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Non-International Armed Conflict between Myanmar and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) (2026-07-22)

Non-International Armed Conflict between Myanmar and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) (2026-07-22)

By clemence

Background

The TNLA was founded in January 2009.1 ‘Palaung State Liberation Front/ Ta’ang National Liberation Army – PSLF/TNLA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024; ‘Rising dragon: TNLA declares ‘victory’ in northern Shan’, Frontier Myanmar, 4 February 2022. It is the armed wing of the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF).2 C. Schutte, ‘Who is the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)?’, Geopolitical Report, 5 February 2025. It has engaged in a NIAC with the Tatmadaw since at least 2011.3 ‘Sixty-one Years of Ta’ang Revolution’, PeaceRep, 12 January 2024.

The ideology of the TNLA is to establish a Ta’ang state that includes all of Namhsan and Mantong townships, and parts of Namhkam, Mongyai, Tangyan, Kyaukme, Hsipaw, Lashio, and Namtu townships in northern Shan state, as well as Mogok township in the northern Mandalay region. 4‘Rising dragon: TNLA declares ‘victory’ in northern Shan’, Frontier Myanmar, 4 February 2022. Other EAGs, including the KIO and the UWSA, supported the evolution of the TNLA by training its fighters and providing it with weapons. The TNLA has capitalized on the aftermath of the 2021 coup, strengthening its control over territory in northern Shan state and becoming one of the most powerful EAGs in Myanmar.5 ‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023.

In the direct aftermath of the coup, the TNLA infrequently engaged the military junta and on occasion covertly supported anti-junta forces in a bid to achieve its long-term goal, which is autonomy. It already functions as a quasi-state.6 ‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023. The TNLA joined the 3BHA and played a significant role in Operation 1027. This successful alliance enabled the TNLA to gain control over fifteen of seventeen townships in its operational area.7 C. Schutte, ‘Who is the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)?’, Geopolitical Report, 5 February 2025. In late 2025, the 3BHA was, however, significantly weakened, especially after the TNLA signed a ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar military junta in late October 2025. In implementing the ceasefire, the TNLA handed over control of the towns of Mogok and Momeik to the Tatmadaw in November 2025 (see above).8S. Strangio, ‘Myanmar Rebel Group Agrees to Ceasefire With Military Ahead of Junta Election’, The Diplomat, 30 October 2025; ‘Fractured Heartland: Shan Politics and Conflict in Post-coup Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, 27 November 2025.

Intensity

Until the signing of the ceasefire with the junta in October 2025, fighting between the Tatmadaw and the TNLA was frequent and intense.9 Z. Abuza, ‘Tiny ethnic Ta’ang army is a bellwether for opposition fight against Myanmar junta’, Radio Free Asia, 29 August 2023. According to the Myanmar Peace Monitor, there were at least 274 armed clashes between the Tatmadaw and the TNLA in the period between January 2020 and October 2025.10‘Numbers Behind Myanmar’s Conflicts’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 25 June 2026. Significant military operations included an aerial bombardment by the Tatmadaw against the TNLA on 3 May 2025 after the collapse of ceasefire negotiations.11 ‘Myanmar Junta Bombs TNLA Territory After Peace Talks Fail’, The Irrawaddy, 3 May 2025. Between 4 and 8 May 2025, the Tatmadaw managed to recapture at least eight outposts in northern Shan state’s Nawnghkio township.12‘Myanmar Junta ‘Seizes Eight TNLA Positions’’, The Irrawaddy, 9 May 2025. The TNLA alleged that the Tatmadaw launched an aerial and artillery campaign throughout May 2025, which was in breach of the ceasefire agreement concluded post-earthquake (see major developments of 2025 version of Myanmar entry). The Irrawaddy – English Edition, Facebook, 23 May 2025.

