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War Watch

Non-International Armed Conflict between Myanmar and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) (2026-07-22)

Non-International Armed Conflict between Myanmar and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) (2026-07-22)

By clemence

Background

The MNDAA, also known as the Kokang Army,1 ‘Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/ Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang Army) – MNTJP/MNDAA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024 originated from the remnants of the military wing of the Communist Party of Burma, which was disbanded in 1989. The MNDAA represents the Kokang ethnic Chinese community.2 ‘The Brotherhood Alliance and Operation 1027: Reshaping Myanmar’s Conflict’, Human Development Forum Foundation, 21 April 2025. The MNDAA operates in the northern Shan state of Myanmar, in close proximity to the Chinese border.3 ‘What is Myanmar’s Three Brotherhood Alliance that’s resisting the military?’, Al Jazeera, 16 January 2024.

Founded in March 1989,4 ‘Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/ Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang Army) – MNTJP/MNDAA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024 it has been actively engaged in a NIAC against the Tatmadaw since August 2009.5 Y. Xian, ‘Good Rebels or Good Timing?: Myanmar’s MNDAA and Operation 1027’, The Diplomat, 5 January 2024. The MNDAA is currently part of the 3BHA, formed in June 2019,6 ‘The Brotherhood Alliance and Operation 1027: Reshaping Myanmar’s Conflict’, Human Development Forum Foundation, 21 April 2025 which also consists of the AA and the TNLA.7 Z. Abuza, ‘Operation 1027 poses rare challenge to Myanmar junta’, Radio Free Asia, 10 November 2023.  As of June 2026, the 3BHA had, however, been significantly weakened, especially since the MNDAA entered into a Chinese-brokered ceasefire with the Myanmar military junta in January 2025 and subsequently handed back control over the town of Lashio to the authorities in April 2025 (see below).

Intensity

Up until the implementation of the MNDAA’s ceasefire with the junta in April 2025 (see above), clashes with the Tatmadaw occurred frequently, often lasting for several days,8 H. Regan and A. Watson, ‘Myanmar rebels are claiming their biggest victory yet over junta forces. Could it be a turning point in the brutal civil war?’, CNN, 2 August 2024 and resulting in many casualties.9 N. Swe, ‘MNDAA reports major weapons seizure from Myanmar army’, Myanmar Now, 5 January 2022; ‘MNDAA attack kills junta brigadier general’, Myanmar Now, 8 December 2023.

The MNDAA employed heavy weaponry in such clashes. For the most part, the weapons had been seized from the Tatmadaw and included grenades, mortar shells, RPGs, and bombs.10 N. Swe, ‘MNDAA reports major weapons seizure from Myanmar army’, Myanmar Now, 5 January 2022. The MNDAA and the other members of the 3BHA were also reported to have access to anti-aircraft weapons.11 ‘MNDAA to use seized anti-aircraft guns for air defense’, Than Lwin Times Media, 7 November 2023.

As of June 2026, the MNDAA continues to hold territory in northern Shan state, including the town of Kutkai which it captured from the TNLA in March 2026 (see above).12M. K. Jar, ‘MNDAA to Surrender Lashio but Hold Surrounding Country’, The Irrawaddy, 7 April 2025; ‘The State of Myanmar: ISP-Myanmar’s Annual Strategic Review and Foresight 2025-2026’, ISP Myanmar, January 2026; ‘MNDAA seizes full control of Kutkai Town following TNLA dispute’, Burma News International, 17 March 2026; ‘Kokang Armed Group Using Local ID Registry for Forced Conscription, Residents Say’, Burma News International, 14 July 2026; S. Wansai, ‘KOKANG SPECIAL REGION 1: The Rise of an Authoritarian Enclave in Northern Shan State’, Shan Herald Agency for News, 15 June 2026; ‘Bilateral Ceasefires: Fragmentation of Elusive Peace Process in Myanmar’, ISP Myanmar, June 2026, 24. As a result of the second phase of Operation 1027 in mid-2024, the MNDAA captured additional territory, including the capital Lashio and the Northeast Military Command headquarters of the Tatmadaw, and held control for eight months prior to ceasefire negotiations with the junta13 ‘Implications of the MNDAA & Military Council’s Negotiations in Kunming’, MoeMaKa, 25 March 2025 according to which it handed over Lashio city to the Myanmar government by 21 April 2025.14 ‘MNDAA to hand over administration of Lashio Town to Myanmar junta in April’, Mizzima, 6 April 2025. China’s concern over the conflict escalating further led to its facilitation and monitoring of the 2025 ceasefire agreement. 15‘China sends team to monitor Myanmar ceasefire, spokesperson confirms’, CGTN, 22 April 2025; C. Tan, ‘China deploys ceasefire monitors to Myanmar border region’, Nikkei Asia, 2 May 2025. No violent incidents were reported between the MNDAA and the Tatmadaw since the implementation of the ceasefire agreement in April 2025. Under IHL, NIACs end when a fighting non-State actor ceases to exist (or be sufficiently organized), or if an effective peace agreement is agreed upon. The NIAC between Myanmar and the MNDAA was therefore no longer ongoing as of June 2026.

