Non-international armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army (2026-07-22)

4 August 2026

Background

The AA was founded in April 2009 in Kachin state on the border of Myanmar and China.¹ Initially, the establishment of AA was supported by the KIA and the two groups often fought alongside each other until the AA refocused its attention on Rakhine state (formerly Arakan state).² The AA fosters the political goal of creating an ‘Arakan Nation’ through the ‘way of Rakhita’ – an ideology encapsulating the national liberation struggle of the people of Arakan and the restoration of the sovereignty of Arakan.³ The AA aims to represent all people living in Rakhine state, which is different from other EAGs that view the struggle explicitly as nationalists, basing the fight exclusively on ethnic lines.⁴

The AA has engaged in a NIAC with the Tatmadaw since 2009.⁵ The intensity of the conflict peaked between 2018 and 12 November 2020, when a ceasefire agreement was reached.⁶ Fighting between the Tatmadaw and the AA reignited on 5 July 2022 and intensified in August 2022, ending the existing ceasefire.⁷ Another humanitarian ceasefire agreement was reached on 2 November 2022.⁸ Fighting resumed again in 2023 with Operation 1027 (see above).⁹

Intensity

The Myanmar Peace Monitor has documented a total of 855 clash days between the AA and the Tatmadaw in the period between January 2020 and June 2026.¹⁰ Specifically, a total of 191 conflict events occurred between the Tatmadaw and the AA between January 2025 and May 2026.¹¹

The Tatmadaw has, on various occasions, employed heavy weaponry as well as other military tactics such as drone strikes and other forms of aerial strikes against the AA. United League of Arakan/Arakha Army – ULA/AA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024. The AA’s communications and military tactics are sophisticated. This prompted the NLD to make an unparalleled demand to all mobile service providers in 2019 to prevent internet services in nine townships with a high AA presence, leading to the world’s longest internet blackout, lasting one and half years.¹² In clashes with the Tatmadaw, the AA has captured sophisticated heavy military weapons including tank destroyers and 105mm M101 howitzers.¹³ The AA retains consolidated control over mainland Rakhine,¹⁴ and, as of May 2026, had captured and maintained control of multiple Tatmadaw bases along the borders of Rakhine, Magway, Bago, and Ayeyarwady.¹⁵

In March 2025, OCHA reported the resumption of the conflict in Rakhine between the AA and Tatmadaw. ‘Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 45’, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 28 March 2025. On various occasions, the United Nations has expressed concern over this situation. On 28 February 2025, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, expressed his ‘deep concern’ over the escalation of violence in the region.¹⁶ Since this resumption of fighting, clashes continued escalating and in response to the increased intensity of these confrontations, the Tatmadaw repositioned its forces from existing military bases including Dhanyawady Naval Headquarters, Battalion 32, Infantry Battalion 542, and Infantry Battalion 543, in order to create a defensive posture enabling the deployment of approximately seventy soldiers in areas where the AA was active, such as Kyaukphyu. The Tatmadaw also restocked its bases for increased combat readiness.¹⁷

Clashes between the AA and Tatmadaw were frequent throughout 2025 including those reported during May,¹⁸ June,¹⁹ July,²⁰ September,²¹ October,²² November,²³ and December 2025.²⁴ Clashes continued in 2026, including in January,²⁵ February,²⁶ March,²⁷ April,²⁸May,²⁹ and June.³⁰

Significant clashes between the AA and Tatmadaw occurred during May 2025. The AA and Tatmadaw have increasingly clashed in the vicinity of Kyaukphyu township in Rakhine state, due to increased movement by the AA. The Chinese government has vested interests in Kyaukphyu as China has oil and gas pipelines in this township (see above). Consequently, increased movement of AA fighters in this part of Myanmar triggered a coordinated response by the Myanmar military, including the deployment of defensive aerial drone strikes by the Tatmadaw from Yangon and the Dhanyawady Naval Base. On 11 May 2025, Tatmadaw ground forces moved towards Laek Khamaw and Malakyun villages where they were ambushed by the AA.³¹ On 19 May 2025, the AA managed to overtake a military outpost in Mindat Taung village. On 22 May 2025, the Tatmadaw responded through aerial bombardment, employing fighter jets as well as (suspected) Russian and Chinese supplied drones and paramotors.³² On 25 May 2025, AA snipers killed five soldiers. The AA also managed to detain soldiers after successfully overtaking the Hnanpe Taung military outpost in Kyaukphyu.³³ The May 2025 clashes led to civilian casualties and injuries, and an increase in IDP numbers.³⁴

