free Asia, 7 March 2025. ↩︎

Non-International Armed Conflict between Myanmar and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)

Background

The TNLA was founded in January 2009.¹ It is the armed wing of the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF).² It has engaged in a NIAC with the Tatmadaw since at least 2011.³

The ideology of the TNLA is to establish a Ta’ang state that includes all of Namhsan and Mantong townships, and parts of Namhkam, Mongyai, Tangyan, Kyaukme, Hsipaw, Lashio, and Namtu townships in northern Shan state, as well as Mogok township in the northern Mandalay region. ⁴ Other EAGs, including the KIO and the UWSA, supported the evolution of the TNLA by training its fighters and providing it with weapons. The TNLA has capitalized on the aftermath of the 2021 coup, strengthening its control over territory in northern Shan state and becoming one of the most powerful EAGs in Myanmar.⁵

In the direct aftermath of the coup, the TNLA infrequently engaged the military junta and on occasion covertly supported anti-junta forces in a bid to achieve its long-term goal, which is autonomy. It already functions as a quasi-state.⁶ The TNLA joined the 3BHA and played a significant role in Operation 1027. This successful alliance enabled the TNLA to gain control over fifteen of seventeen townships in its operational area.⁷ In late 2025, the 3BHA was, however, significantly weakened, especially after the TNLA signed a ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar military junta in late October 2025. In implementing the ceasefire, the TNLA handed over control of the towns of Mogok and Momeik to the Tatmadaw in November 2025 (see above).⁸

Intensity

Until the signing of the ceasefire with the junta in October 2025, fighting between the Tatmadaw and the TNLA was frequent and intense.⁹ According to the Myanmar Peace Monitor, there were at least 274 armed clashes between the Tatmadaw and the TNLA in the period between January 2020 and October 2025.¹⁰ Significant military operations included an aerial bombardment by the Tatmadaw against the TNLA on 3 May 2025 after the collapse of ceasefire negotiations.¹¹ Between 4 and 8 May 2025, the Tatmadaw managed to recapture at least eight outposts in northern Shan state’s Nawnghkio township.¹² The TNLA alleged that the Tatmadaw launched an aerial and artillery campaign throughout May 2025, which was in breach of the ceasefire agreement concluded post-earthquake (see major developments of 2025 version of Myanmar entry). The Irrawaddy – English Edition, Facebook, 23 May 2025.

Frequent fighting between the Tatmadaw and TNLA continued throughout June 2025.¹³ This includes clashes in Shwe Mu Htaw, Nawng Len, Meit Poke, Tha Yet Cho, and Shauk Chon villages in Nawnghkio township where the Tatmadaw successfully regained territory.¹⁴ Fighting continued during July 2025¹⁵ and the junta managed to regain control over Nawnghkio in Shan state.¹⁶ On 25 August 2025, the Tatmadaw bombed Kyaukme town.¹⁷ The Tatmadaw also bombed Mogok township in Mandalay Region during August 2025.¹⁸

Fighting remained protracted throughout September¹⁹ and October 2025.²⁰ After the TNLA’s ceasefire with the junta forces in late October 2025, the group did not engage in any direct reported clashes with the Tatmadaw. The TNLA’s allied forces, such as several local PDFs, the ABSDF, and the KIA, however, continued fighting the Tatmadaw around Mogok and Tagaung towns in Mandalay region in November²¹ and December 2025,²² and March 2026.²³ By 10 March 2026, the Tatmadaw regained control over Tagaung town. This was the last stronghold of resistance forces allied with the TNLA in the Mandalay region and a significant victory for the Tatmadaw.²⁴ As of June 2026, the TNLA continues to exercise control over territories in northern Shan state, including Namtu, Namhkam, Monglon, and Mongngawt towns.²⁵

The Tatmadaw often employs aerial assaults, including drone attacks, against the TNLA.²⁶ These aerial assaults consistently cause casualties among both TNLA fighters and civilians,²⁷ and inflict significant destruction on property, including civilian homes.²⁸ Aerial assaults also contribute to an already significant number of internally displaced persons.²⁹

Successful attacks against the Tatmadaw by the 3BHA, of which the TNLA is a member, have resulted in mass casualties on the side of the Tatmadaw.³⁰ On various occasions the TNLA seized military-grade weaponry following successful assaults.³¹ Weaponry in its arsenal includes man-portable air defence systems³², other anti-aircraft weapons, radar systems, RPGs, and various types of landmines.³³

No violent incidents were reported between the TNLA and the Tatmadaw since the implementation of the ceasefire agreement in October 2025.

Organization

The TNLA and its political wing, the PSLF, as of June 2026, are headed by the Chairman, General Tar Aik Phone (aka Tar Aik Bong).³⁴ As the organization’s armed wing, the TNLA is officially part of the PSLF’s defence department.³⁵ The TNLA command is structured to include various high-ranking officers, including two vice-command chairs (Tar Jok Jar and Tar Khu Lang), a General Secretary major-general (Tar Bone Kyaw),³⁶ a commander-in-chief major-general (Tar Hol Plarng)³⁷ and a deputy commander-in-chief head of the Central General Administration Department (with the rank of brigadier-general). ³⁸ Other high-ranking figures within the TNLA include Tar Om Tamaung, Tar Gu Jar, Tar Nor Rein, Tar Lom Kyaw Mya, Tar Parn La, and Tar Kone Khree.³⁹

The TNLA are well-trained and provide training services to other organized armed groups.⁴⁰ Clearly, owing to a sophisticated command structure and the existence of training centres, the TNLA is capable of implementing IHL.

The TNLA’s command includes an eleven-member Central Executive Committee and a twenty-seven-member Central Committee.⁴¹ It is estimated the TNLA has between 5,000 and 10,000 fighters,⁴² which are divided into seven brigades and more than thirty battalions.⁴³ The TNLA reportedly engages in forced recruitment.⁴⁴ It further implemented a parallel governance structure in areas under its control.⁴⁵ In 2018, the TNLA established a police force⁴⁶ as well as a legal department that acts as a judiciary.⁴⁷

The TNLA’s military success and the stable control over territory (see above) confirms a capacity to engage in military tactics. The TNLA employs guerilla-style operations as a part of its military tactics.⁴⁸ Another feature of the TNLA’s military tactics is to co-operate in and co-ordinate alliances. It is a member of the United Nationalities Federal Council, the 3BHA, the Northern Alliance, and the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee. The TNLA governs the Pa Laung Self-Administered Zone located in northern Shan state, which was established under the 2008 constitution to meet the territorial demands of the Palaung/Ta’ang ethnic group.⁴⁹

The TNLA financially benefits from exploiting ruby mines located in Mogok in the Mandalay Region which is under its control,⁵⁰ as well as from its training activities. ⁵¹ The TNLA also imposes taxes in areas under its control.⁵² These lucrative financial streams enhance its logistical capacity. The TNLA has sufficient command of logistics not only to train other resistance groups but also to equip and to arm such groups. As the TNLA controls several towns (see above),⁵³ its territory is often used to move weapons and other supplies.⁵⁴

Lastly, the TNLA has a spokeswoman, Lway Yay Oo, and thus the group speaks with one voice.⁵⁵

The TNLA is sufficiently organized to constitute an organized armed group under IHL.

