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War Watch

Non-international armed conflict between the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) and the Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC) (formerly Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC)) (2025-2026)

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Non-international armed conflict between the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) and the Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC) (formerly Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC)) (2025-2026)

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Background

The pre-existing NIAC between the EMC and the EGC continued throughout the reporting period.1 ‘Humanitarian Report 2024: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross;‘Humanitarian Challenges 2025: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross.  The EMC is one of two major ex-FARC-EP dissident groups who have been fighting after refusing to demobilize and accept the 2016 peace deal.2 J. McDermott and S. Dudley, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, February 2025. The EMC is the largest of the ex-FARC dissident groups.3 ‘Country Policy and Information Note: Colombia: Armed Groups and Criminal Gangs’, Gov.UK, November 2024, 39. The EMC does not seek to seize power through armed conflict, as the former FARC-EP once did, but rather co-opts local authorities and takes control of the economy.4 L. Benito, ‘La estructura del Estado Mayor Central representaría un problema para las negociaciones del Gobierno de Gustavo Petro, advierte informe’, Infobae, 16 October 2023.

The EGC was established by dissidents from the AUC who opposed the 2006 demobilization process.5 L. Schmidt, ‘Power Play or Peace? AGC’s Role in Colombia’s Fragile Negotiations’, InSight Crime, 16 October 2024; ‘Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC) / Gulf Clan’, Colombia Reports, 25 October 2021. The EGC is considered one of the world’s largest international cocaine distributors.6 J. Freixes, ‘Gulf Clan, a History of Death and Crime in Colombia’, Colombia One, 16 February 2025. Similarly, the EMC uses its military wing to dominate key coca-rich territory.7 J. McDermott and S. Dudley, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, February 2025. Competition is rife among the EMC, the ELN, and the EGC over illicit commercial enterprise such as the cocaine trade.8 T. Breda, ‘Peace talks in Nariño may be a litmus test for Petro’s bid to end Colombia’s conflict’, ACLED, 12 December 2024. The root cause of the NIAC between EMC and the EGC is control of territory that is suitable for cocaine production or permits the easy import and export of cocaine between Venezuela and Colombia.9 ‘Gaitanistas – Gulf Clan’, InSight Crime, 18 March 2025.

This factor does not change the classification of the ongoing NIAC between the EMC and EGC.

Intensity

The intensity of fighting between the EMC and the EGC peaked during 2024.10 T. Breda, ‘Peace talks in Nariño may be a litmus test for Petro’s bid to end Colombia’s conflict’, ACLED, 12 December 2024. The competition between the EMC, the ELN, and the EGC for control of illicit trade, in particular in the departments of Chocó, Antioquia, Cauca, and Valle del Cauca, promotes continuing clashes between these groups.11 T. Breda, ‘Peace talks in Nariño may be a litmus test for Petro’s bid to end Colombia’s conflict’, ACLED, 12 December 2024. For example, the EMC and the EGC fought for five consecutive days over a territorial dispute in the Antioquia department between 18 and 22 November 2025.12 R. Davies et al, ‘Regional Overview: Latin America & the Caribbean: November 2023’, ACLED, 7 December 2023; ‘El terror paramilitar en el Norte de Antioquia’, Coordinación Colombia Europa Estados Unidos, 22 November  2023; S. Rairán, ‘Clan del Golfo tiene atemorizada a la población civil de un municipio de Antioquia’, Infobae, 21 November 2023.

On 24 November 2024, clashes between the EMC, the EGC, and the ELN erupted, and as a result 556 families, around 1,400 people, were forced to flee to Santa Rosa del Sur, Arenal, Morales and to Montecristo, to a place known as ‘La Y de San Luquitas’.13 M. C. Renteria, ‘Tropas del Ejército llegan al sur de Bolívar por alarmante desplazamiento forzado’, El País, 28 November 2023; ‘Enfrentamientos entre grupos armados ilegales generaron el desplazamiento de 1400 personas en el sur de Bolívar’, Defensoria del pueblo, 25 November 2023; I. Gómez Ramírez, ‘Álvaro Uribe Vélez: Comunidades reportan combates de grupos armados al sur de Bolívar’, Diario las Americas, 23 November 2025. 

The EMC and the EGC occasionally fight alongside each other against the ELN when it serves their interests to do so.14 N. V. David, ‘Combates entre EGC y disidencias ocasionaron desplazamientos internos en Briceño’, Caracol Radio, 9 November 2024; ‘“Vemos gente saliendo con los corotos”: en 4 municipios de Antioquia viven en zozobra por disputa de grupos armados’, El Colombiano, 16 September 2024. But alliances are fluid in the region and on occasion the ELN and the EMC have combined against the EGC.15 ‘Guerra en límites entre Antioquia y Bolívar tiene en riesgo a 150.000 personas: alerta Fundación Sumapaz’, El Colombiano, 25 February 2025; J. Franciotti and M. F. Arocha, ‘Regional Overview: Latin America and the Caribbean: March 2025’, ACLED, 7 March 2025. Fighting between the three groups heightens the incidence of civilian displacement.16 N. V. David, ‘Combates entre EGC y disidencias ocasionaron desplazamientos internos en Briceño’, Caracol Radio, 9 November 2024.

The types of weapons used by the EGC include explosive devices and long-range firearms.17 S. Olivares Tobón, ‘Confrontaciones dentro de las minas de Buriticá dejaron dos personas lesionadas’, El Colombiano, 2 October 2023. The EMC not only deploys machine guns, hand grenades, and mines but also drones for airstrikes and aerial bombardment.18 ‘Drones: new terror tool for Colombian guerrillas’, RFI, 21 June 2024; S. Hide, ‘Drone attacks increasingly affect civilians in Colombia’s conflict’, Latin America reports, 5 March 2025; F. Ramos, ‘[ATTACK] FARC Dissidents Escalate Drone Attacks in Colombia’, Modern insurgent, 20 April 2025.

The EGC has been sufficiently successful in its military operations against the EMC (and the ELN) to gain some of their territory.19 ‘Country Policy and Information Note: Colombia: Armed Groups and Criminal Gangs’, Gov.UK, November 2024, 30-31. The territorial stronghold of the EGC is in the Gulf of Arabā, in the departments of Antioquia and Chocó and Córdoba. Displacement figures in these areas, a direct result of the ongoing conflict, are high during the reporting period.20 ‘Humanitarian Challenges 2025: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross.

The fighting between the EMC and the EGC continues to equate to protracted armed violence, satisfying the notion of intensity as demanded under IHL.

Organization

Both non-state actors engaged in this NIAC are sufficiently organized under IHL. For an analysis of the organization of the EMC and the EGC, see above.

The pre-existing NIAC between the EMC and the EGC was ongoing during the reporting period.