Myanmar has faced protracted internal violence since independence, with long-standing ethnic armed groups challenging central authority and a series of military coups. Following the 2021 military takeover, mass protests evolved into NIACs between the Tatmadaw (Myanmar armed forces) and a wide array of organized opposition forces, including National Unity Government (NUG)-aligned People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) and established ethnic armed groups (EAGs), alongside entrenched Rohingya displacement and repression. The reporting period was marked by international proceedings concerning crimes against the Rohingya, major territorial gains by the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) composed of three EAGs under ‘Operation 1027’, fighting between Myanmar armed forces and other EAGs and China mediated ceasefire efforts. Despite episodic truces, hostilities persisted into 2025, confirming the continuation of multiple NIACs.
Classification(s) and Parties to the Conflict(s)
- Non-International Armed Conflict between Myanmar and Arakan Army (AA)
- Non-International Armed between Myanmar and Chin National Defence Force (CNDF)
- Non-International Armed Conflict between Myanmar and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)
- Non-International Armed Conflict between Myanmar and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)
- Non-International Armed Conflict between Myanmar and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)
- Non-International Armed Conflict between Myanmar and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)
Myanmar’s armed conflicts continued to generate widespread civilian harm, marked by airstrikes that were often indiscriminate or directly targeted civilians, including in disaster-affected areas, and by extensive use of anti-personnel mines, unguided bombs, and armed drones. Villages, displacement sites, schools, hospitals, and religious and cultural property were repeatedly struck, causing high civilian casualties, long-term disruption of essential services and large-scale displacement within Myanmar and across borders. Humanitarian needs escalated after major natural disasters, yet authorities systematically impeded aid to opposition-held areas and conducted further attacks that obstructed relief. Persons in the power of parties to the conflicts were subjected to killings, mutilation, torture, arbitrary detention, forced recruitment, and widespread sexual violence.
Historical Background
Origins and ethnic armed groups
Myanmar has experienced persistent internal violence since its independence in 1948, with conflicts largely rooted in ethnic diversity and colonial-era legacy. Ethnic armed groups (EAGs) emerged as autonomous actors – sometimes as coalitions – contesting central authority across border regions. Successive coups and constitutions failed to resolve these fault lines or prevent recurrent State confrontations with ethnic armed groups and between such groups.
Post-2021 coup dynamics
The February 2021 military takeover triggered mass protests that escalated into organized resistance. New anti-junta formations coalesced alongside long-standing EAGs. The National Unity Government (NUG) ‘declared war’ on the junta and created the People’s Defence Force (PDF) as an umbrella supported by various militias. By mid-2021, clashes were frequent and multi-regional, with the Tatmadaw – the Myanmar armed forces – employing heavy weaponry and airstrikes and resistance groups shifting to sustained ambushes and use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
Organization of parties
Opposition actors comprised PDFs recognized by the NUG, smaller People’s Defence Teams (PDTs), independent Local Defence Forces (LDFs), and established EAGs such as the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and Arakan Army (AA). Despite varied agendas and uneven alignment with the NUG, these forces displayed command structures, operational coordination, and de facto territorial control in several areas.
Conflict classification under IHL
The combination of organized armed groups and protracted, geographically dispersed hostilities from March 2021 supports classification as multiple NIACs [hyperlink to glossary] between the Tatmadaw and diverse organized actors, some also fighting each other. These NIACs [hyperlink to glossary] have persisted in 2025 with fluctuating alliances and frontlines, and international responses – sanctions, statements, and limited diplomacy – have not altered underlying realities.
Rohingya crisis
In Rakhine, large-scale displacement of Rohingya and entrenched restrictions on movement intersect with parallel hostilities involving the Tatmadaw and the AA, with civilians caught between front lines and administrative controls.