In view of the lack of armed clashes between the TNLA and the Tatmadaw since the implementation of the ceasefire in October 2025, the NIAC between Myanmar and the TNLA ended as of November 2025.

1
‘Palaung State Liberation Front/ Ta’ang National Liberation Army – PSLF/TNLA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024; ‘Rising dragon: TNLA declares ‘victory’ in northern Shan’, Frontier Myanmar, 4 February 2022. ↩︎
2
C. Schutte, ‘Who is the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)?’, Geopolitical Report, 5 February 2025. ↩︎
3
‘Sixty-one Years of Ta’ang Revolution’, PeaceRep, 12 January 2024. ↩︎
4
‘Rising dragon: TNLA declares ‘victory’ in northern Shan’, Frontier Myanmar, 4 February 2022. ↩︎
5
‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023. ↩︎
6
‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023. ↩︎
7
C. Schutte, ‘Who is the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)?’, Geopolitical Report, 5 February 2025. ↩︎
8
S. Strangio, ‘Myanmar Rebel Group Agrees to Ceasefire With Military Ahead of Junta Election’, The Diplomat, 30 October 2025; ‘Fractured Heartland: Shan Politics and Conflict in Post-coup Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, 27 November 2025. ↩︎
9
Z. Abuza, ‘Tiny ethnic Ta’ang army is a bellwether for opposition fight against Myanmar junta’, Radio Free Asia, 29 August 2023. ↩︎
10
‘Numbers Behind Myanmar’s Conflicts’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 25 June 2026. ↩︎
11
‘Myanmar Junta Bombs TNLA Territory After Peace Talks Fail’, The Irrawaddy, 3 May 2025. ↩︎
12
‘Myanmar Junta ‘Seizes Eight TNLA Positions’’, The Irrawaddy, 9 May 2025. ↩︎
13
‘Intense fighting in Nawnghkio Township; junta retakes some villages’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 24 June 2025; ‘TNLA Fights Off Myanmar Junta Assault’, The Irrawaddy, 24 June 2025; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, June 2025. ↩︎
14
‘Intense fighting in Nawnghkio Township; junta retakes some villages’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 24 June 2025. ↩︎
15
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, July 2025; ‘More Civilian Homes Set on Fire in Moebye After Recapture by Military Junta’, Burma News International, 8 July 2025; ‘Myanmar Junta Recaptures Nawnghkio After Months-Long Counteroffensive’, The Irrawaddy, 16 July 2025 ↩︎
16
‘Regime regains control of Nawnghkio in northern Shan State during counteroffensive’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 17 July 2025; K. Z. Win, ‘Myanmar junta forces recapture strategic northern Shan State town of Nawnghkio’, Myanmar Now, 16 July 2025; ‘Myanmar Junta Recaptures Nawnghkio After Months-Long Counteroffensive’, The Irrawaddy, 16 July 2025. ↩︎
17
‘Junta Airstrikes Kill Civilians, Hit Monasteries in Kyaukme’, Shan Herald Agency for News, 26 August 2025. ↩︎
18
‘More than 10 civilians killed by airstrike in Mandalay Region’s Mogok Township’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 15 August 2025; ‘Myanmar junta airstrike kills eight civilians in Mogok’, Mizzima, 17 August 2025; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, August 2025. ↩︎
19
K. Z. Win, ‘Junta troops push toward Kyaukme amid heavy clashes with TNLA’, Myanmar Now, 23 September 2025; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, September 2025 ↩︎
20
‘Myanmar’s military says it has recaptured a key central town from ethnic rebels’, Associated Press, 2 October 2025; ‘Myanmar Junta Recaptures Kyaukme After 21-Day Offensive’, The Irrawaddy, 2 October 2025; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, October 2025. ↩︎
21
‘Fighting erupts in Mogok after junta takes over from TNLA’, Myanmar Now, 1 December 2025; ‘After the Ceasefire: Renewed Clashes Loom in Myanmar’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 10 November 2025 ↩︎
22
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, December 2025; ‘Junta reportedly clashes with KIA on Mogok–Momeik Road, battles PDF outside Mogok Town’, Burma News International, 2 December 2025 ↩︎
23
‘Military counteroffensive against People’s Defense Force shifts from Mandalay to Sagaing’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 19 March 2026; ‘Myanmar junta retakes Tagaung, Mandalay Region’s last resistance stronghold’, Myanmar Now, 12 March 2026; ‘Junta Troops Close In on Resistance’s Last Stand in Mandalay Region’, The Irrawaddy, 4 March 2026; ‘Last Resistance Stronghold in Mandalay Falls to Myanmar Junta’, The Irrawaddy, 11 March 2026. ↩︎
24
‘Myanmar junta retakes Tagaung, Mandalay Region’s last resistance stronghold’, Myanmar Now, 12 March 2026; ‘Last Resistance Stronghold in Mandalay Falls to Myanmar Junta’, The Irrawaddy, 11 March 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, March 2026. ↩︎
25