During June 2025, the AA made territorial gains of about five kilometres during its advance on Kyaukphyu township. The Tatmadaw continued to direct aerial bombardment at AA strongholds in this area.³⁵ It is reported that the AA killed several soldiers during clashes throughout June 2025. Notably, an intense clash on 11 June 2025 between the AA and the military in Pyaing Say Kay village in Kyaukpyu township, killed a large number of soldiers. Exact numbers were not made public.³⁶ These clashes triggered more internal displacement of villagers living in or near the Kyaukphyu township.³⁷ During July 2025, the Tatmadaw increased its aerial campaign against the AA, and it was reported that the nature of military explosives employed by the Tatmadaw was of a higher military grade by then.³⁸

The Tatmadaw launched military operations against the AA on the Rakhine state border by simultaneously attacking from three different directions during September 2025. The purpose of these military operations was to push the AA back into the western States. The AA was victorious following battles in the Sum Tat Village in Magwe’s Ngape township, forcing the Tatmadaw to retreat.³⁹ The AA claimed to have killed ‘dozens’ of soldiers during clashes on 7 September 2025 in the hills of Ngape township in Magway region.⁴⁰ News outlets report that the AA claims more specific numbers, namely up to seventy soldiers killed, following the two counteroffensives at Sum Tat Village.⁴¹ The AA also benefited from military weaponry and equipment left as the soldiers fled after their defeat. The Tatmadaw deployed more than 1,500 soldiers (mostly conscripts) in Bago Region in an attempt to retake areas under AA control. The third direction from which the Tatmadaw attacked the AA was Ayeyarwady’s Lemyethna township, which triggered frequent clashes between the enemies.⁴²

September 2025 attacks had a significant civilian death toll. Governmental aerial strikes launched between 11 and 12 September 2025 in Thayet Thapin village in Kyaukphyu township killed at least nineteen civilian students and left approximately twenty students injured.⁴³ The Tatmadaw made some gains in Kyaukphyu as part of the September 2025 military campaign against the AA as it recaptured an electrical substation previously held by the AA.⁴⁴

During October 2025, the AA encircled the Tatmadaw’s strategic Nat Ye Kan mountain base in Ngape township, Magway Region. In response, the Tatmadaw air force employed aerial bombardment to prevent the AA from taking over this base. Reports suggest that the base had fallen into the hands of the AA, but as of 15 October 2025, this was being refuted by locals.⁴⁵ The military advantage of seizing the Nat Ye Kan base for the AA is that it serves as a major artillery and air defence hub for the junta.⁴⁶ Between 14 and 23 October 2025, the AA managed to secure all of the Tatmadaw’s remaining defensive positions around the Nat Ye Kan mountain base.⁴⁷ Clashes leading up to this were severe and continuous.⁴⁸

Clashes continued throughout November 2025. Of significance were strategic ambushes by the AA in Thaing Chaung and Min Pyin which led to the AA regaining territories briefly held by the Tatmadaw. The government used aerial support, including heavy artillery strikes, to assist its soldiers in retreating from these positions as intensive fighting continued between the AA and Tatmadaw.⁴⁹ Government airstrikes were reported as consistent and almost daily during November 2025 which, together with ground clashes, further increased the internal displacement figures in this region.⁵⁰

Strategic attacks by the AA against government outposts, namely outposts safeguarding the Thaing Chaung Dam and the Min Pyin weather radar station in Kyaukphyu township in Rakhine state, occurred in early December 2025. Capturing these outposts holds a potential significant military advantage in that they are the central military observance points for the Thain Chaung Dam.⁵¹ Aerial bombardment by drones and coordinated artillery strikes by the AA against the Tatmadaw were reported during December 2025 and January 2026, showing how the use of technology in the hands of this non-State actor is escalating violence in the Rakhine region. Barracks at the Dhanyawady Navy base were hit, causing extensive structural damage and leaving many soldiers injured.⁵²

