Togo (2026-07-06)

In the Republic of Togo there is one ongoing non-international armed conflict (NIAC) between the Togolese Armed Forces and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Togo is a State Party to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II of 1977. The NIAC does not, however, satisfy the requirement in Article 1(1) of the Additional Protocol that the group exercise a level of territorial control that would enable it to conduct sustained military operations and implement the obligations in the Protocol and thus it does not formally apply. Most if not all of the obligations are, though, reflected in customary international humanitarian law (IHL).

Togo is a Sahelian coastal State on Africa’s west coast¹ with a population of about 8.5 million.² Togo became an independent nation on 27 April 1960.³ There was a military coup in 1963 in the course of which President Sylvanus Olympio was assassinated. In 1967, Gnassingbé Eyadéma seized power in another military coup, ruling the country for thirty-eight years until his death in 2005.⁴ Shortly after his death, his son, Faure Gnassingbé, became president with the support of the military.⁵

The Sahel is beset with terrorist activity.⁶ Togo borders Burkina Faso to the north and Benin to the west. These States are both engaged in ongoing NIACs. Two non-State actors, JNIM and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), are dominant in the conflicts in Burkina Faso,⁷ and are in competition with each other over territory as they tussle for supremacy in the Sahel.⁸ W-Arly-Pendjari (WAP) complex, a series of protected national parks, stretches over several Sahelian territories including Benin, Burkina Faso, and Niger, and borders Ghana, and Nigeria, and Togo. The complex is said to offer armed groups a buffer zone in which to hide, launch operations, and to serve as a corridor for illicit activities.⁹

JNIM has expanded its military operations into Togo.¹⁰ JNIM is the Sahel affiliate of al-Qaeda. It is a Salafi-jihadist group that has, as a parent organization, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) which finds its origins in the 1990s Algerian civil war.¹¹ Togo reported an early JNIM attack between 9 and 10November 2021 in the village of Sanloaga in Kpendjal prefecture. The attack did not, though, result in casualties.¹² Six months after the first incursion, a coordinated attack was executed by JNIM against the Togolese military outpost in Kpinkankandi, Kpendjal prefecture, on 10 and 11 May 2022, resulting in the deaths of eight soldiers and thirteen injured, as well as significant material damage. In 2023, Togo experienced a total of twenty-one attacks that killed thirty-one deaths and injured twenty-nine.¹³

In 2024, four separate attacks were attributed to JNIM with fifty-two people killed in total. In 2025, between January and July, at least fifty-four civilians and eight soldiers were killed.¹⁴ Consequently, JNIM attacks in Togo are now considered a ‘strategic expansion rather than spill-over’¹⁵ because they are no longer limited to the border area with Burkina Faso.¹⁶ The Togolese government has suggested that ISSP contributed to some of the attacks on its territory, but it has not backed up the claim with evidence.¹⁷ It is unclear if ISSP is indeed conducting hostilities in Togo of whether the violence is an occasional spill-over from the conflict in Burkina Faso.

The formation of and security efforts by the Confederation of Sahel States

The Togolese government received training from the Confederation of Sahel States during 2025.¹⁸ Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger officially exited the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on 29 January 2025 to form a new alliance, the Confederation of Sahel States.¹⁹ Russia met with the Confederation in Moscow on 3 April 2025 to promote security and defence cooperation.²⁰

On multiple occasions during 2025, Togo announced it was seriously contemplating also exiting ECOWAS and joining the Confederation.²¹ It remained part of ECOWAS as of May 2026.²² Togo and Chad did participate in a joint military exercise, Tarha Nakal 2, on 15 May – 4 June 2025 that was organized by the Confederation.²³

Constitutional Reform from a Presidential to a Parliamentary System of Government

Following the approval of a new constitution in April 2024 (see 2023 version), President Gnassingbé was sworn in as the president of the Council of Ministers on 3 May 2025.²⁴ The constitutional change that extended the president’s tenure was met with protests on the basis that it is seen as a strategy to ensure indefinite rule by Faure Gnassingbe.²⁵

Unlawful Arrest of Tchala Essowè Narcisse

Tchala Essowè Narcisse, known as Aamron, is popular for his songs which condemn corruption and bemoan the lack of development in the nation.²⁶ The artist was arrested without a warrant according to his lawyer and kept in custody incommunicado for ten days. A video of the activist circulated on social media with a claim that he is mentally unstable and has been committed to a psychiatric facility.²⁷ Mr Aamron was later released.²⁸

