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Non-international armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Chin National Defense Force (CNDF) (2026-07-22)

Non-international armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Chin National Defense Force (CNDF) (2026-07-22)

By clemence

Background

The CNDF is an EAG and the armed wing of the Chin National Organization (CNO), which emerged in 2021 as a civilian response to the coup. 1L. Lovett, ‘‘Inch by inch’: Myanmar rebels close in on key military base in Chin State’, Al Jazeera, 15 March 2025. An ethnolinguistic diverse group, the Chin are indigenous to Chin state in western Myanmar.2 E. Berridge, ‘Chin National Defense Force’, Modern Insurgent, 19 February 2025. The Chin response to the Tatmadaw is fragmented – there are two Chin factions. The first is led by the Chin National Front (CNF), an EAG established in 1988, and its allies. The second is the Chin Brotherhood which, at time of reporting, is made up of six resistance groups including the CNDF. The cause of fragmentation among the Chin is based on different approaches to governance of the Chin people.3 L. Lovett, ‘‘Inch by inch’: Myanmar rebels close in on key military base in Chin State’, Al Jazeera, 15 March 2025. Despite various unification attempts, 4L. Lovett, ‘‘Inch by inch’: Myanmar rebels close in on key military base in Chin State’, Al Jazeera, 15 March 2025; ‘Two factions of the Chin resistance agree to merge after talks in India’s Mizoram State capital Aizawl’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 28 February 2025 there is tension between the two factions, which includes sporadic clashes that have the potential to escalate to the level of NIAC.5 ‘Disquiet on the Western Front: A Divided Resistance in Myanmar’s Chin State’, International Crisis Group, 19 March 2025.

Intensity

The CNDF continues to suffer heavy losses in their fighting against the Tatmadaw. A memorial of fallen soldiers is installed at its headquarters in western Myanmar. An honour roll displays the names of eighty fallen fighters killed during May 2021. Airstrikes in November 2024 caused fifty casualties among the CNDF and its allies.6 L. Lovett, ‘‘Inch by inch’: Myanmar rebels close in on key military base in Chin State’, Al Jazeera, 15 March 2025; ‘Myanmar: Junta Drops ‘More Than 500’ Bombs On Chin State Town During Week Of Clashes’, Eurasia Review, 20 March 2025. The CNDF did make territorial gains during 2025 as it managed to capture the last junta base in Chin State Town in early April 2025. Consequently, the Chin Brotherhood has full control over the town of Falam in Northern Chin state.7 ‘Chin Brotherhood takes over last junta base in Chin State town’, Myanmar Now, 5 April 2025. The Myanmar military launched an offensive in Chin state in October 2025 which eventually led to the recapture of Taingen village from the Chin Brotherhood on 9 November 2025. Between 29 October and 7 November 2025, fierce fighting between the junta forces comprising about 400 soldiers and the Chin Brotherhood occurred daily. The fighting led to about forty Tatmadaw soldiers being killed in combat. By 11 November 2025, more than 2,000 residents of the town had to flee their homes due to the armed clashes between regime and Chin resistance forces.8‘Fighting Near Taingen Displaces 2,000, Urgent Aid Needed’, Burma News International, 13 November 2025; ‘Military takes control of strategic village connecting Chin State to Sagaing Region’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 12 November 2025; ‘Myanmar military seizes key hill position from Chin resistance’, Myanmar Now, 11 November 2025. As a part of the same broader campaign, the Tatmadaw launched another offensive against the Chin Brotherhood Alliance (including the CNDF) in October 2025, which involved ground offensives, intense airstrikes, and sustained artillery shelling. The offensive lasted for about six months and culminated in the recapture of Falam town by the Myanmar military on 25 April 2026, which the Chin Brotherhood Alliance had previously controlled for about a year. Shortages in ammunition supplies were cited as one of the main reasons for the resistance forces’ loss of Falam. During the six-month-long operation, a minimum of 109 armed clashes took place between both sides according to the Tatmadaw. In the days following the recapture of Falam, clashes continued in surrounding villages. The months-long fighting reportedly led to both sides suffering ‘significant casualties’.9‘Junta’s recapture of Falam raises threat to remaining resistance-held areas in Chin State’, Burma News International, 30 April 2026; ‘Military Regains Control of Falam Town’, Channel News Independent, 25 April 2026; ‘Myanmar Regime Recaptures Chin State’s Falam’, The Irrawaddy, 27 April 2026; ‘Military regains control of Chin State’s Falam town from resistance forces’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 26 April 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, May 2026.