The period from January to June 2026 saw a continued escalation in fighting between the AA and the Tatmadaw. During January 2026, the AA specifically targeted two outposts as part of its campaign to control the regional military base in Rakhine state.⁵³ Attacks by the AA towards these outposts servicing the military headquarters (Dakasa) located in Sittwe in Rakhine state were so severe that by 12 January 2026 at least forty-nine soldiers, including from the Tatmadaw’s elite combat units, had deserted their positions.⁵⁴ The Tatmadaw responded through indiscriminate aerial bombardment which killed at least twenty-one people and left approximately thirty people injured. These numbers include detained Tatmadaw soldiers.⁵⁵ The Tatmadaw continued its aerial campaign, dominated by drone strikes, in Rakhine state throughout February⁵⁶ and March 2026.⁵⁷ The impactful attacks launched by the AA up to February 2026 saw the Tatmadaw send additional forces to the south of Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine state, in early February 2026.⁵⁸ Four hundred soldiers were deployed to a government military post in Kyaukphyu township.⁵⁹ Intensive fighting towards this military post in Sittwe continued to escalate throughout March,⁶⁰ April,⁶¹ May,⁶² and June 2026.⁶³ This includes the Tatmadaw’s use of aerial bombardment in support of their soldiers still manning this base.⁶⁴ Owing to the gains made by the AA during this period, the Tatmadaw tried to send reinforcements, but the AA ambushed these soldiers on 23 March 2026⁶⁵ and again ambushed Tatmadaw reinforcements coming from the direction of Sane Town on 10 May 2026.⁶⁶ The ongoing protracted armed violence throughout March 2026 led to the increase of IDPs from Sittwe.⁶⁷

The AA continues to increase its geographic footprint. It was reported that by mid-2026, the AA controlled fourteen of the seventeen townships in Rakhine state as well as Paletwa township in Chin state bordering India.⁶⁸ Territorial control remains contested between the AA and the Tatmadaw in Sittwe in Kyaukpyu (which hosts strategic Chinese infrastructure projects), and the small island township of Man Aung. The AA exercises control over the totality of Myanmar’s border with Bangladesh and an almost 740-kilometre-long stretch of coastline.⁶⁹ The AA implements governance structures in areas under its control and divides its territorial jurisdiction into three military regions referred to as Alpha, Victor, and Nova, each comprising three to four subunits.⁷⁰

Territorial control by a non-State actor indicates that the threshold of protracted armed violence is met.⁷¹

Clearly, the conflict situation between the AA and the Tatmadaw continues to satisfy the notion of protracted armed violence.

Organization

The AA has a sophisticated command structure. The AA has a political and a military wing, the latter estimated to have between 15,000⁷² and 40,000 fighters.⁷³ High-level decisions are reportedly made by the top five leaders of the political and military wings.⁷⁴ Twan Mrat Naing is the leader of the ULA and Commander-in-Chief of the AA military wing.⁷⁵ Brigadier-General Nyo Twan Awng is the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the United League of Arakan, which is the political wing of the movement, and the Vice Commander-in Chief of the AA.⁷⁶ The leadership of the AA is described as ‘young’, ‘educated’, and able to evolve.⁷⁷ It also incorporates the experiences of an older generation of the Rakhine revolutionary movement.⁷⁸

The military wing of the AA is structured in nine military regional commands to achieve greater coordination and efficiency in executing operations against the Tatmadaw. These military regional commands are directed by colonels and lieutenant-colonels and are supervised by a war office at a secret location, where Twan Mrat Naing and his deputy, Brigadier-General Dr Nyo Twan Aung, are assisted by a group of senior officers. ⁷⁹ This sophisticated command structure allows for the structured training of fighters belonging to the AA and thus the AA possesses the ability to comply with IHL. The AA is considered ‘well-trained’.⁸⁰

There is strict military discipline in the regional command divisions.⁸¹ Supplementary to internal disciplinary measures in place, the political wing, the United League of Arakan, has created an administrative and justice system⁸² which supports people in Rakhine state who report criminal incidents.⁸³

Initially, the AA employed a mix of guerilla warfare and conventional assaults in its approach to operations against the Tatmadaw.⁸⁴

