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Non-international armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) (2026-07-22)

Non-international armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) (2026-07-22)

By clemence

Background

The Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) is a political group representing the Kachin ethnic minority in northern Myanmar.1 C. Stutte, ‘Who is the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)?’, Geopolitical Report, 4 February 2025. The KIA is the armed wing of the KIO.2 ‘Kachin Independence Organisation/ Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA)’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 5 September 2024.

The KIA was founded on 5 February 1961 with the goal of establishing an autonomous state for the Kachin people.3 M. Martin, ‘Update on the Armed Resistance in Myanmar’s Kachin State’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 17 July 2024; C. Stutte, ‘Who is the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)?’, Geopolitical Report, 4 February 2025. Over time, KIA objectives evolved from seeking independence to demanding meaningful autonomy and the protection of Kachin rights and resources.4 M. Martin, ‘Update on the Armed Resistance in Myanmar’s Kachin State’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 17 July 2024. The term ‘Kachin’ encompasses a diverse group of ethnicities, notably the Jingpo, Rawang, Lisu, Zaiwa, Lashi (Lachik), and Lawngwaw (Maru) peoples.5 ‘The Kachin Independence Army: A Comprehensive Overview’, A Complicated War.

A ceasefire agreement between the KIA and the Myanmar government was reached in 1994.6 ‘Dossier: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Myanmar’, Global Counter-Terrorism Institute, 7 September 2024; ‘Memoirs of Kachin Peace Efforts (1994)’, Kachinland News, 31 October 2024. In 2010, the military junta issued an ultimatum to all EAOs in Myanmar to transform into a border guard force under command of the military junta or face a resumption of conflict.7 H. Beech, ‘On Burmese New Year, a String of Attacks’, Time Magazine, 19 April 2010. The ultimatum was rejected by the KIA and KIO, and the ceasefire broke down in June 2011.8 M. Martin, ‘Update on the Armed Resistance in Myanmar’s Kachin State’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 17 July 2024. As a consequence, the KIA has been fighting the Tatmadaw as of 2011, resulting in significant internal displacement and a continued humanitarian crisis in Kachin state.9 ‘The Kachin Independence Army: A Comprehensive Overview’, A Complicated War.

Intensity

According to the Myanmar Peace Monitor, the KIA and allied forces have clashed with the Tatmadaw more than 935 times between September 2020 and June 2026.10‘Numbers Behind Myanmar’s Conflicts’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 25 June 2026. The KIA has seized more than 300 military installations and fifteen towns in Kachin state, Shan state, and Sagaing region since the 2021 coup.11M. Martin, ‘The Importance of Kachin State to Myanmar’s Revolution’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 22 July 2025. In April 2025, clashes between the KIA and Tatmadaw continued to escalate.12 ‘Heavy fighting erupts as KIA ambushes advancing Myanmar junta troops near Hpakant’, Mizzima, 27 April 2025; M. Maung, ‘Battles resume in Kachin State’, Myanmar Now, 28 April 2025; M. Maung and M. Shwe Wah, ‘Myanmar military attacks KIA-controlled territories, including Laiza, with aircraft and drones’, Myanmar Now, 27 February 2025; ‘KIA Resumes Bhamo Attacks on Myanmar Junta After Quake Ceasefire’, The Irrawaddy, 30 April 2025. Following the expiration of KIA’s earthquake-related unilateral ceasefire on 22 April 2025, there was an escalation in fighting between KIA and the military in the Bhamo and Hpakant regions.13 ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group. Notably, the KIA attempted to capture the regime’s last significant stronghold in Bhamo town.14‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group.

