Non-international armed conflict between Colombia and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) (2026-03-15)

15 June 2026

Background

The ELN is an armed group founded in 1963 whose ideology is predicated on revolutionary terrorism, drawing inspiration from the ideas of Cuban leader Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, as well as the liberation theology of a Peruvian Catholic priest.¹ Although the Colombian military wiped out most of the ELN in 1973, the group was able to recover and rebuild itself from just sixty-five members.²

The first peace talks with the Colombian government were held in 1975.³ Further talks took place in 1994, 1998, 2005–08, and 2014, but were unsuccessful.⁴ In 2022, the ELN recommenced peace negotiations with the newly elected Colombian president, Gustavo Petro, under the auspices of his ‘total peace’ policy. The peace dialogues have experienced considerable turbulence but in May 2024, the parties reached agreement on a one-year ceasefire, representing the most substantial advancement in the history of the peace dialogues involving the ELN. The resurgence of violence in January 2025, however, prompted Colombian President Petro to suspend peace negotiations with the group.⁵

Intensity

Although there were lulls in fighting during the reporting period due to the peace negotiations that ultimately failed, in the absence of a ceasefire agreement and a lasting cessation of armed confrontations without real risk of resumption, the pre-existing⁶ Additional Protocol II-type NIAC between the parties to the conflict is ongoing.⁷

As of June 2024, it was reported that the ELN had 6,000 fighters and networks of militants infiltrating the civilian population.⁸ Its organizational structure and substantial membership allow the ELN to continue to exercise military control over substantial parts of the territory of Colombia.⁹ This also confirms that the ELN can execute sustained and concerted military operations to ensure that such territory escapes governmental control.¹⁰ These territories include parts of the Catatumbo region in Norte de Santander department,¹¹ specifically Ocaña and Sardinata,¹² as well as San José del Palmar in the Chocó department.

On 17 September 2024, and despite the peace talks, the ELN launched an attack against a Colombian military base. The ELN used artisanal explosives in the attack that killed two soldiers and injured a further twenty-four.¹³ The ELN also clashed with the Colombian National Army on 15 October 2024, resulting in the death of one soldier.¹⁴ During March 2025, this NIAC intensified with at least twenty clashes recorded, the highest frequency since January 2018.¹⁵

The ELN is equipped with AK-47 assault rifles,¹⁶ other small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, landmines, explosives and mortars.¹⁷ The ELN has used drones, both for surveillance but also to bomb the Colombian National Army.¹⁸

More than seven million IDPs were reported as of the middle of 2024 in Colombia.¹⁹ Part of the displacement is caused by conflict and the drug trade – two situations to which the ELN contributes. However, it is not possible to determine the exact number of IDPs whose displacement can be attributed directly to the activities of the ELN.

Organization

The ELN has a decentralized,²⁰ but complex command structure.²¹ The highest hierarchical structure of the ELN armed wing is the so-called Comando Central (COCE), which oversees all ELN operations, including military operations. The Dirección Nacional (National Directorate) is tasked by the COCE with coordinating ‘war fronts’, which are combat units that operate in parallel and are led by a commander, a political leader and a military leader.²² The Dirección Nacional is made up of 23 members elected by the eight war fronts.²³ Because the ELN follows a confederate structure, the war fronts remain financially and operationally independent.²⁴ The war front leadership-structures allow fighters to be disciplined and constitute evidence of the ELN’s ability to implement IHL. In the Akayesu case, a Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) considered the notion of ‘responsible command’ and concluded that structured leadership is indicative of the fact that the organization of a group has reached a sophisticated level. The Trial Chamber found that the fact that the leadership was answerable to authority showed that leadership was sufficiently structured.²⁵ Responsible command is one of the requirements to trigger the application of Additional Protocol II.²⁶