The AA’s strategic military tactics have been successful and enable it to control trade routes along the Myanmar-Bangladesh border, cutting off key supply lines for the Tatmadaw.⁸⁵ The military tactics and operations employed by the AA in Rakhine state since November 2023 enabled them to make successive territorial gains. By mid-June 2025, it was reported that the AA controlled a number of important former Tatmadaw military bases and fourteen of Rakhine’s seventeen townships (see above).⁸⁶ During October 2025, the AA employed siege warfare tactics to attempt to force soldiers to surrender and hand over the Tatmadaw’s strategic Nat Ye Kan mountain base in Ngape township in Magway region. Siege tactics included encirclement as well as cutting all supply chains and communication to and from this base.⁸⁷ As the Nat Ye Kan mountain base is a major weapons and ammunition supply hub, soldiers had access to ammunition but were cut off from food. In starving the soldiers, the siege resulted in their decision to surrender.⁸⁸ In January 2026, the AA showcased its use of technology as part of its military tactics when it synchronized artillery and aerial bombardment by drone in its battle with the Tatmadaw for the Dhanyawady Navy base in Rakhine state.⁸⁹ It is clear that the AA has evolved significantly from the guerilla tactics employed between 2023 and mid-2025.⁹⁰

Further tactics the AA employs include building and fostering alliances with other EAGs in the region through, e.g. the Northern Alliance, the Federal Political Negotiation and Coordination Committee.⁹¹ The AA’s military tactics are considered so successful that it often provides training to resistance forces as well as technical advice to its allies.⁹²

The AA is successful in its recruiting initiatives P. Pearson, ‘Arakan Army’, Modern Insurgent, 10 April 2025 and has not engaged in forced recruitment practices.⁹³ The AA benefits from a reliance on its allies to source small arms and procure larger equipment, such as artillery and armoured vehicles through their successful clashes with the Tatmadaw.⁹⁴The UWSA is an important logistical partner of the AA and often provides it with arms and other military equipment.⁹⁵ While initially funding its activities through donations and support from allied EAGs, the AA now has established tax collection and allegedly the movement of illicit drugs into Bangladesh (which the AA denies) as new revenue streams. The group also maintains a close trading relationship with India.⁹⁶

The AA is sophisticated in its approach to communication with the outside world.⁹⁷

The AA has an official spokesperson who was, as of mid-2026, Khaing Thu Kha.⁹⁸ Furthermore, the AA has its own website where it posts press releases.⁹⁹

As of the end-June 2026, the AA remained sufficiently organized to constitute an organized armed group under IHL.