‘The State of Myanmar: ISP-Myanmar’s Annual Strategic Review and Foresight 2025-2026’, ISP Myanmar, January 2026; ‘Junta pressures TNLA to withdraw from four controlled towns’, Burma News International, 20 May 2026; ‘Regime demands return of four TNLA-held towns in China-mediated talks’, Development Media Group, 19 May 2026; ‘Fractured Heartland: Shan Politics and Conflict in Post-coup Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, 27 November 2025. ↩︎
26
‘Myanmar junta continues attacks in northern Shan State despite ceasefire’, Myanmar Now, 23 April 2025; M. Pan, ‘Military attacks ethnic Ta’ang armed group’s base in northern Shan State using aircraft and drones’, Myanmar Now, 25 September 2023. ↩︎
27
Z. Abuza, ‘Tiny ethnic Ta’ang army is a bellwether for opposition fight against Myanmar junta’, Radio Free Asia, 29 August 2023; ‘Junta’s Drones an Airstrikes Inflict Casualties on TNLA Fighters and Civilians Northern Shan State’, Burma News International, 21 June 2024 ↩︎
28
‘Myanmar Junta Airstrikes Kill 20 in TNLA Territory’, The Irrawaddy, 13 November 2024; ‘Ta’ang National Liberation Army claims 5 killed by airstrikes; Myanmar experts support Argentina arrest warrants’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 24 February 2025. ↩︎
29
N. Swe, ‘Myanmar army drops massive aerial bombs during northern Shan State clashes, TNLA says’, Myanmar Now, 13 December 2022. ↩︎
30
T. M. Thet and T. Kyaw, ‘Civilian casualties high in Kyaukme by TNLA’s military assaults’, NP News, 8 July 2024; ‘Inside ‘Operation 1027’, the anti-junta offensive in Myanmar’, Firstpost, 15 December 2023. ↩︎
31
I. Naing, ‘Myanmar resistance captures strategic town near Mandalay’, Voice of America, 12 July 2024. ↩︎
32
A. Davis, ‘China’s mobile missiles on the loose in Myanmar’, Asia Times, 28 November 2019 ↩︎
33
‘TNLA Seizes Anti-Aircraft Weapons in Battle at Nawnghkio’, Independent Mon News Agency, 11 July 2024. ↩︎
34
‘What is Myanmar’s Three Brotherhood Alliance that’s resisting the military?’, Al Jazeera, 16 January 2024; ‘The Rise of Princelings – 2: An Upturn of Ta’ang’s Non-Royal Leadership (Ngattapa Min)’, ISP Myanmar, 15 March 2024, 5. ↩︎
35
‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023. ↩︎
36
‘Palaung State Liberation Front/ Ta’ang National Liberation Army – PSLF/TNLA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024; ‘An Upturn of Ta’ang’s Non-Royal Leadership (Ngattapa Min)’, ISP Myanmar, 21 March 2024; ‘The Rise of Princelings – 2: An Upturn of Ta’ang’s Non-Royal Leadership (Ngattapa Min)’, ISP Myanmar, 15 March 2024, 6 ↩︎
37
‘Rising dragon: TNLA declares ‘victory’ in northern Shan’, Frontier Myanmar, 4 February 2022; ‘The Rise of Princelings – 2: An Upturn of Ta’ang’s Non-Royal Leadership (Ngattapa Min)’, ISP Myanmar, 15 March 2024, 6 ↩︎
38
‘TNLA says it will make a revolutionary government emerge in 2025’, Channel News Independent, 27 August 2024. ↩︎
39
‘The Rise of Princelings – 2: An Upturn of Ta’ang’s Non-Royal Leadership (Ngattapa Min)’, ISP Myanmar, 15 March 2024, 6. ↩︎
40
‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023. ↩︎
41
‘An Upturn of Ta’ang’s Non-Royal Leadership (Ngattapa Min)’, ISP Myanmar, 21 March 2024; ‘The Rise of Princelings – 2: An Upturn of Ta’ang’s Non-Royal Leadership (Ngattapa Min)’, ISP Myanmar, 15 March 2024, 5. ↩︎
42
‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023; A. Graceffo, ‘Backgrounder: Ethnic Armies in Myanmar Civil War’, Geopolitical Monitor, 27 February 2024; ‘What is Myanmar’s Three Brotherhood Alliance that’s resisting the military?’, Al Jazeera, 16 January 2024 ↩︎
43
‘Rising dragon: TNLA declares ‘victory’ in northern Shan’, Frontier Myanmar, 4 February 2022. ↩︎
44
‘Fractured Heartland: Shan Politics and Conflict in Post-coup Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, 27 November 2025. ↩︎
45
‘Fractured Heartland: Shan Politics and Conflict in Post-coup Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, 27 November 2025. ↩︎
46
‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023 ↩︎
47
‘Rising dragon: TNLA declares ‘victory’ in northern Shan’, Frontier Myanmar, 4 February 2022. Thus, the TNLA is in a position to discipline its fighters. ↩︎
48
‘Myanmar Junta Seizes Key Village Near TNLA Stronghold in Northern Shan’, The Irrawaddy, 27 March 2025. ↩︎
49
‘Understanding Inter-ethnic Conflict in Myanmar’, Reliefweb, 28 September 2018; A. Graceffo, ‘Backgrounder: Ethnic Armies in Myanmar Civil War’, Geopolitical Monitor, 27 February 2024. ↩︎
50
‘Ta’ang rebels renew vow to crush Myanmar’s junta despite earlier ceasefire offer’, Radio Free Asia, 13 January 2025 ↩︎
51
‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023. ↩︎
52
‘Fractured Heartland: Shan Politics and Conflict in Post-coup Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, 27 November 2025. ↩︎
53
H. H. Zan, ‘Ta’ang Rebels Start Talks With Myanmar Junta in China’, The Irrawaddy, 17 February 2025 ↩︎
54
‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023. ↩︎
55
S. Naing, ‘Myanmar rebel army ready for dialogue with junta, with China’s help’, Reuters, 26 November 2024; ‘Myanmar Junta Seizes Key Village Near TNLA Stronghold in Northern Shan’, The Irrawaddy, 27 March 2025. ↩︎