Fighting between the Tatmadaw and the KIA peaked in April and May 2025, specifically in the Bhamo and Hpakant regions as the KIA worked towards capturing the junta’s key military base in Bhamo.15‘KIA Resumes Bhamo Attacks on Myanmar Junta After Quake Ceasefire’, The Irrawaddy, 30 April 2025; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, May 2025; H. Altman and T. Rogoway, ‘Mi-17 Appears To Have Been Downed By FPV Drone In Myanmar’, The War Zone, 22 May 2025. The Tatmadaw launched counterattacks against the KIA in Kachin state during June 2025 in an effort to retake Special Region 1, which is a mineral rich economic hub in northern Myanmar.16‘Myanmar Junta Attacks to Reclaim KIA’s Jade and Rare Earth Strongholds’, The Irrawaddy, 16 June 2025. Fighting up to June 2025 enabled the KIA to dominate at least two thirds of the territory in Bhamo.17‘KIA controls two-thirds of Bhamo after six months of battle, clashes continue near junta strongholds’, Mizzima, 14 June 2025. The group captured more than 300 government military bases in Kachin state between 2021 and July 2025.18M. Martin, ‘The Importance of Kachin State to Myanmar’s Revolution’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 22 July 2025. KIA’s territorial gains in Bhamo have specifically caught the attention of the Chinese government which benefits from this mineral-rich region. China has warned the KIA to withdraw from Bhamo.19‘Myanmar: KIA Clash Risks China’s Rare Earth Imports’, Strat News Global, 8 July 2025; N. B. Han et al, ‘Why China’s ultimatum to Myanmar rebels threatens global supply of heavy rare earths’, Reuters, 8 July 2025; M. Martin, ‘The Importance of Kachin State to Myanmar’s Revolution’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 22 July 2025.

Fighting between the Tatmadaw and KIA escalated once again in August 2025 and September 2025 when the Tatmadaw planned to attack KIA-dominated territory in Bhamo.20M. Pyae, ‘KIA Says Myanmar Junta Retakes Two More Bases in Bhamo but Fighting Continues’, The Irrawaddy, 15 September 2025. By mid-September 2025, the Tatmadaw had retaken two of its bases as a result of these counteroffensives.21M. Pyae, ‘KIA Says Myanmar Junta Retakes Two More Bases in Bhamo but Fighting Continues’, The Irrawaddy, 15 September 2025; ‘16 civilians killed as Myanmar junta fleet makes its way down the Ayeyarwady’, Myanmar Now, 11 September 2025. The September 2025 attacks by the Tatmadaw signalled the KIA’s first big military defeat since March 2024.22‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, September 2025. During October 2025, however, the KIA gained more ground in Bhamo in attacks against the Tatmadaw.23M. Pyae, ‘KIA Seizes Camps From Myanmar Military in Bhamo, Waingmaw’, The Irrawaddy, 9 October 2025. Fighting between KIA and the Tatmadaw intensified in Bhamo and the Hpakant and Waingmaw townships throughout October,24‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, October 2025; M. Pyae, ‘KIA Seizes Camps From Myanmar Military in Bhamo, Waingmaw’, The Irrawaddy, 9 October 2025 November,25C. Thar and M. Maung, ‘Among three Kachin State battlefronts, clashes in Bhamo remain fiercest’, Myanmar Now, 1 December 2025 and December 2025.26A. Htoi, ‘Myanmar Junta Losing Grip on Key Sagaing Stronghold as KIA-Led Forces Advance’, The Irrawaddy, 6 January 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, December 2025.

By 6 January 2026, more than 1,000 civilians were internally displaced as a direct result of the severity of ongoing fighting in this region.27‘Over 1,000 war-displaced Kathan residents seek refuge in Monghnyin’, Burma News International, 6 January 2026. At the same time, fighting between several groups opposing the Tatmadaw, including the KIA, peaked in Kachin and Sagaing regions as resistance groups encircled the Light Infantry Battalion 309 headquarters (LIB 309).28‘Resistance Forces March Into Katha on the Irrawaddy’, The Irrawaddy, 2 January 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, January 2026. On 14 January 2026, the KIA captured the 399 Transport Battalion. Twenty soldiers based at the 399 Transport Battalion surrendered to the KIA,29‘KIA forces seize Myanmar junta outpost in Bhamo, 20 soldiers surrender’, Burma News International, 17 January 2026 leading the Tatmadaw to send 200 soldiers in as reinforcement and launch another aerial campaign against the KIA.30‘Kachin Independence Army resumes fight with military for control of Kachin State’s Bhamo’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 15 January 2026. Fighting continued throughout February 2026.31‘General Gun Maw says KIA’s Bhamo offensive as necessary’, Burma News International, 12 February 2026; ‘Clashes erupt in four Kachin State townships within a week’, Burma News International, 10 February 2026. During May 2025, the Tatmadaw sent more than 400 military vehicles and soldiers to Kachin in order to recapture key military posts held by the KIA.32‘Junta reinforces troops to open multiple fronts in Kachin State operations’, Burma News International, 26 May 2026.

