Skip to content
War Watch

International Armed Conflict between Morocco and the Polisario Front (2026-01-15)

International Armed Conflict between Morocco and the Polisario Front (2026-01-15)

By man

Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I determines that armed conflicts in which a people are fighting against colonial domination, alien occupation, or racist regimes qualify as IACs.1‘Article 1 – General principles and scope of application’, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), International Humanitarian Law Databases, International Committee of the Red Cross. Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I thus elevate ‘wars of national liberation’ into the realm as IACs; prior to this treaty, such conflicts were considered as being of a non-international character (NIACs).2‘Article 1 – General principles and scope of application – Commentary of 1987’, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), International Humanitarian Law Databases, International Committee of the Red Cross, para 66. Simply put, when a party to the Protocol engages in an armed conflict against a non-State actor which qualifies as a ‘people’ and such people has made an Article 96(3) declaration stating that they are fighting against colonial domination, alien occupation, or racist regimes in order to exercise their right to self-determination, the application of the Protocol to this conflict is triggered.3‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 10.

Morocco has been a party to Additional Protocol I since 2011.4‘States Party to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties’, International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law Databases, 23 January 2026. The Polisario Front had the opportunity under Article 96(3) of Additional Protocol II to bind itself to Additional Protocol I through a unilateral declaration.5‘Article 96 – Treaty relations upon entry into force of this Protocol’, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), International Humanitarian Law Databases, International Committee of the Red Cross. On 21 June 2015 the Polisario Front made a unilateral declaration on behalf of the people of Western Sahara under Article 96(3) of the Protocol, undertaking to apply the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Protocol in its armed conflict against Morocco.6Polisario Front, ‘Unilateral declaration under Article 96(3) AP I’, 21 June 2015, 1. On 26 June 2015, the Swiss Federal Council, in its capacity as depositary of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, accepted the declaration by the Polisario Front and notified this to the other States Parties.7K. Fortin, ‘Unilateral Declaration by Polisario under API accepted by Swiss Federal Council’, Armed Groups and International Law, 2 September 2015. In line with Article 96(3), the unilateral declaration had the effect, as of 23 June 2015 (the date of its receipt), of (i) bringing into force the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I for the Polisario Front in its armed conflict with Morocco; (ii) establishing for the Polisario Front the same rights and obligations as those assumed by Morocco; and (iii) making the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Protocol equally binding for all the parties to the armed conflict in Western Sahara.8‘Article 96 – Treaty relations upon entry into force of this Protocol’, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), International Humanitarian Law Databases, International Committee of the Red Cross. This was the first occasion where the Swiss Federal Council accepted such a declaration by a national liberation movement and non-state actor.9A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.22.

According to the International Committee of the Red Cross’ Commentaries to Additional Protocol I, for a conflict to qualify as a war of national liberation and be classified as an IAC, two cumulative conditions must apply: (i) there must be an armed conflict in which a people is struggling against colonial domination, alien occupation or a racist regime, and (iii) the struggle of that people must be in order to exercise its right to self-determination.10‘Article 1 – General principles and scope of application – Commentary of 1987’, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)’, International Humanitarian Law Databases, International Committee of the Red Cross, para 107.

It will first be determined if the Polisario Front constitutes a ‘people’ and if this ‘people’ fights against Morocco (an alien occupier) and second if the armed conflict is fought for the purpose of exercising the right to self-determination.

Additional Protocol I does not define the term ‘peoples’, however, the 1987 Commentaries to article 1(4) of the Additional Protocols elaborates on this notion in the context of this treaty: ‘The essential factor is a common sentiment of forming a people, and a political will to live together as such. Such a sentiment and will are the result of one or more of the criteria indicated, and are generally highlighted and reinforced by a common history. This means simultaneously that there is a bond between the persons belonging to this people and something that separates them from other peoples: there is a common element and a distinctive element’.11‘Article 1 – General principles and scope of application – Commentary of 1987’, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)’, International Humanitarian Law Databases, International Committee of the Red Cross, para 103.