Key Developments (2023–2026)
Several major developments occurred between July 2023 and June 2026:
- The Gambia v Myanmar case before the International Court of Justice: Since July 2023, the case brought by The Gambia against Myanmar under the Genocide Convention has progressed procedurally. Several States filed declarations of intervention, which Myanmar opposed, but the Court declared them admissible to the extent that they concerned the interpretation of the Genocide Convention. Additional interventions were later accepted, and merits hearings were held in January 2026.
- Criminal proceedings initiated against Myanmar’s military leader: In 2026, Timor-Leste opened investigations under universal jurisdiction into alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed against the Chin population following the 2021 coup. Indonesia also accepted a criminal complaint against Min Aung Hlaing for alleged genocide and other international crimes against the Rohingya during earlier military operations in Rakhine State.
- Weakening of the Three Brotherhood Alliance and Operation 1027: The Three Brotherhood Alliance made significant territorial gains after Operation 1027, but its cohesion weakened in 2025 and 2026. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army entered into Chinese-mediated ceasefires with the junta, while the Arakan Army remained the only member engaged in sustained, large-scale combat. Clashes between the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army further indicated internal fragmentation.
- Chinese influence on Myanmar’s conflict: China remained a central external actor due to its economic and strategic interests in Myanmar. It supported the junta while maintaining contact with border-based armed groups, mediated ceasefires, and pressured ethnic armed groups into negotiations. It also gave the junta armed drones and other aerial warfare technologies.
- Developments related to the December 2025 elections: After lifting parts of the state of emergency and establishing new oversight structures, the junta organized phased elections between December 2025 and January 2026. Opposition actors rejected the process; many townships were excluded from voting; critics faced repression; and international reactions remained divided. The pro-military party was declared the winner in February 2026, followed by legal changes that strengthened executive power. After the elections, Min Aung Hlaing stepped down as commander-in-chief and became president in April 2026. The new government announced peace talks, prisoner amnesties and sentence reductions, while ethnic armed groups and the National Unity Government (NUG) formed a rival coordination mechanism. International responses were mixed, with some States engaging with the new administration and others remaining cautious.
- The evolving violent situation between the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and the Arakan Army (AA):The ARSA and the Arakan Army continued to clash sporadically, mainly near the Myanmar-Bangladesh border. But available information indicates low-intensity violence that falls below the threshold of a NIAC.
- Arakan Army accused of massacres against Rohingya in 2024 and deteriorating humanitarian situation in Rakhine state:Rohingya advocacy groups accused the Arakan Army of killing large numbers of Rohingya civilians during its 2024 offensive in Rakhine State, a claim the AA denied. The humanitarian situation in Rakhine and Cox’s Bazar also deteriorated, marked by worsening food insecurity and a sharp rise in the Rohingya refugee population.
- The nature and shifting alliances of the People’s Defence Forces (PDFs): PDFs emerged after the 2021 coup as diverse armed formations, ranging from local self-defence groups to larger combat forces. Their links to the NUG, ethnic armed groups, and independent command structures vary significantly and therefore their classification as parties to armed conflict must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
- Escalation of airstrikes and drone attacks carried out by Myanmar’s military: The Tatmadaw increasingly relied on airstrikes and drones in 2025 and early 2026, partly in response to battlefield losses and a weakened ground force. Resistance groups also expanded their use of drones, placing Myanmar among the conflicts with the highest recorded armed drone activity.
Non-International Armed Conflicts
Tatmadaw vs Arakan Army
The NIAC between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army continued as at the end of June 2026. Founded in 2009 with support from the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the AA later refocused on Rakhine state and pursued the political objective of an Arakan Nation. The intensity threshold remained satisfied through frequent clashes, sieges, ambushes, drone and airstrikes, and use of heavy weaponry in Rakhine and neighbouring regions. The Arakan Army expanded its territorial control, holding most of Rakhine state, Paletwa township, the border with Bangladesh, and a long coastline. The organization requirement was also met. The AA retained political and military wings, identifiable leadership, strict discipline, and logistical capacities.