State Parties

Myanmar

Non-State parties

Arakan Army (AA)
Chin National Defence Force (CNDF)
Kachin Independence Army (KIA)
Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)
Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)
Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)

Other actors involved

Several Ethnic Armed Organisations
Various People’s Defence Forces

Foreign Involvement

China

1
A. Thiha, ‘It’s Time To Rethink Myanmar’s Ethnic Armed Organizations’, The Diplomat, 24 March 2023. ↩︎
2
‘The State of Conflict and Violence in Asia: Myanmar’, The Asia Foundation, October 2017, 106. ↩︎
3
Center for Preventive Action, ‘Civil War in Myanmar’, Council on Foreign Relations, 26 March 2025. ↩︎
4
‘Myanmar: UN Fact-Finding Mission releases its full account of massive violations by military in Rakhine, Kachin and Shan States’, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 18 September 2018. ↩︎
5
R. Ratcliffe, ‘Myanmar civil war: a quick guide to the conflict’, The Guardian, 31 January 2025. ↩︎
6
Center for Preventive Action, ‘Civil War in Myanmar’, Council on Foreign Relations,26 March 2025. ↩︎
7
R. Ratcliffe, ‘Myanmar civil war: a quick guide to the conflict’, The Guardian, 31 January 2025. ↩︎
8
‘Myanmar profile – Timeline’, BBC News, 3 September 2018. ↩︎
9
‘…formerly known as SLORC’, The Economist, 20 November 1997 ↩︎
10
L. Maizland, ‘Myanmar’s Troubled History: Coups, Military Rule, and Ethnic Conflict’, Council on Foreign Relations, 31 January 2022. ↩︎
11
L. Maizland, ‘Myanmar’s Troubled History: Coups, Military Rule, and Ethnic Conflict’, Council on Foreign Relations, 31 January 2022. ↩︎
12
Center for Preventive Action, ‘Civil War in Myanmar’, Council on Foreign Relations, 26 March 2025 ↩︎
13
‘Burma: 20 Years After 1990 Elections, Democracy Still Denied’, Human Rights Watch, 26 May 2010. ↩︎
14
‘Burma: 20 Years After 1990 Elections, Democracy Still Denied’, Human Rights Watch, 26 May 2010. ↩︎
15
‘Country report 70 – Myanmar’, German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 25 November 2024; ‘Identity Crisis: Ethnicity and Conflict in Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, 28 August 2020. ↩︎
16
T. Fuller, ‘Main Opposition to Boycott Myanmar Election’, The New York Times, 29 March 2010. ↩︎
17
E. Teekah and A. McKenna, ‘Myanmar Civil War [2021 – present]’, Britannica, 20 February 2025. ↩︎
18
L. Maizland, ‘Myanmar’s Troubled History: Coups, Military Rule, and Ethnic Conflict’, Council on Foreign Relations, 31 January 2022. ↩︎
19
L. Maizland, ‘Myanmar’s Troubled History: Coups, Military Rule, and Ethnic Conflict’, Council on Foreign Relations, 31 January 2022 ↩︎
20
R. Ratcliffe, ‘Myanmar civil war: a quick guide to the conflict’, The Guardian, 31 January 2025. ↩︎
21
Center for Preventive Action, ‘Civil War in Myanmar’, Council on Foreign Relations,26 March 2025. ↩︎
22
‘The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and the Ethnic Armed Organisations’ ↩︎
23
‘Myanmar profile – Timeline’, BBC News, 3 September 2018. ↩︎
24
See ‘Myanmar profile – Timeline’, BBC News, 3 September 2018. ↩︎
25
Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the detailed findings of the Independent International Fact Finding Mission on Myanmar’, UN Soc A/HRC/39/CRP.2, 17 September 2018; ‘Special Session of the Human Rights Council on the human rights situation of the minority Rohingya Muslim population and other minorities in the Rakhine State of Myanmar’, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 5 December 2017; ‘UN expert demands accountability for the Rohingya and an end to ‘paralysis of indifference’’, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 24 August 2023; ‘Far from the Headlines: Myanmar – The Rohingya crisis’, United Nations Regional Information Centre for Western Europe, 3 May 2024. ↩︎
26
ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar). ↩︎
27
‘Far from the Headlines: Myanmar – The Rohingya crisis’, United Nations Regional Information Centre for Western Europe, 3 May 2024. ↩︎
28
‘The Brotherhood Alliance and Operation 1027: Reshaping Myanmar’s Conflict’, Human Development Forum Foundation, 21 April 2025. ↩︎
29
‘Myanmar: Aung San Suu Kyi’s party wins majority in election’, BBC News, 13 November 2020. ↩︎
30
‘Few Serious Takers for Myanmar Junta’s Election Commission Meeting’, Ecoi.net, 21 May 2021. ↩︎
31
E. Teekah and A. McKenna, ‘Myanmar Civil War [2021 – present]’, Britannica, 20 February 2025. ↩︎
32
R. Ratcliffe, ‘Myanmar civil war: a quick guide to the conflict’, The Guardian, 31 January 2025. ↩︎
33
E. Teekah and A. McKenna, ‘Myanmar Civil War [2021 – present]’, Britannica, 20 February 2025. ↩︎
34
M. Yu et al., ‘Son of ousted Myanmar leader speaks to NPR about her imprisonment’, National Public Radio, 1 April 2025; F. Mao, ‘Aung San Suu Kyi jailed for a further seven years’, BBC, 30 December 2022. ↩︎
35
L. B. Thang, ‘Understanding the Military Coup in Myanmar, Two Years Later’, East West Centre, 15 March 2025. ↩︎
36
‘Daily Briefing in Relation to the Military Coup’, Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, 8 March 2023. ↩︎
37
J. Curtis et al, ‘Myanmar’s civil war’, House of Commons Library, 9 April 2025. ↩︎
38
J. Curtis, ‘One year on from Myanmar’s military coup’, House of Commons Library, 2 February 2022. ↩︎
39
T. Robinson and J. Curtis, ‘Human rights in Myanmar’, House of Commons Library, 17 April 2023. ↩︎
40
‘Myanmar coup: At least two killed as police disperse protesters’, BBC, 20 February 2021. ↩︎
41
S. Ryan and G. Feely, ‘Atrocity crimes in Myanmar? Assessing violence in the wake of the 1 February 2021 attempted coup’, Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 20 September 2021; ‘What’s happening in Myanmar’, Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, 7 May 2025; M. Z. Oo and S. Tønnesson, ‘Counting Myanmar’s Dead: Reported Civilian Casualties since the 2021 Military Coup’, Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2023, 40. ↩︎
42
‘Myanmar: Several injured as security forces violently quash peaceful protests’, Amnesty International, 9 February 2021. ↩︎
43
‘Myanmar: UN Security Council strongly condemns violence against peaceful protesters’, United Nations News, 11 March 2021; UNSC, ‘Statement by the President of the Security Council’, UN Doc S/PRST/2021/5, 10 March 2021. ↩︎
44
‘As slaughter of civilians continues, some decide it’s time to take up arms’, Myanmar Now, 30 March 2021; E. Fishbein et al, ‘‘The last fight’: With growing support for federal army, Kachin prepares for war’, Frontier Myanmar, 3 April 2021. ↩︎
45
‘Myanmar Conflict Map’, International Institute for Strategic Studies; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
46
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
47
‘Taking Aim at the Tatmadaw: The New Armed Resistance to Myanmar’s Coup’, International Crisis Group, 28 June 2021; C. Molyneux, ‘The Use and Impact of Explosive Weapons in Myanmar’, Explosive Weapons Monitor, September 2024. ↩︎
48
‘Myanmar: Vast arsenal and notorious troops deployed during nationwide ‘killing spree’ protest crackdown-new research’, Amnesty International, 11 March 2021; ‘Myanmar Conflict Map’, International Institute for Strategic Studies; ‘Taking Aim at the Tatmadaw: The New Armed Resistance to Myanmar’s Coup’, International Crisis Group, 28 June 2021. ↩︎
49