The KIA continues to launch sustained and concerted military operations against the Tatmadaw. As of mid-2026, the KIA controlled eight of eighteen townships in Kachin, including Sumprabum, Injangyang, Tsawlaw, and Chipwi.33‘For Peace or for Military Entrenchment?’, Kachin News, 10 March 2026; ‘The State of Myanmar: ISP-Myanmar’s Annual Strategic Review and Foresight 2025-2026’, ISP Myanmar, January 2026; ‘KIA Announces Shift to Defensive Strategy as Regime Troops Pour into Kachin State’, The Irrawaddy, 19 May 2026. The fighting between the Tatmadaw and the KIA was sufficiently intense to be of concern to China to the extent that in the first quarter of 2025, it was committed to negotiating a ceasefire.34M. Micheals, ‘Crossing the Rubicon: Are Myanmar’s ethnic armies prepared to go all in?’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2025.

The Tatmadaw’s choice of attack against the KIA is often aerial strikes, including sophisticated drone attacks.35 M. Maung and M. Shwe Wah, ‘Myanmar military attacks KIA-controlled territories, including Laiza, with aircraft and drones’, Myanmar Now, 27 February 2025; M. Maung and M. Shwe Wah, ‘Myanmar junta strikes Kachin armed group’s stronghold as clashes in Bhamo continue’, Myanmar Now, 27 January 2025. The use of aerial bombardment against the KIA signals an assessment that the KIA is a serious military opponent.36‘Junta Airstrike Kills Nearly 40 Trainees at KIA Camp Amid Crisis’, Kachin News, 1 April 2025; ‘Myanmar’s junta seeks to regain air edge with foreign night vision drones’, Radio Free Asia, 15 March 2025. During June 2025, the KIA responded with employing first-person view (FPV) drones to down a military aircraft by flying the drone into the helicopter’s rudders.37H. Altman and T. Rogoway, ‘Mi-17 Appears To Have Been Downed By FPV Drone In Myanmar’, The War Zone, 22 May 2025.

Weaponry used by the KIA includes AK47s and improvised explosive devices and they are capable of producing weaponry which includes single shot rifles. War Noir, ‘Manufacturing the Revolution: Weapons and Explosives Craft-Produced by Myanmar’s Anti-Junta Fighters’, Militant Wire, 31 October 2022. Among the military tactics of the KIA is the forming of alliances with other EAGs, which includes the successful alliance with the TNLA, and one with the CNDF.38 ‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, March 2025, 22. As noted above, the KIA obtained FPV drone technology as early as June 2025.39H. Altman and T. Rogoway, ‘Mi-17 Appears To Have Been Downed By FPV Drone In Myanmar’, The War Zone, 22 May 2025.

The number of internally displaced persons in Kachin state as of 6 July 2026 was estimated at 244,600 people – a direct result of the severity of fighting in this region.40‘Myanmar’ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Operational Data Portal, Updated 6 July 2026.

The intensity of fighting between the KIA and the Tatmadaw is sufficiently intense to equate to protracted armed violence.

Organization

The KIA and KIO are led by General N/Ban and the second in command is General Gam Shawng.. Other high-ranking leaders include Sumlut Gam, Wang Hkang Aung Seng La (Commander-in-Chief), and Maran Zau Tawng (Deputy Commander-in-Chief).41‘Kachin Independence Organisation/ Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA)’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 5 September 2024; ‘Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)’, ISP Myanmar, 20 August 2025. The precise organizational structure of the KIA is unclear. The Kachin People’s Defence Force (KPDF) operates under the command of the KIA, as is the case with various other PDFs in Kachin.42 ‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, March 2025, 4. An executive decision has been taken to subsume PDFs active in areas in which the KIA operates in the command structure of the KIA. An example of this integration is presented by the Myo Hla PDF which was integrated into KIA’s Battalion 28 under its 11th Brigade.43 ‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, March 2025, 13.