The CNDF has similar combat capabilities to the Tatmadaw, including man-portable air-defence systems, shoulder-fired anti-tank launchers, and 40mm grenade launchers. These similarities stem from the fact that the CNDF’s weaponry is primarily comprised of captured weapons. But it also relies on locally produced rifles.10 E. Berridge, ‘Chin National Defense Force’, Modern Insurgent, 19 February 2025; ‘Two Dozen Myanmar Junta Troops Killed in Chin State Camp Raid’, The Irrawaddy, 21 April 2023. The Tatmadaw mostly responds through aerial bombardment of the CNDF and its allies.11 ‘Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 45’, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 28 March 2025; ‘Pastor among 13 killed as Myanmar military bombs Chin State villages’, Barnabas Aid, 15 April 2025.

It is clear that the intensity of fighting between the CNDF and Tatmadaw equates to protracted armed violence.

Organization

The CNDF has a sophisticated organizational structure. It is reported that the CNDF is made up of ten battalions divided into four brigades.12 The Border Lens, ‘In conversation with Salai Peter Thang, Chin National Defence Force (CNDF) Chin State Myanmar’, YouTube, 10 May 2023. The CNDF’s headquarters are located at Camp Rihli, roughly fifty kilometres south of Rihkhawdar near the India-Myanmar border.13‘Fractures Deepen Among Chin Resistance Groups’, ISP Myanmar, 24 July 2025. Peter Thang has been reported as either holding the position of deputy chairman or chief of staff, 14‘Myanmar’s junta chief faces growing criticism over military failures: group’, Radio Free Asia, 30 May 2023 and Olivia Thawng Luai is the group’s defence secretary.15 S. Johnny and L. Lovett, ‘‘How could I do any less?’: Chin State’s Mother of Resistance’, Myanmar Frontier, 6 March 2025; E. Fishbein, ‘Meet the women fighting Myanmar’s junta’, The New Humanitarian, 12 January 2023; L. Lovett, ‘‘I stopped counting after three’: the ‘girl sniper’ fighting on the frontline of Myanmar’s civil war’, The Guardian, 31 March 2025. The names of other high-ranking officials are not in the public domain.

The nature of the organizational structure of the CNDF should facilitate the ability to implement IHL and for the commanders to discipline fighters who are non-compliant. Additionally, CNDF fighters have to complete two months of training prior to deployment.16 The Border Lens, ‘In conversation with Salai Peter Thang, Chin National Defence Force (CNDF) Chin State Myanmar’, YouTube, 10 May 2023. Such a training curriculum could be used as a vehicle to implement IHL.

The CNDF employ guerrilla tactics such as ambush tactics and hit-and-run attacks as part of its military strategy. The CNDF strategically designs military operations based on the terrain from where operations are launched. Thus, for example, attacks will differ if launched from dense jungles versus urban settings.17 E. Berridge, ‘Chin National Defense Force’, Modern Insurgent, 19 February 2025. Part of the CNDF’s military tactics includes keeping their geographic locations secret in order to maximize the effectiveness of surprise attacks or minimize the risk of aerial bombardments.18 The Border Lens, ‘In conversation with Salai Peter Thang, Chin National Defence Force (CNDF) Chin State Myanmar’, YouTube, 10 May 2023. Finally, military tactics include forming alliances for the purposes of launching joint operations against the Tatmadaw. Allies include the CDF, the CNF and certain PDFs. The CNO and CNDF are a part of the Chin Brotherhood.19 E. Berridge, ‘Chin National Defense Force’, Modern Insurgent, 19 February 2025.

Territorial control provides the CNDF with greater logistical capacity. Coordination and co-operation with allies such as the AA who also control townships further promotes its logistics.20 ‘Chin Brotherhood takes over last junta base in Chin State town’, Myanmar Now, 5 April 2025; ‘Eighty-nine Chin resistance members killed in Falam Township’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 18 April 2025. The CNDF has had success as of June 2024 with recruitment drives through conscription from Chin state and the neighbouring Sagaing region.21 ‘Forced recruitment pushes young people into the ranks of the resistance’, Agenzia Fides, 7 June 2024. The CNDF manages to source military equipment (including helmets, ammunition, and uniforms) from its allies as well as from ambushes.22 E. Berridge, ‘Chin National Defense Force’, Modern Insurgent, 19 February 2025; ‘Two Dozen Myanmar Junta Troops Killed in Chin State Camp Raid’, The Irrawaddy, 21 April 2023. The CNDF also raises funds from international private donors, 23The Border Lens, ‘In conversation with Salai Peter Thang, Chin National Defence Force (CNDF) Chin State Myanmar’, YouTube, 10 May 2023 and through collecting taxes from its community.24 ‘We Are Ready to Serve’, Chin National Organisation.

Finally, the CNDF has its own spokesperson, Salai Timmy, which enables this armed group to speak with a unified voice. 25‘Eighty-nine Chin resistance members killed in Falam Township’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 18 April 2025. It also has an official website which is managed by its Information and Public Relations Department.26 ‘We Are Ready to Serve’, Chin National Organisation.

The CNDF is sufficiently organized to constitute an organized armed group under IHL.