Violent Protest Against Constitutional Reform

On 26–28 June 2025, hundreds of citizens set up barricades of burning tyres during a protest against the constitutional changes which turned violent (see above). The protesters in the capital Lomé called for the resignation of President Gnassingbé.²⁹ The protest, which involved mainly Gen Z youth, also signalled dissatisfaction with the level of unemployment, the increase in electricity tariffs, crumbling infrastructure, and the Gnassingbé dynasty more broadly, which has ruled since 1967.³⁰

The current Togolese government adopts a zero-tolerance approach to protests, political party meetings, and gatherings.³¹ The police used tear gas to disperse the protesters and officers used excessive force against the protesters leading to deaths, injuries, and arbitrary arrests.³² In some neighbourhoodsin Lomé, the military were deployed.³³

Extension of State of Security Emergency by National Assembly in Northern Region

The state of emergency in the Savanes region in the north of Togo was extended throughout 2025 and 2026 allegedly to counter a rebel insurgency and to stabilize the security situation.³⁴ The ‘State of Security Emergency’ was declared first in June 2022 by the National Assembly,³⁵ and later extended in September 2022, April 2023, and again on 12 March 2024.³⁶

The request for an extension for a further twelve-month period of the state of emergency in the Savanes region was approved by the National Assembly on 6 March 2025. The decision, supported by a majority in the legislature, took effect on 13 March 2025 and remained in effect until March 2026. The extension enables the government to adopt new measures in response to the continuing activities of armed groups.³⁷

On 27 February 2026, the Togolese National Assembly once more extended the state of emergency in the northern Savanes region of Togo for a further twelve months, starting on 13 March 2026.³⁸ Opposition parties challenged this latest extension, calling it oppressive.³⁹

Government information lockdown

Local media whistleblowers report that the Togolese government initiated an information lockdown over the developing security situation in the north, which encompassed not only the spill-over conflict from Burkina Faso but also clashes between the Togolese Armed Forces and JNIM.⁴⁰ A Togolese political scientist, Madi Djabakate, declared that the Togolese High Authority for Broadcasting/Audiovisual and Communication has ‘expressly forbidden journalists from mentioning the attacks or human or material losses, so as not to demoralize the troops engaged on the ground’.⁴¹ Civil society has repeatedly denounced the information blockage.⁴²

On 16 June 2025, Togo’s regulatory High Authority for Broadcasting/Audiovisual and Communication suspended the licence of two outlets, France 24 and RFI, for ‘biased reporting’ on the security situation in the country.⁴³ Their three-month suspension corresponds to a trend exercised by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, which suspended these broadcasters indefinitely.⁴⁴

Suspected Turkish Private Military Support Operations

According to reports, combat personnel from SADAT,⁴⁵ the only private military company in Türkiye, have been deployed to Togo for the purposes of supporting border security. The nature of support includes training, demining activities, and border surveillance via helicopter.⁴⁶ The exact mandate is unclear, though, as the Togolese government had not yet formally confirmed the presence of SADAT in the country.⁴⁷ During violent clashes in 2024, two suspected SADAT employees died. Those responsible for the violence have not yet been identified and JNIM did not claim responsibility for these incidents.⁴⁸

Detention of Togolese Soldiers

As of April 2026, more than fifty-two Togolese soldiers, including at least eight women, were held in Lomé civil prison under allegations of ‘inciting mutiny’. This brought the estimated number of soldiers detained by the Togolese government at this facility to 563.⁴⁹

The Togolese Government’s Arrest and Extradition of Ousted Burkinabe President Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba

Paul Henri Sandaogo Damiba is the former president of Burkina Faso who was ousted in 2022 by the junta, led by President Ibrahim Traoré, only nine months after taking office. After his ousting he fled to Togo.⁵⁰ Traoré’s government accused Damiba of planning to overthrow and assassinate President Traoré.⁵¹ An investigation into the accusations was launched on 5 January 2026, and an international arrest warrant was issued by the Burkinabe government the next day.⁵² On 12 January 2026, the Burkinabe Justice Department issued an extradition request to Togo.⁵³

Damiba was arrested by Togolese authorities and extradited to Burkina Faso to face trial on 17 January 2026.⁵⁴ Togolese authorities said that assurances were provided by the Burkinabe authorities that Mr Damiba’s human rights would be respected and that he will face a fair trial.⁵⁵

Non-international armed conflict between Togo and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)