The KIA headquarters are based in Laiza, Kachin state.44 ‘Kachin Independence Organisation/ Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA)’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 5 September 2024. It is reported the KIA has some 15,000 active fighters organized into between eight and eleven brigades.45‘Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)’, ISP Myanmar, 20 August 2025;  ‘Kachin Independence Organisation/ Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA)’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 5 September 2024; ‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, March 2025, 13. Of its eleven brigades, eight operate in Kachin state, while three operate in Northen Shan state. They comprise ‘two mobile regiments, three special battalions, twenty-four regionally based battalions, and twenty-seven mobile battalions that move between regions’.46‘Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)’, ISP Myanmar, 20 August 2025. Little information is available on the group’s disciplinary system, but the organization into battalions headed by brigades could ensure enforcement of discipline among fighters and enable the system of command to implement IHL. The KIA is well-trained,47 ‘Dossier: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Myanmar’, Global Counter-Terrorism Institute, 7 September 2024 which should ensure the ability to comply with IHL.

Its military tactics include guerrilla warfare, with claims that the KIA excels in hit-and-run tactics and ambushes, leveraging its knowledge of the terrain in Kachin state.48 ‘Dossier: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Myanmar’, Global Counter-Terrorism Institute, 7 September 2024; C. Stutte, ‘Who is the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)?’, Geopolitical Report, 4 February 2025. In recent years, however, the KIA has demonstrated increased capacity for conventional military operations, including the use of artillery and the capture of major military bases.49 C. Stutte, ‘Who is the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)?’, Geopolitical Report, 4 February 2025. This development suggests an evolution in military tactics akin to the type employed by conventional armies.50 ‘The Long War Pt. 4; The Kachin Independence Army (KIA)’, Military Matters, 30 November 2020.The KIA has also repeatedly entered into alliances with other resistance groups such as various PDFs, Chin resistance groups, the AA, and the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF). Following the buildup of regime troops in Kachin state in the first half of 2026, the KIA has temporarily shifted to a defensive strategy.51‘KIA Announces Shift to Defensive Strategy as Regime Troops Pour into Kachin State’, The Irrawaddy, 19 May 2026; ‘Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)’, ISP Myanmar, 20 August 2025.

The KIA has sufficient logistical capacity to meet the criteria of organization. For example, the group produces small arms as well as a range of modified AK47s and self-made landmines.52 ‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, March 2025, 22. The KIA has built up an arsenal of small arms, mortars, and light artillery captured during clashes with the military junta or procured on the black market.53 ‘Dossier: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Myanmar’, Global Counter-Terrorism Institute, 7 September 2024.

The KIA is described as well-equipped and well-supplied.54 ‘The Long War Pt. 4; The Kachin Independence Army (KIA)’, Military Matters, 30 November 2020. Its operations are funded from the profits of the group’s interests in jade mining, 55‘The Kachin Independence Army: A Comprehensive Overview’, A Complicated War; M. Micheals, ‘Myanmar regime brings significant escalation to the doorstep of key opponent’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 2023 as well as trade in timber and gold.56 ‘Dossier: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Myanmar’, Global Counter-Terrorism Institute, 7 September 2024; ‘The Kachin Independence Army: A Comprehensive Overview’, A Complicated War. The ‘taxation’ collected in territories under its control further contributes to financing military operations.57 ‘Dossier: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Myanmar’, Global Counter-Terrorism Institute, 7 September 2024; ‘The Kachin Independence Army: A Comprehensive Overview’, A Complicated War. In the past, the KIA has trained and armed other EAGs which adds to its income.58‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, March 2025, 22; ‘KIA Announces Shift to Defensive Strategy as Regime Troops Pour into Kachin State’, The Irrawaddy, 19 May 2026.

The KIA has an official spokesperson, who acts as the spokesperson for the KIO as well, Colonel Naw Bu, allowing the EAG to speak with a unified voice.59 ‘KIA Expects Kachin State Conflicts to Escalate in 2025’, Burma News International, 3 January 2025. The KIA employs sophisticated media strategies to promote its cause and to maintain support in the Kachin population.60 C. Stutte, ‘Who is the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)?’, Geopolitical Report, 4 February 2025.

Clearly, the KIA is sufficiently organized to constitute an organized armed group under IHL.