The majority of the ELN leadership operate from Venezuela,²⁷ with other leaders operating from Cuba.²⁸ The ELN established its current headquarters in Havana.²⁹ At the time of reporting, the commander-in-chief of the ELN’s military wing and the overall leader of the group was Eliécer Erlinto Chamorro (or Eliecer Herlinto Chamorro Acosta), alias “Antonio García”.³⁰ The second-in-command of the military wing was Israel Ramírez Pineda, alias ‘Pablo Beltrán’, who fulfils various political roles in the organization, including being responsible for recruiting new fighters.³¹ Gustavo Aníbal Giraldo Quinchía, alias ‘Pablito’ or ‘Carlos Marín Guarín’, is third-in-command and oversees relations between the COCE and the war fronts.³²

The armed wing is funded through the ELN’s cross-border drug trade operations to Ecuador and Venezuela. The ELN grows coca and produces cocaine. Well-established drug routes and networks enhance the logistical capability of this group.³³

An example of a military tactic employed by the ELN is to use as escape routes the border routes between Colombia and Venezuela that typically are used by the drug trade when the Colombian National Army is in the area.³⁴ The group patrols in small groups of no more than thirty fighters. This practice, coupled with a growing membership, makes it a challenge for Colombia and Venezuela to address.³⁵ The ELN’s presence in Colombia and Venezuela makes the classification of the group complex but it is clearly adaptable. In Venezuela, the group is a paramilitary force that supports the Venezuelan government, whereas in Colombia, it is a guerrilla force fighting the Colombian government.³⁶ The ELN has installed anti-personnel mines around its camps as protection and a means of limiting access by law enforcement.³⁷ According to the CIA, the ELN’s typical military tactics include mortaring police stations and military bases; planting explosive devices on hard targets such as pipelines and electric pylons; and conducting ambushes, roadblocks and sniper attacks.³⁸

Pablo Beltrán is its chief negotiator, often representing the ELN in public and to the media.³⁹ The ELN has an official website which it uses to communicate with one voice.⁴⁰

Territorial control is a requirement of Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. The ELN exercises control over parts of the territory of Casigua El Cubo, specifically south of Lake Maracaibo, which borders on Venezuela’s Zulia state.⁴¹ The ELN has managed to consolidate territory under its control over parts of the Catatumbo region in the Norte de Santander department,⁴² including Ocaña, Convención and Sardinata.The nature of control exercised by the ELN in this region is more sophisticated than military control, as it includes social control over the civilian population.⁴³ The ELN also exercises consolidated control over parts of the Chocó department, including the urban centre of San José del Palmar, parts of San Juan subregion, seventeen villages in the La Italia district, thirteen villages in the San Pedro de Ingará district, as well as the Embera Chamí Copé del Río Ingará, the Sabaletera San Onofre y El Tigre, and the Alto Bonito Vira Vira reservations.⁴⁴ Such consolidated control enables the ELN to launch sufficiently sustained and concerted operations,⁴⁵ and sufficiently dominate territory under its control so as to escape the control of the armed forces.⁴⁶ Control over territory confirms the sophisticated degree of organization of the ELN, which is confirmation that the status accorded to the leadership of the ELN is akin to responsible command.⁴⁷ The combination of responsible command and control over territory enables the ELN to implement Additional Protocol II. It must be stressed that Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II does not necessitate actual implementation but only such a capability.⁴⁸

The organizational structure of the ELN is sophisticated and complies with the four organizational requirements under Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. Hence, the NIAC between Colombia and the ELN constitutes an Additional Protocol II-type NIAC.