‘Myanmar Conflict Map’, International Institute for Strategic Studies. ↩︎
50
A. Davis, ‘Myanmar’s fluid war edging toward an endgame’, Asia Times, 18 February 2025; L. Lovett, and S. Johnny, ‘Q&A: Leader of Myanmar’s shadow government talks civil war strategy in 2025’, Al Jazeera, 4 January 2025. ↩︎
51
J. Curtis, ‘One year on from Myanmar’s military coup’, House of Commons Library, 2 February 2022. ↩︎
52
‘Myanmar’s Coup Shakes Up Its Ethnic Conflicts’, International Crisis Group, 22 January 2022. ↩︎
53
‘Myanmar: Dozens killed in alleged military massacre’, DW, 26 December 2021; Z. M. Awng, et al, ‘Christmas eve killings reinforce views of ‘evil’ Myanmar military’, Al Jazeera, 30 December 2021 ↩︎
54
‘Chin rebel groups team up to capture military outpost near Indian border’, Myanmar Now, 13 September 2021. ↩︎
55
‘Chin rebel groups team up to capture military outpost near Indian border’, Myanmar Now, 13 September 2021 ↩︎
56
‘Some 90 Myanmar Junta Soldiers Killed During Intense Weekend Fighting’, The Irrawaddy (Wayback Machine), 11 October 2021 ↩︎
57
‘KIA attacks Tatmadaw base in Kachin’s Mogaung township’, Myanmar Now, 13 March 2021 ↩︎
58
K. Ye Lynn, ‘10 Soldiers killed in Myanmar base attack’, AA, 28 March 2021. ↩︎
59
‘Myanmar: UN Security Council strongly condemns violence against peaceful protesters’, United Nations News, 11 March 2021; UNSC, ‘Statement by the President of the Security Council’, UN Doc S/PRST/2021/5, 10 March 2021; ‘Security Council Press Statement on Situation in Myanmar’, United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 29 December 2021 ↩︎
60
‘ASEAN Chairman’s Statement on the Developments in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar’, ASEAN, 1 February 2021; ‘Chairman’s Statement in the ASEAN Leader’s meeting’, ASEAN, 24 April 2021 ↩︎
61
‘Remarks by President Biden on the Administration’s Response to the Coup in Burma’ The White House, 10 February 2021; ‘S.2937 – Burma Act of 2021’, United States Congress, 2021 and the European Parliament, ‘European Parliament Motion for a Resolution on the human rights situation in Myanmar’, European Parliament, 5 October 2021 ↩︎
62
‘Myanmar Conflict Map’, International Institute for Strategic Studies. ↩︎
63
‘Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessments: Key developments and trends, 2023’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2023, 143. ↩︎
64
‘Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessments: Key developments and trends, 2023’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2023, 143. ↩︎
65
‘Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessments: Key developments and trends, 2023’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2023, 144. ↩︎
66
‘35 Junta Forces Killed in Three Days of Resistance Attacks’, The Irrawaddy, 6 March 2023. ↩︎
67
‘Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessments: Key developments and trends, 2023’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2023, 144. ↩︎
68
I. R. Scarpino and N. Schochet, ‘Do ‘good rebels’ exist in Myanmar’, The New Humanitarian, 25 September 2024. ↩︎
69
A. Connelly and S. Loong, ‘Conflict in Myanmar and the International Response’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2023. ↩︎
70
H. Thit, ‘Head of security for Yangon International Airport assassinated’, Myanmar Now (Wayback Machine), 21 June 2023. ↩︎
71
‘Application Instituting Proceedings and Request for Provisional Measures filed in the Registry of the Court on 11 November 2019: Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v Myanmar)’, International Court of Justice, 11 November 2019; ‘Unofficial Summary: Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v Myanmar)’ International Court of Justice, 3 July 2024. ↩︎
72
‘Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v Myanmar) Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures: Order of 23 January 2020’, International Court of Justice, 23 January 2020. ↩︎
73
‘Declaration of Intervention of the Republic of Maldives’ International Court of Justice, 10 November 2023. ↩︎
74
‘Joint Declaration of Intervention of Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’, International Court of Justice. ↩︎
75
‘Declaration of Intervention under Article 63 of the Republic of Slovenia’, ICJ, 22 November 2024 ↩︎
76
‘Declaration of Intervention of the Democratic Republic of the Congo under Article 63 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice’, ICJ, 10 December 2024 ↩︎
77
‘Declaration of Intervention of the Kingdom of Belgium under Article 63 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice’, ICJ, 12 December 2024 ↩︎
78
‘Declaration of Intervention by Ireland pursuant to Article 63 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice’, ICJ, 10 December 2024. ↩︎
79
‘The Court decides that the Declarations of intervention filed by Slovenia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Belgium and Ireland are admissible’, ICJ, 29 July 2025. ↩︎
80
‘Conclusion of the public hearings on the merits held from Monday 12 to Thursday 29 January 2026’, ICJ, 29 January 2026. ↩︎
81
E. Palmer, ‘With international law at a ‘breaking point’, a tiny country goes after Myanmar’s junta on its own’, The Conversation, 6 February 2026; ‘Timor Leste Opens Unprecedented Legal Proceedings Against Myanmar Junta’, Myanmar Accountability Project, 2 February 2026. ↩︎
82
‘Myanmar’s new president Min Aung Hlaing faces genocide complaint in Indonesia’, Reuters, 6 April 2026; ‘Rights group files ‘genocide’ complaint against Myanmar president-elect: Indonesian AG’, IndoPremier News, 6 April 2026; ‘Indonesian court accepts genocide complaint against Myanmar’s new president’, Mizzima, 9 April 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, April 2026. ↩︎
83
See major developments of Myanmar 2025 entry ↩︎
84
‘Rakhine Rebels Harried on Three Fronts by Myanmar Junta Assaults’, Irrawaddy, 6 September 2025; ‘Analysts warn of escalation in Rakhine State as regime forces advance westward’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 5 December 2025. ↩︎
85
See major developments of Myanmar 2025 entry. ↩︎
86
‘Myanmar Junta Recaptures Kyaukme After 21-Day Offensive’, The Irrawaddy, 2 October 2025; ‘Junta Airstrikes Kill Civilians, Hit Monasteries in Kyaukme’, Shan Herald Agency for News, 26 August 2025; ‘Regime forces retake Hsipaw in northern Shan State from Ta’ang National Liberation Army’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 17 October 2025; ‘Myanmar Junta Recaptures Nawnghkio After Months-Long Counteroffensive’, The Irrawaddy, 16 July 2025. ↩︎
87
S. Strangio, ‘Myanmar Rebel Group Agrees to Ceasefire With Military Ahead of Junta Election’, The Diplomat, 30 October 2025; ‘After the Ceasefire: Renewed Clashes Loom in Myanmar’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 10 November 2025. ↩︎
88
L. Thit, ‘Arakan Army Surrounds Myanmar’s Western Naval Bases, Sparking Intense Battles’, The Irrawaddy, 2 June 2026; ‘Kyaukphyu Conflict Escalates Daily’, Burma News International, 13 May 2025. ↩︎
89
‘MNDAA Captures Kutkai From TNLA as Brotherhood Alliance Shatters in Northern Shan’, The Irrawaddy, 16 March 2026; S. Mon, ‘The recent territorial clashes within Myanmar’s Brotherhood Alliance signal a shift toward Beijing’, ACLED, 23 March 2026; ‘MNDAA seizes full control of Kutkai Town following TNLA dispute’, Burma News International, 17 March 2026; N. Kyal, ‘TNLA and MNDAA Reach Ceasefire Agreement’, MoeMaKa, 23 March 2026. ↩︎