Organization

The Kokang EAG has a political wing, a military wing and a justice department.16 ‘Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/ Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang Army) – MNTJP/MNDAA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024. The political wing of the Kokang EAG is the Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party (MNTJP). The military wing, the MNDAA, has a sophisticated command structure. The military wing consists of a Central Military Commission,17 S. Wansai, ‘MNDAA: Beating a bold revolutionary path to fulfill the people’s aspirations?’, Shan Herald Agency for News, 10 January 2023 and deploys several battalions. From 2015, the MNDAA formed political and supply departments as well as command and control, and artillery battalions. The MNDAA has at least four brigades: Brigade 211, Brigade 311, Brigade 511 and Brigade 611. 18‘Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party’, Spring Sprouts.

The close working relationship between the Justice Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission ensures the imposition of discipline among MNDAA fighters.19 S. Wansai, ‘MNDAA: Beating a bold revolutionary path to fulfill the people’s aspirations?’, Shan Herald Agency for News, 10 January 2023. The MNDAA has set up parallel governance structures in the areas under its control which are described as ‘state-like apparatus[es]’. Further, the MNDAA has installed a punitive system on the basis of Kokang customary law.20 S. Wansai, ‘KOKANG SPECIAL REGION 1: The Rise of an Authoritarian Enclave in Northern Shan State’, Shan Herald Agency for News, 15 June 2026.

As of June 2026, Peng Daxun (Peng Deren) is the MNDAA’s Commander-in-Chief as well as the MNTJP’s General Secretary and the Chairman of the Special Region 1 (Kokang) Administrative Committee.21‘Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/ Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang Army) – MNTJP/MNDAA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024. The deputy Commander-in-Chief is Yang Winxian, the secretary is Pheung Ah Di (aka U Tun Myat Linn) and in charge of external relations is Pheung Win Naing. Yang Guanghua is deputy Chief-of-Staff of Allied Command of the MNDAA.22 ‘Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party’, Spring Sprouts.

It is estimated that by the end of April 2025, the MNDAA had 6,000 to 8,000 active fighters.23 ‘The Brotherhood Alliance and Operation 1027: Reshaping Myanmar’s Conflict’, Human Development Forum Foundation, 21 April 2025; ‘Myanmar rebels prepare to hand key city back to junta, China says’, France24, 22 April 2025. There have been reports of the MNDAA engaging in forced recruitment activities in areas under its control by exploiting personal data of residents gathered during a registration campaign.24S. Wansai, ‘KOKANG SPECIAL REGION 1: The Rise of an Authoritarian Enclave in Northern Shan State’, Shan Herald Agency for News, 15 June 2026; ‘Fractured Heartland: Shan Politics and Conflict in Post-coup Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, 27 November 2025. MNDAA fighters are well-trained and provide training for other EAGs.25 K. Oo, ‘Myanmar’s Spring Revolution Aided by Ethnic Kokang Armed Group’, The Irrawaddy, 8 March 2023. The MNDAA pays its fighters a monthly salary.26‘Fractured Heartland: Shan Politics and Conflict in Post-coup Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, 27 November 2025. The fact that other EAGs use the MNDAA to train fighters speaks to the MNDAA’s command of military tactics and discipline. Further testament to the MNDAA’s success in military tactics is the leading role it played in the planning and execution of a joint operation, Operation 1027.27 ‘Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/ Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang Army) – MNTJP/MNDAA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024.

The MNDAA training programmes are sufficiently effective that rapidly after completion fighters are deployed and have the ability to operate independently after undergoing training.28 S. Wansai, ‘MNDAA: Beating a bold revolutionary path to fulfill the people’s aspirations?’, Shan Herald Agency for News, 10 January 2023. The training programme and sophisticated command structure29 K. Oo, ‘Myanmar’s Spring Revolution Aided by Ethnic Kokang Armed Group’, The Irrawaddy, 8 March 2023. confirm the ability of the MNDAA to comply with and implement IHL.

The MNDAA are capable of securing weaponry and are able to finance military expenses owing to profits from the drug trade, in particular the harvesting of opium, heroin refining, and the production of methamphetamine.30 ‘Kokang rebels produce drugs in Asia World Company dam sites’, Burma News International, 14 July 2010; ‘Synthetic Drugs in East and Southeast Asia: Latest Developments and Challenges’ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2023; Y. Xian, ‘Good Rebels or Good Timing?: Myanmar’s MNDAA and Operation 1027’, The Diplomat, 5 January 2024. Also, it is claimed that the group operates a gold mine in north-eastern Myanmar.31 ‘6 shot dead after confrontation over Myanmar gold mine operation’, Radio Free Asia, 7 March 2025. The MNDAA also engages in tax collection in areas under its control.32‘Fractured Heartland: Shan Politics and Conflict in Post-coup Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, 27 November 2025. Since the January 2025 ceasefire (see above), the MNDAA has further established gradually closer ties with the Chinese government. As of June 2026, it controls Lashio-Muse Road, which is essential for border trade with China.33S. Wansai, ‘KOKANG SPECIAL REGION 1: The Rise of an Authoritarian Enclave in Northern Shan State’, Shan Herald Agency for News, 15 June 2026; ‘Fractured Heartland: Shan Politics and Conflict in Post-coup Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, 27 November 2025. Lastly, the MNDAA speaks with one voice through an official spokesperson and information officer who is, as of June 2026, Li Kyar Win.34 DVB English News, X, 1 December 2023; ‘6 shot dead after confrontation over Myanmar gold mine operation’, Radio Free Asia, 7 March 2025.

As of end-June 2026, the MNDAA was sufficiently organized to constitute an organized armed group under IHL.