Frequent fighting between the Tatmadaw and TNLA continued throughout June 2025.13‘Intense fighting in Nawnghkio Township; junta retakes some villages’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 24 June 2025; ‘TNLA Fights Off Myanmar Junta Assault’, The Irrawaddy, 24 June 2025; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, June 2025. This includes clashes in Shwe Mu Htaw, Nawng Len, Meit Poke, Tha Yet Cho, and Shauk Chon villages in Nawnghkio township where the Tatmadaw successfully regained territory.14‘Intense fighting in Nawnghkio Township; junta retakes some villages’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 24 June 2025. Fighting continued during July 202515‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, July 2025; ‘More Civilian Homes Set on Fire in Moebye After Recapture by Military Junta’, Burma News International, 8 July 2025; ‘Myanmar Junta Recaptures Nawnghkio After Months-Long Counteroffensive’, The Irrawaddy, 16 July 2025 and the junta managed to regain control over Nawnghkio in Shan state.16‘Regime regains control of Nawnghkio in northern Shan State during counteroffensive’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 17 July 2025; K. Z. Win, ‘Myanmar junta forces recapture strategic northern Shan State town of Nawnghkio’, Myanmar Now, 16 July 2025; ‘Myanmar Junta Recaptures Nawnghkio After Months-Long Counteroffensive’, The Irrawaddy, 16 July 2025. On 25 August 2025, the Tatmadaw bombed Kyaukme town.17‘Junta Airstrikes Kill Civilians, Hit Monasteries in Kyaukme’, Shan Herald Agency for News, 26 August 2025. The Tatmadaw also bombed Mogok township in Mandalay Region during August 2025.18‘More than 10 civilians killed by airstrike in Mandalay Region’s Mogok Township’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 15 August 2025; ‘Myanmar junta airstrike kills eight civilians in Mogok’, Mizzima, 17 August 2025; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, August 2025.

Fighting remained protracted throughout September19K. Z. Win, ‘Junta troops push toward Kyaukme amid heavy clashes with TNLA’, Myanmar Now, 23 September 2025; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, September 2025 and October 2025.20‘Myanmar’s military says it has recaptured a key central town from ethnic rebels’, Associated Press, 2 October 2025; ‘Myanmar Junta Recaptures Kyaukme After 21-Day Offensive’, The Irrawaddy, 2 October 2025; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, October 2025. After the TNLA’s ceasefire with the junta forces in late October 2025, the group did not engage in any direct reported clashes with the Tatmadaw. The TNLA’s allied forces, such as several local PDFs, the ABSDF, and the KIA, however, continued fighting the Tatmadaw around Mogok and Tagaung towns in Mandalay region in November21‘Fighting erupts in Mogok after junta takes over from TNLA’, Myanmar Now, 1 December 2025; ‘After the Ceasefire: Renewed Clashes Loom in Myanmar’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 10 November 2025 and December 2025,22‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, December 2025; ‘Junta reportedly clashes with KIA on Mogok–Momeik Road, battles PDF outside Mogok Town’, Burma News International, 2 December 2025 and March 2026.23‘Military counteroffensive against People’s Defense Force shifts from Mandalay to Sagaing’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 19 March 2026; ‘Myanmar junta retakes Tagaung, Mandalay Region’s last resistance stronghold’, Myanmar Now, 12 March 2026; ‘Junta Troops Close In on Resistance’s Last Stand in Mandalay Region’, The Irrawaddy, 4 March 2026; ‘Last Resistance Stronghold in Mandalay Falls to Myanmar Junta’, The Irrawaddy, 11 March 2026. By 10 March 2026, the Tatmadaw regained control over Tagaung town. This was the last stronghold of resistance forces allied with the TNLA in the Mandalay region and a significant victory for the Tatmadaw.24‘Myanmar junta retakes Tagaung, Mandalay Region’s last resistance stronghold’, Myanmar Now, 12 March 2026; ‘Last Resistance Stronghold in Mandalay Falls to Myanmar Junta’, The Irrawaddy, 11 March 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, March 2026. As of June 2026, the TNLA continues to exercise control over territories in northern Shan state, including Namtu, Namhkam, Monglon, and Mongngawt towns.25‘The State of Myanmar: ISP-Myanmar’s Annual Strategic Review and Foresight 2025-2026’, ISP Myanmar, January 2026; ‘Junta pressures TNLA to withdraw from four controlled towns’, Burma News International, 20 May 2026; ‘Regime demands return of four TNLA-held towns in China-mediated talks’, Development Media Group, 19 May 2026; ‘Fractured Heartland: Shan Politics and Conflict in Post-coup Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, 27 November 2025.