1
‘Ejército de Liberacion Nacional (ELN)’, Kennisbank Terrorisrische Organisaties, 20 January 2025; ‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, Colombia Reports, 14 May 2022; ‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, InSight Crime, 18 June 2024.
2
‘National Liberation Army (Colombia)’, Mapping Militants Project, 3 December 2024.
3
‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, InSight Crime, 18 June 2024; S. Castillo, ‘Proceso de Paz con el ELN: diálogos regionales como alternativa histórica’, Indepaz, 30 April 2024.
4
‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, InSight Crime, 18 June 2024; S. Castillo, ‘Proceso de Paz con el ELN: diálogos regionales como alternativa histórica’, Indepaz, 30 April 2024.
5
‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, InSight Crime, 18 June 2024; S. Castillo, ‘Proceso de Paz con el ELN: diálogos regionales como alternativa histórica’, Indepaz, 30 April 2024; ‘Colombia halts peace talks with ELN rebels and accuses them of war crimes in northeastern region’, AP News, 18 January 2025; J. Freixes, ‘Colombia and ELN Guerrilla to Meet in Venezuela to ‘Unfreeze’ Peace Talks’, Colombia One, 1 November 2024; ‘¿En qué van los diálogos de paz con ELN? La línea de tiempo con los momentos clave’, El Espectador, 15 April 2024; S. Torrado, ‘Proceso de paz con el ELN: fin del cese al fuego, secuestro y suspensión de los diálogos con el Gobierno Petro’, El Pais, 6 June 2025.
6
‘Humanitarian Report 2024: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross; ‘Humanitarian Challenges 2025: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross.
7
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” is Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 19.
8
‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, InSight Crime, 18 June 2024; S. Rodriguez Álvarez, ‘Cifras secretas del gobierno confirman que todos los grupos armados crecieron’, La Silla Vacía, 13 March 2024; A. Busch, ‘Kolumbiens Albtraum ist zurück: die ELN-Guerilla startet einen Grossangriff’, NZZ, 11 February 2025; ‘Terrorist Organizations’, Central Intelligence Agency.
9
A. Diaz Castro, ‘The ELN – Colombia’s last guerrilla’, London politica.
10
M. M. Bradley, ‘Additional Protocol II: Elevating the minimum threshold of intensity?’, International Review of the Red Cross, 2020.
11
R. Emblin, ‘ELN commanders claim Petro’s Total Peace is becoming “Total War”’, The City Paper, 10 March 2025.
12
‘El Catatumbo padece la emergencia humanitaria más grande desde que hay registro en Colombia, a causa del conflicto armado’, Defensoría del pueblo, 6 May 2025; ‘Consolidación territorial del ELN en San José del Palmar (Chocó) e interés del Ejército Gaitanista por la zona tienen en riesgo a su población’, Defensoría del pueblo, 6 June 2025.
13
A. Pérez, ‘Petro: Friedensprozess mit ELN in Kolumbien beendet’, Amerika21, 19 September 2024; ‘Colombia suspends peace talks with ELN rebels’, Deutsche Welle, 19 September 2024.
14
‘Francotirador del ELN asesinó a un soldado profesional e hirió otro en el departamento del Cesar’, Diario del Norte, 15 October 2024.
15
L. Calderón et al, ‘Regional Overview: Latin America and the Caribbean, April 2025’, ACLED, 3 April 2025.
16
‘Ejército de Liberacion Nacional (ELN)’, Nationaal coördinator terrorismebestrijding en veiligheid, 20 January 2025.
17
‘Terrorist Organizations’, Central Intelligence Agency.
18
L. Bonilla, ‘Drones de guerra: así operan los grupos colombianos la nueva arma que siembra terror’, El Espectador, 24 April 2025.
19
‘Colombia situation’, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2025.
20
‘National Liberation Army (Colombia)’, Mapping Militants Project, 3 December 2024.
21
A. Diaz Castro, ‘The ELN – Colombia’s last guerrilla’, London politica; J. Jules, ‘Así está distribuido el ELN en Colombia, según informes de inteligencia’, RCN Radio, 30 January 2019.
22