Background

Between 2023 and 2026, Togo not only experienced increasing spill-over activity as a result of the NIACs in the States it borders,¹ but also an increase in attacks by JNIM launched against Togolese territory.² These attacks are now considered as a ‘strategic expansion rather than spill over’,³ as they are no longer limited to the border area with Burkina Faso.⁴

Intensity

The conflict between the Togolese Armed Forces and JNIM is under-reported as neither the Togolese government nor the army comments specifically on the security situation in the north.⁵ Civil society has repeatedly denounced the silence of the Togolese government about the security situation and its under-reporting. The media describes the Togolese approach to the security situation with JNIM as an information lock-down.⁶ In the task of classification, observers rely on the local press and on other limited media reports.⁷ The repeated extension of a state of emergency in northern Togo signals, though, that the situation is not contained (see above).

Reports in the media illustrate that attacks are of a military nature. Despite the information lockdown, there are reports of attacks in April⁸ and June 2025.⁹

The frequent reporting (leaking) of attacks shows they are not sporadic or isolated.

In 2025, JNIM escalated military operations against the armed forces including with a drone attack on a Togolese military position in Djignandjoaga in April.¹⁰ There was also a ground incursion by JNIM from Burkina Faso into Togo on 8 June 2025 into the village of Kpinkankandi in the prefecture of Kpendjal. The attack was repelled by the Togolese Armed Forces and weapons and motorcycles were seized by the military.¹¹

Though limited, reporting indicates that during 2025 the death toll related to JNIM and Togolese military activities in northern Togo rose significantly.¹² Approximately sixty combat related deaths, including eight Togolese soldiers, were reported between January and July 2025.¹³ There are also reports of more than 8,000 Togolese soldiers deployed in the region.¹⁴

The weaponry JNIM fighters use includes those taken in ambushes of State armed forces. Stolen weapons include Kalashnikov assault rifles¹⁵ M80 rifles, ¹⁶ and 12.7mm machine guns.¹⁷ JNIM’s arsenal increasingly uses unmanned vehicle systems and improvised explosive devices.¹⁸ In May 2026, it was reported that the Togolese Armed Forces purchased four Embraer A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft specifically to respond to JNIM activities in its territory. These aircraft will be used for surveillance and targeting purposes.¹⁹

Despite under-reporting, the fighting between the Togolese Armed Forces and JNIM satisfies the intensity demanded by IHL.

Organization

JNIM has an organized command structure with a top-down hierarchy. Essentially, there are three overall tiers: central leadership, regional commanders, and local commanders.²⁰ Central leadership includes the emir, Iyad Ag Ghaly(aka Abu al-Fadl), who founded Ansar Dine.²¹ Deputy leaders are Yahya Abu Hammam (Djamel Okacha), the leader of AQIM Sahara, Amadou Koufa, the leader of the Katibat Macina (Macina Liberation Front or FLM), and Abu Hassan al-Ansari, the deputy leader of al-Mourabitoun.²² Another deputy leader is Abu Abdul Rahman Ali al-Sanhaji (Ali Maychou) who is a representative of AQIM Sahara, as well as being a senior judge in JNIM and its religious advisor, ‘Koufa’.²³

Different subgroups are at the disposal of top leadership but operate with some flexibility as subgroups are divided into regionally separate areas.²⁴

Its organizational structure has been described as ‘strategically coherent’ with senior regional commanders deployed to external JNIM subgroups to ensure cooperation and discipline.²⁵ Some analysts, though, dispute whether coherence exists between subgroups,²⁶ instead describing JNIM as essentially an umbrella group.²⁷

Discipline is enforced at the highest level by a ‘Majlis Shura’ (Consultative Council) which publicly responds to accusations of atrocities. JNIM’s Shura Council ensures Islamic governance and strict adherence to Islamic law in areas under JNIM control.²⁸ These bodies, as well as the tiered command structure, enable JNIM to implement IHL. Training is offered to fighters by highly mobile units using motorcycles to facilitate training where and when needed across the Sahel region.²⁹ Training camps create the opportunity to implement IHL and enhance discipline among fighters.