The Tatmadaw often employs aerial assaults, including drone attacks, against the TNLA.26 ‘Myanmar junta continues attacks in northern Shan State despite ceasefire’, Myanmar Now, 23 April 2025; M. Pan, ‘Military attacks ethnic Ta’ang armed group’s base in northern Shan State using aircraft and drones’, Myanmar Now, 25 September 2023. These aerial assaults consistently cause casualties among both TNLA fighters and civilians,27 Z. Abuza, ‘Tiny ethnic Ta’ang army is a bellwether for opposition fight against Myanmar junta’, Radio Free Asia, 29 August 2023; ‘Junta’s Drones an Airstrikes Inflict Casualties on TNLA Fighters and Civilians Northern Shan State’, Burma News International, 21 June 2024 and inflict significant destruction on property, including civilian homes.28 ‘Myanmar Junta Airstrikes Kill 20 in TNLA Territory’, The Irrawaddy, 13 November 2024; ‘Ta’ang National Liberation Army claims 5 killed by airstrikes; Myanmar experts support Argentina arrest warrants’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 24 February 2025. Aerial assaults also contribute to an already significant number of internally displaced persons.29 N. Swe, ‘Myanmar army drops massive aerial bombs during northern Shan State clashes, TNLA says’, Myanmar Now, 13 December 2022.

Successful attacks against the Tatmadaw by the 3BHA, of which the TNLA is a member, have resulted in mass casualties on the side of the Tatmadaw.30 T. M. Thet and T. Kyaw, ‘Civilian casualties high in Kyaukme by TNLA’s military assaults’, NP News, 8 July 2024; ‘Inside ‘Operation 1027’, the anti-junta offensive in Myanmar’, Firstpost, 15 December 2023. On various occasions the TNLA seized military-grade weaponry following successful assaults.31 I. Naing, ‘Myanmar resistance captures strategic town near Mandalay’, Voice of America, 12 July 2024. Weaponry in its arsenal includes man-portable air defence systems32 A. Davis, ‘China’s mobile missiles on the loose in Myanmar’, Asia Times, 28 November 2019, other anti-aircraft weapons, radar systems, RPGs, and various types of landmines.33 ‘TNLA Seizes Anti-Aircraft Weapons in Battle at Nawnghkio’, Independent Mon News Agency, 11 July 2024.

No violent incidents were reported between the TNLA and the Tatmadaw since the implementation of the ceasefire agreement in October 2025. The NIAC between Myanmar and the TNLA has, therefore, ended as of the end of 2025.

Organization

The TNLA and its political wing, the PSLF, as of June 2026, are headed by the Chairman, General Tar Aik Phone (aka Tar Aik Bong).34 ‘What is Myanmar’s Three Brotherhood Alliance that’s resisting the military?’, Al Jazeera, 16 January 2024; ‘The Rise of Princelings – 2: An Upturn of Ta’ang’s Non-Royal Leadership (Ngattapa Min)’, ISP Myanmar, 15 March 2024, 5. As the organization’s armed wing, the TNLA is officially part of the PSLF’s defence department.35 ‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023. The TNLA command is structured to include various high-ranking officers, including two vice-command chairs (Tar Jok Jar and Tar Khu Lang), a General Secretary major-general (Tar Bone Kyaw),36 ‘Palaung State Liberation Front/ Ta’ang National Liberation Army – PSLF/TNLA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024; ‘An Upturn of Ta’ang’s Non-Royal Leadership (Ngattapa Min)’, ISP Myanmar, 21 March 2024; ‘The Rise of Princelings – 2: An Upturn of Ta’ang’s Non-Royal Leadership (Ngattapa Min)’, ISP Myanmar, 15 March 2024, 6 a commander-in-chief major-general (Tar Hol Plarng)37 ‘Rising dragon: TNLA declares ‘victory’ in northern Shan’, Frontier Myanmar, 4 February 2022; ‘The Rise of Princelings – 2: An Upturn of Ta’ang’s Non-Royal Leadership (Ngattapa Min)’, ISP Myanmar, 15 March 2024, 6  and a deputy commander-in-chief head of the Central General Administration Department (with the rank of brigadier-general). 38‘TNLA says it will make a revolutionary government emerge in 2025’, Channel News Independent, 27 August 2024. Other high-ranking figures within the TNLA include Tar Om Tamaung, Tar Gu Jar, Tar Nor Rein, Tar Lom Kyaw Mya, Tar Parn La, and Tar Kone Khree.39‘The Rise of Princelings – 2: An Upturn of Ta’ang’s Non-Royal Leadership (Ngattapa Min)’, ISP Myanmar, 15 March 2024, 6.