Tatmadaw vs Chin National Defense Force
The NIAC between the Tatmadaw and the CNDF continued in 2026. The CNDF emerged in 2021 as the armed wing of the Chin National Organization, within a fragmented Chin resistance landscape divided between the Chin National Front and the Chin Brotherhood, of which the CNDF forms part. The intensity threshold was met through protracted armed violence, including repeated clashes, airstrikes, and sustained fighting around Falam and other strategic areas in Chin state. The Tatmadaw relied heavily on aerial bombardment, while the CNDF possessed significant combat capabilities. The organization requirement was fulfilled by its battalion and brigade structure, identifiable leadership, and logistical capacity.
Tatmadaw vs Kachin Independence Army
The NIAC between the Tatmadaw and the KIA continued as of mid-2026. The KIA is the armed wing of the Kachin Independence Organisation and has fought the Tatmadaw since the breakdown of the 1994 ceasefire in 2011. The threshold for intensity was reached through protracted armed violence, including hundreds of clashes, sustained offensives and counteroffensives, and the capture and recapture of military bases and towns. Fighting was especially intense in Bhamo, Hpakant, and other areas of Kachin and Sagaing, while the group retained control over several townships. The organization condition was satisfied by identifiable leadership, integrated allied forces, use of guerrilla and conventional tactics, and a logistical capacity.
Tatmadaw vs the Karen Liberation Army
The NIAC between the Tatmadaw and the KNLA continued as of June 2026. The KNLA, which is the military wing of the Karen National Union (KNU), has fought the Myanmar military, in different forms, since Myanmar’s independence. It pursues autonomy and self-determination for the Karen people. The required level of intensity was satisfied by protracted armed violence, including repeated clashes, the use of armed drones, aerial bombardment, strategic offensives along the Myanmar-Thailand border, and significant fighting in Karen, Mon, Tanintharyi, and Kayah areas. The KNLA also formed alliances with other resistance actors and remained capable of sustained operations against the Tatmadaw. The organizational criterion was met through its brigade and battalion structure and its ability to enforce discipline among fighters.
Myanmar vs the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army
The NIAC between the Tatmadaw and the MNDAA was no longer ongoing as of June 2026. The MNDAA, also known as the Kokang Army, emerged from the former Communist Party of Burma military wing and has represented the Kokang ethnic Chinese community in northern Shan state since 1989. It had fought the Tatmadaw since 2009 and later became part of the Three Brotherhood Alliance. The level of violence was previously sufficient, with frequent clashes and casualties, and major gains during Operation 1027, including the capture of Lashio and the Northeast Military Command headquarters. However, after the Chinese brokered ceasefire, the handover of Lashio in April 2025, and the absence of reported clashes thereafter, the conflict was considered ended. The MNDAA nevertheless remained sufficiently organized under IHL, with political, military and justice structures and an identifiable leadership.
Myanmar vs the Ta'ang National Liberation Army
The NIAC between the Tatmadaw and the TNLA ended by the end of December 2025. Founded in 2009 as the armed wing of the Palaung State Liberation Front, the TNLA had fought the Tatmadaw since at least 2011 and had become a major member of the Three Brotherhood Alliance. The required level of intensity had previously been met through the use and seizure of military-grade weapons, and sustained fighting in northern Shan state, including after the collapse of ceasefire negotiations in 2025. However, after the Chinese-mediated ceasefire of late October 2025 and the absence of reported direct clashes with the Tatmadaw thereafter, the conflict was no longer ongoing. The organizational criterion remained satisfied through identifiable leadership, territorial control, and logistics.