1
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023.
2
P. Pearson, ‘Arakan Army’, Modern Insurgent, 10 April 2025; See ‘Breaking Away: The Battle for Myanmar’s Rakhine State’, International Crisis Group, 27 August 2024.
3
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023; J. T. Davies and H. Oung, ‘Decentralisation by Force: The United League of Arakan/ Arakan Army’s Expansion in Western Myanmar’, Australian National University: ANU Myanmar Research Centre, 16 March 2026.
4
P. Pearson, ‘Arakan Army’, Modern Insurgent, 10 April 2025.
5
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023.
6
S. Strangio, ‘Ceasefire Raises Hopes of Elections in Myanmar’s Rakhine State’, The Diplomat, 7 December 2020.
7
‘Six AA Fighters Killed as Myanmar Regime Bombs Outpost in Karen State’, The Irrawaddy, 5 July 2022.
8
‘Breaking Away: The Battle for Myanmar’s Rakhine State’, International Crisis Group, 27 August 2024; ‘Informal ceasefire with Myanmar military ‘not permanent’ solution, Arakan Army says’, Myanmar Now, 28 November 2022.
9
United League of Arakan/Arakha Army – ULA/AA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024.
10
‘Numbers Behind Myanmar’s Conflicts’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 25 June 2026.
11
‘The Arakan Army and the Quest for Total Control of Arakan State: How Close?’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 8 June 2026.
12
S. Long, ‘Rakhine: a precarious ceasefire hangs in the balance’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 26 July 2022.
13
War Noir, X, 27 December 2024.
14
M. Martin, ‘Arakan Army Posed to “Liberate” Myanmar’s Rakhine State’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 20 February 2025; ‘The State of Myanmar: ISP-Myanmar’s Annual Strategic Review and Foresight 2025-2026’, ISP Myanmar, January 2026
15
L. Thit, ‘Arakan Army Advances to Edge of Sittwe as Fighting Intensifies’, The Irrawaddy, 2 March 2026; L. Thit, ‘Arakan Army Surrounds Myanmar’s Western Naval Bases, Sparking Intense Battles’, The Irrawaddy, 2 June 2026.
16
‘UN rights chief concerned over escalating violence in Myanmar’s Rakhine’, Kuwait News Agency, 28 February 2025.
17
‘Kyaukphyu Conflict Escalates Daily’, Burma News International, 13 May 2025.
18
‘Kyaukphyu Conflict Escalates Daily’, Burma News International, 13 May 2025; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, May 2025; ‘Three, including a woman, injured in Kyaukphyu airstrikes by the junta’, Burma News International, 26 May 2025
19
L. Thit, ‘Myanmar Junta Reinforces Kyaukphyu as AA Nears China-Backed SEZ Hub’, The Irrawaddy, 11 June 2025; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, June 2025
20
‘Kyaukphyu battle resumes in three locations after week-long standoff’, Burma News International, 11 July 2025
21
‘Air strike on two Myanmar schools: 500-pound bombs dropped as students slept in Rakhine; 19 killed’, The Times of India, 13 September 2025; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, September 2025; ‘Rakhine Rebels Harried on Three Fronts by Myanmar Junta Assaults’, Irrawaddy, 6 September 2025
22
L. Thit, ‘Arakan Army Tightens Siege on Hill Base Guarding Myanmar Junta Arms Plant’, The Irrawaddy, 15 October 2025; ‘AA surrounds Nat Ye Kan base in Magway Region, cutting off all supply routes to junta troops’, Burma News International, 15 October 2025
23
L. Thit, ‘30 Junta Soldiers Reported Dead in AA Ambush in Rakhine’, The Irrawaddy, 17 November 2025
24
‘Analysts warn of escalation in Rakhine State as regime forces advance westward’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 5 December 2025; ‘AA reportedly seizes outposts in Kyaukphyu’, Burma News International, 3 December 2025.
25
‘Analysts warn of escalation in Rakhine State as regime forces advance westward’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 5 December 2025; ‘AA drones, heavy weaponry simultaneously attack Dhanyawaddy Naval Base, Police Battalion 32, located in Kyaukphyu, leading to casualties, collapsed barracks’, Burma News International, 9 January 2026; T. New, ‘AA assaults two outposts defending regional military headquarters, Dakasa, in Sittwe’, NarinJara, 8 January 2026; ‘Arakan Army captures two forward outposts of junta’s regional command in Sittwe’, Development Media Group, 10 January 2026; ‘Dozens of Myanmar junta troops desert as Arakan Army encircles Rakhine State capital’, Mizzima, 21 January 2026; ‘The Junta Turns on Its Own: Airstrikes on POW Detention Camps’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 20 March 2026
26