The TNLA are well-trained and provide training services to other organized armed groups.40 ‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023. Clearly, owing to a sophisticated command structure and the existence of training centres, the TNLA is capable of implementing IHL.

The TNLA’s command includes an eleven-member Central Executive Committee and a twenty-seven-member Central Committee.41 ‘An Upturn of Ta’ang’s Non-Royal Leadership (Ngattapa Min)’, ISP Myanmar, 21 March 2024; ‘The Rise of Princelings – 2: An Upturn of Ta’ang’s Non-Royal Leadership (Ngattapa Min)’, ISP Myanmar, 15 March 2024, 5.  It is estimated the TNLA has between 5,000 and 10,000 fighters,42 ‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023; A. Graceffo, ‘Backgrounder: Ethnic Armies in Myanmar Civil War’, Geopolitical Monitor, 27 February 2024; ‘What is Myanmar’s Three Brotherhood Alliance that’s resisting the military?’, Al Jazeera, 16 January 2024 which are divided into seven brigades and more than thirty battalions.43‘Rising dragon: TNLA declares ‘victory’ in northern Shan’, Frontier Myanmar, 4 February 2022. The TNLA reportedly engages in forced recruitment.44‘Fractured Heartland: Shan Politics and Conflict in Post-coup Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, 27 November 2025. It further implemented a parallel governance structure in areas under its control.45‘Fractured Heartland: Shan Politics and Conflict in Post-coup Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, 27 November 2025. In 2018, the TNLA established a police force ‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023 as well as a legal department that acts as a judiciary.46 ‘Rising dragon: TNLA declares ‘victory’ in northern Shan’, Frontier Myanmar, 4 February 2022. Thus, the TNLA is in a position to discipline its fighters.

The TNLA’s military success and the stable control over territory (see above) confirms a capacity to engage in military tactics. The TNLA employs guerilla-style operations as a part of its military tactics.47‘Myanmar Junta Seizes Key Village Near TNLA Stronghold in Northern Shan’, The Irrawaddy, 27 March 2025. Another feature of the TNLA’s military tactics is to co-operate in and co-ordinate alliances. It is a member of the United Nationalities Federal Council, the 3BHA, the Northern Alliance, and the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee. The TNLA governs the Pa Laung Self-Administered Zone located in northern Shan state, which was established under the 2008 constitution to meet the territorial demands of the Palaung/Ta’ang ethnic group.48 ‘Understanding Inter-ethnic Conflict in Myanmar’, Reliefweb, 28 September 2018; A. Graceffo, ‘Backgrounder: Ethnic Armies in Myanmar Civil War’, Geopolitical Monitor, 27 February 2024.

The TNLA financially benefits from exploiting ruby mines located in Mogok in the Mandalay Region which is under its control,49 ‘Ta’ang rebels renew vow to crush Myanmar’s junta despite earlier ceasefire offer’, Radio Free Asia, 13 January 2025 as well as from its training activities. 50‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023. The TNLA also imposes taxes in areas under its control.51‘Fractured Heartland: Shan Politics and Conflict in Post-coup Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, 27 November 2025. These lucrative financial streams enhance its logistical capacity. The TNLA has sufficient command of logistics not only to train other resistance groups but also to equip and to arm such groups. As the TNLA controls several towns (see above),52 H. H. Zan, ‘Ta’ang Rebels Start Talks With Myanmar Junta in China’, The Irrawaddy, 17 February 2025 its territory is often used to move weapons and other supplies.53 ‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023.

Lastly, the TNLA has a spokeswoman, Lway Yay Oo, and thus the group speaks with one voice.54 S. Naing, ‘Myanmar rebel army ready for dialogue with junta, with China’s help’, Reuters, 26 November 2024; ‘Myanmar Junta Seizes Key Village Near TNLA Stronghold in Northern Shan’, The Irrawaddy, 27 March 2025.

The TNLA is sufficiently organized to constitute an organized armed group under IHL.