90
‘Ceasefire in northeast Myanmar ends as junta battles ethnic rebels’, Radio Free Asia, 25 June 2024; ‘Arakan Army fires rockets on junta naval base in Myanmar’s Rakhine state’, Radio Free Asia, 23 January 2024. ↩︎
91
Z. Abuza and N. N. T. Aung, ‘Too Little, Too Late: China Steps Up Military Aid to Myanmar’s Junta’, Stimson, 4 March 2025; H. S. Lynn, ‘Managing the Margins: China’s Risk Calculus in Myanmar’s Civil War’, ISP Myanmar, 9 July 2026. ↩︎
92
‘Myanmar junta and armed rebels agree ceasefire’, The Guardian, 12 January 2024. ↩︎
93
E. R. Garagarza, ‘China’s Myanmar Gambit: Seeking greater influence in the region’, Universidad de Navarra, 19 April 2023. ↩︎
94
‘Myanmar firmly upholds One-China policy’, The Global New Light of Myanmar, 9 June 2025; M. Kavi, ‘Myanmar: Military regime passes law allowing Chinese private security firms to protect Chinese investments across the country’, Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, 19 February 2025. ↩︎
95
H. Lee et al, ‘Regional Overview: Asia-Pacific, January 2024’, ACLED, 9 February 2024. ↩︎
96
‘Myanmar junta and armed rebels agree ceasefire’, The Guardian, 12 January 2024. ↩︎
97
H. Lee et al, ‘Regional Overview: Asia-Pacific, January 2024’, ACLED, 9 February 2024. ↩︎
98
‘Ceasefire in northeast Myanmar ends as junta battles ethnic rebels’, Radio Free Asia, 25 June 2024. ↩︎
99
‘China border restrictions prompts pricing surge in Myanmar’, Radio Free Asia, 24 October 2024. ↩︎
100
‘Myanmar Alliance Agrees to Extend Ceasefire With Junta in Shan State’, The Defense Post, 22 July 2024; S. Strangio, ‘Myanmar Armed Groups Extend Ceasefire at China’s Urging’, The Diplomat, 22 July 2024. ↩︎
101
‘Myanmar Alliance Agrees to Extend Ceasefire With Junta in Shan State’, The Defense Post, 22 July 2024. ↩︎
102
‘MNDAA calls for ceasefire and political dialogue amid escalating conflict in Myanmar’, Mizzima, 6 December 2024; ‘Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/ Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang Army) – MNTJP/MNDAA’, Burma News International, 9 September 2025. ↩︎
103
M. Kavi, ‘In Orchestrating Lashio Handover, China Tightens Its Grip on Myanmar’, The Irrawaddy, 24 April 2025; ‘MNDAA Declares Truce With Myanmar Junta After China Detains Leader’, The Irrawaddy, 4 December 2024. ↩︎
104
M. Kavi, ‘In Orchestrating Lashio Handover, China Tightens Its Grip on Myanmar’, The Irrawaddy, 24 April 2025. ↩︎
105
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
106
M. Kavi, ‘In Orchestrating Lashio Handover, China Tightens Its Grip on Myanmar’, The Irrawaddy, 24 April 2025. ↩︎
107
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
108
‘Myanmar military, minority armed group agree ceasefire, China says’, Reuters, 20 January 2025 and between the TNLA and the junta in October 2025 (see above).S. Strangio, ‘Myanmar Rebel Group Agrees to Ceasefire With Military Ahead of Junta Election’, The Diplomat, 30 October 2025. ↩︎
109
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, July 2025; H. S. Lynn, ‘Managing the Margins: China’s Risk Calculus in Myanmar’s Civil War’, ISP Myanmar, 9 July 2026. ↩︎
110
‘After the Ceasefire: Renewed Clashes Loom in Myanmar’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 10 November 2025; L. Thit, ‘Myanmar Junta Reinforces Kyaukphyu as AA Nears China-Backed SEZ Hub’, The Irrawaddy, 11 June 2025. ↩︎
111
‘Resistance-held towns lost amid weakening unity among revolutionary forces: analysts’, Development Media Group, 12 May 2026. ↩︎
112
‘Myanmar junta announces schedule for December, January election’, Radio Free Asia, 26 March 2025; ‘Election date set in December 2025 or early January 2026’, The Global New Light of Myanmar, 21 March 2025. ↩︎
113
Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
114
‘Myanmar armed groups rebuff junta’s “cooperation” appeal’, Myanmar Now, 7 July 2025; ‘Republic of the Union of Myanmar: The National Unity Government Bi-weekly News Update (15/2025)’, NUG Myanmar, 28 August 2025; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, July 2025. ↩︎
115
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, August 2025; ‘Myanmar ends state of emergency in some parts before planned elections’, Al Jazeera, 31 July 2025; ‘Myanmar’s junta ends four-year state of emergency ahead of planned elections – but top general still in charge’, CNN, 1 August 2025; SL. Wee, ‘Myanmar Lifts State of Emergency, Paving the Way for Disputed Vote’, The New York Times, 31 July 2025; ‘Order No.4/2025: Formation of State Security and Peace Commission’, MITV, 31 July 2025; ‘General Nyo Saw appointed Prime Minister’, Channel News Independent, 31 July 2025. ↩︎
116
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, August 2025; ‘ASEAN-Led Special Meeting on Myanmar’s Political and Security Crisis’, Myanmar Muslims News Network, 5 August 2025; ‘Malaysia minister to seek clarity from Myanmar on election, state media reports’, Reuters, 8 August 2025. ↩︎
117
‘Myanmar’s military government announces elections for December 28’, Al Jazeera, 18 August 2025; S. Strangio, ‘Myanmar Military Administration Sets Date For Long-awaited Election’, The Diplomat, 19 August 2025; K. Ng and J. Head, ‘War-torn Myanmar to hold first general election since 2021 coup’, BBC, 18 August 2025; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, August 2025. ↩︎
118
‘Myanmar junta election body dissolves four political parties including Sandar Min’s NDF’, Mizzima, 12 September 2025; ‘Notification No. 95/2025: Cancellation of party registration and dissolution’, MITV, 10 September 2025; ‘UEC Announcement: List of constituencies where elections will not be held’, MITV, 15 September 2025; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, September 2025. ↩︎
119
‘Xi Jinping Meets with Myanmar’s Acting President Min Aung Hlaing’, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Kingdom of Sweden, 30 August 2025; ‘Xi Jinping Meets with Myanmar’s Acting President Min Aung Hlaing’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: People’s Republic of China, 30 August 2025; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, September 2025. ↩︎
120
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, September 2025; ‘Myanmar, Russia celebrate 70 years of enduring friendship’, The Global New Light of Myanmar, 27 September 2025; ‘Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and Myanmar’s military chief Min Aung Hlaing meet in Moscow’, Reuters Connect, 25 September 2025; K. L. Kyaw, ‘Putin, Myanmar Junta Chief Discuss Deepening Ties in Moscow’, Bloomberg, 26 September 2025. ↩︎
121
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, October 2025; ‘Myanmar: Elections a Fraudulent Claim for Credibility’, Human Rights Watch, 16 November 2025. ↩︎
122
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, October 2025; S. Strangio, ‘Myanmar Invites ASEAN to Send Election Observers to Year-end Polls’, The Diplomat, 13 October 2025; ‘ASEAN to discuss Myanmar election observers at October summit’, Reuters, 11 October 2025. ↩︎
123
‘Myanmar: Repressive tactics intensify before junta-imposed elections’, Amnesty International, 22 December 2025; M. Pyae, ‘Myanmar Junta Silences Election Criticism With Mass Arrests’, The Irrawaddy, 3 November 2025; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, November 2025. ↩︎