Military tactics employed by JNIM are described as a purposeful encircling of isolated strategic zones, weakening State presence and creating power vacuums.³⁰ JNIM relies on motorcycles for manoeuvrability during an ambush.³¹ That said, JNIM generally prefers use of remote violence, such as IEDs and indirect artillery and mortar fire, over swarming tactics and ambushes, which are more the modus operandi of ISSP.³²

JNIM facilitates logistics through an extended network across central Sahel into the West African littoral states including parts of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Benin, Ivory Coast, and Togo.³³ Weapons and munitions are replenished through large-scale attacks on garrisons or auxiliary camps belonging to State armed forces in the operational area.³⁴ Also, weapons and other military needs are met using profits from artisanal mining, livestock theft, fundraising, taxation, and looting.³⁵

JNIM‘s vast territorial reach³⁶ gives it a large recruitment pool.³⁷ Although the group does not have control over territory in Togo as of May 2026,³⁸ it is reported that JNIM has between 5,000 and 6,000 fighters in its ranks.³⁹ JNIM uses its media wing, al-Zallaqa,⁴⁰ and propaganda channels⁴¹ to communicate with the outside world and to control its narrative. JNIM also has an official spokesperson, who, at the time of reporting, was Mahmoud Barry.⁴²

JNIM is sufficiently organized for IHL to apply.

A NIAC between Togo and JNIM was triggered as of July 2025 and was continuing as of May 2026.

1
‘Togo Travel Advisory’, US Department of State, 7 November 2024.
2
‘Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/495, 31 July 2025, para 24; ‘A hidden war: Violent extremism rules in the Sahel, and is spreading south’, Centre for Information Resilience, 30 July 2025.
3
H. Nsaibia, ‘Conflict intensifies and instability spreads beyond Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger’, ACLED, 12 December 2024.
4
R. K. Douti, ‘ “No Peace, No Bread”: Northern Togo in the Grip of a Three-year State of Emergency’, Afrique XXI, 31 July 2025; ‘Togo tight-lipped as Burkina jihadists infiltrate north’, Club of Mozambique, 19 August 2025.
5
‘Togo extends state of security emergency in north’, Africa News, 13 August 2024.
6
‘Togo extends state of security emergency in north’, Africa News, 13 August 2024.
7
‘Togo extends state of security emergency in north’, Africa News, 13 August 2024.
8
J. G. Birru and L. Serwat, ‘Africa Overview: May 2025’, ACLED, 9 May 2025;‘Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/495, 31 July 2025, para 51.
9
‘Nord-Togo: les FAT tiennent bon face aux djihadistes’, Republic of Togo, 9 June 2025; ‘A hidden war: Violent extremism rules in the Sahel, and is spreading south’, Centre for Information Resilience, 30 July 2025.
10
J. G. Birru and L. Serwat, ‘Africa Overview: May 2025’, ACLED, 9 May 2025;‘Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/495, 31 July 2025, para 31.
11
‘Nord-Togo: les FAT tiennent bon face aux djihadistes’, Republic of Togo, 9 June 2025; ‘A hidden war: Violent extremism rules in the Sahel, and is spreading south’, Centre for Information Resilience, 30 July 2025; J. Zenn, ‘Brief: Togo Resurfaces as Conflict Zone After JNIM Overruns Border Military Base’, Jamestown, 21 August 2024.
12
‘Togo tight-lipped as Burkina jihadists infiltrate north’, eNCA, 19 August 2025; ‘Togo Extends Northern ‘State of Emergency’’, Voice of America, 7 April 2023.
13
‘Super Tucano Aircraft to Help Togo Address Terror Threats’, African Defense Forum, 19 May 2026.
14
‘Togo tight-lipped as Burkina jihadists infiltrate north’, eNCA, 19 August 2025.
15
M. Laplace, ‘Al‑Qaeda affiliate JNIM claims attack near Niamey’, The Africa Report, 19 October 2024
16
‘Attaque à Assamaka: une offensive des Forces Armées Libres (FAL) fait sept morts et cinq blessés, trente-sept suspects interpellés’, ActuNiger, 19 October 2024.
17
‘Opération Damissa: Une attaque terroriste vaillamment repoussé à Falmey’, Le Sahel, 18 March 2025.
18
‘Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/495, 31 July 2025, para 24.
19
‘Super Tucano Aircraft to Help Togo Address Terror Threats’, African Defense Forum, 19 May 2026.
20
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
21
J. Thompson, ‘Examining Extremism: Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 July 2021; ‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
22
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
23
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
24
L. Karr and B. Carter, ‘Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel’, Critical Threats, 20 November 2024; H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023; J. Thompson, ‘Examining Extremism: Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 July 2021; ‘Mapping armed groups in Mali and the Sahel’, European Council on Foreign Relations; ‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
25
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
26
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025; D. Eizenga and W. Williams, ‘The Puzzle of JNIM and Militant Islamist Groups in the Sahel’, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, December 2020.
27
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
28
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025; H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
29
‘JNIM Training Camp in Burkina Faso Shows Terror Group’s Deadly Ambition’, Africa Defense Forum, 18 June 2024; C. Weiss, ‘JNIM documents training camp in Burkina Faso’, Online Article, Long War Journal, 25 May 2024.
30
‘After Tillabéri, Is Niamey the Next Target?’, Zagazola, 9 April 2025.
31
‘Le JNIM frappe au Niger: offensive éclair contre la base militaire de Mossipaga, l’AES en difficulté’, Daily Motion, 20 May 2025.
32
J. G. Birru, ‘IS Sahel’s tactics cause mass, indiscriminate violence’, ACLED, 13 January 2023.
33
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
34
‘Thirty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/556, 22 July 2024, para 18.
35
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
36
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
37
‘Thirty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2025/71/Rev.1, 6 February 2025, para 12.
38
R. Kanssoubigue Douti, “No Peace, No Bread”: Northern Togo in the Grip of a Three-year State of Emergency, Afrique XXI, 31 July 2025.
39
‘Thirty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/556, 22 July 2024, para 10.
40
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
41
M. Laplace, ‘Al‑Qaeda affiliate JNIM claims attack near Niamey’, The Africa Report, 19 October 2024; ‘Mapping armed groups in Mali and the Sahel’, European Council on Foreign Relations.
42
LSI Africa, X, 26 November 2024; ‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.