‘Ejército de Liberacion Nacional (ELN)’, Nationaal coördinator terrorismebestrijding en veiligheid, 20 January 2025; ‘National Liberation Army (Colombia)’, Mapping Militants Project, 3 December 2024; ‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, InSight Crime, 18 June 2024.
23
‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, InSight Crime, 18 June 2024.
24
J. McDermott and S. Dudley, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, February 2025; A. Diaz Castro, ‘The ELN – Colombia’s last guerrilla’, London politica; J. Jules, ‘Así está distribuido el ELN en Colombia, según informes de inteligencia’, RCN Radio, 30 January 2019.
25
ICTR, ‘The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu’, Chamber I,Judgment, 2 September 1998, para 623.
26
‘Article 1 – Material field of application’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases.
27
‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, InSight Crime, 18 June 2024.
28
L. Loaiza, ‘US Pressure on Cuba to Extradite ELN Leaders Unlikely to Succeed’, InSight Crime, 18 May 2020.
29
M. Romero, ‘Colombia exige a Cuba que entregue a los jefes guerrilleros del ELN’, France 24, 11 September 2019.
30
‘Eliecer Erlinto Chamorro, alias ‘Antonio Garcia’’, InSight Crime, 24 June 2021.
31
‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, Counter terrorism guide, October 2022; ‘National Liberation Army (Colombia)’, Mapping Militants Project, 3 December 2024.
32
‘Gustavo Aníbal Giraldo, alias ‘Pablito’’, InSight Crime, 3 October 2022; ‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, Counter Terrorism Guide, October 2022; ‘National Liberation Army (Colombia)’, Mapping Militants Project, 3 December 2024.
33
‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, InSight Crime, 18 June 2024; Unidad Investigative de Venezuela, ‘Rebels and Paramilitaries: Colombia’s Guerrillas in Venezuela’, InSight Crime, 3 October 2022; ‘Ejército de Liberacion Nacional (ELN)’, Nationaal coördinator terrorismebestrijding en veiligheid, 20 January 2025.
34
A. Diaz Castro, ‘The ELN – Colombia’s last guerrilla’, London politica.
35
L. J. Acosta and H. Murphy, ‘Violentos grupos rivales llenan vacío de las FARC en Colombia: Una paz quebrantada’, Reuters, 26 April 2018.
36
A. Diaz Castro, ‘The ELN – Colombia’s last guerrilla’, London politica.
37
M. V. Llorente and J. C. Garzón V., ‘¿Qué hacer con el ELN? Opciones para no cerrar la puerta a una salida negociada’, Fundación ideas para la paz, 28 January 2020.
38
‘Terrorist Organizations’, Central Intelligence Agency.
39
W. Grant and D. Pardo, ‘”El ELN y Maduro combaten un enemigo común”: entrevista con Pablo Beltrán, negociador de la guerrilla’, BBC, 20 August 2020.
40
See, ‘ELN Voces’, ELN Voces.
41
‘Colombia Defense Minister Vows ‘Full Force’ Against Guerrillas’, The defense post, 17 March 2025; ‘In Casigua El Cubo, No One Dares Speak of Those Who Rule: The ELN’, Connectas.
42
R. Emblin, ‘ELN commanders claim Petro’s Total Peace is becoming “Total War”’, The City Paper, 10 March 2025.
43
‘El Catatumbo padece la emergencia humanitaria más grande desde que hay registro en Colombia, a causa del conflicto armado’, Defensoría del pueblo, 6 May 2025.
44
‘Consolidación territorial del ELN en San José del Palmar (Chocó) e interés del Ejército Gaitanista por la zona tienen en riesgo a su población’, Defensoría del pueblo, 6 June 2025.
45
SCSL, ‘Prosecutor v Moimina Fofana and Allieu Kandewa’, Trial Chamber I, Judgement, 2 August 2007, para 126.
46
ICTR, ‘Prosecutor v Alfred Musema’, Trial Chamber I, Judgment and Sentence, 27 January 2000, para 258.
47
M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol ii in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 9 December 2021.
48
ICTR, ‘The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu’, Chamber I,Judgment, 2 September 1998, para 623; ICTR, ‘Prosecutor v Alfred Musema’, Trial Chamber I, Judgment and Sentence, 27 January 2000, para 258; A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.38.