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War Watch

Non-international armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Karen National Union (KNLA) (2026-07-22)

Non-international armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Karen National Union (KNLA) (2026-07-22)

By clemence

Background

The KNLA is the military wing of the political movement, the Karen National Union (KNU).1 M. Hughey, ‘Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)’, Modern Insurgent, 11 June 2024. Formed in 1949, it is the oldest EAG in Myanmar.2 S. Loong, ‘The Karen National Union in Post-Coup Myanmar’, Stimson, 7 April 2022. Post-World War II, the situation reflected the fact that the Karen people had sided with British forces, whereas the Burmese had co-operated with Imperial Japan.3 M. H. Aung and D. I. Steinberg, ‘The British in Burma, 1885–1948’, Britannica. Since Myanmar’s independence from Britain, the KNLA has engaged in a conflict against the military junta. This NIAC between the KNLA and the Tatmadaw (and previous versions of the military junta) has lasted for more than seventy-five years.4 M. Hughey, ‘Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)’, Modern Insurgent, 11 June 2024.

The KNU’s objectives include ensuring the autonomy and self-determination of the Karen people through the establishment of a democratic Karen state.5 ‘About KNU’, Karen National Union. The KLNA describes its mission as being to serve as a self-defence force for the protection of the Karen people and the KNU.6 ‘Department of Defence’ Karen National Union. The KLNA believes that to be able successfully to act in self-defence it must defend against Tatmadaw aggression, aim to ban narcotics, provide village security, and provide security for humanitarian relief missions.7‘Department of Defence’ Karen National Union.

Intensity

KNLA brigades control their own territory in a relatively autonomous way under a central command.8 H. M. Kyed and M. Gravers, ‘Non-state armed groups in the Myanmar peace process: What are the future options?’, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2014. Stable territorial control confirms the KNLA has the capacity to oppose the Tatmadaw by its military operations and the territory to evade government control. The military tactics the KNLA employs include maintaining a defensive force and engaging in guerilla warfare and ambush tactics suited to the jungle environment.9 M. Hughey, ‘Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)’, Modern Insurgent, 11 June 2024; A. Nachemson, ‘How the Karen became crucial to Myanmar’s anti-coup resistance’, Al Jazeera, 6 May 2022. The junta, too, deploys special forces for special operations against the KNLA. 10M. Hughey, ‘Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)’, Modern Insurgent, 11 June 2024; S. Y. Naing, ‘‘Special Force’ Joins KNLA on High Alert’, The Irrawaddy, 19 October 2010.

Part of the KNLA strategy is to form alliances. As of 2023, the KNLA was associated with more than a dozen other insurgent groups; it is a part of the 4K Coalition which consists of the Karenni Army, the Karenni National People’s Liberation Front and the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force. Other allies are the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO), the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front, the AA, the Bamar People’s Liberation Army, DKBA-5, the KIA, and the PDF.11 M. Hughey, ‘Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)’, Modern Insurgent, 11 June 2024. The KNLA/KNU openly allies with the NUG, which was founded on 31 January 2007 by Major-General Saw Htein Maung, the commander of the KNLA’s 7th Brigade. 12M. Hughey, ‘Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)’, Modern Insurgent, 11 June 2024.

Similarly, in the south-eastern Tanintharyi region, the KNLA and the KNDO, in collaboration with other resistance forces, captured the last remaining regime position at the Htee Khee base on 9 May 2025, which serves as the overland route from Thailand to the regional capital, Dawei. On 7 May 2025, regime bases along the Thai border came under attack from KNLA and KNDO forces in neighbouring Kayin state.13 ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group. On 6 and 10 June 2025, the KNLA and allied resistance forces gained further ground against the regime by capturing bases in Kyaukkyi township (Bago region) and Dawei township (Tanintharyi region). Additionally, the large Thay Baw Boe base in Kayin state was seized by the KNLA on 3 June 2025 following a ten-day offensive, with forty government troops reportedly killed. . ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group; ‘KNU/KNLA recaptures camps including Te Baw Boe camp near Thai-Myanmar border; just four camps remain to be retaken’, Myanmar (CRPH) Support Group, 6 June 2025; ‘KNLA seizes Bawdi border post on Thai-Myanmar border after three-day battle’, Mizzima, 13 June 2025.[JP1]  The KNLA continued capturing smaller government military outposts along the Myanmar-Thailand border throughout July 2025,‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, July 2025 often employing armed drones.‘Karen resistance forces seize regime ‘Living Fence’ outpost along Myanmar-Thailand border’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 13 July 2025. Fighting during the beginning of July was so severe that around ninety soldiers and 3,000 civilians fled across the border into Thailand.‘Karen resistance forces seize regime ‘Living Fence’ outpost along Myanmar-Thailand border’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 13 July 2025. By 15 July 2025, the KNLA captured the military base of Ukrit Hta on the Myanmar side of the border with Thailand. This was a significant base for the Tatmadaw, and the successful attack was not only a strategic victory for the KNLA, but it also gave them access to weapons, including a mortar and ammunition, left behind by soldiers fleeing into Thailand.L. H. Naing, ‘KNLA-led forces capture key Ukrit Hta military base on Thai border, maintain assault on Wawlay military base’, NarinJara, 15 July 2025.