124
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, November 2025; D. Paramitha, ‘Myanmar Invites ASEAN to Monitor Elections, But the Bloc Says No’, Seasia, 2 November 2025; ‘ASEAN Not Sending Monitors to Myanmar Junta’s Election: Sources’, The Irrawaddy, 27 October 2025. ↩︎
125
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, December 2025; R. Horsey, ‘Myanmar’s Military Seeks Vote of Approval in One-sided Polls’, International Crisis Group, 9 December 2025; ‘Myanmar’s military government charge hundreds with breaking election law as voting date nears’, Associated Press, 17 December 2025; ‘Myanmar arrests hundreds under new election law ahead of December vote’, Reuters, 19 December 2025. ↩︎
126
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, January 2026; ‘Myanmar votes again in military’s lopsided election’, Reuters, 11 January 2026; ‘Myanmar’s junta leader dismisses critics as military allies head for landslide election win’, Reuters, 25 January 2026; ‘Myanmar military-led election Phase 3: Delayed voting does not mean safer elections’, Centre for Information Resilience, 4 February 2026; ‘Military-Run Vote in War Zones; APHR Rejects Myanmar’s Election as it enters Second Phase’, ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights, 13 January 2026. ↩︎
127
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, February 2026; ‘Recalibrating Diplomacy with Myanmar after Election Seals Military Control’, International Crisis Group, 25 March 2026; ‘Myanmar military-backed party declared election winner as army plans new body to maintain control’, NBC News, 5 February 2026. ↩︎
128
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, February 2026; ‘Union Consultative Council Law: NDSC enacted Union Consultative Council Law’, MITV, 4 February 2026; ‘Myanmar’s military government creates new body to maintain control’, Constitution Net, 4 February 2026; ‘Personalistic Tyranny: The Constitutional Tribunal Amendment’, ISP Myanmar, 11 February 2026. ↩︎
129
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, March 2026; ‘Myanmar junta chief in line for presidency as military seeks to maintain power’, Reuters, 30 March 2026; ‘Recalibrating Diplomacy with Myanmar after Election Seals Military Control’, International Crisis Group, 25 March 2026; ‘Myanmar parliament picks leader of army-backed party as speaker’, Reuters, 16 March 2026. ↩︎
130
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, March 2026; S. Strangio, ‘Myanmar Junta Grants Amnesties to More Than 7,300 Political Prisoners’, The Diplomat, 3 March 2026; R. Groen, ‘Myanmar military junta announces amnesty for 10,000 prisoners’, Jurist News, 3 March 2026. ↩︎
131
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, April 2026; ‘Myanmar junta chief Min Aung Hlaing elected president by pro-military parliament’, Reuters, 3 April 2026; J. Head, ‘Myanmar’s coup leader who set off a brutal civil war becomes president’, BBC, 3 April 2026; ‘Myanmar’s coup leader Min Aung Hlaing sworn in as president’, Al Jazeera, 10 April 2026. ↩︎
132
M. Kavi, ‘Min Aung Hlaing Gives Armed Groups 100 Days to Join Peace Talks’, The Irrawaddy, 21 April 2026; ‘Myanmar president seeks peace talks within 100 days, rebels reject offer’, Reuters, 21 April 2026; M. Monn, ‘Steps Towards Peace: Myanmar’s 100-Day Initiative’, Myanmar Digital News, 29 April 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, April 2026. ↩︎
133
‘SCEF formed as major coalition between NUG and EAOs’, Burma News International, 2 April 2026; ‘Announcement by the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF)’, NUG Myanmar, 5 April 2026; ‘Historic formation of Steering Council for Federal Democratic Union in Myanmar’, Mizzima, 2 April 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, April 2026. ↩︎
134
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, April 2026; ‘Myanmar National Human Rights Commission: Statement No. (5/2026)’, Myanmar National Human Rights Commission, 30 April 2026; ‘Myanmar to free more than 4,000 prisoners in amnesty’, Reuters, 17 April 2026; ‘Myanmar cuts ex-leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s sentence, frees former president’, Reuters, 17 April 2026; G. Peck, ‘Former President Win Myint freed in broad Myanmar prisoner amnesty’, Associated Press, 17 April 2026. ↩︎
135
‘Wang Yi Holds Talks with Foreign Minister of Myanmar Tin Maung Swe’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: People’s Republic of China, 25 April 2026; ‘Chinese FM meets with Myanmar counterpart’, Xinhua, 26 April 2026; ‘Myanmar’s President Min Aung Hlaing Meets with Wang Yi’, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 26 April 2026; ‘MoS for External Affairs Kirti Vardhan Singh calls on representatives of Myanmar’s new Govt’, Akashvani News, 11 April 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, April 2026. ↩︎
136
L. Hakim and A. Azmi, ‘Malaysia does not recognise Myanmar administration, says Tok Mat’, New Strait Times, 25 June 2026; ‘Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr Vivian Balakrishnan’s Written Reply to Parliamentary Question, 12 February 2026’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Singapore, 12 February 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, April 2026. ↩︎
137
‘Thailand dukung kembalinya Myanmar ke dalam ASEAN’, Antara, 23 April 2026; ‘Sihasak visits Myanmar, seeks ASEAN return and border stability’, The Nation Thailand, 22 April 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, April 2026. ↩︎
138
M. Flores, ‘ASEAN to hold talks soon with Myanmar foreign minister, secretary-general says’, Reuters, 7 May 2026; ‘Summary of the Press Briefing on the briefing for the diplomatic corps on the outcomes of the 48th ASEAN Summit and Related Meetings on 11 May 2026’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Thailand, 11 May 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, May 2026. During June 2026, President Min Aung Hlaing conducted official visits to India and China, strengthening ties with both countries.‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, June 2026; A. Dey, ‘Why Myanmar president’s India visit is being closely watched’, BBC, 2 June 2026; M. Sullivan, ‘Myanmar’s Min Aung Hlaing takes first foreign tour as leader, with visit to India’, NPR, 30 May 2026; ‘Myanmar’s former junta chief kicks off visit to China as civilian president’, Reuters, 15 June 2026. ↩︎
139
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, June 2026; ‘Myanmar-Malaysia: Myanmar and Malaysia FMs held bilateral meeting’, MITV, 20 May 2026; ‘Foreign Ministers of Myanmar and Indonesia hold Bilateral Meeting (8-6-2026, Nay Pyi Taw)’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 9 June 2026; ‘Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Myanmar and Lao PDR hold bilateral talks (12-6-2026, Nay Pyi Taw)’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 15 June 2026. ↩︎
140
‘BRI Welcomes $121 Million U.S. Assistance for Burma in FY2026 Appropriations’, Burma Research Institute, 4 February 2026; ‘Burma: Background and Issues for Congress’, Congress.gov, 4 May 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, June 2026. ↩︎
141
B. Lintner, ‘The truth behind Myanmar’s Rohingya insurgency’, Asia Times, 20 September 2017. ↩︎
142