‘Junta Drone Strikes Continue to Rise Across Myanmar’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 6 March 2026; ‘Arakan OSINT Situation Brief – February 2026’, Bangladesh Defence Journal, 11 March 2026
27
‘The Junta Turns on Its Own: Airstrikes on POW Detention Camps’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 20 March 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, March 2026; ‘500 locals flee after junta bombs AA PoW detention center in Ann Township’, Burma News International, 12 March 2026
28
‘Intense battles erupted in Sittwe as AA fighters target junta headquarters’, Myanmar (CRPH) Support Group, 11 April 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, April 2026
29
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, May 2026; ‘Arakan OSINT Situation Brief – May 2026’, Bangladesh Defence Journal, 10 June 2026; ‘Kyaukphyu Conflict Escalates Daily’, Burma News International, 13 May 2025
30
L. Thit, ‘Arakan Army Surrounds Myanmar’s Western Naval Bases, Sparking Intense Battles’, The Irrawaddy, 2 June 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, June 2026.
31
‘Kyaukphyu Conflict Escalates Daily’, Burma News International, 13 May 2025.
32
‘Three, including a woman, injured in Kyaukphyu airstrikes by the junta’, Burma News International, 26 May 2025.
33
‘Arakan Army detains regime troops in Kyaukphyu Township of Rakhine State’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 1 June 2025.
34
‘Three, including a woman, injured in Kyaukphyu airstrikes by the junta’, Burma News International, 26 May 2025.
35
L. Thit, ‘Myanmar Junta Reinforces Kyaukphyu as AA Nears China-Backed SEZ Hub’, The Irrawaddy, 11 June 2025.
36
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, June 2025.
37
L. Thit, ‘Myanmar Junta Reinforces Kyaukphyu as AA Nears China-Backed SEZ Hub’, The Irrawaddy, 11 June 2025.
38
‘Kyaukphyu battle resumes in three locations after week-long standoff’, Burma News International, 11 July 2025; ‘Air strike on two Myanmar schools: 500-pound bombs dropped as students slept in Rakhine; 19 killed’, The Times of India, 13 September 2025.
39
‘Rakhine Rebels Harried on Three Fronts by Myanmar Junta Assaults’, Irrawaddy, 6 September 2025.
40
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, September 2025.
41
M. Pyae, ‘AA Repels Myanmar Junta Counteroffensive Near Magwe-Rakhine Border’, The Irrawaddy, 11 September 2025.
42
‘Rakhine Rebels Harried on Three Fronts by Myanmar Junta Assaults’, Irrawaddy, 6 September 2025.
43
‘Air strike on two Myanmar schools: 500-pound bombs dropped as students slept in Rakhine; 19 killed’, The Times of India, 13 September 2025; ‘Military airstrike on schools in western Myanmar kills at least 18 people, most of them students’, Associated Press, 12 September 2025; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, September 2025.
44
‘Rakhine Rebels Harried on Three Fronts by Myanmar Junta Assaults’, Irrawaddy, 6 September 2025.
45
‘AA surrounds Nat Ye Kan base in Magway Region, cutting off all supply routes to junta troops’, Burma News International, 15 October 2025; L. Thit, ‘Arakan Army Tightens Siege on Hill Base Guarding Myanmar Junta Arms Plant’, The Irrawaddy, 15 October 2025.
46
L. Thit, ‘Arakan Army Tightens Siege on Hill Base Guarding Myanmar Junta Arms Plant’, The Irrawaddy, 15 October 2025.
47
K. L. Hla, ‘AA issues statement regarding capture of Point 666 hill near Bagan Gway village in Padaung Township’, NarinJara, 16 October 2025; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, October 2025; ‘Arakan Army captures key junta tactical base in Padaung Twsp’, Development Media Group, 30 January 2026.
48
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, October 2025.
49
‘AA recaptures some military-occupied areas in Kyaukphyu amid intense combat’, Myanmar (CRPH) Support Group, 21 November 2025.
50
L. Thit, ‘30 Junta Soldiers Reported Dead in AA Ambush in Rakhine’, The Irrawaddy, 17 November 2025.
51
‘AA reportedly seizes outposts in Kyaukphyu’, Burma News International, 3 December 2025; ‘Analysts warn of escalation in Rakhine State as regime forces advance westward’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 5 December 2025.
52
‘Analysts warn of escalation in Rakhine State as regime forces advance westward’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 5 December 2025.
53
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, January 2026; ‘Arakan Army captures two forward outposts of junta’s regional command in Sittwe’, Development Media Group, 10 January 2026; ‘Dozens of Myanmar junta troops desert as Arakan Army encircles Rakhine State capital’, Mizzima, 21 January 2026.
