Non-international armed conflicts in Central African Republic

The pre-existing NIAC between CAR and 3R continued as of May 2026, with FACA supported by the Wagner Group/Africa Corps, while MINUSCA provided security assistance without a combat role. Established in 2015 and later integrated into the CPC coalition, 3R remained a distinct party to the conflict. The N’Djamena Agreement of April 2025 and the July 2025 declaration of dissolution marked relevant peace efforts, but did not suffice to end the conflict, as tensions persisted, hostilities remained possible, and 3R continued to exist. The intensity threshold was reached through repeated clashes and attacks involving FACA, support forces and 3R, causing casualties, civilian harm, infrastructure destruction and displacement. Despite territorial losses and partial demobilization, 3R retained remote bases, used portable weapons, improvised explosive devices and landmines, and remained militarily active. Its political and military divisions, hierarchical command structure, identifiable leadership, local cells, planning capacity, supply networks and illicit financing further demonstrate the required degree of organization, enabling discipline and sustained operations.

The NIAC between CAR and the UPC continued from August 2023 up to the end of June 2025. FACA fought the UPC with Wagner Group/Africa Corps support, while MINUSCA provided security assistance without a combat role. The UPC, led by Ali Darassa, joined the CPC and later the CPC-F, but also carried out bilateral hostilities against FACA. The April 2025 peace agreement and July 2025 declaration of dissolution marked de-escalation, but did not establish that all UPC structures had disappeared. The intensity threshold was met through repeated clashes, attacks on military bases, territorial contests, casualties, destruction, displacement and continued reliance on Wagner support. The organization criterion was satisfied by the UPC’s leadership, hierarchical military command, thousands of ranked fighters, logistical capacity, external weapon sourcing, unity of voice and spokesperson. However, the subsequent drop in intensity indicates that the non-international armed conflict ended in June 2025 at the latest.

The pre-existing NIAC between CAR and the CPC continued as of May 2026, with FACA supported by the Wagner Group/Africa Corps. Formed in 2020 to oppose President Touadéra and Russian paramilitaries, the CPC later fragmented, notably through the departure of the MPC, the creation of the CPC-F, and 3R’s reintegration into the peace process, leaving the alliance altered but not dissolved. The intensity threshold remained satisfied through frequent clashes, coordinated attacks, casualties including civilians, destruction of homes and villages, displacement, and the use of improvised explosive devices, grenades and landmines. The temporary lull in fighting after January 2025 did not necessarily indicate the end of the conflict. For organization, the Anti-Balaka Ndalé faction is sufficiently organized through its cellular command structure, leadership, logistical capacity, prior territorial influence, ability to negotiate ceasefires and unity of voice. The CPC alliance also retained sufficient coordination through a common leadership structure, appointments to military and political roles, and continued capacity to coordinate attacks and joint operations against FACA.

The CPC-F emerged as a splinter of the CPC on 30 August 2024 after internal tensions over a ceasefire announcement by Ali Darassa, leader of the UPC and former Chief of Staff of the CPC, and his subsequent dispute with François Bozizé, former CAR President and general coordinator of the CPC. The CPC-F later resumed hostilities against government forces and reiterated its objective of overthrowing the CAR government. FACA fought the CPC-F with Wagner Group/Africa Corps support. The intensity threshold was met through repeated clashes from late 2024 into early 2026, including coordinated attacks on FACA outposts, destruction and looting of civilian property, displacement, seizure of military equipment, and armed retaliation involving Wagner forces. For organization, the relevant CPC-F members, namely the Popular Front for the Renaissance of the Central African Republic (FPRC), Anti-Balaka Mokom faction and MPC, were sufficiently organized through identifiable leadership, command structures, logistical capacity, weapons access, financing and unity of voice. The CPC-F itself also had a coordination structure, senior appointments, communiqués, synchronized attacks and joint military operations. Accordingly, a new NIAC between CAR and the CPC-F arose in the second half of 2024 and is still ongoing.

A new NIAC between the CAR and Azande Ani Kpi Gbe (AAKG) non-formés arose in March 2025 after non-integrated AAKG fighters and ex-‘Wagner Ti Azande’ (WTA) elements, namely AAKG fighters integrated into FACA, turned against FACA, following failed incorporation into the army and opposition to government negotiations with the UPC. FACA fought AAKG non-formés with Wagner Group/Africa Corps military support and MINUSCA security assistance, while suspected AAKG members also attacked MINUSCA. The intensity threshold was reached through sustained clashes from March 2025 into 2026, prolonged fighting around Zémio, hostage-taking of a FACA soldier, attacks on convoys and checkpoints, disruption of elections, temporary capture of Bambouti, air and ground counteroperations, casualties, damage to civilian infrastructure and repeated displacement. Organization was demonstrated by AAKG’s continued operation despite partial integration into FACA, its tiered command structure, identifiable commanders, spokesperson, public statements, logistical support, political wing, training, territorial base, and capacity to plan ambushes and capture towns.

The NIAC between the UPC and the AAKG arose from the AAKG’s stated objective of protecting Azande communities and removing UPC territorial control in Haut-Mbomou, while the UPC responded to AAKG attacks against Muslim Fulani communities. After part of the AAKG was integrated into FACA in 2024, the conflict continued between the UPC and the remaining AAKG non-formés. The intensity threshold was met through frequent clashes in 2023 and 2024, protracted fighting, displacement, and the use of automatic rifles by AAKG and heavier weapons by the UPC. Although direct fighting decreased after July 2024, the lull did not immediately end the conflict, as AAKG continued to exist, the risk of renewed hostilities remained, and AAKG elements continued targeting Fulani civilians for alleged association with the UPC. The organization requirement was satisfied for both the UPC and the AAKG. The NIAC eventually ended in August 2024.