‘Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State’, International Crisis Group, 15 September 2016. ↩︎
143
A. Pandey, ‘Myanmar’s Rohingya rebels – What you need to know’, DW, 9 October 2017 ↩︎
144
‘Bangladesh: Spiraling Violence Against Rohingya Refugees’, Human Rights Watch, 13 July 2023. ↩︎
145
S. Czimmek, and A. Islam, ‘Rohingya militants active in Bangladeshi refugee camps’, DW, 24 September 2019. ↩︎
146
F. Edroos, ‘ARSA: Who are the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army?’, Al Jazeera, 13 September 2019; ‘Myanmar: Who are the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army?’, BBC, 6 September 2017. ↩︎
147
‘Crisis Mounts for Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh’, International Crisis Group, 6 December 2023. ↩︎
148
‘Bangladesh arrests leader of Rohingya insurgent group on criminal charges’, Reuters, 19 March 2025. ↩︎
149
S. Bhattacharya, ‘Bangladesh: Change of Reign in Arakan Army’, Sri Lankan Guardian, 1 April 2025. ↩︎
150
‘“I May be Killed Any Moment”: Killings, Abductions, Torture and other Serious Violations by Rohingya Militant Groups in Bangladesh’, Fortify Rights, 18 March 2025. ↩︎
151
S. Rahman, ‘Dil Mohammed: The smuggler shaping a war in Arakan’, Dhaka Tribune, 16 February 2025. ↩︎
152
‘‘They don’t represent us’: Rohingya armed groups wreak havoc in Rakhine’, Frontier Myanmar, 7 May 2025; ‘Rakhine State Clash Reported Between AA and Rohingya Militants’, The Irrawaddy, 22 July 2023. ↩︎
153
N. M. Thu, ‘ARSA cross into Maungdaw from Bangladesh, clash with AA’, NarinJara, 29 April 2025. ↩︎
154
‘AA and ARSA clash near Mee Taik village in northern Maungdaw’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 19 February 2025. ↩︎
155
N. M. Thu, ‘ARSA cross into Maungdaw from Bangladesh, clash with AA’, NarinJara, 29 April 2025. ↩︎
156
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, September 2025; The Irrawaddy – English Edition, Facebook, 29 September 2025; ‘Tracking Conflict in the Asia-Pacific: September 2025 Update’, The Diplomat, 7 October 2025. ↩︎
157
J. Singh, ‘Southeast Asia and the Rohingya Militant Threat’, The Diplomat, 19 February 2026; ‘AA steps up warnings as ARSA members enter Mayu Mountains’, Burma News International, 2 February 2026. ↩︎
158
‘Bangladesh border fence plan puts focus on Arakan Army’s role in border security’, Development Media Group, 7 July 2026. ↩︎
159
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, August 2025; ‘Arakan Rohingya National Council Condemns Buthidaung Massacre and Calls for Urgent International Investigation’, Arakan News Agency, 4 August 2025; ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews’, UN Doc A/80/490, 20 October 2025. ↩︎
160
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, August 2025; M. Pyae, ‘Arakan Army Denies Rohingya Massacre’, The Irrawaddy, 12 August 2025. ↩︎
161
‘WFP urges life-saving support for Myanmar’s Rakhine State as hunger surges’, World Food Programme, 12 August 2025; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, August 2025. ↩︎
162
‘Rohingya population in Cox’s Bazar rises by nearly 179,000 in one year: UNHCR’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 19 March 2026. ↩︎
163
‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, March 2025. ↩︎
164
‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, March 2025; ‘Towards a deeper understanding of Myanmar’s People’s Defence Forces’, Centre on Armed Groups, July 2025. ↩︎
165
‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, March 2025; ‘Towards a deeper understanding of Myanmar’s People’s Defence Forces’, Centre on Armed Groups, July 2025. ↩︎
166
‘Towards a deeper understanding of Myanmar’s People’s Defence Forces’, Centre on Armed Groups, July 2025; ‘The State of Myanmar: ISP–Myanmar’s Annual Strategic Review and Foresight 2025–2026’, ISP Myanmar, 31 January 2026. ↩︎
167
‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, March 2025. ↩︎
168
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, November 2025; ‘Myanmar state television broadcasts army crackdown on scam centers’, Associated Press, 25 November 2025; N. B. Han, ‘Global pressure forces Myanmar junta to crack down on scam centres, sources say’, Reuters, 21 November 2025. ↩︎
169
‘KNU denies involvement in KK Park online scam allegations’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 28 October 2025; ‘KNU leaders accused of role in KK Park and online gambling operations’, The Nation Thailand, 21 October 2025; ‘KNU denies involvement in KK Park online scam allegations’, Mizzima, 28 October 2025. ↩︎
170
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, November 2025; ‘Myanmar state television broadcasts army crackdown on scam centers’, Associated Press, 25 November 2025; N. B. Han, ‘Global pressure forces Myanmar junta to crack down on scam centres, sources say’, Reuters, 21 November 2025; ‘Myanmar Junta Dynamites Scam Hub in PR Move as Global Pressure Grows’, The Irrawaddy, 6 November 2025; ‘Treasury Sanctions Southeast Asian Networks Targeting Americans with Cyber Scams’, U.S. Department of the Treasury, 8 September 2025. ↩︎
171
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, December 2025; E. Kinetz, ‘Takeaways from The Associated Press report on Myanmar’s crackdown on cyberscam centers’, Associated Press, 17 December 2025; ‘Myanmar steps up fight against online scams, gambling; Shwe Kokko and KK Park buildings demolished’, Myanmar Digital News, 24 December 2025. ↩︎
172
‘Myanmar Junta’s Anti-Scam Czar Purged in Bribery Scandal’, The Irrawaddy, 12 February 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, February 2026. ↩︎
173
See 2023–2025 version of this entry ↩︎
174
S. Mon, ‘The war from the sky: How drone warfare is shaping the conflict in Myanmar’, ACLED, 1 July 2025; S. Mon, ‘Ahead of elections, Myanmar’s military capitalizes on foreign support to divide the resistance’, ACLED, 11 December 2025; ‘Changes and Adaptations in Command, Control, and Strategic Aerial Operations of the Junta’s Air Force’, Myanmar Defense & Security Institute, April 2025; N. B. Han and S. Naing, ‘Human‑wave attacks and drones: How Myanmar’s junta is fighting back’, Reuters, 16 December 2025; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, December 2025. ↩︎
175
‘Military Airstrikes Tracker’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 25 June 2026. ↩︎

Myanmar

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (January 2025 and June 2026)

The Gambia v Myanmar case before the International Court of Justice

Criminal proceedings initiated against Myanmar’s military leader

Weakening of the Three Brotherhood Alliance and Operation 1027

Chinese influence on Myanmar’s conflict

Developments related to the December 2025 elections

New nominally civilian pro-military government took office

The evolving violent situation between the ARSA and the AA

AA accused of massacres against Rohingya in 2024 and deteriorating humanitarian situation in Rakhine state

The nature and shifting alliances of the PDF

Crack-down on cyber scam operations along Thai-Myanmar border

Escalation of airstrikes and drone attacks carried out by Myanmar’s military

Non International Armed Conflict

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Parties to the Conflict

State Parties

Non-State parties

Other actors involved

Foreign Involvement