54
‘Dozens of Myanmar junta troops desert as Arakan Army encircles Rakhine State capital’, Mizzima, 21 January 2026; T. New, ‘AA assaults two outposts defending regional military headquarters, Dakasa, in Sittwe’, NarinJara, 8 January 2026.
55
‘Junta airstrike kills its own troops and families detained by AA in Kyauktaw’, Burma News International, 23 January 2026; ‘Junta airstrike kills 21 POWs, family members at Kyauktaw detention centre’, Development Media Group, 21 January 2026; ‘The Junta Turns on Its Own: Airstrikes on POW Detention Camps’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 20 March 2026.
56
‘Arakan OSINT Situation Brief – February 2026’, Bangladesh Defence Journal, 11 March 2026; B. K. Gokmen, ‘Airstrikes kill at least 26 civilians in Myanmar’s Arakan, Sagaing regions’, AA, 25 February 2026
57
‘Junta Drone Strikes Continue to Rise Across Myanmar’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 6 March 2026.
58
‘Arakan Army attacks regime forces in Rakhine State, Bago and Magway regions’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 2 February 2026; ‘Fighting for control of Kyaukphyu intensifies’, Development Media Group, 8 January 2026.
59
‘Arakan Army attacks regime forces in Rakhine State, Bago and Magway regions’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 2 February 2026.
60
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, March 2026
61
‘Intense battles erupted in Sittwe as AA fighters target junta headquarters’, Myanmar (CRPH) Support Group, 11 April 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, April 2026
62
‘Arakan OSINT Situation Brief – May 2026’, Bangladesh Defence Journal, 10 June 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, May 2026; ‘Kyaukphyu Conflict Escalates Daily’, Burma News International, 13 May 2025
63
L. Thit, ‘Arakan Army Surrounds Myanmar’s Western Naval Bases, Sparking Intense Battles’, The Irrawaddy, 2 June 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, June 2026.
64
‘Fierce fighting erupts across Sittwe; residents urged to remain on high alert’, Development Media Group, 7 March 2026; L. Thit, ‘AA Tightens Noose in Battle for Rakhine Capital Sittwe’, The Irrawaddy, 12 March 2026; ‘Fighting escalates near Sittwe as Arakan Army attacks regime positions’, Development Media Group, 28 March 2026; ‘Junta’s push toward Natyaekan base triggers fierce clashes’, Burma News International, 11 March 2026; L. Thit, ‘Arakan Army Advances to Edge of Sittwe as Fighting Intensifies’, The Irrawaddy, 2 March 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, March 2026.
65
‘Junta reinforcement convoy to Nat Yay Kan base ambushed; officers among casualties’, Development Media Group, 25 March 2026
66
‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, May 2026.
67
‘500 locals flee after junta bombs AA PoW detention center in Ann Township’, Burma News International, 12 March 2026.
68
‘Rakhine Rebels Harried on Three Fronts by Myanmar Junta Assaults’, Irrawaddy, 6 September 2025.
69
J. T. Davies and H. Oung, ‘Decentralisation by Force: The United League of Arakan/ Arakan Army’s Expansion in Western Myanmar’, Australian National University: ANU Myanmar Research Centre, 16 March 2026; S. Mon, ‘From state to nation: The Arakan Army’s ascent in post-coup Myanmar’, ACLED, 31 October 2025; ‘The Arakan Army and the Quest for Total Control of Arakan State: How Close?’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 8 June 2026.
70
J. T. Davies and H. Oung, ‘Decentralisation by Force: The United League of Arakan/ Arakan Army’s Expansion in Western Myanmar’, Australian National University: ANU Myanmar Research Centre, 16 March 2026.
71
ICC, ‘The Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda’, Judgement, Trial Chamber VI, 8 July 2019, para 717; ICC, ‘The Prosecutor v Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi’, Judgment and Sentence, Trial Chamber VIII, 27 September 2016, para 49; ‘Rakhine Rebels Harried on Three Fronts by Myanmar Junta Assaults’, Irrawaddy, 6 September 2025.
72
P. Pearson, ‘Arakan Army’, Modern Insurgent, 10 April 2025
73
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023; B. Lintner, ‘Rebel yell: Arakan Army leader speaks to Asia Times’, Asia Times, 18 January 2022; J. T. Davies and H. Oung, ‘Decentralisation by Force: The United League of Arakan/ Arakan Army’s Expansion in Western Myanmar’, Australian National University: ANU Myanmar Research Centre, 16 March 2026.
74