State Parties

Togo

Non-State parties

Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)

1
‘Togo country profile’, BBC News, 21 May 2024
2
E. R. Aikins, ‘Togo’, Institute for Security Studies: African Futures, 2025.
3
M. Echenberg, ‘History of Togo’, Britannica, 11 December 2025.
4
‘Faure Gnassingbe: Togo Leader Treads in Father’s Steps’, Voice of America, 24 February 2020.
5
‘Faure Gnassingbe: Togo Leader Treads in Father’s Steps’, Voice of America, 24 February 2020.
6
A. Jamiu, ‘Sahel-based terror groups expand to coastal West Africa’, Deutsche Welle, 8 November 2025.
7
‘Country Analysis: Burkina Faso’, ACAPS
8
H. Nsaibia, ‘New frontlines: Jihadist expansion is reshaping the Benin, Niger, and Nigeria borderlands’, ACLED, 27 March 2025.
9
A. Jamiu, ‘Sahel-based terror groups expand to coastal West Africa’, Deutsche Welle, 11 August 2025.
10
H. Nsaibia, ‘Conflict intensifies and instability spreads beyond Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger’, ACLED, 12 December 2024.
11
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023; L. Karr and B. Carter, ‘Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel’, Critical Threats, 20 November 2024.
12
R. K. Douti, ‘“No Peace, No Bread”: Northern Togo in the Grip of a Three-year State of Emergency’, Afrique XXI, 31 July 2025.
13
R. K. Douti, ‘ “No Peace, No Bread”: Northern Togo in the Grip of a Three-year State of Emergency’, Afrique XXI, 31 July 2025.
14
‘Analyst: West Africa a Potential ‘Powder Keg’ Due to Spreading Sahel Terrorism’, African Defense Forum, 14 October 2025.
15
H. Nsaibia, ‘Conflict intensifies and instability spreads beyond Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger’, ACLED, 12 December 2024.
16
R. K. Douti, ‘ “No Peace, No Bread”: Northern Togo in the Grip of a Three-year State of Emergency’, Afrique XXI, 31 July 2025.
17
‘Terror attacks increase in Togo as Sahel extremists encroach’, DefenceWeb, 11 October 2024.
18
‘Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/495, 31 July 2025, paras 24 and 50.
19
‘Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso formally leave ECOWAS’, Le Monde, 29 January 2025; ‘What’s behind the creation of the Alliance of Sahel States?’, Al Jazeera, 7 July 2024.
20
‘Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/495, 31 July 2025, paras 24 and 50.
21
‘Over Half of Togolese Support Leaving ECOWAS to Join Sahel States Alliance’, Ecofin Agency, 12 May 2025; ‘Togo Considering Becoming a Member of the Alliance of Sahel States’, Africa.com, 21 January 2025.
22
‘Togo Reaffirms Strong Partnership With Sahel Alliance’, West Africa Democracy Radio, 14 October 2025.
23
‘Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/495, 31 July 2025, paras 24 and 50.
24
‘Togo: Testimonies provide glimpse into violent repression of protests’, Amnesty International, 3 July 2025.
25
‘Security forces disperse Togo protesters demanding president’s resignation’, Al Jazeera, 27 June 2025.
26
E. Egbejule, ‘‘One too many’: rapper’s arrest sparks protests against Togo’s ruling dynasty’, The Guardian, 10 July 2025.
27
E. Egbejule, ‘‘One too many’: rapper’s arrest sparks protests against Togo’s ruling dynasty’, The Guardian, 10 July 2025.
28
E. Kaglan, ‘Togo protests signal youth anger at dynastic rule – but is change possible?’, Al Jazeera, 4 July 2025.
29