The Sahrawi are a mostly nomadic people of Abar and Berber descent and heritage.12‘Backgrounder: Sahrawi Refugees and Western Sahara’, U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 23 April 2025. Their identity is closely tied to the desert of Western Sahara.13‘Backgrounder: Sahrawi Refugees and Western Sahara’, U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 23 April 2025. Some Sahrawi people are from southern Morocco and Algeria, but many are from Western Sahara.14‘Sahrawi People’, Atlas of Humanity. The Polisario Front represents the Sahrawi people of Western Sahara and emerged as an opposition to Moroccan and Mauritanian occupation of Western Sahara during the 1970s.15‘Backgrounder: Sahrawi Refugees and Western Sahara’, U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 23 April 2025. A large number of Sahrawi’s fled to Algeria where they have lived in refugee camps ever since.16‘Backgrounder: Sahrawi Refugees and Western Sahara’, U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 23 April 2025. Sahrawis share a language (Hassaniya), common origin, and religion – Islam.17‘Sahrawi People’, Atlas of Humanity; ‘The Saharawi people and the Western Sahara’, Sahara Marathon. The Polisario Front, as the internationally recognized representative of the Sahrawi people,18‘Sahrawi People’, Atlas of Humanity has, since its inception, repeatedly called for the Sahrawi to be able to exercise their right to self-determination and establish the independent SADR in the territory of Western Sahara.19‘Letter dated 17 November 2025 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council’, UN Doc S/2025/764, 24 November 2025; ‘POLISARIO affirms Sahrawi people’s strong commitment to self-determination and independence, and to defending their rights and sovereignty by all legitimate means’, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic: Embassy to Ethiopia & Permanent Representation to the African Union, 5 November 2025; S. El-Hafed, ‘Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination, independence, and legitimate resistance is inalienable and non-negotiable right’, Sahara Press Service, 14 July 2025. It is understood that most Sahrawis still support this.20K. Fadel, ‘Self-Determination Is the Only Endgame for Western Sahara’, Modern Diplomacy, 15 May 2025. Sassòli explains that ‘alien occupation’ could refer to instances such as the Sahrawis where ‘people have never had an opportunity to exercise their right to self-determination’.21M. Sassòli ‘International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies, and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare (Second Edition)’, Edward Elgar, 2024, para 6.28. Indeed, since the 1991 promise of the referendum that would allow the Sahrawi people to determine their own future, including whether they wish for the SADR to be an independent State, has yet to take place and is unlikely to under Morocco’s Autonomy Plan.22K. Fadel, ‘Self-Determination Is the Only Endgame for Western Sahara’, Modern Diplomacy, 15 May 2025.

The first requirement is thus met, the Polisario Front, representing ‘a people’, is engaged in an armed conflict against Morocco an ‘alien occupier’.

The second requirement under Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I is to determine if the liberation movement is fighting its enemy for the purpose of self-determination. The UN’s Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples recognizes that all peoples have the right to self-determination which allows them to ‘freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’.23UN General Assembly ‘Resolution 1514 (XV): Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples’, UN Doc A/Res/1514(XV), 14 December 1960, para 2. The Polisario Front is committed to achieving and defending the right of the people Sahrawi people to freedom and independence24‘Polisario Front’, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic: Embassy to Ethiopia & Permanent Representation to the African Union and has consistently framed their actions as those of a colonized people fighting to exercise their right to freely determine their political and economic future,25‘Letter dated 21 October 2025 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council’, UN Doc S/2025/664, 21 October 2025, Annex, para 7 as well as repeatedly referring to Western Sahara as ‘the last colony in Africa’, framing its struggle as one of decolonization.26‘Situation concerning Western Sahara – Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2022/733, 3 October 2022, para 17; and UN Doc S/2024/707, 1 October 2024, para 4; ‘Letter dated 17 November 2025 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council’, UN Doc S/2025/764, 24 November 2025; S. El-Hafed, ‘Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination, independence, and legitimate resistance is inalienable and non-negotiable right’, Sahara Press Service, 14 July 2025. Additionally, they often justify their military activities against the RMA as a fight against occupation.27‘SPLA inflicts heavy losses on Moroccan occupation forces in Farsia sector’, Sahara Press Service, 23 December 2025; ‘SPLA carries out attacks against positions of Moroccan occupation soldiers in Houza and Farsia sectors’, Sahara Press Service, 18 January 2025.

In addition, the UN has re-affirmed on numerous occasions ‘the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence … and the legitimacy of their struggle to secure the enjoyment of that right’.28UN General Assembly ‘Resolution 34/37: Question of Western Sahara’, 21 November 1979, para 1; and ‘Resolution 35/19: Question of Western Sahara’, UN Doc A/Res/35/19, 11 November 1980, para 1. Despite indicating Morocco’s Autonomy Proposal as basis for discussions between parties, the latest UN Security Council Resolution 2797 (2025) envisages self-determination of the people of Western Sahara as the ultimate objective that any final and mutually acceptable political solution must aim to achieve.29UN Security Council ‘Resolution 2797 (2025)’, 31 October 2025, operative para 3. A similar approach emerges from the work of the African Union, with both the Assembly of Heads of State and Government and the AU Peace and Security Council requiring that political solutions to the dispute over Western Sahara provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.30AU Peace and Security Council, ‘Decision on the Situation in Western Sahara’, AU Doc PSC/PR/COMM.(DLXXXVIII), 6 April 2016, paras 3 and 7; AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, ‘Decision on the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union on the issue of Western Sahara’, AU Doc Assembly/AU/4(XXXI), 2 July 2018, para 4.

The second requirement is thus met. The Polisario Front are fighting for the right to exercise self-determination.

Finally, the acceptance of the Article 96(3) Additional Protocol I unilateral declaration by the Polisario Front on behalf of its people31A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.22 may serve as evidence that Swiss Federal Council who serves as a depository of the protocol considers the situation between Morocco and the Polisario Front to meet the requirements for an Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I.

It is concluded that the armed conflict between Morocco and the Polisario Front meets the requirements under Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I of 1977 and constitutes an IAC.