J. T. Davies and H. Oung, ‘Decentralisation by Force: The United League of Arakan/ Arakan Army’s Expansion in Western Myanmar’, Australian National University: ANU Myanmar Research Centre, 16 March 2026.
75
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023; B. Lintner, ‘Rebel yell: Arakan Army leader speaks to Asia Times’, Asia Times, 18 January 2022; P. Pearson, ‘Arakan Army’, Modern Insurgent, 10 April 2025; J. T. Davies and H. Oung, ‘Decentralisation by Force: The United League of Arakan/ Arakan Army’s Expansion in Western Myanmar’, Australian National University: ANU Myanmar Research Centre, 16 March 2026.
76
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023.
77
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023.
78
United League of Arakan/ Arakha Army – ULA/AA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024.
79
R. Bhattacharyya, ‘5 Factors That Catapulted Arakan Army to Unprecedented Success Against the Myanmar Military’, The Diplomat, 28 December 2024.
80
‘Military airstrike on schools in western Myanmar kills at least 18 people, most of them students’, Associated Press, 12 September 2025.
81
R. Bhattacharyya, ‘5 Factors That Catapulted Arakan Army to Unprecedented Success Against the Myanmar Military’, The Diplomat, 28 December 2024.
82
‘Breaking Away: The Battle for Myanmar’s Rakhine State’, International Crisis Group, 27 August 2024; J. T. Davies and H. Oung, ‘Decentralisation by Force: The United League of Arakan/ Arakan Army’s Expansion in Western Myanmar’, Australian National University: ANU Myanmar Research Centre, 16 March 2026
83
‘The Arakan Army’s Journey: From Rebels to Rulers and A New Arakan Paradigm’, Centre for Arakan Studies, 2 July 2024.
84
‘The Arakan Army’s Journey: From Rebels to Rulers and A New Arakan Paradigm’, Centre for Arakan Studies, 2 July 2024; J. P. Leider, ‘The Arakan Army, Rakhine State and the Promise of Arakan’s Independence’, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher Policy Brief Series 128, 2022.
85
P. Pearson, ‘Arakan Army’, Modern Insurgent, 10 April 2025.
86
‘Military airstrike on schools in western Myanmar kills at least 18 people, most of them students’, Associated Press, 12 September 2025.
87
‘AA surrounds Nat Ye Kan base in Magway Region, cutting off all supply routes to junta troops’, Burma News International, 15 October 2025.
88
‘AA surrounds Nat Ye Kan base in Magway Region, cutting off all supply routes to junta troops’, Burma News International, 15 October 2025.
89
‘AA drones, heavy weaponry simultaneously attack Dhanyawaddy Naval Base, Police Battalion 32, located in Kyaukphyu, leading to casualties, collapsed barracks’, Burma News International, 9 January 2026.
90
P. T. Aung, ‘AA vows to take all of Rakhine State by end of next year’, Myanmar Now, 13 April 2026
91
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023; ‘The Arakan Army’s Journey: From Rebels to Rulers and A New Arakan Paradigm’, Centre for Arakan Studies, 2 July 2024 and the 3BHA. ‘Breaking Away: The Battle for Myanmar’s Rakhine State’, International Crisis Group, 27 August 2024; J. T. Davies and H. Oung, ‘Decentralisation by Force: The United League of Arakan/ Arakan Army’s Expansion in Western Myanmar’, Australian National University: ANU Myanmar Research Centre, 16 March 2026.
92
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023.
93
R. Bhattacharyya, ‘5 Factors That Catapulted Arakan Army to Unprecedented Success Against the Myanmar Military’, The Diplomat, 28 December 2024.
94
P. Pearson, ‘Arakan Army’, Modern Insurgent, 10 April 2025.
95
S. Ramachandran, ‘The Arakan Army and Tatmadaw’s Tenuous Truces in Myanmar’s Rakhine State’, The Jamestown Foundation, 16 December 2022; ‘The rapid rise of the Arakan Army’, Mizzima, 21 July 2022.
96
J. T. Davies and H. Oung, ‘Decentralisation by Force: The United League of Arakan/ Arakan Army’s Expansion in Western Myanmar’, Australian National University: ANU Myanmar Research Centre, 16 March 2026; L. H. Naing, ‘ULA/AA: Junta’s claim linking captured drugs with AA is utterly unfounded and purely a political smear’, NarinJara, 20 March 2025.
97
P. T. Aung, ‘AA vows to take all of Rakhine State by end of next year’, Myanmar Now, 13 April 2026; J. T. Davies and H. Oung, ‘Decentralisation by Force: The United League of Arakan/ Arakan Army’s Expansion in Western Myanmar’, Australian National University: ANU Myanmar Research Centre, 16 March 2026.
98
K. Hsan Hlaing, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army’, Stimson, 21 April 2023; ‘The Arakan Army’s Journey: From Rebels to Rulers and A New Arakan Paradigm’, Centre for Arakan Studies, 2 July 2024.
99
‘ULA/AA Press-Briefing’, Arakan Army.