During August 2025, the Tatmadaw attacked the KNLA to regain control over Demoso township in Kayah (Karenni) state.‘Myanmar junta claims control of Demoso town, resistance forces dispute narrative’, Mizzima, 23 August 2025. The KNLA disputed claims of victory by the Tatmadaw.‘Myanmar Junta Claims Capture of Demoso From Karenni Forces’, The Irrawaddy, 20 August 2025. The Tatmadaw did recapture two military bases in Thingannyinaung village in Kayin state during September 2025.‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, September 2025. In October 2025, the Tatmadaw recaptured further bases along the border previously held by the KNLA, including Shwe Khin Thar Camp and the Swel Taw Kone Camp.‘Myanmar army regains control of KK Park, KNU and PDF bases’, The Nation Thailand, 20 October 2025. Fighting remained intense throughout November 2025, as the Tatmadaw continued to regain more territory along the border.‘Myanmar Junta Pushes to Retake Asian Highway, Igniting Fierce Battles With KNU’, The Irrawaddy, 10 November 2025.

In April 2026, intense fighting between the Tatmadaw and the KNLA was reported.14P. Tar, ‘Karen Resistance Captures Two Regime Bases Over Thingyan Holidays’, The Irrawaddy, 16 April 2026. The KLN successfully ousted the Tatmadaw from Lay Kay military base in Mon state’s Bilin township by 12 April 2026. This base is significant due to its location is between the Mon and Karen states in Myanmar.15P. Tar, ‘Karen Resistance Captures Two Regime Bases Over Thingyan Holidays’, The Irrawaddy, 16 April 2026; ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group, April 2026. Fighting displaced approximately 13,000 Bilin residents.16‘Over 13,000 Bilin residents unable to return home amid ongoing fighting with Myanmar military’, Mizzima, 18 April 2026. A battle for Way Lay military base triggered a strong aerial response by the Tatmadaw towards the end of April 2026.17P. Tar, ‘Myanmar Regime Stronghold Teeters as Karen Forces Launch Waw Lay Assault’, The Irrawaddy, 27 April 2026. On 19 May 2026, the Tatmadaw managed to recapture the Mawtaung town on the Thai border.‘Regime recaptures Tonzang and Mawtaung from resistance forces’, Development Media Group, 20 May 2026. The Tatmadaw also recaptured Tonzang  base, close to the border with India.18‘Myanmar military recaptures 2 strategic border towns from ethnic militias’, Associated Press, 21 May 2026.

Fighting significantly escalated between the Tatmadaw and the KLNA throughout 2025 up until June 2026. This NIAC remains sufficiently protracted to satisfy the intensity threshold demanded by IHL.

Organization

The KNLA is a part of the sophisticated organizational structure of the KNU. The Karen Defence Department was formed in 1956 and comprises the KNLA and the KNDO, as well as militia and home guard units.19‘Department of Defence’ Karen National Union. The KNLA command structure is as follows: seven brigades and three battalion headquarters. Each brigade is divided into five battalions, each battalion consists of four companies, and each company has three platoons. A majority of the PDFs operating in Karen are under the KNLA umbrella. Each brigade has a joint coalition committee. In this case, where a PDF is a part of a KNLA brigade, the commander is from the KNLA, and the deputy is from the PDF.20A. Nachemson, ‘How the Karen became crucial to Myanmar’s anti-coup resistance’, Al Jazeera, 6 May 2022; ‘Mizzima Weekly: Analysis and Insight’, Mizzima, 21 May 2026. The KLNA has three central branches: the General Staff Office, an Adjutant General Office and a Quartermaster Office.21 ‘Department of Defence’ Karen National Union. The organizational structure of the KNLA corresponds to that of a modern military. According to analysts from the International Crisis Group, the KNLA was ‘in its strongest position in decades’ as of June 2026. It governs large swathes of territory, especially along the Myanmar-Thailand border.22T. Kean, ‘Bracing for a Long War in Myanmar’s Karen State’, International Crisis Group, 12 June 2026.

The KNLA/KNU’s organizational structure satisfies the requirement that it has the capacity to comply with IHL and enforce discipline amongst its fighters. The KNU’s declared core values, which include honesty and equality, further support discipline in all departments23 ‘About KNU: Values’, Karen National Union and are published on its website as an expression of humanitarian policy.24 ‘Policies’, Karen National Union.

In 2015, Geneva Call presented and explained the international norms pertaining to children affected by armed conflict and exposed sexual and gender-based violence and gender discrimination to nearly forty officers from the KNLA, from six of the seven KNU brigade areas, as well as from the associated KNDO and the Karen National Police Force. Geneva Call demonstrated how these norms are refined and appear in a condensed form in its Deeds of Commitment protecting children in armed conflict and prohibiting sexual violence and gender discrimination. These commitments were agreed to by the KNU in 2013.25 ‘Burma/Myanmar: 40 high-ranking officers from the Karen National Liberation Army are trained on child protection’, Geneva Call, 25 November 2015.

The proper functioning of the disciplinary system was evident when, in 2022, KNU suspended Nerdah Bo Mya, at the time the commander-in-chief of an armed force, for killing twenty-five civilians. It was explicitly stated that his suspension was the result of the accused contravening the Geneva Conventions.26 S. Loong, ‘Southeast Myanmar: a shared struggle for federal democracy’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 23 September 2022.

The KNU has an official website27 Karen National Union on which it releases official statements,28 ‘Statements’, Karen National Union hosts official documents such as ceasefire agreements,29 ‘Peace Process’, Karen National Union and posts news related to the KNLA. 30‘News’, Karen National Union.

Clearly, the KNLA is sufficiently organized to constitute an organized armed group under IHL.