Parties to the Conflict(s) and Other Main Actor(s)
State Party
- Myanmar
Non-State Parties
- Arakan Army (AA)
- Chin National Defence Force (CNDF)
- Kachin Independence Army (KIA)
- Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)
- Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) until the conflict ended as of June 2026
- Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) until the conflict ended by end-December 2025
Other Resistance Movements
- Several Ethnic Armed Organisations
- Various People’s Defence Forces
Foreign involvement
- China
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS
There have been continued serious violations of IHL. Myanmar’s air attacks were often directed at civilians or were indiscriminate, and continued strikes in earthquake-affected areas caused many casualties. The military have emplaced anti-personnel mines in and around villages, and frequently used unguided gravity bombs in populated areas, resulting in extensive civilian harm. Reports also indicate the Arakan Army used armed drones against Rohingya civilians fleeing toward Bangladesh. Displacement reached about five million, propelled by unlawful attacks and abuses. Despite acute needs after major disasters, authorities impeded aid to areas outside their control and airstrikes further obstructed relief.
Airstrikes by the Myanmar have frequently been indiscriminate or have targeted civilians deliberately. An internally displaced person (IDP) camp in Shan State was struck with two 500-pound bombs and then strafed, and later hit again, despite there being no discernible military objective in the vicinity. A crowded market in Mandalay Region was bombed with two 500-pound munitions after the jet circled, producing the deadliest incident there since the area shifted to the control of an armed group. Despite the 28 March 2025 earthquake, air attacks continued in Chin, Mandalay, and Sagaing, killing and injuring many. Even where fighters or checkpoints were nearby, the extent of damage suggests that the choice of large bombs resulted in many civilian casualties, raising significant concerns about compliance with the principle of proportionality in attack.
ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE
Tatmadaw air operations in opposition-held areas caused severe civilian harm and widespread destruction. Schools were repeatedly struck during the reporting period, while broader patterns show hundreds of education sites attacked since 2021 with long term disruption. Medical facilities were also targeted. Religious and cultural sites suffered extensive damage, with hundreds of buildings destroyed and recent strikes killing civilians at monasteries and churches.
Attacks against Villages and Shelters
Recent Tatmadaw air operations in opposition-held areas generated severe civilian harm and widespread destruction. In January 2025, bombing of Kyauk Ni Maw village in Rakhine state killed numerous civilians and destroyed hundreds of structures. Although the military claimed having observed fire flashes from buildings, the Arakan Army claimed that the attack did not strike their positions. Even assuming the presence of Arakan Army fighters within the village, the effects indicate a disproportionate attack. In May 2025, combat aircraft struck a monastery sheltering displaced people in Bhamo, Kachin, where Kachin Independence Army (KIA) elements were reportedly present. The circumstances suggest disproportionate civilian harm and a failure to take all feasible precautions to minimize incidental damage to civilians and civilian objects.
VIOLATIONS AGAINST PERSONS IN THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY
Serious violations against persons in the power of parties to the conflict were pervasive. Civilians, including public officials and local politicians, were murdered by the Tatmadaw and organized armed groups through summary executions, mass killings, and acts of mutilation. A sustained pattern of terror tactics by the Tatmadaw was reported, with beheadings, dismemberment, and village-wide arson, often coupled with murder, pillage, and forced conscription. Torture by State forces and non-State armed groups occurred in detention and during attacks, sometimes preceding execution, with electroshock and severe abuses of Rohingya detainees. Children faced high levels of killing, maiming and recruitment. Arbitrary detention expanded after the coup, forced recruitment persisted, and conflict-related sexual violence remained widespread and severe.
- Murder
- Torture
- Acts of terrorism
- Protection of Children
- Arbitrary Detention
- Forced Recruitment
- Sexual Violence
Murders of civilians were widespread and perpetrated by both state forces and organized armed groups. Military raids in Magway featured summary executions at close range including older persons and killings preceded by torture, with bodies concealed and evidence of electroshock abuse. In Rakhine, as the Arakan Army expanded territorial control, accounts indicate mass killings of Rohingya civilians and mutilation, together with lethal ill treatment in custody. Armed groups also pursued targeted assassinations of protected public officials and local politicians, a pattern ongoing since 2021, with at least 136 killings, sometimes linked to accusations of facilitating forced porterage or conscription.