‘Security forces disperse Togo protesters demanding president’s resignation’, Al Jazeera, 27 June 2025.
30
E. Egbejule, ‘‘One too many’: rapper’s arrest sparks protests against Togo’s ruling dynasty’, The Guardian, 10 July 2025; E. Kaglan, ‘Togo protests signal youth anger at dynastic rule – but is change possible?’, Al Jazeera, 4 July 2025.
31
‘Togo: Testimonies provide glimpse into violent repression of protests’, Amnesty International, 3 July 2025.
32
E. Kaglan, ‘Togo protests signal youth anger at dynastic rule – but is change possible?’, Al Jazeera, 4 July 2025; ‘Togo: Testimonies provide glimpse into violent repression of protests’, Amnesty International, 3 July 2025.
33
‘Security forces disperse Togo protesters demanding president’s resignation’, Al Jazeera, 27 June 2025.
34
‘Togo extends state of emergency in restive Savanes region’, APA News, 7 March 2025; R. K. Douti, ‘ “No Peace, No Bread”: Northern Togo in the Grip of a Three-year State of Emergency’, Afrique XXI, 31 July 2025; ‘Togo extends state of emergency in northern region’, West Africa Democracy Radio, 8 March 2025; ‘Togo extends state of security emergency in north’, Africa News, 13 August 2024.
35
‘Togo Extends Security Emergency in Savanes Region Until 2026’, Togo First, 7 March 2025
36
‘Togo extends state of emergency in restive Savanes region’, APA News, 7 March 2025; ‘Togo Extends Security Emergency in Savanes Region Until 2026’, Togo First, 7 March 2025.
37
‘Togo extends state of emergency in restive Savanes region’, APA News, 7 March 2025.
38
‘Togo extends state of emergency in Savanes amid persistent border threats’, Togo First, 2 March 2026.
39
‘Togo: growing political tensions and challenges to institutional structures’, Timbuktu Institute: Africa Center for Peace Studies, 31 March 2026.
40
‘Togo tight-lipped as Burkina jihadists infiltrate north’, eNCA, 19 August 2025.
41
‘Togo tight-lipped as Burkina jihadists infiltrate north’, Macau Business, 19 August 2025.
42
‘Togo Extends Northern ‘State of Emergency’’, Voice of America, 7 April 2023.
43
‘France 24 and RFI broadcasters suspended in Togo for 3 months’, Committee to Protect Journalists, 20 June 2025; ‘RFI et France 24 suspendus pour trois mois au Togo’, RFI, 16 June 2025.
44
‘France 24 and RFI broadcasters suspended in Togo for 3 months’, Committee to Protect Journalists, 20 June 2025.
45
‘SADAT Defense’ SADAT
46
‘Togo- Attaque djihadiste à Fanworgou, des soldats turcs parmi les victimes’, L’Alternative, 4 October 2024.
47
R. K. Douti, ‘“No Peace, No Bread”: Northern Togo in the Grip of a Three-year State of Emergency’, Afrique XXI, 31 July 2025.
48
‘Togo- Attaque djihadiste à Fanworgou, des soldats turcs parmi les victimes’, L’Alternative, 4 October 2024.
49
‘Togo: 52 militaires dont 8 femmes envoyés en prison à Lomé’, 27 Avril.com, 21 April 2026.
50
‘Burkina Faso’s ousted leader Damiba flees to Togo’, France 24, 2 October 2022.
51
‘Burkina confirms Damiba extradition to face multiple crimes trial’, APA News, 21 January 2026; ‘Burkina Faso: Damiba extradited by Togo’, Africa News, 1 January 2026.
52
‘Burkina confirms Damiba extradition to face multiple crimes trial’, APA News, 21 January 2026.
53
C. A. A. Atayi, ‘Togo extradites former Burkina Faso president accused of corruption and coup attempt’, Jurist News, 21 January 2026.
54
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